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This project begins with the position that the persistence of the academic 
achievement gap suggests the need for a new way of thinking about the gap and the 
efforts to eliminate it.  To be successful, reform efforts need to address both the school 
and community issues that impact academic achievement.  Community stakeholders must 
come together as a community to build an education regime that has improving academic 
achievement as its agenda.   
This work presents a case study of a community in need of a new education 
regime, Prince George‘s County, Maryland.  The county has a majority African 
American population and a large black middle class.  For years the county‘s school 
system has produced disappointing results on state assessments.  Additionally, the system 
 
 
has been hampered by the existence of a governing regime focused on its own 
preservation instead of academic achievement.    
In 2002, county residents interested in educational reform were handed an 
enormous opportunity to challenge the existing education regime when the elected school 
board was dissolved by the state legislature.  This action came after years of subpar 
academic performance, after repeated allegations of fiscal mismanagement, and after 
months of feuding between the school board and superintendent.   
This work posits the ouster of the elected school board was a focusing event that 
disrupted the existing regime and provided an opportunity for regime change.  An 
examination of county education politics after 2002 shows that regime change did not 
occur.  The county was unable to move beyond the first stage of a three stage process of 
regime change.  Regime change efforts were hindered by a number of obstacles.  The 
most prominent was the near constant turnover of school system leadership since 2002. 
Other obstacles to coalition building and regime change include; a political environment 
hostile to cooperation, a disengaged citizenry, and a dearth of prominent reform 
advocates.  For these and other reasons, the old regime still maintains control of the 
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Getting to this point has been a long and at times a seemingly endless journey.  
Yet despite the obstacles along the way, I have finally arrived at the point at which I can 
say this journey has come to an end and another is about to begin.  But before moving on, 
I find it important to acknowledge all of those along the way who have contributed, in 
ways large and small, to the successful conclusion of this journey.  To everyone who has 
helped to make this journey a success, I thank you.   
There are two people who stand out for helping to put me on this particular 
journey.  The first is Dr. Clarence Stone.  Dr. Stone introduced me to the study of 
education politics.  He gave me the opportunity to participate in meaningful research that 
has had an impact on an important public policy.  He also afforded me the ability to 
interact with and learn from a number of extraordinary researchers.  They showed me that 
I could have a career that was both meaningful to me and an asset to the community.   
Perhaps the person most responsible for me being on this particular journey is my 
committee chair, Dr. Eric Uslaner.  He has always been supportive of me, and more than 
once prodded me to action.  I say Dr. Uslaner is responsible for me being at this point 
because it was a simple questioned he asked me near the beginning of my time at the 
University of Maryland that started this journey.  One day after class, Dr. Uslaner asked 
me if I was going to pursue a PhD.  Until that point I had not considered pursuing a 
doctorate.  As I later pondered his question, it became clear to me that pursuing a PhD 
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Introduction:  The Academic Achievement Gap and Education Politics 
in a Suburban Community 
 
If anyone has any doubts about the importance of education, they need look no 
further than the unemployment rate during the Great Recession of 2007.  In 2009, the 
national unemployment rate was 7.9% (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011).  It was 
9.7% for high school graduates and 14.6% for those who did not graduate from high 
school.  Conversely, the unemployment rate for people with bachelor‘s degrees was 
5.2%.  It was 2.5% for people with doctoral degrees.   As the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
website says, ―Education pays‖ (Ibid.).  A recent report argues America‘s economy is 
becoming a college economy (Carnevale 2010).  A college economy is one in which most 
jobs require a college degree or college level training.  The Great Recession only 
accelerated the country‘s movement to this new economy.  Because blacks tend to trail 
whites educationally, this trend is potentially devastating news for the African American 
community.   
  African American students are less likely than white students to go to college 
and more likely to drop out of high school.  In 2007, the dropout rate for whites was 
5.3%.  It was 8.4% for blacks (Aud, Fox and KewalRamani 2010).  The percentage of 
white students enrolling into college immediately after high school was 71.7% in 2008 
(Ibid.).  It was 55.7% for blacks.  Further movement towards a college economy will only 
exacerbate the disparities between blacks and whites.  In November 2010, the 
unemployment rate for blacks was nearly double that of whites: 15.2% for blacks versus 
2 
 
8.4% for whites (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011). The employment gap is likely to 
grow as America moves further towards a college economy.  It will worsen unless 
something is done to close the academic achievement gap between blacks and whites.   
The federal government has been addressing the academic achievement gap 
problem in one form or another since 1965 when the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act was signed.  Closing of the achievement gap between whites and 
minorities is a cornerstone of the current federal education law, No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB).  While NCLB has had some success in raising standards and achievement for 
all students, the gap between students still remains and has barely budged in years 
(Vanneman et al. 2009).   
Of course, the federal government is not alone in attempts to eliminate 
achievement gaps.  Efforts at the state and local level have been going almost non-stop 
for years.  The state of Maryland has long been involved in efforts to raise academic 
achievement.  In 1972, the Maryland legislature enacted a law mandating statewide goal-
setting and testing that focused on minimum competencies (Governor‘s Commission on 
School Performance 1989).  This system was replaced by a new assessment program, 
Maryland School Performance Program that focused on high standards and proficiency 
(Ibid..).  This new program‘s testing battery, Maryland School Performance Assessment 
Program (MSPAP), exposed academic achievement differences among various groups of 
students.  In 1997 the Maryland State Education That is Multicultural Advisory Council 
was appointed to study the achievement gap in Maryland and make recommendations for 
addressing the problem.  The Council found, ―definite and looming disparities in 
academic achievement for minority students in Maryland‖ (Maryland State Education 
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That is Multicultural Advisory Council 1998, 53).  The Council added, ―Resolution 
requires concerted effort from the public, business, political and educational arenas.  If 
the disparate academic situation of [minority] students is not eliminated, there are 
consequences for them, for all‖ (Ibid.).  Prince George‘s County is one Maryland 
community that has had to deal with those consequences as it has struggled for years to 
raise the academic achievement of African American students.   
Prince George‘s County is a suburb of the District of Columbia and has a 
population of just over 820,000 (U.S. Bureau of Census 2008). The county has a 
majority-minority population with African Americans comprising the majority at 63.4%.  
Whites are 24.3% of the population and Hispanics are 12.8%.
1
  The county‘s school 
system, Prince George‘s County Public Schools (PGCPS) is the 21
st
 largest public school 
system in America (Sable, Plotts and Mitchell 2010).  It has an enrollment of more than 
130,000, of whom 75% are African American (Maryland Department of Education 
2010).   
For years PGCPS has suffered from the persistent underperformance of African 
American students.  On the latest state assessments, African American students scored an 
average of 19 percentage points lower than white students in mathematics and 14 
percentage points lower in reading (Maryland State Department of Education 2010).
2
  For 
years, the county has lagged behind almost all of Maryland‘s other school systems.  The 
only system it has consistently outperformed is Baltimore City‘s school system; 
Baltimore City Public Schools is the only central city system in the state.
3
  Today, even 
Baltimore City has outperformed Prince George‘s as PGCPS is the only school system 
designated to be in ―Corrective Status‖.  This designation is given to school systems that 
4 
 
have failed to meet state educational targets for 4 consecutive years.  Baltimore moved 
out of corrective action in 2009 after meeting state goals for two consecutive years.   
One would not expect PGCPS to perform so poorly.  Prince George‘s County is a 
community that on its face would seem to be well positioned to address the African 
American achievement gap.  Because the county is majority African American, one 
would expect a heightened sensitivity to the problems of African American academic 
achievement.  The achievement gap stops being an abstract problem when it is your child 
that is falling behind.  The county is a relatively affluent county with a median family 
income of $82,004 that is almost 30% higher than the national average of $63,366 
(Census 2008).  Its family poverty rate of 4.1% is less than half of the national average of 
9.7% (Ibid.).  The county is not in the position of many impoverished inner-cities with 
abhorrently high levels of poverty and no economic base upon which to draw.  Prince 
George‘s African American population is more highly educated than African Americans 
throughout the country.  27.5% of blacks hold a bachelor degree or higher compared to 
17.5% of blacks nationally (Ibid.).  Highly educated people tend to demand educational 
quality more than those without such degrees (Hess 1999, 127). 
Being adjacent to the nation‘s capitol with so many residents either working for 
the federal, state, or local governments or working for companies and organizations doing 
business with local, state, and federal governments tends to give residents a heightened 
political awareness.  Additionally, Prince George‘s is located in a state that has been in 
the forefront of state-level education reform efforts.  For some time the county has been 
encouraged—some would say pressured—by the state to improve academic achievement.   
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The county does not appear to suffer from the racial strife that is evident in many 
central cities.  It is probably impossible to have a majority African American county in 
America and not have race become a contentious issue at times.  However discussions of 
race in Prince George‘s, while at times contentious, have not taken on the venomous tone 
race has elsewhere.  Perhaps most importantly, Prince George‘s African American 
population is fully incorporated into the county‘s political system and would appear to be 
in a position to direct the county‘s political efforts in the education arena.  For all of these 
reasons, Prince George‘s County would seem to be in a prime position to resolve a 
problem that has often eluded others.  It has not.  The question for this project is, why 
not?   
I propose a reason why the county has not done a better job closing the 
achievement gap is because the county‘s educational arena is controlled by a governing 
regime incapable of implementing the policies and initiatives capable of closing the gap.  
The county‘s education arena is governed by an employment regime that has self-
preservation and self-protection as it agenda.  The county has had opportunities to change 
its approach to education and the gap however.  In 2002, county residents interested in 
educational reform were handed an enormous opportunity to challenge the existing 
education regime when the elected school board was dissolved by the Maryland General 
Assembly.  This action came after Prince George‘s Public Schools (PGCPS) students 
recorded years of subpar academic performance on state assessments.  It came after 
allegations of fiscal mismanagement.  And it came after almost two years of feuding 
between the school board and Superintendent Iris Metts.   
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The ouster of the elected school board in 2002 was a focusing event that provided 
a window of opportunity through which the existing regime could be disrupted and the 
process of regime change could begin.  It is the argument of this dissertation that regime 
change did not occur.  It did not occur because disrupting the current regime is only the 
first stage of a three stage process of regime change.  Prince George‘s County was unable 
to generate enough civic capacity to develop the broad-based coalition that was needed to 
form a performance regime to replace the existing employment regime.  This project will 
attempt to show why Prince George‘s was not able to move beyond the first stage of 
regime change and to this day continues to grapple with closing the African American 
academic achievement gap.  
 
The Complexity of the African American Achievement Gap  
Over 50 years after Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
desegregated schools the gap in the academic achievement levels of white and African 
American children persists (National Center for Education Statistics 2005). Initially it 
was assumed that the act of desegregating the schools would close the gap by giving 
black students access to the resources given to their white counterparts.  Clearly that has 
not been the case.  While the achievement gap has diminished from its initial high, 
progress has been much slower than expected.  Desegregation and other civil rights 
efforts as well as initiatives part of the War on Poverty have been credited for the decline 
of the gap in the 1970s and 1980s (Jencks and Phillips 1998).  However, as the United 
States Supreme Court retreated from its commitment to desegregation and anti-poverty 
programs fell out of favor, progress on closing the gap stalled (Ipka 2003).  Current 
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federal reform efforts have most often focused on increased accountability for students, 
teachers, and administrators.  Despite some success in raising overall achievement levels, 
national test data show little change in the achievement gap between blacks and whites 
between 1992 and 2005 (National Center for Education Statistics 2007).  Identification of 
the cause or causes of the achievement gap might reveal why the gap has been so difficult 
to eliminate. 
In a review of the research on achievement gaps, Paul Barton searched for the 
―life and educational experiences associated with continual development and school 
achievement‖ (Barton 2003, 3).  He identified 14 correlates of achievement.  Six are 
related to what happens inside schools.  They are rigor of the curriculum, teacher 
preparation, teacher experience and attendance, class size, availability of appropriate 
technology-assisted instruction, and school safety.  The other eight correlates are related 
to what occurs outside of schools.  These are, weight at birth, exposure to lead, hunger 
and nutrition, student mobility, reading to young children amount of TV watching, parent 
availability, and parent participation.  Deficits in any or all of these correlates lead to 
achievement gaps Barton found.   
In his research on desegregation, David Armor (2006) distills many of the 
explanations on the existence of the gap into four major theories.  The self-esteem theory 
argues blacks internalize their inferior status (second-class citizens) in a white dominated 
society and then sink to meet the low expectations society has for them.  The educational 
input theory asserts school resources (quality teachers, smaller class size, etc.) affect 
achievement, and many minority children are being deprived of resources necessary for a 
quality education.  The peer group theory is the black culture argument.  That is, 
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proponents of this theory argue that minority students are in the grip of a "culture" that 
does not value educational achievement and may even promote action in opposition to it.  
Lastly, the family risk factor theory points to family characteristics and habits such as 
poverty, poor parenting skills, and low IQ levels as the explanation for the gap.   
Mano Singham (2005) distills the causes of the gap into three models generally 
aligned with the ideological spectrum in the country.  The first model is the 
socioeconomic model favored by liberals.  In this model, the gap is caused by economic 
disparities between blacks and whites that result from the legacy of slavery and racial 
oppression. Eliminating these disparities will eliminate the gap.  Accordingly, eliminating 
the gap depends on taking actions--addressing social conditions and economic policies--
that lie well outside the schoolhouse.  The second model Singham identifies is the 
sociopathological model.  This model tends to be favored by conservatives.  As its name 
suggests, the sociopathological model points to social pathologies within the black 
community.  Unstable families, high levels of incarceration and teen pregnancies, poor 
parenting, and black culture more generally contribute to poor academic achievement.  
The solution in this model lies in African Americans‘ controlling themselves.  The third 
model Singham presents is the genetics model.  This model argues that blacks do not 
have the genetic intelligence that makes them capable of competing equally with whites.  
In this model, the gap cannot be eliminated.  The best that can be accomplished is a 
mitigation of the gap‘s consequences.   
Rod Paige and Elaine Witty (2010) add two other explanations to Singham‘s 
models: black identity and educational deprivation.  The black identity explanation aligns 
with the work of John Ogbu (2003) who argues that blacks as involuntary minority group 
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have developed an oppositional culture that equates education with the dominant white 
institutions.  From this perspective we get the ―acting white‖ phenomenon which equates 
doing well in school to acting white which of course is the opposite of ―acting black‖.  
This argument is basically a peer pressure argument and the key to confronting it is either 
changing peer pressure or giving students the tools to withstand that pressure.  The 
educational deprivation argument claims deprivation occurs when, ―a child is deprived of 
fundamentals essential to sound cognitive development, most especially, high 
expectations and great teaching‖ (Paige and Witty 2010, 71).  This explanation asserts 
that effective educational practices can overcome the problems laid out in the other 
explanations of the achievement gap.  This model lays the solutions directly in the 
schoolhouse.   
From multiple explanations for the gap come multiple solutions for closing the 
gap.  Increasing school funding, reducing class size, improving teacher quality, 
developing a stronger curriculum, expanding preschool education, expanding after-school 
programs, enhancing parental education, and instituting parental choice have all been 
touted as solutions.  Some reform advocates argue the need to counter the increasing 
resegregation of schools perhaps through regional enrollment policies (Orfield and 
Easton 1996).  Still others call for policies that address the unequal position of minorities 
in American society through housing policy, antipoverty policy, employment policies, 
and health policies (Rothstein 2004).  The currently popular reform measure that has 
come to prominence is the emphasis on greater school and school district accountability 
as championed by the NCLB.     
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A number of the proposals, particularly the school related proposals, have been 
tried.   So far, none has been shown to consistently and substantially close the 
achievement gap between white and African American students.  Even in schools that 
have successfully raised the academic achievement of poor and minority students, the gap 
still remains (Chenoweth 2009).  The question is why?    
I would argue that most efforts to close the achievement gap fail to meet 
expectations because they are one-dimensional solutions used to solve a 
multidimensional problem.  Eliminating the achievement gap will not come in a neatly 
packaged program, or two for that matter.  Indeed evidence suggests that fragmented 
efforts aggravate the problem (Hess 1999).  Karin Chenoweth spent two years visiting 
schools that have made progress in improving student performance.  What she saw 
convinced her that, ―there is no one single factor that is at the core of a successful school.  
That is, there is no one structure, or one curriculum, or one set of policies and procedures 
that, if every school in the country were to adopt it, would transform them into high-
achieving schools.  Schools are complex organisms that can‘t be changed that easily‖ 
(Chenoweth 2007, 213).  The stubbornness of the gap suggests reducing it will require 
the simultaneous implementation of a variety of programs and practices that go beyond 
what schools typically do.   
Paige and Witty describe the achievement gap as, ―a complex phenomenon that 
has powerful tentacles, buried deeply not only in school quality but also in African 
American home and family life in African American community sociocultural life‖ 
(Paige and Witty 2010,153).  Like many organisms with tentacles, cutting off one 
tentacle will not kill it.  In fact, many organisms have the ability to regenerate the severed 
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tentacle.  Multiple tentacles need to be severed before the organism dies.  So it is with the 
gap.  Multiple tentacles of the gap need to be attacked in order to eliminate the gap.  
Because those tentacles stretch both into schools, and into homes and communities, 
strategies that attack the tentacles in all three places need to be developed and deployed.  
Reform efforts that only focus on what happens in the classroom are destined to 
fail because they do not take into account that what happens in the home and the 
community also affects achievement.  Permanently closing the achievement gap requires 
pairing school-focused reforms with efforts that address the home and community factors 
that contribute to the gap (Rothman 2007; Paige and Witty 2010).  This will require 
multi-layered reform of schools and school districts.  More importantly, it suggests the 
need to change the way we approach the achievement gap.  To that end, some researchers 
have focused on the school community connection (Goodlad 1984; Portz, Stein and 
Jones; Lawson et al. 2007).  For example, Larry Cuban and Michael Usdan (2003) argue 
that one of the reasons why seemingly powerful reform efforts have limited results is 
because the reforms fail to take into account the context of the cities and communities 
surrounding schools.  To have a deeper impact, reforms have to be tailored to a city‘s 
unique context and political coalitions.  Paul Barton and Richard Coley write that closing 
the achievement gap, ―will not happen unless there is first widespread understanding of 
the nature and magnitude of the problem, and a considerable degree of consensus about 
it‖ (Barton and Coley 2010, 37).   They add, ―Solutions will have to be crafted with the 
involvement of [the black] community, for [the black] community, often by the 
community ... and not without it‖ (Ibid.).  That communities have become a focus of 




The School and Community Linkage  
Schools are important to communities.  Schools are the places outside of the home 
most responsible for nurturing a community‘s children.  Schools also serve as the venue 
for many community activities.  Because of their prominent position in neighborhoods, 
schools are a natural focus for community development efforts (Stone et al. 1999).  The 
quality of schools can affect the economic well being of a community also (Weiss 2004).  
A well educated workforce is likely to increase a community‘s wealth.  Good quality 
schools are an important tool used to attract businesses.  The quality of a community‘s 
schools can impact the value of homes in the community, and in turn impact the wealth 
of homeowners and the larger community.  As a large employer and contractor, a 
community‘s public school system is an important part of the local economy.   
On the other hand, schools are impacted by the community in which they exist.  
Children are products of their communities and they bring the impact of those 
communities with them to school.  Further schools tend to be a reflection of their 
neighborhoods.  Because a significant portion of education funding comes from local 
revenues, the economic well-being of schools is directly tied to the economic well-being 
of the local community.   
For all of these reasons and more the community affects schools and schools 
affect the community.  It is in the community‘s interest for its schools to be successful.  
Therefore, school improvement is good for both schools and the community.  Simply put, 
school reform is not just an education matter.  It is a community concern that needs to be 
addressed by the community.  This characteristic makes school reform a political issue  
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There are other reasons why it is advantageous to have communities involved in 
school reform.  Some individual schools can create a broad array of learning 
opportunities for their students and establish the ad hoc partnerships to support them, but 
this strategy will not work on a district level because not all schools have such capability 
and ad hoc arrangements are difficult to maintain (Rothman 2007).  Efforts to scale-up 
school level initiatives to the district level and sustain them at the district level can 
benefit greatly from broad-based community involvement.   
Community involvement can also strengthen the effectiveness of reform.  Cuban 
and Usdan show in their book, Powerful Reforms with Shallow Roots (2003) that reform 
efforts focused on a schools-alone approach to improving education are likely to have 
moderate and extremely fragile success.  They show that in places in which relationships 
with the community are cultivated reforms seem to extend deeper and have a greater 
chance of being sustained.   
In her survey of successful schools, Chenoweth identified 25 characteristics of a 
successful school.  They boiled down to one axiom: The adults in the profiled schools, 
―expect their students to learn, and they work hard to master the skills and knowledge 
necessary to teach those students‖ (Chenoweth 2007, 226).  I submit that if communities 
and the nation as a whole are going to close the achievement gap, adults in communities 
and in the nation have to come to believe that all children can learn, and more 
importantly, must be willing to do what is necessary to help children do just that.  
Children must believe that the adults in their lives, both inside and outside the classroom, 
believe in their ability to achieve.   
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The primary reason why communities or broad-based coalitions should be 
involved in education reform is because 
education is fundamentally a political process.  Instituting reform cannot be 
analyzed simply as a problem of program design because program designs mean 
little if they cannot be actualized.  Rather programs for reform must be considered 
in the context of the political environment in which they will either wither or take 
root….the failure of education reform should be understood as a failure of 
political leadership to generate a sustainable coalition to bring together the 
political and social resources necessary to implement real change (Henig et al. 
1999, 274-275). 
A strong, broad-based coalition is needed because without it fundamental change 
is unlikely to occur.  The type of reform necessary to close the achievement gap is not the 
piecemeal type of reform that is usually implemented but rather substantive reform that in 
many ways seeks to restructure relationships and institutions.  It is difficult to push such 
reforms without the backing of influential stakeholders.   
A strong group of community stakeholders would seem most capable of 
countering and overcoming the inevitable opposition.  Further, because it often takes 
considerable time to see the results of new efforts it will be important to maintain the 
drive (momentum) to continue with the reform efforts as those frustrated by the pace of 
progress begin calling to abandon efforts when they fail to show immediate results.  A 
large community coalition would seem to be best positioned to withstand these demands.  
As Jeffrey Henig and colleagues say,  
The challenge may be less one of gaining attention and commitment than 
sustaining attention and  commitment, less one of reorganizing educational 
bureaucracies than of organizing whole communities so that the education 
enterprise keeps moving in the right direction even when attention and 
commitment flag.  Successful school reform requires selectivity, institutional 
capacity, and sufficient political support to maintain positive momentum in the 
face of various forces that can block, contain, or gradually erode promising 
initiatives (Ibid., 14). 
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Paul Hill and colleagues add, 
No initiative is likely to survive if it threatens more people than it attracts, if it 
threatens too many people gratuitously, or if its leaders do not anticipate 
opposition.  For a reform strategy to survive, its leaders must build as broad a 
coalition as is consistent with a focused initiative and either channel opposition in 
productive ways or meet it with countervailing ideas, organization, and political 
pressure (Hill et al. 2000, 106).   
This political approach to educational reform does not concentrate on the 
promotion of specific educational programs.  Instead this approach emphasizes the need 
for the community to come together as a community to determine which programs and 
strategies, educational or otherwise, will allow the community to improve the academic 
achievement of the community‘s children.  The challenge for communities is to establish 
the political conditions that support applying efforts to a system-wide level and sustaining 
those efforts so that all children are given an equal chance to succeed.  It requires 
communities to change the way they approach education.  Community members need to 
understand the role they play in education and more fully understand the importance of 
the school-community relationship.  Continued participation in a broad-based coalition 
can give people a new understanding of education, the reforms necessary to improve it, 
and most importantly, their role in educational improvement.   
Effectively addressing the achievement gap requires communities to have a 
conversation about the connections between home and school, and the community and 
school.  The community must come to understand that closing the achievement gap is a 
community responsibility, and, as a community responsibility, will require community 
action.  Achieving that understanding and then acting on it requires what Clarence Stone 




Civic Capacity and Education Reform 
According to Stone, ―civic capacity concerns the extent to which different sectors 
of the community—business, parents, educators, state and local officeholders, nonprofits, 
and others—act in concert around a matter of community-wide import.  It involves 
mobilization—that is, bringing different sectors together but also developing a shared 
plan of action‖ (Ibid., 596).  Civic capacity is the extent to which different segments of 
the community view themselves as having a stake in solving to an issue that is in need of 
solving by the community.  But civic capacity is more than merely supporting a plan.  It 
involves the active participation of stakeholders in the promotion of that plan.  Thus civic 
capacity is about a community‘s ability to build a coalition capable of affecting change in 
an identified community matter.   
Stone and colleagues caution that a community‘s civic capacity is not necessarily 
transferrable from one issue area to another (Stone et al. 2001).  Civic capacity mobilized 
in support of economic development does not insure the activation of civic capacity in 
support of education reform.  Civic capacity must be developed in each issue area, and 
the nature of that development will likely vary with the context of each issue area.  
Dorothy Shipps (2006) also contends context influences the shape of coalitions.  Writing 
about education reform, Shipps states,  
There is no template; the composition of a reform coalition and the viability of its 
agenda are contingent on the institutions—the local economy, community 
demographics, political history—and traditions of school governance (e.g., 
elected or appointed school board, independent or dependent financial authority, 
the strength of collective bargaining) (Ibid., 8).   
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The ability to form a coalition and the shape of that coalition varies from city to city, 
from issue area to issue area, and from one time period to another. 
For Stone, civic capacity is a matter of degree.  It is ―the degree to which a broad, 
cross-sector coalition comes together in support of a task of community-wide 
importance‖ (Stone 1996, 4).  Thus civic capacity lies on a continuum from high or low.  
The level of civic capacity rises as the breadth of the coalition widens.  High levels of 
civic capacity involve engaging a broad base of participants instead of a narrow 
collection of elites.  Educational reform capable of closing the achievement gap requires 
a high level of civic capacity.    
Shipps outlines five key components of civic capacity (2003, 846).  First, the 
governing regimes developed through civic capacity are not electoral coalitions though 
they may contain some of the same members. Second, as was stated above, civic capacity 
is agenda specific, dependent on local history and not transferable from one arena to 
another.  Third, civic capacity is created and maintained by a combination of 
governmental and nongovernmental partners and resources.  Fourth, leadership is needed 
to mobilize and maintain a cross-sector coalition for reform.  Fifth and last, the 
composition of the coalition and the relationships among members help to shape the 
agenda.  To some readers, these components might sound suspiciously like the 
components of an urban regime.   Indeed, civic capacity is the application of urban 
regime theory to urban education reform.  ―Institutionalizing systemwide urban school 
reform involves the formation of a new stable and active school governing regime, 
typically including the core constituents of an initiating reform coalition.  Urban regime 
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theory thus highlights the resources and coalitions—the civic capacity—that are needed 
to enact and sustain change‖ (Ibid., 844). 
At its core, educational reform that is substantial and fundamental and not just the 
usual piecemeal effort is about changing relationships.  It is about changing relationships 
inside the classroom, changing relationships throughout the school building, and 
changing relationships within the community.  Regime analysis provides a useful tool 
with which to examine relationship change.  ―Regimes are a way of understanding how 
we act as political communities‖ (Stone 2006, 28).  
 
Urban Regime Theory and the Politics of Education 
Urban regime analysis originates as an explanation of the influence of business in 
the governance of urban cities.  Urban regime theory argues the formal structures of 
government are insufficient to effectively govern communities because of the 
fragmentary nature of power in America (Elkin 1987; Stone 1989; Ferman 1996; 
Mossberger and Stoker 2001).  Others outside the formal governmental structure hold 
economic resources the government needs to address the complex matters affecting the 
community.  Because cities cannot effectively operate without the exercise of both 
political and economic resources, public officials must form collaborative arrangements 
with private entities in order to pursue desired goals.  
These arrangements are informal because they rely not on formal codified 
structures but rather on an unofficial arrangement of cooperation.  Thus, by definition, an 
urban regime is, ―the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests 
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function together in order to be able to make and carry out government decisions‖ (Stone 
1989, 6).  Through cooperation, the members of the regime coordinate their efforts and 
resources to achieve their shared objective.      
All regimes have four main elements.  The first is an agenda to address a distinct 
set of problems.  There must be a concern and an approach to addressing that concern 
around which a group coalesces.  Second, regimes have a governing coalition formed 
around the agenda.  The governing coalition is composed of core members of the regime 
who make important decisions for the regime.  It is this governing coalition that 
determines what policies will be chosen and how those policies are pursued.  It is the 
actions of this core group that effectively govern the community.  Third, regimes must 
have the resources for the pursuit of the agenda.  Those resources are brought to the 
regime by the members of it.  Fourth and last, regimes must have a scheme of 
cooperation through which coalition members contribute to the task of governing.  
Creating and sustaining a governing coalition necessitates working out the terms of 
cooperation and the resources each participant brings to the relationship (Stone 2006, 29).  
As a result, some regimes are easier to establish and maintain than others.  Those regimes 
pursuing a broader agenda tend to have a more difficult task than regimes pursuing a 
narrower agenda because generally speaking, it is easier to coordinate the collective 
actions of a smaller regime than a larger one.   
Regime theory holds that public policies are shaped by the composition of a 
community‘s governing coalition, the nature of the relationship among members of the 
coalition, and the resources the members bring to the governing coalition (Stone 1993; 
Ferman1996).  Stone has identified two regime types pertinent to the issue area of 
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education: the employment regime and the performance regime (1993, 18).  The types 
differ on the extent of the policy agenda they intend to pursue, the number of actors 
involved and their motivations for participating, and the amount of resources required to 
pursue the regime‘s agenda.   
The easiest type of education regime to build is the employment regime, or what 
Wilbur Rich (1996) calls the ―school cartel‖.  The cartel is, ―a set of well-organized 
insiders, striving to retain their autonomy and focused mainly on the immediate rewards 
and compensations of their current positions‖ (Pedescleauxet al. 1994, 24). A school 
cartel usually consists of a relatively small group that includes professional school 
administrators, the school board, superintendent, union leaders, and school activists 
whose job it is to promote the interests of the cartel‘s members (Rich 1996, 5).  
Employment regimes are also characterized by limited business and parent involvement. 
Employment regimes develop in the education arena because public school 
systems are not just places where children learn (Henig et al. 1999; Orr, 1999).  Public 
schools wield a great deal of economic power in many communities.  They often have 
large budgets and employ large numbers of people.  Frequently, school systems are one 
of the largest, if not the largest employers in a community.  Public school systems also 
can be places where people are able to wield a significant amount of political authority 
(Orr 1999).  And school board membership is frequently a springboard for those desiring 
higher political office.   
Employment regimes prefer to concentrate on ―bread and butter‖ issues like 
salary increases and job security rather than substantive reform.  Board members are 
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likely to be focused on constituency service and small attainable goals.  They are more 
apt to micromanage the day-to-day affairs of the school system rather than concentrate on 
broader policymaking responsibilities.   
An employment regime frequently will pursue educational policies that serve to 
cement the security of its member‘s positions.  Since the goal of the school cartel is self-
preservation it usually works toward stasis.  As a result, employment regimes are likely to 
resist the kind of reform needed to close the achievement gap.  That kind of substantive 
reform calls for a change in relationships.  More importantly it calls for movement away 
from the status quo.  Since the status quo is a source of strength for the employment 
regime, any movement away from it is a potential threat to the regime.  Indeed, the 
employment regime is apt to favor ―policy churn,‖ (Hess 1999, 6) the constant recycling 
of reforms.  The repeated starting and stopping of programs eventually lead to efforts that 
go nowhere.  This ―churn‖ ultimately helps maintain the status quo and keep the regime 
in control.  It is for this reason that the kind of educational reform needed to close the gap 
is not likely to occur while the school cartel controls the education arena.   
Sitting in contrast to the employment regime is the performance regime.  The 
performance regime is characterized as a coalition of community stakeholders formed 
around the agenda of academic improvement of all students (Stone 1998).  A 
performance or reform regime consists of ―those political arrangements, coalitions and 
understandings that are conducive to changing school cultures and pedagogy in ways that 
will improve the performance of …children‖ (Shipps 2003, 851).  In this regime 
improving the academic performance of children is seen as a community issue to be 
addressed by the community as a whole.  This regime requires significant resources in the 
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pursuit of the most substantive change.  Acquiring needed resources in turn requires a 
larger number of participants, many of whom are likely not used to participating in such 
an endeavor or working together.   The performance regime is extremely difficult to build 
and maintain, ―because so many actors need to be engaged, and the regime must be 
sustained for a long period to lead to deep educational change‖ (Bulkley 2007, 160). 
Stone argues that core members of a performance regime include parents, 
educators and business elites.  The importance involving educators is obvious.  Although, 
educators are often identified as obstacles to reform, children cannot be educated without 
them.  Thus, educators must be drawn into the new coalition though their position within 
the regime may not be as dominant as it was in the employment regime.   
Of course parents are core members of the regime.  As discussed above, what 
happens in the home influences outcomes inside the school.  Successfully closing the 
achievement gap will require melding what happens at home with what happens at school 
into a comprehensive strategy to improve academic performance.  Getting parents to trust 
educators, and conversely getting educators to earn the trust of parents and support 
change may require the inclusion of community-based organizations that can medicate 
between the two.   
Stone includes business elites as a core member of the performance regime.  For 
Stone and others political economists, business has a special place in American politics 
because business controls private resources that elected officials find beneficial to their 
ability to govern (Lindblom 1977; Elkin 1987; Stone 1989).  Business has resources that 
other institutions may not be able to provide.  Business often has a level of influence 
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others do not possess, and that influence can be used to more effectively promote the 
agenda of the new regime.  Additionally, for disadvantaged communities, business 
represents a path to the economic mainstream. 
In her formulation of a performance regime, Dorothy Shipps (2006) argues that 
the position of business is not a necessary component of the regime.  In fact in her 
formulation of education regimes, Shipps argues business participation in not required in 
a performance regime.  She gives the performance regime a much more specific agenda 
than Stone and colleagues give it.  For Shipps, a performance regime is focused on 
changing school culture and pedagogy.  Because closing the achievement gap will require 
changes in school and community habits and practices, I agree with Stone in that the 
business sector must be a participant in a performance regime.   
Shipps adds elected officials as core constituents of a performance regime.  They 
supply ―legitimacy and function as political buffers or mediators, permitting educators 
the freedom to learn new methods without the premature scrutiny that can end 
experimentation‖ (Shipps 2003, 853).   
Shipps posits two other education regime types; the market regime and 
empowerment regime.  Both regimes lie between the employment and performance 
regimes.  A market regime pursues educational change that is only slightly removed from 
the stasis of the employment regime.  The size of the regime is limited to business elites, 
elected officials, and occasionally parents.  Applying the tenets of the market to 
education reform, these regimes pursue corporate-style market change.  
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The empowerment regime is the other regime Shipps puts forth. The 
empowerment regime lies between the market regime and the performance regime.  The 
agenda of this regime is the authorization of ―new decision makers to enable better and 
more innovative decisions‖ (Ibid., 853).  Core constituents of this regime include those 
groups represented by the new decision makers.  It also includes government actors 
capable of sanctioning the new power arrangements.  Building an empowerment regime 
is more difficult than a market regime but less difficult than a performance regime.    
I submit that in 2002 a school cartel controlled Prince George‘s educational 
system.  Like a typical employment regime, protection of employees was a key 
component of the regime‘s agenda.  But job protection was not this regime‘s only agenda.  
Another agenda was maintaining the authority of African Americans in control of the 
system.  A number of regime members saw African American control of education as a 
measure of the increased political power of African Americans in the county.  Thus the 
regime‘s ability to maintain control was equated to the ability of African Americans in 
the county to wield political power.  When the regime was challenged on the system‘s 
poor performance, board members usually interpreted the challenge as an attack on 
African American authority.  The school board in particular rejected reform efforts that it 
believed infringed upon its authority. 
I argue that in order to improve the academic achievement of the county‘s African 
American students, and all students for that matter, the employment regime needed to be 
replaced with a new performance regime that had improving academic achievement as its 
agenda. This undertaking is easier said than done.   
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With so many potential participants it should come as no surprise that a 
performance regime is difficult to build and maintain, and is considerably more fragile 
than the employment regime.  Employment regimes are rather easy to build and maintain 
because the goal of the regime is closely aligned with the immediate interests of the 
regime‘s members.  School employees want to keep their jobs.  School board members 
want to maintain their position of authority.  In order to achieve these ends, members 
simply have to keep doing what they are already doing.  The employment regime does 
not require much more than the pursuit of narrow interests, and for this reason, 
employment regimes find little difficulty in maintaining themselves.  
Conversely, performance regimes must often overcome several challenges.  
Members of a performance regime are asked to focus on broader interests.  Sustaining 
this focus may be difficult for people to do.  It may be especially difficult for those 
members for whom the community goal is less of an immediate concern.  Another 
challenge is maintaining the steady involvement of the various members of the regime 
despite the existence of competing considerations.  Even if people agree that reform is 
necessary, there may be disagreement over the shape of that reform.  And of course the 
usual collective-action problems apply.   
For the performance regime, the variety of motivations for involvement is likely 
to be as varied as the stakeholders who hold them.  Parents are obviously concerned with 
the education of their children.  Business is motivated by a desire for a better workforce.  
Educators have professional and employment concerns.  Other community groups may 
see education reform as part of a larger community development issue.  And we cannot 
ignore the fact that some will view education reform through the prism of racial politics 
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and be motivated by a desire to protect hard won political gains.  These various 
motivations might impede consensus building efforts.  Further, numerous stakeholders 
with various incentives to participate make it likely that competing issue definitions will 
exist (Henig, 2004).  
Part of the task for reformers is to frame education reform in such a way as self-
interest gives way to public interest; ―recasting issues in terms that reflect shared interests 
and reveal areas of agreement can minimize divisions‖ (Puriefoy 2005, 245).  Levin and 
Fullan argue,  
Reformers often have a tendency to think that their approach is self-evident to 
every reasonable person. But …, there will always be different points of view, 
different priorities and different understandings in a public system. People will 
inevitably misunderstand or misinterpret what is happening, either from lack of 
understanding or for purposes of their own interests. The nature of human 
interaction requires constant efforts to communicate, and never more so than 
when some significant change from the status quo is being attempted (2008, 298). 
Developing the means for overcoming these difficulties is the role of leadership.   
Leaders have to convince people that their cause is worthy.  They also have to convince 
people that the goal of the cause is achievable (Chong 1991).   
Convincing people is easier said than done.  There will be opposition.  First, a 
legacy of failed reforms tends to diminish the desire to attempt additional reforms.  
Second, the more reforms differ from the norm, the more difficult they are to implement 
(Fuhrman 2003).  Third, reform requires change and makes the status quo unacceptable.  
However, there are those who benefit from the current system and they likely resist 
change.   
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Naturally the employment regime benefits the most from the current system.  
Thus, substantive education reform that is capable of closing the achievement gap 
requires the displacement of the school cartel.  ―It requires at least a limited destruction of 
the existing policy subsystem [regime] because the existing subsystem [regime] is 
invested in the current arrangement or current set of implemented solutions‖ (Stone et al. 
2001, 52).  Civic capacity involves the mobilization of a broad array of community 
interests to remove policy-making authority from the employment regime (Ibid., 7).  How 
does one go about dismantling the existing regime?   
 
Regime Change and Policy Change  
Marion Orr and Gerry Stoker have posited a theory of regime change as a three 
stage process (1994, 68).  The first stage is taking advantage of opportunities to question 
the legitimacy of the existing regime during periods of changes in the political 
environment.  This questioning is done by raising doubts about the regime‘s capacity to 
govern and the validity of its policy agenda.  The second stage is a conflictual stage in 
which groups compete to establish alternative agendas with the hope of creating a new 
regime.  This second stage is the period of coalition building in which support for a new 
regime is built.  The third stage involves the institutionalization of the new regime.  
Members pursue efforts and strategies that help to maintain, stabilize, and strengthen the 
new regime.  
Carter Wilson (2000) posits a five stage process of regime change.  He lists the 
stages as: stressors/enablers, paradigm shifts, power shifts, legitimacy crisis, and 
organizational and policy change (Ibid. 260).  The stages do not necessarily occur in 
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sequence and can occur simultaneously.  The first stage involves external factors that 
impose stress on the regime or enable change.  ―They weaken policy regimes, create 
conditions favorable for change, or act as catalysts for change‖ (Ibid., 260).  
Stressors/enablers stimulate paradigm shifts which are part of the foundation of regime 
change.  ―A paradigm shift involves a process that leads to the discrediting of the 
dominant paradigm and the ascension of an alternative or opposition paradigm‖ (Ibid. 
262).   
Stressors and paradigm shifts often interact to produce a legitimacy crisis.  The 
crisis occurs when people start to question the capabilities of the old regime.  Power 
shifts occur when old actors leave the policy regime and/or new members enter.  Shifts 
can occur with grassroots mobilization or the emergence of new sources of power.  
Wilson writes the final stage of policy change, ―generally culminates in the 
reorganization of the policy implementation structure.  This reorganization is 
accompanied by changes in policy goals, shifts in the policy paradigm, and changes in 
power arrangements‖ (Ibid., 265).  Change culminates in the formation of a new regime.  
To recap, ―regime changes occur when regimes become stressed, alternative policy 
paradigms arise, legitimacy crises occur, and shifts in power become evident‖ (Ibid., 
266). 
From the discussions above, it is clear that regime change is a difficult endeavor.  
The difficulty favors the continuance of the status quo.  Yet regime change does occur.  
The key to regime change in both Orr and Stoker‘s and Wilson‘s account is the presence 
of an external stimulus that puts stress on the regime.  One such stimulus is a focusing 
event.   
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Focusing events are sudden extraordinary events like crises, disasters, or scandals 
that shock the system and focus attention on a problem that needs addressing (Kingdon 
1984; Birkland 2004).  Often they shock the system by reinforcing some preexisting 
perception of a problem or by moving forward a problem that was already ―in the back of 
people‘s minds‖ (Kingdon 1984,103).  Focusing events dramatically highlight policy 
failures and provide opportunities for policy learning (Birkland 2004).  ―A focusing event 
shifts the presumption away from the status quo and toward the proposition that policy 
change is necessary‖ at least momentarily (Ibid.,181).   
Although focusing events can be very powerful, focusing events need not lead to 
substantive policy change.  The focusing event or external stimulus on its own does not 
create the capacity to develop and sustain an agenda.  A political or civic actor must 
initiate a reform coalition to tackle the problems the focusing event or external stimulus 
reveals (or constructs) (Shipps 2003, 846).   Wilbur Rich writing of the resilience of the 
school cartel offers, ―The rascals are repeatedly thrown out, but they usually return to 
power.  Besides cartel members have an uncanny ability to clone themselves‖ (Rich 
1996, 8).  Thus, disrupting the regime is not enough.  It is only the first step in the 
process of regime change.  The second step is for reformers to coalesce. 
For reformers, the political challenge is to build a new set of arrangements in 
which ―academic performance is a focal concern‖ [emphasis in the original] to take the 
place of the old regime (Stone 1998, 9).  Advocates of regime change must be able to 
activate a community‘s civic capacity to produce the coalitions necessary to support the 
formation of a new regime.  Disrupting the current regime is not enough.  If reform 
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efforts are to endure, the disruption must be followed with the institutionalization of a 
new performance regime.   
Today, outward appearances suggest Prince George‘s reformers were not 
successful in creating a new performance regime.  As researchers have mentioned, ―the 
formation of a new education regime comes about through a fresh set of relationships, 
even though some of the players remain the same‖ (Stone, Orr and Imbroscio 1991, 13).  
One might be inclined to assume that the restructuring of the board and hence the 
removal of key actors from the regime would have resulted in the needed changed 
relationships.  This assumption would be wrong.  Structural changes do not guarantee 
that the basic nature of relationships within the regime will change.  Changing the formal 
arrangements of governing does not ensure a change in the informal arrangements of 
governing.  While state legislature made a dramatic structural change in the county‘s 
education subsystem, it precipitated only minor changes to the nature of the relationships 
among the actors within the subsystem.  The structural changes did not themselves create 
the capacity to develop and sustain a reform coalition.  Moreover, in Prince George‘s, it 
does not appear that relationships between the board and other members of the governing 
coalition and other stakeholders in the county have changed significantly.   
This project argues a performance or education reform regime was not created in 
Prince George‘s County.  However, the old regime was destabilized and did not return as 
before.  It is not clear what type of regime is in control at this moment.  It might well be a 
reconstituted version of the old regime.  It is clear that a small group of people are in 
control of the education process in the county so in that sense the new regime looks like 
the old employment regime.  However, the board does not seem to be as noticeably 
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focused on its own welfare as the old regime had been.  And recently, it appears that a 
more cooperative attitude has taken hold in the county as people are less likely to reject 
change out of hand.  Thus, outwardly the regime presents a façade that suggests a 
genuine concern for educational performance.  
 
Thesis 
This project studies educational reform efforts in Prince George‘s County, 
Maryland.  I argue regime change is the key to educational reform in the county because 
the regime that was in control of education in 2002 pursued an agenda at odds with 
substantive educational reform.  Because of the power of the school cartel, educational 
reform would be unlikely to occur without regime change.  Before reform advocates 
could develop a community strategy for closing the gap, they would need to supplant the 
existing employment regime and replace it with a reform-minded performance regime.   
It is my contention that the dissolution of the school board was a focusing event 
that directly questioned the legitimacy of the school cartel.  The dissolution of the board 
also disrupted the organizational structure of the cartel.  Thus, the dissolution put the 
regime in a weakened position and made it vulnerable to attack from opponents.     
It is also my contention that in Prince George‘s County was not able to move 
beyond the first stage of the regime change process.  Reform advocates were unable to 
activate the county‘s civic capacity on behalf of education reform.  The goal of this 
research is to determine why reformers were not successful.  In addition this research 
hopes to ascertain the nature of the current regime controlling county education.  Was the 
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old regime able to withstand the disruption?  Was it replaced by a new regime that is 
neither an employment regime nor performance regime?  Basically, this project seeks to 
answer the question, what happened after the school board was dissolved? 
Additionally this project is interested in the impact of the failure of regime change 
on the academic achievement and the achievement gap. The premise of this project is that 
regime change is necessary to produce a significant improvement in African American 
student‘s academic performance and narrow the Black-White achievement gap.  Because 
this project posits that a performance regime was not established, no significant rise in 




This project uses a single case study approach to study regime change.  Case 
studies attempt to examine a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context (McNabb 
2010, 237). The use of case studies is well suited to the study of urban regime theory.  At 
the heart of regime theory is the proposition that context matters.  Thus urban regime 
theory and the case study method are well suited for one another.   
Sometimes the case study method is criticized because study results are not 
generalizable to broader set of cases.  I would argue, the specifics of the case study can 
expose the practicality of those broader generalizations.  Explanations or theories can be 
so broad that they explain nothing of real relevance.  Explanations that are too broad are 
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likely to miss the specifics that actually matter.  By studying the specifics, case studies 
can help refine broader theories. 
This case study applies both qualitative and quantitative methods.  The 
centerpiece of the qualitative methods is the use of semi-structured interviews.  
Respondents were chosen by two methods.  First, key educational, political, and 
community elites were identified.  Second, once interviewing began, a snowballing 
technique was used.  This technique involves expanding the interview sample by asking 
respondents to identify others potential respondents for interviews.   
Three interview schedules with open-ended questions were used.  One schedule 
was used for people who are no longer involved in county education or politics but were 
involved in or before 2002.  A second schedule was used for people currently involved in 
county education or politics but not involved in 2002.  The last schedule was designed for 
school board members.  The first two schedules were nearly identical save for the 
elimination of questions concerning time periods for which respondents were inactive.  
The school board schedule contained a number of questions included in the other 
schedules.  It also contained additional questions pertaining to the school board and its 
relationship with other educational actors.   
 In total 48 people were interviewed between June 2009 and April 2010.  
Interview respondents included educators, politicians, business and community leaders, 
activists, and parents.  To encourage people to speak freely, respondents were given 
anonymity.  The length of the interviews ranged from 23 minutes to 2:30 hours with most 
lasting about an hour.   
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In addition to the interviews, newspaper articles and primary source documents 
were used to develop a more vivid political picture of the county.  To produce a 
demographic picture of the county, local, state, and federal census data were used as well.  
The centerpiece of the quantitative methods was the use of test data to analyze 
changes in the black-white test-score gap.  For the study the results of Maryland School 
Performance assessment Program are analyzed.  A more detail discussion of the data set 
and the methods used to analyze the data is presented in Chapter 6.  
 
Contributions and Limitations of the Dissertation 
Studying Prince George's underscores the pervasiveness of the problem of 
minority academic achievement.  Stone‘s conceptualization of civic capacity is based on 
its application to urban education.  But as John Ogbu (2003), Ronald Ferguson (2002), 
and others have shown, poor student performance is not limited to poor communities.  
Studies like this one remind people that while most of the students in large city schools 
are minorities, not all minority students attend big city schools.  A sizable number of 
minority students attend suburban schools.  The ubiquitousness of the achievement gap is 
illustrated in case studies of non-central city communities like Prince George‘s County. 
Prince George's is a suburban school district.  And like many big-city systems it is 
large and diverse.  But unlike many big-city systems it is not overwhelmed by the 
problem of concentrated poverty in the way that many big-city systems are.  Because its 
problems are large enough to warrant concern, but not so large as to seem intractible, the 
county provides an environment that would seem to be suitable for community 
35 
 
mobilization.  Further, because of its size and diversity, Prince George's offers potential 
lessons about community mobilization that might apply to other localities.  Additionally, 
many education reformers advocate a greater community role in education policy 
formation.  This study can help highlight the difficulties of getting that community 
involvement. 
This project began with the question of how does a community go about solving 
the problem of poor African American academic achievement?  In the past, educators 
have tackled this issue alone as they enjoyed a high level of professional autonomy.  
Today, however, the notion of bureaucratic insulation has given way to the belief that 
schools cannot close the achievement gap on their own.  At the same time schools are 
connected to the broader political, economic, and social community surrounding them 
(Wong 1991; Reed 1991).  Accordingly, to adequately address the problem of minority 
achievement the role of the community must be considered.  I have suggested the key to 
developing and maintaining a successful reform effort lies in the ability to mobilize 
various influential actors in the community, build a consensus on the nature of the 
problem or problems, and coordinate efforts to solve them.  I have argued that regime 
change is a key to this process.  The complexity of this process is confirmed by in events 
in Prince George‘s County, Maryland. 
This study also is important from a normative point-of-view.  Education is not an 
abstract pursuit.  Real consequences and real lives and futures are at stake.  I would argue 
that a goal of political scientists and education researchers should be to help society solve 
some of its problems.  It is not enough to simply observe the achievement gap and its 
impact on the children who are victims of it. Part of our goal should be to bring light and 
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information to the problem with the hope that the information may help those charged 
with closing the gap.  By illuminating the obstacles that stand in the way of reform, 
researchers can help reformers in the development of strategies for achieving successful 
reform. 
A limitation of the study may be its timeframe.  Some researchers of regime 
change suggest that a historical perspective is necessary if one is to accurately gauge 
attempts at regime change (McGuinn 2006; Shipps 2006).  It may be that my nearly 
decade-long timeframe is not long enough.  The implication being that the county is still 
in the midst of undergoing change.   Paul Sabatier argues that explaining policy change 
requires a ―time perspective of a decade or more‖ (Sabatier, 1993). Another limitation 
may be in the fact that Prince George‘s County is not the typical suburban county.  While 
the value of a case may lie in its uniqueness, it may be that the county is so atypical that 
what happens in it has no applicable value to any other community. 
 
Preview of Upcoming Chapters  
Chapter 2 presents a historical overview of the changes in Prince George‘s 
County as it moved from a majority white population to a majority African American 
population.   
Chapter 3 presents an examination of Prince George‘s County Public Schools.  
The chapter identifies three issues; desegregation, testing and finances, that have shaped 
the education arena in the county.    
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Chapter 4 presents a detailed discussion of events leading to the school board‘s 
removal in 2002.  It then turns to a discussion of why the dissolution of the school board 
occurred.  The chapter digs below the surface and reveals an employment regime under 
significant pressure.   
 Chapter 5 chronicles events after 2002.  It continues the discussion of reform 
efforts and details the failure to establish a performance regime. Because of the 
significant amount of change experienced in school governance, the chapter is split into 
two parts.  The first part covers the time period between 2002 and 2006.  The second part 
covers events since 2006. 
In Chapter 6 this project comes full circle with an examination of the impact of 
county education politics on educational outcomes.  This chapter uses test data and other 
indicators to determine whether academic achievement has improved or declined since 
2002.   
Chapter 7 concludes the project with a final analysis of Prince George‘s County 







   Asians are 4% of the population. 
2
  The average mathematics score was 83.65% for whites and 64.43% for blacks.  
The average reading scores was 88.86% for whites and 13.99% for blacks.   
 
3
  Maryland has 24 school districts 23 of which are county districts. The city of 






An Overview of Prince George’s County 
 
Introduction  
The state of Maryland has been referred to as a microcosm of the United States 
(Callcott 1985).  Sitting just below the Mason-Dixon Line, the state is neither wholly 
southern nor wholly northern.  It has both coastlines and mountains.  It is both rural and 
urban, and increasingly it is suburban.  Economically, the state has both great wealth and 
staggering poverty.  The population is as diversified as the nation, if not more so. 
In some ways Prince George‘s County is a microcosm of Maryland.  While it 
does not have mountains, it does have the coastline of the Potomac River which separates 
it from the state of Virginia.  The county has several densely populated communities that 
resemble the central city (Washington, D.C.) they border.  At the same time, it has wide 
expanses of farm land.  Suburbanization has transformed the county from a tobacco 
farming town steeped in a southern plantation tradition into one of the largest, affluent, 
majority African American counties in the country.   
Geographically, Prince George‘s County is located in central Maryland.  The 
county sits on the east side of the District of Columbia and is about 37 miles south of 
Baltimore.  The county seat is Upper Marlboro in the south central portion of the county.  
One of 24 local units in Maryland, the county along with Montgomery County, which sits 







Early History of Prince George’s County     
Prince George‘s County was established on April 23, 1696.  Its early growth was 
directly related to the growth of the tobacco trade (Virta 1991).  It was with the growth of 
the tobacco trade in the 18
th
 century that slaves were brought to the county, and by the 
middle of the century almost half of the county population was slave.
2
  By the time of the 
Civil War, African Americans (overwhelmingly slaves) outnumbered whites in the 
county.  During the 19
th
 century, Prince George‘s was the greatest tobacco producing 
county in Maryland and was one of the more prosperous counties in the state as a result 
(Virta 1991, 88).   
Accompanying the tobacco trade was a plantation lifestyle that resembled the 
plantation culture of the antebellum South.  The plantation gentry ruled Prince George‘s 
social and political life.  And while there was strong Unionist sentiment in Maryland, 
Prince George‘s sympathies lay decidedly with the South (Pearl 1996, 10; Virta 1991, 
120; Callcott 1985, 19).  
The Civil War and the subsequent end of slavery in Maryland effectively killed 
the tobacco trade in the county.
3
  Without the slaves needed to sustain it, the old 
plantation system died and the land was broken up into small farms.  The county entered 
into a new era of ―small farms, quiet country villages, and modest living‖ (Virta 1991, 
135).  Although a number of freed slaves left the county after the Civil War, most blacks 
stayed in the county continuing on as tenant farmers and sharecroppers.   
Prince George‘s County‘s first encounter with suburbanization came in the years 
after the Civil War with the expansion of the federal government in Washington, D.C. 
(Virta, 1991, 190).  The District of Columbia‘s population doubled in the 1860s and grew 
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by an additional third during the 1870s and 1880s.  In a story to be repeated later, city 
workers searching for affordable housing were forced to look outside the city to the less 
expensive homes of the surrounding counties, and Prince George‘s was more than happy 
to accommodate them.  The introduction of the streetcar to the county in 1897 led to 
further suburbanization as it made the county more accessible to an increasing number of 
workers looking for affordable housing outside of Washington.  Thus the county‘s 
reputation as a bastion of affordable housing for the working class was established early 
on.  Despite the growth, however, the county remained essentially a rural hamlet for 
decades.  
Prior to the Civil War, blacks lived in all of the counties of the Washington region 
(Virta 1991, 213).  Only in Prince George‘s did blacks build new suburban towns during 
the streetcar era of the late 1890s.
4
  North Brentwood was Prince George‘s County‘s first 
African American town formed in1890 and incorporated in 1924 (Pearl 1996, 24).   
Fairmount Heights was also one of the earliest African American communities in the 
county.  Incorporated in 1935, it was one of the earliest black middle class suburbs in the 
county (Pearl 1996, 12, 65).  It was populated by blacks who worked for the federeal 
government in the District of Columbia (Thornton and Gooden 1997, 164).  
 
The Suburbanization of Prince George’s County by the Decades
5
 
The county‘s more transformative encounter with suburbanization occurred in the 
period between 1930 and 1970.  During this period, the county‘s population ballooned, 
swelling from 60,000 in 1930 to just over 660,000 in 1970.
6
  Not surprisingly, the 
beginnings of this population growth rested in the New Deal and an explosion of new 
federal programs as President Franklin Roosevelt tried to pull the country out of the Great 
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Depression.  The New Deal doubled the size of the federal government and dramatically 
increased the size of its workforce—a workforce in need of housing.  Because of the 
expense of the District, workers once again looked to the areas surrounding the nation‘s 
capitol for affordable housing.  As one of those communities, Prince George‘s County 
became a prototypical bedroom community of homes and consumer services businesses 
(banks, supermarkets, retail stores, etc.).   
Although the surge of suburbanization occurred in all of the jurisdictions 
surrounding the nation‘s capitol, the suburbanization that took place in Prince George‘s 
differed from that of neighboring Montgomery County.  Prince George‘s drew middle 
and working class people while Montgomery drew more affluent residents (Virta 1991, 
213).  Perhaps the greatest reason for the difference was geography.  That is, what 
happened in Prince George‘s and Montgomery counties was an extension of what was 
happening inside the city of Washington. 
  Montgomery County lies on the western edge of the District and Prince George‘s 
lies on the eastern edge.  The western side of the District was (and remains) the affluent 
side of the city while the eastern side was (and remains) more working class.  As city 
residents moved to the suburbs, they just moved outward from the communities in which 
they lived.  The affluent moved further out westward, and the working class moved 
further eastward.  Those living in the western portion of the city moved out further west 
into Montgomery County in Maryland.  Those on the eastern side of the District moved 
into Prince George‘s County.     
Another reason for the difference was the penchant of Prince George‘s leaders to 
court any kind of development while neighboring jurisdictions such as Montgomery 
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County were more selective in the type of development they encouraged (Granat 1986).  
Prince George‘s leaders gladly welcomed the developers of garden style apartments and 
condominiums that were rejected in Montgomery County in favor of single family homes 
and more upscale development.   
Blacks were part of the suburban migration (Wiese 2004). Of the new residential 
communities built in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, blacks primarily moved to those in 
Prince George‘s (Virta 1991, 213).  These new communities were usually near the old 
towns built by blacks earlier during the streetcar period.   
 
The 1970s 
Between 1970 and 1980, the total population size in Prince George‘s remained 
relatively unchanged growing by slightly less than 5,000 during the decade (U.S. Bureau 
of Census 1980).  Some of the slowing population growth was tied to the slowing growth 
of the federal government during the 1970s.  Additionally, a state ban on new sewer 
construction curtailed development in the county at the same time that affordable land 
became more available in other jurisdictions (Virta 1991, 213).  And of course, an end to 
the baby boom of the 1950s and early 1960s slowed growth everywhere.   
The overall flat population growth does not give an accurate picture of what was 
happening in the county however.  Although the numbers suggest little movement within 
the county, the exact opposite is true.  Between 1970 and 1980, the county‘s white 
population shrank by 170,049 (Table 2-1).  The dramatic reduction in the white 
population was matched by the dramatic increase in the black population.  Between 1970 
and 1980, the black population increased by 156,052.  So while the overall size of the 
county‘s population did not change appreciably between 1970 and 1980, the racial 
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composition of the population changed significantly.  Whites who were 85% of the 
population in 1970 declined to 59% in 1980.  Blacks who were 14% of the population in 
1970 grew to 37% in 1980.  It should be noted that the growth of the black population 
was not limited to Prince George‘s County.  The Washington region also saw an increase.  
During the decade, blacks increased from 8% of the metropolitan population to 16.7% 
(Feinberg 1981).  
 
             Table 2-1: Prince George‘s County Population 1970-2007 
  1970 1980 1990 2000 2007 
Total 660,567 665,071 729,268 801,515 828,770 
Black 91,808 247,860 369,791 502,550 531,127 
pct 13.90% 37.30% 50.70% 62.70% 64.10% 
White 561,476 391,427 314,616 216,729 182,250 
pct 84.90% 58.80% 43.10% 27.00% 22.00% 
Hispanic 14,586 14,421 29,983 57,057 100,769 
pct 2.20% 2.10% 4.10% 7.10% 12.10% 
Asian 4,478 17,064 28,255 31,032 31,295 
pct 0.70% 2.60% 3.90% 3.90% 3.80% 
      Sources: U.S. Bureau of Census, Census of the Population 1980, 1990,  
       2000; American Community Survey 2007, American FactFinder. 
 
These changes reflected a national trend of increased black suburbanization 
resulting from a growing black middle class (Wiese 2004).  Further, the elimination of 
discriminatory housing laws gave middle class blacks more freedom to move and allowed 
them to search for the suburban ―utopia‖ whites had found earlier.  In fact, during the 
1960s and 1970s the number of black suburbanites more than doubled (Ibid., 211).  This 
is not to say that blacks could move wherever they liked or that housing discrimination 
did not occur in the 1970s.  This is certainly not the case.  While, codified discrimination 
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ended, the more insidious, informal discrimination in the form of ―redlining‖ by banks 
and ―steering‖ by real estate agents continued (Gale 1987).  This informal discrimination 
coupled with the existence of established communities helps to explain why more blacks 
migrated to Prince George‘s instead of other areas in the region.  
The actions of whites also played a role in the concentration of blacks in the 
county.  The desire of whites to limit their contact with blacks has been a critical factor in 
segregation (Massey and Hajnal 1995).  The ―white flight‖ from the county was in part a 
reaction to the increased migration of African Americans into the county.  Opposition to 
court-ordered busing to desegregate the county‘s schools in 1973 further accelerated the 
process.
7
   
In addition to being rejected by fleeing whites, migrating blacks were met with 
more white resistance in the form of violence and considerable police brutality.  The 
brutality was such that the police department was sued by the American Civil Liberties 
Union and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
Legal Defense Fund, and investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Gregg 
1983a; Harriston 1987).  The reputation of the police force was so bad that it was dubbed 
―the police brutality capital in the world‖ by the head of the county chapter of the 
NAACP in 1975 (Whitlock and Fallis 2001).  
 
The 1980s 
The relationship between the police department and blacks in the county began to 
improve during the 1980s.
8
  Moreover, African Americans moving into Prince George‘s 
during the 1980s did not meet the white resistance that greeted earlier blacks.  This is 
most likely because African Americans had reached large enough numbers by the 1980s 
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that they had become more integrated into the county (Pearl 1996, 13).  Also those whites 
most likely to be resistant had fled the county during the 1960s and 1970s. 
The demographic shift of the 1970s foretold the beginning of another 
transformational period in Prince George‘s County.  Between 1980 and 1990 the number 
of county residents grew from 665,071 in 1980 to 729,268 in 1990 (Table 2-1).   A closer 
look at the numbers shows an even more dramatic change.  During the 1980s, the white 
population in the county actually decreased by 76,811.  This decrease was surpassed by 
an increase in the county‘s minority population.  The number of Asians and Hispanics 
doubled during the decade.  The African American population increased by 121,931.  As 
a result of all of these changes, Prince George‘s became a majority-minority county with 
blacks becoming 50.7% of the population while whites decreased to 43.1%.   
This second wave of black migration into Prince George‘s was a part of a 
continuing national migration away from central cities.  Washington, D.C. saw its 
population drop by 31,433 during the 1980s (U.S. Bureau of Census 1990).  Ironically, 
the influx of blacks into the county was propelled in part by the county‘s efforts to attract 
white professionals.  The county‘s Economic Development Corporation began a 
campaign to draw white professionals to the county by courting new industries in the 
county and enticing developers to build new subdivisions for the executives of those new 
industries (Dent 1992, 22).  However, before whites could come in, blacks moved into 
these new upscale communities.  As a result, African Americans migrating to the county 
during the 1980s were considerably more affluent than those coming in the earlier wave.  
In fact, Prince George‘s became the first majority-black, majority-affluent county in the 
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nation (Wiese 2004, 270).  Prince George‘s became the rare community in which its 
affluence grew as the concentration of African Americans grew. 
 
The 1990s 
The 1990s saw a net population gain of 72,247 for the county, making Prince 
George‘s the second largest county in Maryland.  Its total population of 801,515 was only 
surpassed by Montgomery County whose population grew to 873,341 in 2000 (U.S. 
Bureau of Census 2000).  Along with the increase in population came an increase in the 
percentage of the population that was African American.  By 2000, blacks were 62.7% of 
the population while whites in the county continued to decline becoming just over a 
quarter (27%) of the population.  During the 1990s, developers were actively marketing 
homes to middle class African Americans (Wiese 2004, 274).  The black, upper middle 
class golf course communities of Woodmore and Lake Arbor were built in the 1990s as 
affluent blacks moved further out in the county.   
Along with the continued influx of African Americans, Prince George‘s saw a 
significant increase in its Hispanic population during the 1980s and 1990s.  During the 
1980s, the county‘s Hispanic population doubled growing from 14,421 to 29,983 (Table 
2-1).  Only 2.2% of the population in 1980, Hispanics became 4.1% in 1990.  During the 
1990s, the Hispanic population nearly doubled again growing by 90.2%.  By 2000, 
Latinos were 7.1% of the county‘s population numbering 57,057.  In a related trend, 
Prince George‘s saw a significant increase in the number of foreign-born immigrants to 
the county in the 1990s.  By 2000, 14% of the county‘s population was foreign-born.
9
 
Once again what was happening in the county echoed a trend happening 
throughout the metropolitan region.  Between 1990 and 1996, the Washington region‘s 
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population increased by 7.1% (Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy 1999).  The 
percentage of the population that was minority grew by 3.6%.
10
  Conversely, the white 
percentage of the popultaion decreased by 3.7%.  So during the 1990s the entire 
Washington metropolitan region grew more diverse with Prince George‘s leading the 
way.  By 1996, the county was home to 35% of the metropolitan area‘s minority 
population.
11
   
 
The 2000s 
Between 2000 and 2007, Prince George‘s total population grew by 3.4% to reach 
a total of 828,770 (Table 2-1).   The African American population grew 5.7% while the 
white population continued to decline dropping 15.9%.  The Hispanic population saw the 
most dramatic change.  In seven years the Hispanic population grew by 76.6% and 
became 12.2% of the total population.  The county‘s increasing Hispanic population 
points to a trend occurring throughout the metropolitan region: the growth of foreign-
born residents.  The foreign-born population accounted for 50% of the region‘s 
population growth between 1990 and 2007 (Greater Washington Research at Brookings 
2009).   
Another demographic trend occurring in Prince George‘s was the out-migration of 
middle-class African Americans.  Many leaving the county have moved to neighboring 
Maryland counties.  Like those leaving the District earlier, many middle-class, African 
American Prince Georgians left the county in search of lower priced housing, better 
schools, and less crime (Rucker and Thomas-Lester 2007).  In a study of county 
migration between 1993 and 2003, Brooke DeRenzis and Alice M. Rivlin (2007) found 
that those moving into the county had lower median household incomes than those 
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moving out of the county.
12
  While middle-class blacks led the migration into the county 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, those migrating to the county in the late 1990s and 
2000s tended to be foreign born and have lower incomes than those leaving (Ibid.).   
 
Prince George’s County and the Washington Metropolitan Region
13
 
The characteristic that most distinguishes Prince George‘s County from its 
suburban neighbors is the fact that it is the only majority-minority jurisdiction, in the 
region, save for the District of Columbia.  The county is 81.7% minority.  No other 
suburban Washington jurisdiction has a concentration of African Americans or minorities 
anywhere near as high as Prince George‘s.  In Virginia, Alexandria city has an African 
American population that is 21.8% of the total population and a total minority population 
of 32%.  Charles County comes closest in Maryland with an African American 
population of 38.2% and a total minority population of 45% (U.S. Bureau of Census 
2007).  Interestingly, many of these African Americans are former Prince George‘s 
residents and include many of the upper income blacks who left the county (Marimow 
2005).  
As part of the Washington metropolitan area, Prince George‘s County is 
frequently compared to its neighbors, and the comparisons are usually not kind.  As Table 
2-2 shows, Prince George‘s does not measure up well against some of its neighbors on a 







  Table 2-2 Prince George‘s County Comparison with Regional  
  Neighbors  2000 
 
Prince 




Population 729,268 873,341 969,749 7,608,070 
Minority 
Population 73% 35.2% 30.1% 37% 
Median Family 
Income $62,467 $84, 035 $92,146 $66,909 
Family Poverty 7.2% 5.0% 4.3% 8.3% 
Unemployment 4.1% 2.2% 1.9% 3.1% 
High School 
Graduate 27.3% 5.3% 13.9% 23.2% 
Some College 
or BA Degree 47.4% 48.4% 52.5% 45.5% 
Post Grad 
Degree 10.2% 27.5% 24.4% 16.3% 
Bachelor or 
Higher 27.2% 54.6% 54.8% 37.1% 
Home 
Ownership 61.8% 68.7% 70.9% 65.0% 
Median Home 
Value $145, 600 $221,800 $233,300 $161,600 
   Source: 2000 U.S. Bureau of Census. 2000 Census of the Population.  
 
 
It is less affluent than several of its neighbors and has higher levels of poverty and 
unemployment.  The level of educational attainment is lower as well.  The disparities 
even extend to home ownership and home prices.  Lower home prices are one reason why 
the county tends to attract a greater percentage of working class and lower income 
minorities than its neighbors.  On the positive side, for many of these residents Prince 
George‘s provides a ―pathway to the middle class‖ (DeRenzis and Rivlin 2007).  Because 
they are neighbors, are in the same state, and are the largest counties in Maryland, Prince 
George‘s County and Montgomery County are often compared to one another.  Once 
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again the comparison is not kind to Prince George‘s (Table 2-2).  Part of the reasons for 
the county being less affluent than its western neighbors has to do with geography and 
good old-fashioned greed.   
As mentioned above, Prince George‘s sits to the east of the District of Columbia 
while Montgomery sits on the west side.  As the west side of the District is more affluent 
than the east, Montgomery and other western counties reaped the benefits of an affluent 
population moving out away from the core city.  A second geographical reason for Prince 
George‘s less affluent status comes as a result of its position along the B&O Railroad.  
The railroad brought heavy industry and made the county a natural distribution center for 
large multi-chain companies (Granat 1986, 198).  Warehouses tend not to encourage the 
development of upscale residential property nearby.   
Additionally, loose zoning laws allowed developers to come into the county and 
build numerous relatively low-cost apartments that attracted less affluent individuals 
while neighboring counties used more restrictive zoning laws to attract more affluent 
individuals.   Political officials in Prince George‘s believed that any development was 
good development as long as it brought a quick financial return.  However, in their rush 
for quick money, politicians failed to consider the long-term consequences of their 
actions.  The result was ―an urban planner‘s worst nightmare.  The worst of suburbia 
came to Prince George‘s County; randomly placed strip shopping centers and squat 
apartment buildings that turned into instant slums‖ (Granat 1986, 200).  In time the 
politicians realized their mistake and tightened zoning laws but by then the pattern had 
been set, and Prince George‘s reputation as a county of the working class had been firmly 
planted in people‘s minds.   
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Race has also played a role in Prince George‘s position relative to its neighbors.  
Restrictive zoning laws constrained the migration of African Americans to the 
neighboring counties.  With their choices limited, minorities (primarily African 
Americans early on) were led to Prince George‘s.  Because African Americans do less 
well as a group on a number of socioeconomic indicators than whites as a group, it was 
perhaps inevitable that Prince George‘s with its large concentration of African Americans 
would be less affluent than its neighbors who have large concentrations of whites 
(Dawson 1994).   
Race played another role in the county‘s economic status.  The forced integration 
of county schools in the 1970s made many businesses shy away from Prince George‘s.  
Businesses were skeptical of the willingness of their white workers to live in the county 
and send their children to the county‘s public schools where they were likely to be bused 
(Granat 1986).  Busing created a drag on the county‘s ability to attract the commercial 
base from which it could generate the jobs, income and revenues that would allow it to 
keep pace with neighboring jurisdictions.  While companies have begun to pay more 
attention to the county, it still lags behind its neighbors (Meyer and Behr 1997).   
That Prince George‘s is less affluent than some of its majority-white, neighboring 
counties does not mean the county is not doing well economically.  It is still one of the 
more affluent counties in the country.
14
  Moreover, some of the comparisons are a bit 
unfair.  Four of the top ten wealthiest counties in the United States are part of the 
Washington metropolitan area (U.S. Bureau of Census 2008).
15
  As a result, Prince 
George‘s County is being held to a higher than normal standard.  Table1-3 provides a 
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comparison of the county with the United States as a whole and with the state of 
Maryland.   
 
         Table 2-3: 2000 Socioeconomic Comparison Prince George‘s  







Population 729,268 5,296,486 281,421,906 
Minority 
Population 73% 36% 24.9% 
Median Family 
Income $62,467 $61, 876 $50,046 
Family Poverty 7.2% 3.2% 9.2% 
Unemployment 4.1% 6.1% 5.8% 
High School 
Graduate 27.3% 26.7% 28.6% 
Some College 
& BA Degree 47.4% 43.6% 58.3% 
Post Grad 
Degree 10.2% 13.4% 8.9% 
Bachelor or 
Higher 27.2% 31.4% 24.4% 
Home 
Ownership 61.8% 67.7% 66.2% 
Median Home 
Value $145,600 $146,000 $119,600 
  Source: U.S. Bureau of Census. 2000 Census of the Population. 
 
 
Prince George‘s does considerably well when compared to the nation. The county 
has lower unemployment (4.1% for the county and 5.8% for the US) and poverty rates 
(7.2% and 9.2%) than the nation.  Its median income is 12.4% higher than the national 
average.  The county also has a higher number of college graduates.  The county holds its 
own compared to the state.  The median incomes of the county and the state are almost 
identical at $62,467 for the county and $61,876 for the state.  The county does have a 
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higher poverty rate than the state (7.2% and 3.2% respectively).  However, the county has 
a lower unemployment rate (4.1%) than the state (6.1%).    Despite these generally 
positive numbers, Prince George‘s cannot rid itself of its reputation as the poor second 
cousin to its wealthier neighbors. 
The Federal Government in Prince George’s County      
Prince George‘s County has been referred to as, ―the gateway into the United 
States‖ (Bunting and D'Amario 1998, 92).  This is because the county is home to 
Andrews Air Force Base where heads of state and other dignitaries visiting Washington, 
D.C. alight.  It is also home to Air Force One, the president‘s plane.  With a population of 
almost 8,000 (U.S. Bureau of Census 2000) and a workforce of over 15, 000 people 
(Maryland Department of Business & Economic Development 2009), the base is a 
significant fixture in the county.  It is not however, the only federal government presence 
in the county.  The county is also home to the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, the 
Census Bureau, and the Department of Agriculture‘s Beltsville Agricultural Research 
Center.  Additionally, tthe National Archives has a research facility in College Park, and 
the Internal Revenue Service has offices in New Carrollton.   
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        Table 2-4: Top Ten Prince George‘s County Employers in 2009 
Rank Employer Product/Service Employment 
1 
 University of 
Maryland System
 
 Higher Education 15,768 
2 
Andrews Air Force 
Base Military Installation 15,000 
3 
U.S. Internal 




Mail & Package 
Delivery 4,220 
5 U.S. Census Bureau 
Demographic 
Research 4,158 
6 Giant Food Groceries 3, 609 
7 
NASA-Goddard 
Space Flight Center Space Research 3,083 
8 Verizon Telecommunications 2,738 
9 
Dimensions 
Healthcare Systems Medical Services 2,500 
10 Safeway Groceries 2,400 
Source: Maryland Department of Business & Economic Development. Prince               
George‘s County Brief Economic Facts. www.ChooseMaryland.org. 
 
 
The federal government presence in the county is such that of the top ten 
employers in the county (Table 2-4), four are federal government entities.
16
  In 2007, 8% 
of the county workforce were federal government employees (Ibid.).  The national 
average is 2.5% (U.S. Bureau of Census 2007).  Another 18.5% of county residents work 
for state or local governments.  The presence of the federal government has given the 
Washington region a measure of economic stability.  In 2000, the unemployment rate for 
the Washington metropolitan area was 3.1% (U.S. Bureau of Census 2000).  The national 
rate was 5.8%.  The unemployment rate for Prince George‘s was 4.1%.  While the region 
is not completely recession-proof, the federal presence does tend to minimize a 
recession‘s impact.   
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In addition to having a significant federal government presence, Prince George‘s 
County is also home to the flagship campus of the University of Maryland System.  The 
University of Maryland at College Park has an enrollment of 37,000 and employs over 
13, 000 people.
17
  Other colleges in the county include Bowie State University, 
University of Maryland University College (both part of the University of Maryland 
System) and Prince George‘s Community College.  Combined these institutions enroll 
more than 85, 000 students.
18
 
Of the private employers on the list, all but one is a national corporation with 
national headquarters elsewhere.  As such, they tend to view Prince George‘s county 
through the prism of a larger regional perspective.  Consequently, they are not as fully 
invested in the welfare of the county as a homegrown company would be.  Dimensions 
Healthcare Systems, the one local company in the top ten, is a not-for-profit health care 
provider serving Prince George‘s County that operates the county‘s public hospitals.  For 
years it has languished near insolvency in part due to the large number of poor and 
uninsured patients it serves.  In 2008, the state agreed to sell the hospitals as a means of 
stabilizing Dimensions‘ financial condition.  As of May 2010, the hospitals had not been 
sold (Sinha 2010).   Most of the businesses in Prince George‘s County are small 
businesses.  In 2008 there were 15,500 businesses in the county (Maryland Department of 
Business and Economic Development 2009).  Only 350 of them had more than 100 
employees.  The overwhelming majority of businesses in the county are small businesses. 
The county does have a number of business organizations including a county 
Chamber of Commerce.  The county also has a Black Chamber of Commerce that was 
formed in 2001.  Additionally, the county has an alliance of chief executives, The Greater 
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Prince George‘s Business Roundtable.  Both the county Chamber and Roundtable have 
education subcommittees.  There is another business association, the Bowie Chamber of 
Commerce.  The Bowie chamber is comprised of business within the community of 
Bowie, the county‘s largest city.  The Bowie chamber‘s efforts are directed at the Bowie 
community.  It also has an education committee.   
 
Municipalities in Prince George’s County    
―In a region composed of very large counties, three of which are nearing one 
million residents, county-wide indicators do not provide a precise account of all that is 
happening inside these county borders‖ (Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy 1999, 
10).  Differences within the county are sometimes as great if not greater than they are 
between counties in the region.  
The earliest towns in Prince George‘s were commercial ports, and most served as 
inspection stations for the tobacco trade (Denny 1997).  As was typical, the early towns 
in the county were built along the B&O railroad that ran through the northern part of the 
county.  Bladensburg, Beltsville, and Laurel were the earliest settlements in the county 
with Bladensburg, and Beltsville becoming some of the county‘s earliest cities.  Even 
back in the late 1800s, Prince George‘s encouraged unrestrained development with its 
inexpensive land and low tax rates (Virta, 1991, 190).  With the county‘s introduction to 
the streetcar in 1897, numerous suburban-like towns sprang up.  Hyattsville was the first 
county suburb; home to commuters and local businessmen (Virta, 1991, 191).  The towns 
of Mount Rainier, Brentwood and Cottage City were also built during this period.  A 
second streetcar line led to the creation of Seat Pleasant, Capitol Heights, and Fairmount 
Heights.   
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In addition to the streetcars, there were two additional rail lines in the county.  
The small villages of Glenarden, Ardmore, and Dodge Park developed along the line of 
the Baltimore and Annapolis Railway.  Along the other line, the Baltimore and Potomac 
Railroad, grew the towns of Lanham, Seabrook, and Bowie.  Unlike the towns along the 
B&O, these towns were rural in character.   
Map 2-1 shows most of the current municipalities in the county today.  It also 
shows that most of the county‘s early towns and cities lay close to the District of 
Columbia.  This is notable because, as we shall see below, the communities closest to the 
District line are some of the poorest neighborhoods in the county.  Most of these 
communities tend to be the most heavily minority communities in the county as well.   
Today Prince George‘s has 27 incorporated municipalities.
19
 Additionally, Prince 
George‘s has thirty-nine census designated places.
20
  The communities range in 
population size from 50,269 in Bowie to 55 in Eagle Harbor.
21
  The median population 
size for county communities is just over 8,100.  Ten communities have populations 
greater than 20,000 and ten communities have populations less than 2,000.   
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Map 2-1: Municipalities in Prince George‘s County 
Source: Data from U.S. Bureau of Census. Cartographic Boundary Files, 
 Maryland, County Subdivisions.   
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In addition to the changes caused by the introduction of the streetcar, 
transportation has influenced county development in other ways.  United States Route 1 
(US1) moves from north to south through the county, connecting the District of Columbia 
to Baltimore.  Many communities have sprung up along its path.  Perhaps the road of 
greatest significance in the county is US 495 or the ―Beltway‖ as it is referred to locally.  
The Beltway travels in a loop around the District of Columbia passing through Prince 
George‘s and Montgomery counties in Maryland and Alexandria and Arlington cities in 
Virginia.  When it was built in the early 1960s, the Beltway served as the dividing line 
between the developed (urban) and undeveloped (rural) sections of Prince George‘s 
County.  The urban areas lay inside the Beltway and the rural areas lay outside it.   
Today the Beltway still serves as a de facto dividing line between communities in 
Prince George‘s.  Communities lying inside the Beltway tend to be significantly less 
affluent than those outside of it.  Table 2-5 shows the communities with the highest and 
lowest median family incomes.  The county communities with the lowest median family 
incomes lie inside the Beltway.
22
  In contrast, the communities with the highest median 
incomes lie outside of the Beltway.   The one exception is University Park which lies 
inside the Beltway and has the second highest median income in the county.  The town 
sits adjacent to the University of Maryland and is home to many of the university‘s 
professors and administrative staff who account for most of the town‘s high median 
income.   
It must be kept in mind that although Table 2-5 lists the poorest sections of the 
county, most of the county‘s communities are still relatively affluent compared to 
national averages.  In 2000, the national median family income was $50,046 (U.S. 
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Bureau of Census 2000).  Forty-nine of the sixty-six municipalities in Prince George‘s 
County had incomes above the national median. 
 















1 Woodmore outside $103,438 1 
North 
Brentwood inside $45,893 
2 
University 
Park inside $96,349 2 
Seat 
Pleasant inside $45,332 
3 Mitchellville outside $91,297 3 Coral Hills inside $45,288 
4 Lake Arbor outside $89,775 4 Brentwood inside $45,244 
5 Hillandale outside $88,802 5 
Suitland-
Silver Hills inside $43,635 
6 
Fort 
Washington outside $88,374 6 
Andrews 
AFB inside $42,866 
7 West Laurel outside $86,797 7 Bladensburg inside $41,394 
8 Glenn Dale outside $85,448 8 
Mount 
Rainier inside $39,060 
9 Rosaryville outside $85,225 9 
Greater 
Landover inside $38,315 
10 Marlton outside $82,936 10 
Langley 
Park inside $36,018 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Census. 2000 Census of the Population. 
 
Of that number five had incomes five percent higher than the national median.  Forty had 
median incomes at least ten percent higher.   
Table 2-6 shows the highest and lowest poverty rates in the county.  The national 
poverty rate for families with children was 9.2% in 2000.  In Prince George‘s twenty 
municipalities had poverty rates higher than the national rate.
23
   Only two communities, 
Seat Pleasant (24.1%) and Glenarden (22.3%) had levels high enough to classify them as 




















Harbor outside 50.0% 1 Marlton outside 1.9% 
2 
Seat 
Pleasant inside 24.1% 2 West Laurel outside 1.5% 
3 Glenarden inside 22.3% 3 Kettering outside 1.4% 
4 
Greater 
Landover inside 16.6% 4 Lake Arbor outside 1.0% 
5 
Landover 
Hills inside 15.1% 5 Bowie outside 1.0% 
6 
Langley 
Park inside 14.3% 6 Edmonston inside 0.8% 
7 Brentwood inside 14.1% 7 
Berwyn 
Heights inside 0.6% 
8 
Riverdale 
Park inside 13.9% 8 Friendly outside 0.4% 
9 
East 
Riverdale inside 13.6% 9 Hillandale outside 0.0% 
10 
Temple 
Hills inside 13.2% 10 
Upper 
Marlboro outside 0.0% 
 Note: Poverty rate is for families with related children under eighteen. 
 Source: U.S. Bureau of Census. 2000 Census of the Population. 
 
 
Table 2-6 also shows that all of the communities with the highest poverty rates sit 
inside the Beltway save for Eagle Harbor which is something of a statistical anomaly 
because of its miniscule size.
25
  Conversely, almost all of the communities with the 
lowest poverty rates in the county lie outside the Beltway.  University Park, Edmonston, 
and Berwyn Heights are the exceptions.  Edmonston and Berwyn Heights are both 
relatively close to the University of Maryland and have large white middle class 
populations.  The three towns hint at another interesting characteristic of the county—
residential segregation.    
63 
 
Despite its growing diversity, Prince George‘s was still very segregated 
residentially in 1990 (Johnson 2002).  Blacks tended to live in heavily black communities 
while whites lived in overwhelmingly white neighborhoods. More than half of all census 
tracts in the county were at least 70 percent white or 70 percent black (Dent 1992, 21).  
This type of segregation is not unique to the county.  Myron Orfield (1999) 
denotes the concentration of blacks in segregated communities regardless of their 
socioeconomic status.  Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton (1987) found that the rate of 
segregation was almost as high for affluent and middle class blacks as it was for poor 
blacks.  In his national study of suburban segregation, John Logan (2001) found virtually 
no change in the level of segregation between 1990 and 2000.  Further he finds that the 
level of segregation is higher for those suburbs with a higher proportion of minorities 
leading to the existence of ethnic enclaves within suburbs.   
A desire for whites to limit their contact with blacks has been critical to the 
continued segregation (Massey and Hajnal 1995).  While blacks prefer to live in 
neighborhoods that are 50% black and 50% white, whites prefer to live in neighborhoods 
that are 80% white and 20% black (Pattillo 2005).  This said, it must be noted that whites 
are not alone in their desire to segregate.  Observers have noted a trend of some middle 
class blacks to choose to live in majority African American neighborhoods (Chappell 
2006; Lacy 2007).   
According to state data, the level of segregation for Prince George‘s‘ whites has 
decreased (Maryland Department of Planning 2002).  In 1990, 72.5% of whites lived in 
neighborhoods that were at least 50% white while 38.2% lived in neighborhoods that 
were at least 75% white.
26
  By 2000, the number of whites living in neighborhoods more 
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than half white had dropped to 47.1% and the number living in neighborhoods at least 
75% white had fallen to 14%.  While the level of segregation for whites decreased, it 
increased for blacks.  In 1990, 78.6% of blacks lived in neighborhoods at least half black 
while 51.9% lived in neighborhoods at least 75% black.  By 2000, the numbers had risen 
to 84.6% and 58.4% respectively.   
It does appear some blacks have moved to Prince George‘s County because they 
wanted to live in an African American community (Wiese 2004).  This attitude seems to 
be borne out in the sentiment expressed by an attorney and county resident who says, 
―This is the place where I can live, work and accomplish all of my goals. And feel 
comfortable.  You walk out of your home and you see people who look like you, and 
have the same mind-set as you.  They‘re professional‖ (Chappell 2006, 89).  So while 
past and present discriminatory practices (redlining and steering by real estate agents) 
help keep blacks segregated, a certain amount of self-segregation is also occurring in the 
county.  
Table 2-7 shows the municipalities with the highest concentrations of blacks and 
whites.  All of the communities with the highest African American concentrations lie 
inside the Beltway.  Of the top ten communities with the highest percentage of white 
residents, seven lie outside the Beltway.  The three that lie inside the Beltway are 
University Park, Berwyn Heights, and College Park.  As stated above University Park 
and Berwyn Heights are near the University of Maryland which is in College Park.  
The most heavily concentrated Hispanic populations are inside the Beltway.  Only 
one neighborhood is majority Hispanic; Langley Park which is 63.5% Hispanic.  Langley 
Park is part of a six-square-mile northwestern zone just inside the Beltway that is about 
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30% Hispanic (Aizenman 2001).  The area includes the communities of Adelphi, 
Chillum, Hyattsville, Langley Park, Lewisdale and Riverdale Park. The concentration of 
blacks and Hispanics inside the Beltway is due in large part to the abundance of cheaper 
housing stock and apartment complexes in the area.  Thus while blacks and Hispanics are 
most concentrated inside the Beltway, whites are more concentrated outside of it.   
 















inside 96.9% 1 University 
Park 
inside 85.5% 
2 Seat Pleasant inside 96.7% 2 West Laurel outside 84.5% 





inside 95.8% 4 College Park inside 68.8% 
5 Walker Mills inside 95.0% 5 Andrews 
AFB 
outside 65.3% 
6 Coral Hills inside 93.6% 6 Bowie outside 62.6% 
7 Hillcrest 
Heights 
inside 93.2% 7 Brandywine outside 56.2% 
8 Suitland-
Silver Hills 
inside 93.0% 8 Hillandale outside 55.4% 
9 Capitol 
Heights 
inside 92.8% 9 Laurel City outside 52.2% 
10 Largo inside 92.7% 10 Upper 
Marlboro 
outside 51.5% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Census. 2000 Census of the Population. 
 
 
The municipality tables show significant population variation between 
neighborhoods.  Communities inside the Beltway tend to be older, less affluent and more 
majority-minority than most of the communities outside of the Beltway.  Although recent 
municipal estimates are not available, recent county population numbers suggest that the 
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county‘s minority population has continued to increase--with the Hispanic population 
nearly doubling-- as the white percentage has continued to fall (Table 2-1).  Thus the 
concentration of minorities in the county seems to be increasing.  This trend might well 
have a significant economic impact.  Hispanics have a significantly lower median family 
income than African Americans, and African Americans have a lower median family 
income than whites (Table 2-8).  The continuing out-migration of whites and middle class 
African Americans coupled with the increase in Hispanics might lead to a decline in the 
county‘s median income.  
 




Total White Black Hispanic Asian 
2000 $62,467 $70,177 $60,810 $43,193 $61,472 
2007 $79,373 $92,082 $78,943 $52,337 $93,205 
      Source: U.S. Bureau of Census. 2000 Census of the Population; 2007 American  
      Community Survey.  
 
 
Another important trend occurring in the county is the declining inner Beltway 
population.  In 1970 nearly two-thirds of county residents lived inside the Beltway.  By 
2000, less than half of county residents lived inside the Beltway (Prince George's County 
Department of Planning 2004).  The county attributes this pattern to two factors; the 
declining number of persons per dwelling and the increased development outside the 
Beltway.  This shift in population has led to repeated complaints by inner Beltway 
residents who say they have been ignored by county leadership in its efforts to bring new 
up-scale development and new business to the county (Granat 1986, 264; Kennedy 2002).  
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The county‘s Chamber of Commerce accused the county government of a "lack of 
commitment" in the area saying; ―our policy makers clearly have invested all their 
attention and energies in the outer-Beltway communities" (Thompson 1990).  The 
Chamber also accused the government of racial politics by cutting funding for older 
neighborhoods while luring development to more prosperous, predominantly white 
communities like Laurel and Bowie.  
Not surprisingly all of the variation in the county has at times led to tensions 
among the different county constituencies; the inner and outer Beltway divide being just 
one of them.  In an area with such a diverse population conflict between the races are 
likely if not inevitable.  As mentioned before black and white conflicts occurred during 
the 1960s and 1970s.  And occasionally, black-white conflicts still emerge.  In 2001 some 
white Bowie residents wanted to secede from the county because they believed their 
community (predominantly white) was being ignored by the increasingly black political 
leadership.  One local commentator suggested the effort was an expression of ―white 
angst‖ at becoming the minority in a county they once dominated (Frazier 2000a).  The 
rapid growth of the Hispanic population in the county has also sparked tensions.  In a 
clash of cultures reminiscent of the clashes between whites and blacks decades earlier, 
blacks and Hispanics have clashed with blacks claiming Hispanics are destroying their 
neighborhoods and Hispanics arguing they are the victims of prejudice (Aizanman 2001).  
Sometimes the clashes are class-based instead of race-based.  In 1998 residents in 
the Mitchellville subdivision of Woodmore South erected a large planter that served as a 
barrier to through-traffic and separated the community from a neighboring subdivision 
(Meyer 1998).  Woodmore South at the time was a community of $400,000 homes.  
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Residents claimed to have erected the barrier out of a concern about crime and traffic, 
and a desire to protect their property values.  The subdivision the community wanted to 
distance itself from was the subdivision of Kings Forest where houses sold for $200,000 
and some annual incomes topped $100,000 (Ibid.).  The most interesting aspect about the 
dispute is that both communities are almost exclusively black communities. Thus in a 
county with a large affluent, black population, class not race sometimes becomes the tie 
that binds (Lacy 2007).   Sometimes the influence of class even shows up in the politics 
of Prince George‘s.  
 
Prince George’s Government Structure and Politics  
Prince George‘s County‘s has a county executive and county council form of 
government with nine council members elected from nine districts.  The county has 31 
state representatives to the Maryland state legislature, the General Assembly.  This 
number includes eight senators and three delegates from each of eight county districts.
27
   
Prince George‘s politics has been described among other things as ―byzantine‖, ―a 
snake pit,‖ and ―rough and tumble‖ (Krause 1974; Eastman 1980; Abramowitz 1993a).  
Political feuding is more the norm than the exception.  Steven Pearlstein, a financial 
columnist for the Washington Post, said this about Prince George‘s politicians, ―Despite 
some stiff competition, Prince George's County may now have the most dysfunctional 
and ethically challenged political leadership in the Washington region.  Major decisions 
are made not on the basis of what is best for the public, but what is best for elected 
officials and their supporters‖ (Pearlstein 2007).  To get a better sense of this culture, it is 
necessary to review the political history from which it has evolved. 
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As was mentioned above, early Prince George‘s was primarily a rural area.  
Tobacco was king and large plantations dotted the landscape.  County politics were 
controlled by the plantation aristocracy and their politics tended to be of a laissez faire 
style that eschewed government and government control (Granat 1986).  During the 
1930s and 1940s, the Democrats became the controlling political party in the county.
28
  
With party domination came the development of a political machine in the 1930s.  But 
unlike the machines of the northeast (Erie 1988) that relied on patronage for support, the 
county machine drew much of its power from the ―political indifference of the 
unconcerned‖ (Callcott 1985).  The machine became powerful because no one bothered 
to challenge it—at least for a while.   
The machine, led by Lansdale Sasscer was ultraconservative and was comprised 
of lawyers and banking interests in the county.  The machine‘s composition helps explain 
why the county became the epicenter for the building of cookie cutter houses and garden-
style apartments.  They were cheap to build for developers and returned a quick profit for 
the banks supplying construction loans.  As one commentator put it, ―houses replaced 
tobacco as the cash crop‖ in much of the county (Virta 1991, 238).  The belief of the 
machine was that ―all development was good, that low taxes and minimum services 
promoted development and that politicians and developers had much to gain from each 
other‖ (Callcott 1985, 63).  Not surprisingly such a cozy relationship led to scandal.  
Accusations of kickbacks and bribery were alleged leading to the eventual conviction of 
some machine members (Gregg 1983b).   
During the 1960s, a political movement to overthrow the existing conservative 
machine and reform government gathered force among young white Democrats who 
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were more progressive than the existing regime.  These ―insurgent‖ Democrats were part 
of a suburban political revolution that swept through the metropolitan region (Homan 
1965).  In the county, the movement was led by middle class professionals and 
housewives who saw no benefit in sustaining a machine that catered to the working class 
with jobs and to developers with contracts.  In 1962, their reform slate managed to win 
several county seats.  This first attack was one of many that eventually succeeded in 
ousting the old machine.   
As a result of reform efforts, a new government structure was chartered in 1970.  
County residents voted for home rule and abandoned the commissioner form of 
government that had served as the power base for the old machine.  This new system 
called for the election of a county executive and a county council.
29
  The charter 
enactment represented the final death knell for the old Sasscer machine.   
The decline of the machine and its organizational power brought to the surface an 
underlying factionalism within the Democratic Party.  The reform group that seemed so 
formidable in 1962 was itself challenged by even more liberal groups in the county and 
by maverick politicians who had been held in check by the old machine (Osnos 1968).  In 
1966, there were three Democratic slates.  That number increased to four in 1970.  
Internecine fighting within the Democratic Party led to the election of a Republican 
county executive in 1971 even though Democrats outnumbered Republicans by at least 2 
to 1 (Krause 1974).
30
   
During the 1970s, in an attempt to bring some unity to the Party, a handful of 
Democratic elites met bimonthly over breakfast to discuss strategy and tactics (Johnson 
2002, 29).  This ―Breakfast Club‖ selected people to run for office and picked appointees 
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for boards and commissions.  The Club continued the machine tradition of running slates 
by creating ―Blue Ribbon‖ slates and insuring financing for slate members.  Critics of the 
group complained it was a new machine.  Club members did not see it this way of course.  
To them, their group was ―simply an efficient, democratic melding of various feuding 
factions in order to get things done better‖ (Meyer 1977).   
This new group dominated county politics until 1978.  The Club‘s downfall was 
much like the machine‘s before it in that the public began to tire of the seeming 
concentration of power in the hands of a few.   In 1978, Democrats lost control as 
Republican Larry Hogan was elected county executive.
31
  Additionally, the county was 
swept up in the wave of anti-tax, anti-government sentiment sweeping the nation the 
same year. 
 
Tax Reform in Prince George’s County 
 If one single thing has had a major impact on the county, it is the tax referendum 
passed by county residents in 1978.  County politicians have long complained that it 
handcuffs them and does not allow the county to provide the types of services that would 
allow it to compare more favorably with its neighbors. 
The measure dubbed Tax Relief in Maryland (TRIM) permanently froze the 
amount of money the county could collect through property taxes at the 1979 budget 
level which was about $140 million. The measure was modeled after California‘s 
Proposition 13 and was part of a tax revolt sweeping the country.
32
  It was also part of a 
backlash against property taxes which soared as a result of the population explosion of 
the 1960s.  The swelling population led to increased demands for services.  The burden to 
provide those services primarily fell on homeowners because the county lacked a large 
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enough commercial tax base from which to extract the revenue (Granat 1986, 201).  
Support for the effort was also fueled by unrestrained development and a zoning process 
that led to allegations of corruption for which a county official was convicted (Gregg 
1983a). 
The Prince George‘s measure was particularly radical because it did not allow 
adjustments for inflation nor did it include an emergency clause.  Any changes to the 
measure would have to be done through referendum.  Nonetheless, most of the county‘s 
elected officials supported the measure or declined to publicly oppose it even though they 
had concerns about its impact (McQueen and Shapiro 1983).  They should have spoken 
up for the negative impact of TRIM was immediate.  The measure‘s passage led to 
immediate and deep cuts in the county‘s budget (Shapiro and McQueen 1983).  The 
school system and police department were particularly hard hit.
33
  TRIM‘s impact on the 
budget was so severe that it was amended in 1984.  Voters allowed the total amount of 
revenue collected to be increased but they also voted to freeze the property-tax rate.   
In 1992, voters rejected another tax proposal that would have limited annual 
increases in total property tax collections to the rate of inflation, up to 5 percent.  The 
measure failed in part because the county council preempted it by passing its own 
measure that limited the increase in a homeowner's assessment to the same rate for one 
year.  Additionally, the council voted to place a charter amendment on the 1994 ballot to 
make the assessment limit permanent.   
An economic downturn led to more budget cuts in the 1990s, and an effort was 
made to repeal TRIM in 1996.  This time the effort was spearheaded by a well-funded 
group of business and community leaders and had the support of most county officials.  
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Not only did voters reject the measure even though officials said the increased revenue 
would be used to improve schools and combat crime but they voted to toughen TRIM by 
requiring that any local tax increase be approved by voters (Neal and Perez-Rivas 1996).   
In 2003, the newly elected County Executive, Jack Johnson called for TRIM to be 
repealed arguing the county‘s future and its ability to provide adequate services depended 
on TRIM‘s repeal (Wiggins 2005).  However fear of political retribution caused Johnson 
to drop his efforts and TRIM remains in effect today.  TRIM‘s intent was to reduce the 
tax burden on Prince George‘s residents.  And while the measure has kept property 
assessment rates lower than they might otherwise have been, it has also led to the 
increase in other taxes, licenses, and fees (Beyers 1990; Wiggins 2003).   
Part of the reason why TRIM was popular to begin with and continues to be 
popular with residents is their distrust of county politicians.  The cozy relationship 
between politicians and developers at the perceived expense of residents coupled with 
past indiscretions made people hesitant to give the government more of its money.  
Ironically though, it is partly because of TRIM that county officials‘ have focused on 
economic growth as a way to overcome the tax constraint.  Because of the limits set by 
TRIM, any increase in the total revenue the county collects is dependent on the growth of 
the tax base. Thus every county administration has made economic development a 
priority which has a times led to the types of cozy relationships with developers residents 
reacted against (Fallis and Wilson 2000; Thompson and Flaherty 2008).  Moreover, this 
push for economic development has been a continuing source of conflict in the county, 




Demographic Change Leads to Political Change 
The 1980s began with the Prince George‘s Democratic Party badly fractured.  
Rocked by the devastating losses of 1978, the party structure that had kept the various 
factions together decayed.  The factional split was so bad that some tried unsuccessfully 
to resurrect the ―Breakfast Club‖ (Shapiro 1981).  Attempts to unify the party were also 
hurt by election changes.  In 1982, the at-large elections that determined county council 
seats were replaced with single district elections.  Being able to appeal to a narrower 
electorate afforded politicians the opportunity to be less dependent on the party 
machinery that was beneficial in a county-wide race.  As a result, campaigns became 
more personal and candidate focused.  The change gave ―maverick‖ candidates, or 
candidates independent of the Party a better chance of winning elections.  State 
legislators started creating their own slates which they headed.  Thus dueling slates 
became the norm.   
Some of the factionalism is a result of one party politics.  As expressed by V.O. 
Key, when one party dominates a community‘s politics, there is no opposing force to 
serve as the focus of the party‘s attention (Key 1958).  As a consequence focus is shifted 
to the party itself and the individual goals and ambitions of its members.  Another reason 
for the level of factionalism in Prince George‘s County is the diverse nature of the county 
itself.  Going back to the end of the 19
th
 century, the county has had something of a split 
personality.  It was at once rural and suburban.  The multiplicity of personalities has only 
increased as the county has grown and aged.  The county has been so many contradictory 
things at once.  It has been rural-urban, northern-southern, conservative-progressive, old-
timer-newcomer, working class-middle class, black-white, and inner Beltway-outer 
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Beltway.  Given this, it is not surprising that the county has a reputation for political 
theatre.   
The political arena in Prince George‘s County was changed in another important 
way. During the 1980s, Prince George‘s was beginning to feel the effects of a black 
population that was in the early stage of stretching its political muscle.  However, early in 
the 1980s, the level of interest in county politics for many blacks was low and voter 
turnout among blacks was low (Wynter 1981).  Many of the new black residents were 
still connected to their former communities in the District of Columbia and directed their 
social and political activities there.  However, the 1984 presidential campaign of Jesse 
Jackson helped inspire some blacks to take an increased interest in county politics 
(McQueen 1984).  As people turned their attention to the county, it became clear to many 
that the level of black representation in county politics was not keeping pace with their 
growing numbers.   
The first countywide ―Convention of Black People‖ was held in 1984 at Bowie 
State University, the county‘s historically black university (Thornton and Gooden 1997, 
188).  There were approximately 300 attendees and the topics of police protection, 
education, the black family, and economic development were discussed.  A particular 
focus of the convention was black political empowerment.  No specific goals came out of 
the meeting.  However, the convention did represent a significant attempt on the part of 
black residents to form a consensus.   A second convention was held a year later.  A 
tangible outcome of these efforts was a unified demand that Alexander Williams, a black 
attorney, be placed on the Democratic Party ticket as the state‘s attorney for Prince 
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George‘s County instead of the white incumbent, Arthur ―Bud‖ Marshall.  Williams was 
placed on the ticket and was subsequently elected state‘s attorney in 1986.   
The 1990s saw the continued growth in black political influence as African 
Americans became the majority in the county.  Two important events had a significant 
impact on county politics in general and the increase in black political power in 
particular.   The first was the imposition of term limits on the county council and 
executive in 1992.  The referendum limited officials to no more than two consecutive 
terms.  Further, it applied retroactively to the sitting council and executive.  As a result, 
the county executive and six of nine council members were barred from running in 1994.   
Some people felt the push for term limits was an attempt by whites in the county 
to diminish the growing political power of African Americans (Meyer 1992).  But others 
felt term limits would likely increase opportunities for blacks to gain elected office.  
Interestingly, the term limit measure that was passed by a margin of 51% to 49% in 1992 
was reaffirmed by the voters in 2000 when 60% of voters rejected a county council led 
ballot question to have the limits repealed (Honawar 2000).  Apparently, a majority of 
African American voters did not believe limits diminished their political power.   
Perhaps a reason why term limits did not have the deleterious effect some feared 
had to do with the second major event impacting county politics; the 1990 Census.  The 
Census confirmed the county population‘s transition to majority African American and 
required a redistricting that led to the creation of a majority-minority Congressional 
district that included Prince George‘s and Montgomery counties.
34
  In 1992, Albert Wynn 
(D), an African American state senator from Prince George‘s was elected to the United 
States House of Representative.   
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Redistricting also necessitated the redrawing of the county‘s council districts.  
Five of the nine districts became majority African American.  As a result four African 
Americans sat on the county council after the 1994 elections.  An interview respondent 
explained the reason why only four African Americans were elected was because 
although the district was majority black, the district‘s voters were majority white.  Even 
so, until 1994 no more than two African Americans had served on the council at any 
given time (Johnson 2002, 76).    
The continued decline in the ability of Democratic Party leadership to direct 
politics in the county continued in the 1990s.  As a result, party unity was almost 
nonexistent.  The large influx of middle class African Americans into the county during 
the 1980s brought new players to the political game.  Many of these new political 
aspirants were young, ambitious, and perhaps most importantly, not beholden to the old 
party structure.  Not content to wait for the Party to give them their turn, many challenged 
the Party establishment.  This is evidenced by the fact that 73 people filed to run for 29 
state legislature seats in the 1994 elections. (Meyer 1994a).       
A vivid example of this changing dynamic can be seen in the 1994 race for the 
25
th
 Legislative District‘s state senate seat.  The seat was vacated by Beatrice Tignor who 
chose to run for county executive.  The Democratic primary featured two state delegates; 
Ulysses Currie (elected in 1986) and Michael E. Arrington (elected in1990).  Currie was 
supported by Congressmen Steny H. Hoyer and Albert R. Wynn, both of whom formerly 
represented the district, and Maryland Senate President Thomas V. ―Mike‖ Miller, Jr. 
whose district includes Prince George‘s County.  Reacting to the endorsement, Arrington 
called Currie a ―token‖ and a ―pawn‖ and added that leadership attempts to dissuade him 
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from running were ―an effort to keep someone like myself, who is ambitious and 
independent and can't be controlled, from going over to the Senate" (Meyer 1994b).  
After a lively battle, Currie defeated Arrington.  What made this race particularly 
interesting was the fact that both candidates (and the outgoing incumbent) were African 
American.  So not only was there little unity within the Democratic Party, there was little 
unity among black politicians. 
Arrington‗s comments might suggest race was a divisive issue in county politics.  
Such was not the case.  While it would be disingenuous to say race played no role in 
county politics in the 1990s, it was not the volatile issue it had been in the 1970s.  This 
time race was primarily an issue of black empowerment as the majority African 
American county tried to carve out a new political identity.  The 1994 elections 
represented the first real opportunity for blacks in the county to wield significant political 
power.   
This said, other issues like education, crime, development and taxes were more of 
a priority for voters (Meyer 1994c).   Even in the 1994 historic county executive primary 
election that would lead to a first, an African American or female county executive, all 
three candidates in the campaign tried to play down race as an issue.
 35
  
Conventional wisdom had been that the two black candidates, Wayne Curry and 
Beatrice Tignor would split the black vote allowing Sue Mills, a white former 
councilmember, to win with the white vote.  The voters proved conventional wisdom 
wrong.  Not only did Curry win a large share of the black vote, he also garnered a large 
share of the white vote even beating Mills in what was supposed to be her stronghold.
36
  
These results prompted state Delegate James C. Rosapepe Jr. (D) who is white to say, ―I 
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think the assumptions of racial polarization were grossly exaggerated before the primary.  
The results show that at least the majority of Prince Georgians cast their votes based on 
their evaluations of the candidates and all their complexities‖ (Abramowitz 1994). 
Why did it take so long for blacks to garner a larger role in the county‘s power 
structure?  Some claim that for quite a while county blacks, having been District 
residents, were more concerned with what was happening in the District than with what 
was occurring in the county.  Others blame white power brokers in the Democratic 
organization who while putting blacks in appointed positions on boards and commissions, 
kept them off election slates for major offices (Granat 1986).   
In her examination of African American political incorporation in Prince 
George‘s County, Valerie Johnson (2002) concludes that by 1994, African Americans in 
Prince George‘s County had not achieved full political incorporation.  She cites four 
impediments to the realization of incorporation (131).  The first, and she adds the primary 
impediment, is ―the distinct and divergent class interests within the African American 
community‖.  Second, is African Americans‘ inability to mobilize to elect officials in 
numbers in proportion to their numbers in the population.  Next, is the inability of 
African Americans to form a consensus around a policy agenda.  Fourth and last has been 
resistance on the part of the dominant white governing coalition to African Americans‘ 
becoming equal partners.
37
  Notice that the first three obstacles are related and are the 
result of diversity within the African American population.  The black population in 
Prince George‘s, like the county itself, is not monolithic.  This would become more 
apparent as the county moved into the 21
st





 century began with African Americans having a firm grip on county 
politics.  Term limits once again created a massive turnover of political leadership in the 
county.  The county executive position and seven council seats were open in 2002.  No 
fewer than five people ran in the Democratic primary for county executive.  Jack Johnson 
emerged victorious and became the county‘s second African American county executive.  
African Americans became a majority on the county council as well.
38
   
With African Americans being a solid majority of the population, it seems as 
though many people have begun to move beyond race as a primary political motivator.  
In 2002, Edythe Flemings-Hall, head of the county‘s chapter of the NAACP said, ―We've 
had an opportunity to experience government under African American leadership. Now 
we've moved to a higher plateau where, no matter who the leader is, we must make sure 
they're acting in our main interests. We need to make sure that the person who's in office 
will be responsive to the voice of the African American community and not just represent 
us in complexion‖ (Schwartzman 2002d) 
But as race continues to fade as an issue at the turn of the century, class has 
emerged as the dividing line in county politics.  Once again the Beltway serves as a de 
facto dividing line between the classes.  Both sides are interested in reducing crime, 
improving the school system, easing traffic and drawing economic development.  
However, residents inside the Beltway focus on reducing class sizes, hiring certified 
teachers, pumping new life into tired, old strip malls, ridding neighborhoods of drug 
dealers, and punishing abusive police officers.  Outside the Beltway residents focus on 
controlling suburban sprawl, building new schools and luring high-quality restaurants and 
retail to Prince George's (Schwartzman 2002e).  The Reverend Robert Clemetson, a 
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leader of the Interfaith Action Communities, a coalition of county churches, said, ―When 
you look inside the Beltway, the politics is about seeking equity, seeking stability.  The 
politics of outside the Beltway is maintaining and building on what they have‖ (Ibid.).  
People inside the Beltway want to recapture the ―suburban dream‖ they have lost while 
those outside want to hold on to the dream they have been able to create for themselves.  
In a county that often finds itself financially constrained it is unlikely both sides can be 
fully satisfied.  Choices must be made, and with so much at stake, these choices are 
inevitably contentious.   
 
Summary 
Many of the changes in Prince George‘s County politics are directly related to the 
dramatic rise in county population and the demographic changes occurring in the county 
since the 1930s.  The bulk of these changes began in the 1960s when the county‘s 
population grew by 80%.  The newcomers were not steeped in the southern traditions of 
the older residents, and had little interest in a bucolic life.  They wanted a suburban oasis 
complete with all of the amenities and services that went with it.  In some ways what 
occurred in Prince George‘s County was a prototypical culture clash.  Further the rapidity 
of the population change was bound to exacerbate matters.  In some ways the tax revolt 
of 1978 can been seen as an attempt by some to return to the simplicity of Prince 
George‘s‘ past rather than the complexity and uncertainty of Prince George‘s‘ future.   
The 1980s were just as transformational as the 1960s because of the county‘s 
continued demographic change as middle class African Americans migrated to the 
county.  Evidence of the tremendous political changes in Prince George‘s County comes 
in the fact that a county that voted for segregationist George Wallace in the 1972 
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presidential primary just 12 years later voted for Jesse Jackson in the 1984 presidential 
primary.  By the turn of the century, African Americans had become over 60% of the 
county‘s population and were fully incorporated into the county‘s political structure.   
Prince George‘s County has undergone tremendous change over the past seven 
decades.  The county has transitioned from a mostly white, rural backwater town with a 
southern tobacco heritage to one of the largest, most affluent, majority-black 
communities in the country.  For a county that has changed so dramatically, it managed 
to do so with relatively little turmoil.  No doubt a fair amount of conflict that has 
occurred has been caused by the rapidity with which the county has changed.  And a 
great deal of the factionalism emanates from the contradiction that is Prince George‘s 
County.  ―The same heterogeneous quality that makes Prince George‘s [a] microcosm of 
the United States also makes it a battleground of the social and economic conflicts that 
trouble the country at large‖ (Eastman 1980). 
That Prince George‘s County is one of the wealthier counties in the nation is often 
lost in the shadows cast by its proximity to some of the wealthiest counties in the nation.  
While it might not measure up on a comparative scale on any objective scale, the county 
is doing well.  There is need for some concern however.  While the county as a whole is 
relatively affluent there are pockets of relative poverty in the county.  Communities 
inside the Beltway have been in decline for years and in many ways resemble the inner 
neighborhoods of city they border, Washington, D.C..  If Prince George‘s does not 
address these problems beginning with the improvement of its school system, the county 
is in danger of losing even more of the very middle class that has made the county a 
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   These 24 units include 23 counties and the city of Baltimore.  Frederick County 
which abuts Montgomery County on its northwest side is also part of Maryland‘s 
Washington suburban region.   
 
2
   In addition to slaves, there were a small number of free blacks.  By 1860, the 
white population was 9,650 while the slave population was 12, 500.  There were almost 
1,200 free blacks in the county (Virta 1991, 88).   
 
3
   The state of Maryland passed a new state constitution ending slavery in 1865.  




   This is most likely because of the large freed slave population in the county. 
 
5
   The population figures for Prince George‘s include the town of Takoma Park 
which was part of the county until 1997.  Up until that point, Takoma Park had been a 
divided town with one-third of the town in Prince George‘s County and the other two-
thirds in Montgomery County.  In 1995,Takoma Park residents voted to unite the town 
and become part of Montgomery County.  Census data prior to 2000 include Takoma 
Park in the counts. 
 
6
   The county‘s population was 660, 567 in 1970. 
 
7
   The desegregation of the county‘s schools is discussed into chapter 3. 
 
8
   Relations between the police department and the black community improved to 
such an extent in the 1980s that a majority of African Americans surveyed felt satisfied 
with the police department although a significant portion thought excessive force was still 
a problem.  This attitude was most expressed by those living in high-crime 
neighborhoods likely to have the most contact with the police (Harriston 1987). 
 
9
   During the decade, the county‘s foreign-born population grew by 60% 
(DeRenzis and Rivlin 2007, 6). 
 
10
   African Americans led the way with a 1.9% increase in their percentage of the 
population.  According to the report, Asians saw a 0.8% increase while all other minority 
groups saw a 0.9% increase.  These other minorities were primarily Hispanics.  No 
explanation was given for why Hispanics were not treated separately. 
 
11
   The next three jurisdictions with the largest minority populations were the 
District of Columbia with 23% of the metropolitan region‘s minority population.  It was 
followed by Montgomery County at 15% and Fairfax County in Virginia at 13%.  No 
other jurisdiction in the region had a minority population that comprised more than 5% of 






   The adjusted median income of in-migrants ranged from $28,000 to $30,400 
while the range was from $23,900 to $27,100 for out-migrants. 
 
13
   The Washington Metropolitan Statistical Area is composed of the District of 
Columbia and the Maryland counties of Calvert, Charles, Frederick, Montgomery, and 
Prince George‘s.  It includes the Virginia counties of Arlington, Clarke, Fairfax, 
Fauquier, Loudoun, Spotsylvania, Stafford, and Warren as well as the independent cities 
of Alexandria, Falls Church, Fairfax, Fredericksburg, Manassas, and Manassas Park.   It 
also includes the West Virginia county of Jefferson. 
 
14
   In a 2004 ranking of county median family income, Prince George‘s ranked 
60th out of more than 3100 counties (U.S. Bureau of Census 2004). 
  
15
   They include the counties of Loudon (1), Fairfax (2), and Prince William (9) 
in Virginia and Montgomery (7) and counties in Maryland.  Howard County which 
borders Prince George‘s on the east but is part of the Baltimore metropolitan area is the 
third wealthiest county in the country. 
 
16
   The list of top employers excludes post offices and state and local 
governments.  For that reason, the table does not include what is in fact the largest single 
employer in Prince George‘s County; Prince George‘s County Public Schools (PGCPS).  
As of the 2007-2008 school year, PGCPS employed 18,689 instructional and non-




   The enrollment number includes both undergraduates and graduates.  The 
employment number includes over 4,000 graduate assistants.  
 
18
   Other higher education institutions in the county include Capitol College, 
Washington Bible College, and TESST College of Technology.  Together they have an 




  The cities are Bowie, College Park, District Heights, Glenarden, Greenbelt, 
Hyattsville, Laurel, Mount Rainier, New Carrollton, and Seat Pleasant.  The incorporated 
towns are Berwyn Heights, Bladensburg, Brentwood, Capitol Heights, Cheverly, Colmar 
Manor, Cottage City, Eagle Harbor, Edmonston, Fairmount Heights, Forest Heights, 




   The Census Bureau defines a Census designated place as a statistical entity 
comprising a densely settled concentration of population that is not within an 






  These were the populations as of the 2000 Census. 
 
22
   The exception is Andrews Air Force Base which has the fifth lowest median 
family income.  This can be attributed to the large number of young military families 
living on the base.  These families receive in-kind benefits such as free housing and 




   This number does not include Eagle Harbor.  See note 29.   
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   The Census Bureau considers places with poverty rates above 20% to be areas 
of concentrated poverty (Bishaw 2005).  
 
25
   Although Eagle Harbor has the county‘s highest poverty rate, it is a 
community of only 55 and has just 13 families. Only two of these families fell below the 
poverty line.  Of the two, one has children under 18 making Eagle Harbor‘s poverty rate 
50%. 
   
26
   In 1990, there were 338 neighborhoods in the county.  There were 488 in 
2000.  A neighborhood is defined as a census block group. 
 
27
  One district the 27
th
 Legislative District encompasses parts of Prince George‘s 




   The Democratic Party has been the dominant party ever since.  Democrats 
outnumbered Republicans by 5 to1 in 2002.  By 2008, the margin was 8 to 1 (Maryland 
State Board of Elections 2002, 2008) 
 
29
   The council elections were at-large rather than district. 
 
30
   A special election was held in 1971 to elect a county executive and county 
council in accordance with the new county charter passed a year earlier.  Republican 
William Gullett won. 
 
31
   Hogan was the second of only two Republicans to serve as county executive.  
He was able to win because he sided with those opposing the remnants of the old 
machine.  Both Hogan and Gullett served only one term. 
 
32
   In 1978 there were tax limiting measures on the ballots in 16 states (McBee 
1978).   Montgomery County rejected a similar but less radical anti-tax proposal there.  
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   Because the county in overwhelmingly Democratic, most elections are settled 
in the primaries.   
 
36
   Mills‘ stronghold was supposed to be the southern portion of the county which 
is more conservative than the northern portion of the county.  Mills also lost in the 
county‘s primarily white districts (Keary 1994b). 
 
37
   White resistance to sharing power with blacks was an obstacle that had been 
overcome by the late 1990s.   
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Prince George’s County Public Schools: 
The Not So Calm Before the Storm 
 
Just as demographic change has played a defining role in the Prince George‘s 
County at-large; it has played an even larger role in the county‘s public education history.  
At the time of the school board‘s removal in 2002, Prince George‘s County Public 
Schools (PGCPS) operated 196 schools with 135,039 students (Maryland State 
Department of Education 2002).  It was and remains the second largest school system in 
the state with only Montgomery County‘s system being larger.
1
  Of those nearly 140,000 
students 77.4% were African American, 10.3% were white, 8.6% were Hispanic, and 
3.2% were Asian (Ibid.).  Of the 24 school systems in the state, Baltimore city‘s system 
was the only other school system with a majority African American student population.
2
     
The growth of the school system paralleled the growth of the county in its 
rapidity, especially in the last half of the 20
th
 century.  In 1919, 795 students were 
enrolled in the public schools (Prince George‘s Board of Education 1965, 36).  By 1939, 
the number was 17,125.  Enrollment tripled by the 1960 growing to 69,675 (Ibid., 2).  By 
the 1970 school year, student enrollment had again more than doubled, growing to 
160,900 (Maryland State Board of Education 1980, Table 4).  PGCPS enrollment peaked 
in 1972 with 162,828 students (Ibid.). 
Growth is usually accompanied by change, and change is not always easy.  Such 
has been the case for education in Prince George‘s County.  While it could be argued the 
county‘s educational system has made the transition from a small rural school system 
with a majority white population to a suburban (almost urban) mega-district with an 
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overwhelming majority black population better than most, it has not done so effortlessly.  
There have been difficulties.  For almost thirty of the last fifty years, PGCPS has been 
engaged in an ongoing struggle over the integration of its schools.   
The struggle over desegregation has had a profound impact on education politics 
in Prince George‘s County.  Desegregation and the debate surrounding it have played a 
large role in creating an attitude of skepticism (or mistrust) of school and government 
officials that runs through the county population.  It also has exposed class fissures within 
the African American community that have made it difficult for blacks to coalesce 
around a single educational vision.  Both the skepticism and class divisions make any 
attempt to bring the community together on behalf of education reform even more 
difficult than it is already.  More ominously for education reform, it increases the 
likelihood that the status quo will prevail by making coalition building much more 
difficult than it already is—if not impossible.  
Two other issues have contributed to the creation of the challenging environment; 
Tax Relief in Maryland (TRIM) and the Maryland School Performance Assessment 
Program (MSPAP).  TRIM is the voter initiative that capped property taxes in the county.  
It has significantly restricted the amount of money available for education which in turn 
has made the quest for education funding a continuously contentious matter.  MSPAP is 
the state test that is given to children annually.  PGCPS‘s poor performance on the test is 
a constant reminder of the system‘s failures, and as such contributes to the public‘s 
skepticism of the school officials in charge of it.   
TRIM and MSPAP will be discussed later in the chapter.  First, any discussion of 
PGCPS must begin with a discussion of desegregation because desegregation and its 
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tumultuous history are most responsible for shaping the environment of county education 
politics. 
 
 School Desegregation in Prince George’s County: A Decades Long Struggle 
As stated above, enrollment in PGCPS reached its zenith in 1972.  By 1979 
enrollment had dropped to 127, 529 (Ibid.).  This drop in enrollment was driven by two 
things.  The first was the end of the baby boom in 1964 which caused enrollments to drop 
across the Washington metropolitan region and the nation.  The second reason for the 
decline was more specific to Prince George‘s County: desegregation.   In 1972, the 
County was ordered by court decree to desegregate its schools [Vaughns v. Board of 
Education of Prince George’s County 355 F. Supp 1034 (D. Md. 1972)].  For the next 
thirty years, desegregation defined Prince George‘s County education.   But before 
getting into a discussion of those thirty years, it is necessary to go back to PGCPS‘s 
beginning. 
 
The Pre-Vaughns Years 
At the same time Maryland‘s General Assembly passed the School Act 
establishing public school systems in 1865, it passed the Public Instruction Act (Thornton 
and Gooden 1997, 129).  The Act allowed for some of the taxes paid by blacks to be used 
for the construction of schools for black children.  A third state law passed the same year 
required white and black children to be educated separately (Ibid.., 133).  Prince 
George‘s, however, did not begin to publicly educate black children until 1872 (Thornton 
and Gooden 1997, 130).   The county‘s dual school system lasted until 1965 when it was 
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officially abolished.  However, partly because of residential patterns, schools remained 
highly segregated (Virta 1998, 241).   
As was discussed in Chapter 2, many early African American migrants settled 
into the communities just beyond the District of Columbia‘s borders, and as blacks settled 
into those inner communities, whites ventured further out into eastern sections of the 
county.  These residential patterns helped contribute to a school system in which out of 
180 total schools, 10 had all black student populations, 9 were majority black, and 112 
had student populations that were 95% or more white (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 
1976).  61% of all black students attended majority black schools while almost 66% of 
white students attended schools that were at least 90% white (Denton 1972a).   
School demographics were also influenced by the Board of Education‘s reaction 
to the United State Supreme Court‘s decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
Kansas, 347 US 483 (1954) which struck down the practice of racial segregation in 
schools.  The board‘s first reaction to Brown was to ignore the ruling.  When it became 
clear that would not be possible, the board turned to a strategy of massive resistance that 
involved a series of ―freedom of choice‖ plans and bureaucratic non-responses (Thornton 
and Gooden1997, 146).   The ―freedom of choice‖ plans allowed a few select black 
students to apply for a transfer to a school close to their home.  A very small number of 
black students were allowed to attend white schools.  Loopholes in the transfer program 
also allowed whites to transfer away from black schools where they had been assigned.  
Additionally, new schools built to accommodate increasing enrollment were set at sites 
that insured the schools would be racially identifiable.  All of these actions were part of 
the county‘s attempt to delay implementation of Brown.  In fact, when these plans ended 
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in 1965, schools were more segregated than they were when the plans began in 1955 
(U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1976, 98). 
The response of Prince George‘s school board stands in stark contrast to the 
actions of Montgomery County‘s Board of Education.  In 1955, Montgomery also 
adopted a voluntary transfer  program.  However, after two years the plan was scrapped 
because only token progress was being made (Bowie 1961).  A board member remarked, 
―We realized that if desegregation was not to take 20 years or more, we would have to 
take the initiative‖ (Ibid.).  The board did take the initiative and by 1961, 72.9% of  
Montgomery County‘s 3,230 black students attended integrated schools (Ibid.).  
Meanwhile only 6% of Prince George‘s 7,800 black students attended integrated schools.   
Prince George‘s board had no intention of changing its policy of gradual (no) 
desegregation.  Moreover it was clear, the school board was more than willing to take 20 
years or more to desegregate their schools.  Indeed a Washington Post editorial called the 
county‘s transfer plan ―a device, not for desegregation, but for the discouragement of 
desegregation‖ (Washington Post 1962). 
The Civil Right Act of 1964 was supposed to end this kind of foot dragging.  
However, the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare‘s Office of 
Civil Rights (OCR) allowed the county to continue stalling as the two negotiated an 
acceptable desegregation plan. (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1976).  Finally in 1969 
the two developed a plan that redrew attendance zones and desegregated two all-black 
schools.  The board in a five to three vote approved the plan.  An opponent of the plan 
Board President Carroll Beatty said he, ―would rather have a court tell me to do this than 
justify this to the people of our community‖ (Ehrlander 2002, 95). Desite intense 
93 
 
opposition, the plan was implemented.  However, the OCR questioned the plan‘s 
implementation  as a large number of transfers undercut its effectiveness (Ibid., 98).  
Despite the OCR‘s concerns, the school board refused to review the transfers.     
In January 1972, OCR scheduled a non-compliance hearing against the county 
and threatened to withhold federal funds from PGCPS.  However, the OCR essentially 
gave the county another year to desegregate when it removed its threat to withhold funds 
from the school system in March.  Once again, the county was allowed to stonewall.    
While the federal government was willing to wait for change, others were not.  A 
week later, March 29, 1972, the Prince George‘s County chapters of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) filed suit on behalf of eight black parents [Vaughns v. Board of 
Education of Prince George’s County, 355 F. Supp 1034 (D. Md. 1972)].  The plaintiffs 
accused the board of operating a dual system in direct violation of Brown.  The parents 
were joined in their lawsuit by two school board members; Jesse J. Warr, the board‘s 
only black member and Ruth S. Wolf, a supporter of desegregation.   
Using the County‘s own data, United States District Court Judge Frank Kaufman, 
found PGCPS in violation of Brown and ordered involuntary busing to desegregate the 
schools.  On January 29, 1973, busing formally began in Prince George‘s County.  In 
accordance with the court order, the black enrollment at each school was to be no less 
than 10% of the total school population and no more than 50%.  Bus rides were to have 
total maximum times of 35 minutes with an average of 14 minutes one way.  It must be 
noted that the court order increased the number of children being bused to school by less 
than ten percent (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1976, 345).  Prior to the court order, 
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48.4% of students were bused.  After the order, 56.1% were bused.  While many were 
opposed to busing and there were numerous meetings and rallies against busing, fears of 
significant violence proved unfounded as busing‘s commencement was relatively 
peaceful.
3
   
    
Court-Ordered Busing Comes to Prince George’s County 
Busing had some immediate consequences.  The most immediate came the day 
after busing began as members of the county‘s state delegation introduced a bill in the 
Maryland General Assembly to have school board members elected.  School board 
members had been appointed by the governor.  The drive for an elected board was led by 
people angry about busing, and the inability of the school board to stop it.  County 
Delegate Frederick C. Rummage (D) said, ―We are going to thank the school board for its 
inaction by passing an elected school board bill this year, which we hope will make them 
more responsive‖ (Walsh 1973).  The bill passed, and in the county‘s first school board 
election, six of eight candidates backed by Citizens for Community Schools, the county‘s 
largest anti-busing group won seats on the school board (Krause 1973). 
What more the board could have done is unclear.  At every turn, the board sought 
to delay desegregation.  In fact, the board had delayed significant desegregation until 
forced to do so by the court.  Even then the board tried to delay busing‘s start date.  The 
board‘s behavior did not go unnoticed by the court.  Judge Kaufman called the board 
obstructionist and said, there had been ―repeated and continued attempts by the school 
board to avoid changes required by law, to develop varying methods for circumvention of 
the law, [and] to delay any changes which the court ordered‖ (Denton 1972b).   
Apparently this was not enough for desegregation opponents.  It is slightly ironic that 
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thirty years later, the majority black, elected school board that was to be ousted in 2002 
owed its existence to the actions of anti-integrationists. 
The other immediate reaction to court ordered desegregation was white flight.  
Table 3-1 shows changes in PGCPS enrollment from 1968 to 1984.  Enrollment was 
steadily increasing until 1972 when enrollment dropped by 859 students.  The drop was 
attributable to a decline in white students.  Between 1971 and 1972 PGCPS lost 4,926 
white students.  The steep decline in white students was offset by an increase of 3,947 
black students.  [In 1971 the number of white students also declined.  However, growth in 
the number of black students compensated for the white decline and PGCPS‘s enrollment 
actually grew by 1931 students.]  Some of the white decline was caused by an aging 
white community.  The children of many of the residents flocking to the county during 
the 1950s and 1960s aged out of the system.  Further the end of the Baby Boom 
contributed to a decline in enrollment.  But since declines were across all grades, 
something other than the normal attrition had to be at work.  That something was 

























% Students in 
Desegregated. 
Schools 
1968 146,976 124,663 22,313 84.8% 15.2% 23.2 
1969 153,937 126,783 27,154 1.7 21.7 24.0 
1970 160,897 127,570 31,994 0.6 17.8 24.8 
1971 162,828 123,952 36,450 -2.8 13.9 29.2 
1972 161,969 119,026 40,397 -4.0 10.8 32.2 
1973 154,305 107,397 43,649 -9.8 8.1 89.0 
1974 150,022 101,757 45,988 -5.3 5.4 86.0 
1975 148,336 94,838 49,975 -6.8 8.7 83.6 
1976 144,532 86,939 53,667 -8.3 7.4 74.3 
1977 139,302 78,476 56,711 -9.7 5.7 65.3 
1978 133,613 70,309 58,785 -10.4 3.7 61.2 
1979 127,462 62,195 60,415 -11.5 2.8 52.3 
1980 121,893 56,031 60,793 -9.9 0.6 47.4 
1981 116,309 50,348 60,569 -10.1 0.4 44.2 
1982 111,805 45,843 60,273 -8.9 -0.5 42.3 
1983 108,196 42,128 60,305 -8.1 0.1 37.1 
1984 105,830 38,816 61,118 -7.9 1.3 82.5 
    Source: Maryland State Department of Education. Annual Reports  
 
As the reality of busing became clear, whites began to leave PGCPS.  In the first 
year of court-ordered busing, 1973, the number of white students enrolled in PGCPS 
dropped by nearly ten percent more than doubling the rate of the previous year.  The 
white population continued to decline, falling to 38,816 in 1984.  In 15 years, the white 
student population in PGCPS declined by 69.5%.  Conversely, the black student 
population increased 91% moving from 31,994 in 1970 to 61,118 in 1984.   
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Needless to say, the changing demographics had a profound impact on the 
county‘s efforts to keep its schools desegregated.  Just before court ordered busing began, 
46 schools had black majorities (Feinberg 1976).  That number fell to one majority black 
school when busing began in 1973.  But because of the rapidly changing demographics, 
the next year eleven schools that had been desegregated became resegregated.
4
  By 1975, 
46 of the county‘s 233 schools again had black majorities (Feinberg 1975).  In 1976 the 
number had jumped to 67 (Feinberg 1976).  And by 1978, 94 of the county‘s schools had 
black majorities (Feinberg 1978).  Of those, 10 were more than 80% black.  Conversely, 
six elementary schools had populations that were less than 10% black.  Those schools 
were located near the white enclaves of Laurel and Bowie.
5
  By 1980, 120 of the system‘s 
then 216 schools were outside the original 10/50 guidelines (Wynter 1982).  Moreover 
the percentage of racially identifiable schools, 45%, almost equaled the 48% that existed 
before schools were originally desegregated in 1973 (Ibid.).   
In addition to demographic changes, part of the increased segregation was caused 
by the school board‘s failure to redraw the attendance boundaries created at the start of 
court ordered desegregation.  Once again, the school board chose inaction as its approach 
to dealing with desegregation preferring not make the difficult but needed choices sure to 
draw complaints.  The board seems to have chosen a strategy of waiting for the court to 
force it to take action.  Doing so allowed the board to direct criticism towards the court 
and avoid taking responsibility.  As we shall see in the following chapter, the issue of 
board responsibility is a reoccurring theme in the county. 
Because of the changing demographics and limitations on bus travel time, most of 
the burdens of busing fell on blacks.  Most remaining whites lived well beyond the 
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Beltway out in the northern and eastern portions of the county.  They were too far out to 
bus to the schools inside the Beltway.  Thus, it was left to blacks from inner Beltway 
communities to be bused to schools just beyond the Beltway.  Blacks living in integrated 
middle class neighborhoods in the center portion of the county saw no need in having 
their children bused to other schools when they could attend neighborhood schools that 
would be naturally integrated.  Even more, the failure to properly update the busing plan 
resulted in some black students being bused from integrated or majority black 
neighborhoods to attend majority black schools.  For many this situation made little 
sense, and by 1979 a significant number of blacks had become as weary of busing as 
whites.  It was this weariness perhaps that led to a pact between Norman Saunders, 
school board chairman and William Martin, president of the county chapter of the 
NAACP.   
The two agreed to reduce the number of children bused by allowing children in 
integrated communities to attend neighborhood schools.  The plan would also allow some 
schools to become almost entirely black if the affected communities approved.   Though 
the school board was willing to accept the plan, it was not received well by the 
membership of the county NAACP for at least two reasons (Feinberg 1979).  First the 
agreement was reached after a series of secret meetings between Martin and Saunders.  
People did not like being left out of the loop.  Second and most important, people in the 
local chapter felt the agreement represented a dangerous retreat from the NAACP‘s long 
struggle to integrate schools.  Opposition to the effort was so great that Martin was 
suspended by the national NAACP for violating policy, and the NAACP refused to 
endorse the plan, thus killing it (Henry 1979).   
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Although it was rejected, the plan exposed a growing difference of opinion within 
the black community; differences based on class.  Poor and working class blacks living in 
the older, inner Beltway communities tended to be most supportive of desegregation 
efforts.  For them busing was a matter of equity.  They did not necessarily want their 
children bused more than anyone else.  They simply wanted their children to obtain the 
resources and advantages that those outside the Beltway enjoyed; busing was a means to 
that end.  On the other hand, middle-class blacks living beyond the Beltway already 
enjoyed those resources and as a result were less passionate about the need to 
desegregate.  For them desegregation was a philosophical or moral issue rather than a 
personal equity issue.  
The plan‘s rejection did not stop attempts to end busing.  After trying 
unsuccessfully for years to develop a proposal to end or reduce busing in the county, the 
school board unilaterally approved a proposal to reduce busing by 25% in 1980.
6
   The 
county chapter of the NAACP opposed the plan fearing it would lead to the resegregation 
of schools.  The organization moved to have the original desegregation case reopened.  
This time the NAACP alleged that altering the busing plan was a violation of the court‘s 
order.  The plaintiffs also tried to broaden the case by including additional equity issues.  
Among them were the underrepresentation of minority students in Talented and Gifted 
(TAG) programs, an overrepresentation of African Americans in special education 
programs, a high number of black suspensions, and the creation of racially identifiable 





Desegregation in the 1980s: A New Plan Emerges 
In 1983, Judge Kaufman found that though not the result of intentional 
discrimination, the school system was in violation of his Vaughns ruling.   The judge 
found that the school system had not achieved unitary status and directed the county to 
take additional measures to desegregate schools.  Acknowledging the county‘s changing 
demographics, Judge Kaufman changed the racial guideline for schools from 10/50 to 
10/80 and increased the upper level for black concentration in a school from 50 to 80 
percent.  With the new guidelines, 29 schools had populations greater than 80% black and 
two schools had populations that were less than 10% black.
7
 
In his ruling, Judge Kaufman also appointed an expert panel to develop a 
desegregation plan for the county.  The panel‘s report, dubbed the ―Green Report‖ after 
the panel‘s chairman Robert L. Green, called for a number of wide ranging adjustments 
to the existing desegregation plan (Green 1985).   It suggested sending children from 
majority black communities inside the Beltway to majority white communities outside 
the Beltway and vice versa.  The busing would leapfrog integrated communities in 
between.  In those integrated communities children would be allowed to attend their 
neighborhood schools.  The panel also suggested closing 32 schools as well as pairing 
schools and dividing grades between them as a way to integrate.   
The report drew an immediate response from the county; most of it negative.  As 
expected the school board which had consistently looked for ways to reduce busing 
opposed the possibility of increased busing.  School officials cited the large number of 
schools in black communities to be closed as part of the reason for their opposition to the 
panel‘s plan (Vobjeda 1985a).  This objection was ironic because it was in part the school 
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board‘s attempt to close 22 schools, most of which were in majority black 
neighborhoods, that led the NAACP to ask that the original desegregation case be 
reopened.  White parents also reacted negatively to the Green Report.  John Rosser, a 
plaintiff in the original 1972 desegregation lawsuit, claimed the report inspired such 
uproar because, for the first time, large numbers of white children would be affected 
(Vobjeda 1985b).  
Opposition to the report was not limited to whites however.  The Black Coalition 
Against Unnecessary Busing, a parent group organized by Parent Teacher Association 
(PTA) leaders, also rejected the Green Report‘s recommendations (Vobjeda 1985c).  The 
group claimed the county‘s educational problem could not be solved with increased 
busing.  Instead, the coalition preferred children attend neighborhood schools and 
additional resources be spent in schools that were underperforming.  Many blacks were 
tired of bearing the brunt of busing and did not want to see more of their neighborhood 
schools closed.   
As an alternative to the Green Report proposals, Superintendent John A. Murphy 
developed a more voluntary desegregation plan that was based on the creation of magnet 
schools.  These schools would have specialized programs unavailable in neighborhood 
schools and would thus act as a magnet attracting children from outside the neighborhood 
to the school.  In Prince George‘s, the magnets would be used to attract white students to 
schools with black student populations over the court allowable limit and black students 
to majority white schools with black populations lower than the court sanctioned 
minimum.  While the proposed magnets would not eliminate the current busing plan, the 
hope was that in time the magnets would reduce the amount of involuntary busing in the 
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county.  Using a remedy allowed by the U.S. Supreme Court in another desegregation 
case, Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II), the plan also called for extra 
resources to go to those majority black schools too geographically isolated to make 
busing feasible.   
In the summer of 1985, the school board and the NAACP met to hash out a 
compromise solution using Murphy‘s plan as a template.  On June 21, all parties to the 
lawsuit signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) governing desegregation in the 
county (Court Appointed Panel 1997). The centerpiece of the agreement was the 
implementation of the magnet program to be used in conjunction with continued busing.  
For those schools with high black populations for which busing would be impractical 
(Milliken II schools), additional resources were to be provided to compensate for their 
racial isolation.   The goal of the new desegregation plan was to have 85% of all county 
schools within the 10/80 guideline within three years.  Additionally, the plan was to 
remain in effect until such time as black enrollment became 65% of the county‘s total 
enrollment.
8
   
The new plan came after thirteen years of wrangling between the school board 
and the NAACP.  Judge Kaufman noted as much when he said, "We've now been about 
our efforts to try to achieve unitary status [desegregation] for more than a decade . . . . If 
we could have a little bit less fighting and scrapping about every little issue, we could 
move ahead" (Vobejda 1985d).  The constant struggle created a contentious environment 
and led to feelings of mistrust on both sides.   
In August 1985, PGCPS began the new school year with  magnet programs in 
twelve schools and ten compensatory (Milliken II) schools.
9
  The magnet programs were 
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an immediate hit.  Around 1,900 white parents completed applications for the 1,000 TAG 
magnets seats (Vobejda 1985e).  The magnets were able to change the racial balance at 
eight of the twelve schools in which they operated.  The magnets were so popular that 17 
new magnet programs were opened the following year and another 13 opened in the fall 
of 1987 (Marquand 1987).  Moreover, between 1984 and 1987, 4,000 children switched 
from private schools to PGCPS (Ibid.).    
The magnets also drew national attention to the school system.  Congressional 
leaders and even President Ronald Reagan gave the system accolades with Reagan 
calling PGCPS, ―one of the great success stories of the educational reform movement‖ 
(Eaton and Crutcher 1996, 277).  Even the Milliken II schools seemed to be thriving.  In 
1988, Columbia Park Elementary, a Milliken II school, won a national achievement 
award from the U. S. Department of Education.
10
  For the first time in a long time, 
PGCPS was being perceived of in a positive light.  Unfortunately, the good feelings 
would not last.  
The magnets were initially successful in integrating schools.  81.4% of Prince 
George‘s students (the goal was 85%) attended schools that were within the court‘s 10/80 
range by 1988 (Norris 1988).  However, as the African American percentage of the 
student population continued to grow, the ability of magnets to desegregate schools was 
diminished.  An examination of Table 3-2 shows the steady climb in African American 






















1985 102,997 35,804 61,342 34.8 59.6 81.1 
1986 102,530 33,567 62,778 32.7 61.2 81.1 
1987 103,325 32,042 64,714 31.0 62.6 80.8 
1988 104,090 30,968 66,219 29.8 63.6 81.5 
1989 105,595 29,706 68,072 28.1 64.5 77.2 
1990 107,575 28,675 70,212 26.7 65.3 76.9 
1991 109,897 27,681 72,888 25.2 66.3 75.6 
1992 111,132 26,079 75,165 23.5 67.6 70.8 
1993 113,570 24,906 78,235 21.9 68.9 71.4 
1994 116,383 23,502 81,844 20.2 70.3 72.0 
1995 119,951 22,334 86,141 18.6 71.8 74.2 
1996 122,831 20,665 89,990 16.8 73.3 76.6 
1997 128,347 19,580 96,000 15.3 74.8 n/a 
1998 130,259 18,115 98,755 13.9 75.8 n/a 
1999 131,059 16,583 100,385 12.7 76.6 n/a 
2000 133,723 15,303 103,224 11.4 77.2 n/a 
2001 135,039 13,876 104,518 10.3 77.4 n/a 
 Sources: Court Appointed Panel Vaughns v. Prince George‘s County Board  
of Education, 1997; Maryland State Department of Education, The Fact Book  
1998-2001 
 
Table 3-2 shows the percentage of students in desegregated schools.  After the 
1988 school year, the number of children in desegregated schools never reached 80%.  
There just were not enough white students, and you cannot integrate what you do not 
have.  It was becoming clear that student demographics were making any idealized 
version of integration impossible.   
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Along with concerns about the magnets‘ desegregation effectiveness, were other 
concerns about equity.  There was some concern that whites were benefiting more from 
the magnets than blacks since more whites were admitted to the magnets than blacks.  
Additionally there was concern that the magnets might create a ―school within a school‖ 
scenario in which those in the magnet are separated from those outside it with little or no 
contact between the two.  The advisory committee formed to oversee the desegregation 
plan, Community Advisory Council on Magnet and Compensatory Educational Programs 
(known as the Committee of 100) noted these concerns in its second annual report 
(Community Advisory Council on Magnet and Compensatory Educational Programs 
1987).  The Committee was concerned that people saw the magnet schools as better than 
non-magnet schools, and they indicated that parents had expressed concerns about a 2-
tier system of ―haves and have nots‖ in which magnets get more money, the best 
teachers, and innovative instructional materials that non-magnet schools cannot get (Ibid., 
33).  Some parents at comprehensive schools—schools that were neither magnets or 
Milliken II—worried that their schools would become second class schools because they 
were not given any new programs or additional resources.   
By the early 1990s, the desgregation plan that seemed so promising had lost its 
aura as it became clear that magnets were not the answer, and the tide had turned against 
court-ordered busing. 
   
The Beginning of the End of Court-Ordered Busing 
Many in the county began to believe that traditional desegregation approaches had 
reached the limits of their effectiveness.  The Committee of 100 said as much in its fourth 
interim report when it stated the magnets and Milliken II schools while effective at 
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elevating educational quality, ―have gone as far as they can in meeting racial percentage 
guidelines‖ (Community Advisory Council on Magnet and Compensatory Educational 
Programs 1991, 13).  Alvin Thornton, a committee member and future school board 
chairman said, ―We must move beyond numbers to a new definition of equality‖ (Leff 
1991a).  This definition focused on ―educational equity‖ which required providing the 
resources given to Milliken II and magnet schools to all schools.  According to 
Superintendent Murphy, ―We have to focus more on outcomes than on how the numbers 
look, whether our children are getting equal access to quality education‖ (Ibid.).  In fact 
the Committee of 100‘s new definition of a ―unitary‖ school system was one in which, 
―each child has an opportunity to leave the school system equipped to fulfill their 
potential (Community Advisory Council on Magnet and Compensatory Educational 
Programs 1991, 17).  The new definition had no mention of race or integration.  The 
Committee even went so far as to recommended considering the elimination of forced 
busing (Ibid.,13).   
Many in the county had come to question the wisdom of involuntary integration 
altogether.  While whites in the county had generally opposed desegregation from the 
outset, more and more African Americans had become just as skeptical.  Through the 
years blacks‘ frustrations with busing had increased as they continued to bear a 
disproportionate share of the burden of busing.  A 1991 school system report found that 
89% of about 11,000 children bused for desegregation purposes were black (Gonzalez 
1991).  Moreover, the report showed that as many as 1,650 students were being bused for 
no apparent reason.  Also blacks grew frustrated as integration did not bring the academic 
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benefits they had hoped.  PGCPS students still performed below state averages on 
multiple assessments (Leff 1993a). 
The strongest opposition to involuntary desegregation came from middle class 
black parents who were dubious of its purported benefits.  Many in the black middle class 
were happily ensconced in outer Beltway, middle class neighborhoods and had no more 
desire to have their children bused to the poor neighborhoods inside the Beltway than 
whites did.  Also, many new black residents rejected the premise that their children 
needed to sit next to white children in order to get the education they deserved (Leff 
1991a).  Wayne Curry, who would become the county‘s first African American county 
executive in 1994, said of these parents, ―They are tired of chasing white kids all over 
this county, especially since their kids are now in the majority‖ (Ibid.).  Many middle 
class blacks had come to the county precisely because they liked the idea of an affluent, 
majority-black county in which they could determine their own destiny.  The notion that 
they needed white children to secure a quality education for their black children was 
unacceptable.     
In September of 1992, County Executive Parris Glendening proposed a major 
school construction program designed to return children to neighborhood schools and end 
court-ordered busing.  His proposal called for the building or renovation of about six 
schools in the inner Beltway communities that had schools closed during the 1970s and 
1980s as enrollment declined.  Lacking sufficient funding or political support, the plan 
died.  Two years later the school board presented for discussion its own proposal to end 
busing in July.  The nearly $350 million plan called for the building or reopening of 16 
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schools and the expansion of 22 more.  Though generally positively received, funding 
concerns also put this plan on hold.   
The difficulty in ending busing despite widespread opposition by both blacks and 
whites was due in part to racial politics.  In 1992, the majority of school board members 
were white as was the superintendent.  They were afraid of stirring the racial pot without 
having something to offer the NAACP which was reluctant to end busing.  Blacks on the 
other hand were suspicious of the white leadership.  A black board member Frederick C. 
Hutchinson said of black activists, they had ―no confidence the school system could be 
trusted, given the [majority-white] constitution of the school board‖ (Leff 1993b).  Also, 
many were loath to relinquish the leverage the court order gave them.  Hutchinson added, 
―Suppose you are suing me and you had the legal upper hand. All of a sudden I decide I 
want you to withdraw the suit and relinquish your upper hand and [I] promise [I] will be 
good -- this time.  What would you do?‖ (Ibid.).  The result was the status quo remained 
despite widespread dissatisfaction.  Kenneth Johnson, another black school board 
member described the stalemate thusly, ―What the busing brought was nobody trusting 
anybody.  We need to let go of some of the fears that have grown up with us over the 
years‖ (Ibid.).   
Two years later in 1996, the school board tried a different approach.  Rather than 
trying to end busing, it preferred to modify the county‘s desegregation plan.  The board 
unilaterally decided to abandon the court-ordered racial guidelines for the county‘s 
magnet programs by opening up 500 seats to black students.  The seats had been reserved 
for white students as part of the county‘s desegregation plan but were empty because 
there were not enough white children to fill them.  At the same time 4,000 black children 
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sat on a waiting list to get into the magnet programs (Frazier 1996a).  The school board 
was caught between parents who wanted their children to attend what they believed to be 
PGCPS‘ best schools and others who feared increased segregation as a result of the 
change.   In response to the board‘s action, the NAACP petitioned the court to block the 
board‘s decision.   
To the surprise of everyone, the judge now presiding over the case, U.S. District 
Judge Peter J. Messitte, decided to do more than just rule on the legality of the board‘s 
action.  He decided to conduct a comprehensive review of the county‘s desegregation 
plan.  Judge Messitte appointed a panel of experts to review the plan, but encouraged 
both parties in the case to reach a settlement on their own.  The review panel found that 
continued busing contributed little to desegregating schools, and the magnets had reached 
their limits of effectiveness as desegregation tools (Court Appointed Panel 1997).  
Moreover, because of the changes in student demographics, the racial imbalance in some 
schools had worsened since 1974.  The county‘s demographics made the county‘s ability 
to make any further progress on desegregation unlikely.  As a result, the panel did not 
oppose PGCPS being declared a unitary district.  However, it did recommend that certain 
requirements be met; the greatest among them was the development of a master plan of 
action for the system‘s new status (Ibid., xxiv). 
Faced with the likelihood of busing being ended without making provisions for 
the building of new schools, the school board and the NAACP began discussions on the 
board‘s six-year plan for a return to neighborhood schools.  The plan, which had been 
floating around since 1994 and now called the ―Community Schools Education Plan,‖ 
would cost $333 million for the construction and expansion of schools (Task Force on 
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Education Funding Equity 1998).  It would also require $500 million in operating costs 
over eight years, and this time there appeared to be the political will and funding 
necessary to support the plan.  An NAACP official part of the negotiations said the 
NAACP was willing to reach a compromise with the school board because the judge 
insisted on it.  ―They all realized this could go on and on and on, costing more time and 
money.‖
11
  Also the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was a conservative court.  If the 
judge ruled in favor of the school board and released the system outright, the NAACP 
was not likely to win an appeal.  Reaching a new MOU would force the school board to 
pay attention to the NAACP‘s concerns.   
On March 20, 1998, County Executive Wayne K. Curry, Board of Education 
Chairman Alvin Thornton and NAACP President Hardi Jones signed an agreement to end 
court supervised desegregation in the county.  The agreement called for the phasing out 
of mandatory busing as new schools were to be built between 1999 and 2002 (Frazier 
1998a).  The magnets would be maintained and Milliken II schools would continue to 
receive compensatory support.  Additional money would also be spent on comprehensive 
schools.  The agreement also required PGCPS to develop a plan to reduce the academic 
achievement gap between African American and non-black students.  In September 1998, 
Judge Messitte approved the MOU after county and state officials committed funding for 
school construction.  Finally in 2002, PGCPS was declared unitary and the desegregation 
lawsuit that had defined (plagued) the system for thirty years was dismissed. 
 
Analysis  
Desegregation, an already complicated issue was even more so in Prince George‘s 
County.  The initial strategy of passive resistance employed by the board of education led 
111 
 
to frustrations on both sides of the debate.  Those opposed to desegregation wanted the 
school board to more actively resist.  Supporters on the other hand wanted full 
compliance.  Thus neither side was satisfied.  Once the board complied with the court‘s 
order, it spent much of the next thirty years trying to reduce the mechanism necessary for 
compliance; busing.  The repeated attempts made blacks doubt that the board was acting 
in good faith.  The lack of results from the attempts made whites doubt the effectiveness 
of the board‘s efforts.  
Over time, white resistance to busing based on racial animus decreased as those 
most opposed left the county.  However, black resistance increased as African Americans 
became a larger percentage of the population.  New, middle class blacks rejected the core 
premise of busing; the necessity of black children to attend schools with white children in 
order to receive a quality education.  At the same time older working class blacks had 
grown weary of shouldering the burden of desegregation.  By the time busing ended, just 
about everyone in the County was glad to see it go.  Yet, because of changes in the 
county‘s demographics, many Prince George‘s schools were as segregated in 2002 as 
they had been in 1972.  And in addition to being racially segregated, schools were also 
segregated by class.   
Busing in Prince George‘s County has had an enormous impact on education 
politics in the county.  Among other things, court-ordered desegregation exposed deep 
divisions within the county‘s African American population.  It became clear that the 
interests of middle and upper class blacks differed from those of working class and poor 
blacks.  Not only were the interests different, but they at times worked against each other.  
The lack of unity within the black community diminished the pressure on the school 
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board to improve the quality of education for African American children which after all 
was the intended purpose of the original lawsuit anyway.   
Additionally, the struggle over desegregation led to increased levels of mistrust 
and skepticism throughout the county.  First, there was increased racial mistrust between 
blacks and whites.  Second, as the difference in their interests became apparent, middle 
class and working class blacks became more skeptical of each other‘s motives.   Third 
and most importantly for PGCPS, the public as a whole became increasingly skeptical 
and mistrustful of school officials as year after year school officials struggled to develop 
and maintain a desegregation plan acceptable to all constituents.   Of course with various 
constituents wanting competing outcomes, pleasing everyone if not most was most likely 
impossible.  This was especially true given the system‘s rapidly changing student 
demographics. 
But what did years of desegregation do for those most affected by busing; the 
children?  Not much according to Washington Post columnist, William Raspberry who 
wrote a week after the settlement was reached in 1998, ―In a nutshell: Twenty-five years 
of often-bitter warfare has ended with little to show for it, either in racial integration or in 
academic performance (Raspberry 1998).‖  By the end of court-ordered desegregation, a 
school system that had been 69.6% white had become 77.4% African American 
(Maryland State Department of Education 2002).  And as we will see in the next section, 
desegregation apparently did little to improve African American achievement.  
  
School Performance and MSPAP
12
   
In 1972 PGCPS was sued because parents were dissatisfied with the quality of 
education their children were receiving.  In 2002, thirty years later, parents were still 
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dissatisfied.  In a 2002 Washington Post poll, only 43% of surveyed Prince Georgians 
gave the schools a favorable rating while 52% considered the schools to be a major 
problem (Washington Post 2002).  The number one reason cited for the negative 
evaluation was the poor performance of county schools on state performance tests.    
Maryland has had a state testing program since 1971 when Maryland‘s General 
Assembly, taking the lead on education reform, passed a school accountability law 
designed to improve education by making state and local officials responsible for meeting 
their own educational goals.  The program used national norm referenced tests and 
focused on minimal competencies (Governor‘s Commission on School Performance 
1989).  Table 3-3 shows some of the results from the first test given during the 1973 
school year.  PGCPS lagged behind the state and its immediate neighbors, Montgomery 
and Howard counties.  It did outperform Baltimore city.  So even when PGCPS had a 
majority white student population the system performed poorly on state assessments. 
Table 3-3  Maryland Accountability Program 
  Results for Prince George‘s County and  




  Maryland  3.93 3.61 
Prince George's 3.86 3.61 
Montgomery 4.4 4.04 
Howard 4.46 3.97 
Baltimore city 3.36 3.08 
Grade 5 
  Maryland 5.5 5.53 
Prince George's 5.34 5.45 
Montgomery 6.15 6.15 
Howard 6.08 5.96 
Baltimore city 4.89 4.82 
   Source: Maryland State Department of Education 
Summary Highlights, MAP 1974-75  
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In 1991 Maryland began a new school performance program: the Maryland 
School Performance Program (MSPP).  This program was designed to be more rigorous 
and set higher standards than the previous program.  Instead of focusing on minimal 
competencies as the initial program did, MSPP focused on proficiency.  Students were 
given a series of assessments (MSPAP) on a number of subjects.
13
  A school district or 
school achieved the proficiency goal when 70% of its students met the ―satisfactory‖ 
standard and 25% met the ―excellent‖ standard.   
Achievement standards were deliberately set high.  So high in fact that school 
systems were not expected to meet the standards until 1996.
14
  As an incentive to improve 
test scores, the state used a carrot and stick approach by giving bonuses to schools that 
made significant progress while threatening failing schools with state takeover.  Each 
year schools and school systems were expected to make improvements.  Schools that 
failed to make adequate yearly progress (AYP) were put on a watch list for potential 
takeover.  To be on the list, schools must have been far from standard and have shown 
little or no progress for multiple years.  If schools remained on the list for two 
consecutive years they became eligible for reconstitution, state takeover or other 
corrective action. 
Since the tests began, PGCPS has ranked either second from or next to the bottom 
and in 2002 only Baltimore city schools fared worse than Prince George‘s schools (Hill 
1994b; Trejos 2002b).  Table 3-4 shows the MSPAP scores in reading and mathematics 
for Prince George‘s and neighboring jurisdictions. 
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2001 
    % Sat. PG Mont Howard Balt. MD PG Mont Howard Balt. MD 
Grade 3             
Reading 19.4 41.6 38.8 11.7 28.6 21.4 37.6 60.1 17.4 36.5 
Math 13.9 41.3 45.8 10.4 27.4 20.1 43.4 57.8 20.4 37.8 
Grade 5           
Reading 18.3 38 39.2 9.5 25.9 26.5 49.4 66.5 21.8 44.6 
Math 28.9 62.3 62.3 20.5 42.9 21.7 52.2 60.2 23 42.6 
Grade 8           
Reading 13.7 38.6 36.6 7.1 24 18 33.4 39.8 9.6 26.6 
Math 17.2 53.2 55.3 6.9 34.2 24.7 63 67.3 14.3 47 
Note:  % Sat=percentage of students performing at satisfactory level.  Satisfactory goal is 70%.  
 1993 is the baseline year.  
Source: Maryland State Department of Education. Maryland School Performance Report 1993 & 
2001. 
 
While none of the jurisdictions met the 70% proficiency level, Prince George‘s 
scores were significantly lower than its neighbors.  Montgomery and Howard counties 
performed above the state average while Prince George‘s and Baltimore city performed 
below the state average.  Baltimore city was the only district to perform worse than 
PGCPS.  Table 3-4 does show that the county has made some gains since 1993.  This fact 
however is tempered by the reality that all of the county‘s neighbors made improvements.  
As a consequence Prince George‘s scores remain at the bottom.  What perhaps is most 
problematic is the distance between the results for Prince George‘s and the other 
jurisdictions.   PGCPS‘s scores were 20 to almost 40 points lower than Montgomery‘s or 
Howard‘s scores. 
Prince George‘s also surpassed its neighbors in the number of schools on the 
state‘s watch list.  When MSDE began to identify schools eligible for state takeover in 
1995, PGCPS did not have any schools on the list.  By 1998, nine PGCPS schools were 
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on the list (Maryland State Department of Education 1998).  By 2002 the number had 
climbed to 20 (Maryland State Department of Education 2002). The only school system 
with more schools on the list was Baltimore city with 85 schools on the list.  Since 1995 
only three other school systems have had a school on the list: Anne Arundel, Baltimore 
County, and Somerset.   
The annual publication of test data has served as a continual reminder that Prince 
George‘s schools were not meeting state expectations.  Undoubtedly, the system‘s poor 
performance helped to feed the negative opinions of the school system.  Residents 
complained about the quality of PGCPS and its negative influence on the county‘s ability 
to attract new business investment and hold on to middle class residents (Frazier 1997).  
In response to the negative scrutiny of MSPP results, school officials argued that PGCPS 
was not as bad as people believed.  While they admitted the system had problems, they 
claimed PGCPS would perform better if it was better funded.  They pointed to 
Montgomery County and the fact that it spent significantly more on education than Prince 
George‘s County did.
15
   
School officials also pointed to student demographics as an explanation for why 
performance lagged.  ―Factors related to poverty and race continue to impact heavily on 
student performance, with the poorest performing schools having a demonstratively 
higher percent of both African-American students and students participating in free and 
reduced-priced meals programs‖ (Prince George‘s County Public Schools 1999).  In 
addition to PGCPS‘s student population being overwhelmingly African American (Table 
3-2), PGCPS‘s student population also included a significant number of poor students.  
Table 3-5 shows the number of students participating in the federal government‘s free 
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and reduced meals programs (FARMS).  FARMS participation is often used as a proxy 
for poverty status.  The number of FARMS participants grew steadily from 1992 to 2002, 
rising from 28.6% to 44.3%.  The number of children attending schools receiving Title I
16
 
funding rose even more dramatically.  The number of Title I children exploded between 
1992 and 2002.  There is a sizable amount of research on academic achievement showing 
a negative correlation between minority race, poverty, and achievement (Jencks and 
Phillips 1998; Rothstein 2004; Paik and Walberg 2007).  The growth of these populations 
made improving academic achievement more difficult.   
 
            Table 3-5:  Prince George‘s County Public Schools and Maryland  
            Special Student Populations 
 Prince George‘s Maryland 
Year FARMS Title 1 FARMS Title 1 
1992 28.6 6.2 26.1 9.0 
1993 34.1 6.8 28.2 8.4 
1994 36.7 5.2 29.2 7.7 
1995 39.7 3.8 30.4 6.8 
1996 41.2 4.8 31.0 7.7 
1997 41.7 17.3 30.9 13.1 
1998 41.3 20.4 30.9 14.3 
1999 39.2 29.0 30.5 16.9 
2000 41.1 31.8 29.2       18.7 
2001 43.1 31.6 29.9 18.5 
2002 44.3 33.6 30.3 19.2 
              Note: Year is school year.  Title I is Chapter I for years 1992-1995. 
       Source: Maryland State Department of Education. Maryland School  
       Performance Reports, 1992-2002. 
 
School officials argued that poor students come to school with several 
disadvantages related to poverty.  Overcoming those disadvantages and improving 
academic achievement required a significant amount of resources, resources PGCPS did 
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not have because it was not receiving the funds it needed.  And the reason for the lack of 
adequate funding, in the opinion of school officials was TRIM. 
   
TRIM and Its Impact on PGCPS 
For most of the past thirty years, school funding has been an issue for Prince 
George‘s County.  In 1978, homeowners placed a cap on property taxes through the 
referendum known as TRIM.
17
  Ever since its imposition, TRIM has been the subject of 
much debate, and its impact on Prince George‘s County cannot be underestimated.  It can 
be argued that TRIM has generated a level of contentiousness that has negatively 
influenced education politics.  But before discussing the impact of TRIM, a discussion of  
PGCPS‘s budget process is in order. 
 
The Budget Process: Shared Authority  
PGCPS does not have independent taxing authority.  Local funding for schools is 
provided through the county government‘s budget.
18
  Because education is not separately 
financed, educational priorities must be reconciled with other priorities such as public 
safety and economic development.  Even so, education typically receives the greatest 
percentage of the county‘s budget and accounts for nearly half or over half of the 
county‘s entire budget.
19
   In 2002, PGCPS accounted for 49.6% of the county‘s budget 
(Department of Legislative services 2008).  
  The budget for PGCPS is actually two budgets; an operating budget and a capital 
improvement program (CIP) budget.  The CIP budget is basically the school construction 
budget.  The operating budget covers all other PGCPS activities including day-to-day 
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activities.  When people talk about the school system‘s budget, they are usually referring 
to the operating budget.
20
   
The budget process begins with the presentation of the Superintendent‘s Proposed 
Budget to the Board of Education by mid December.  The board then can make changes 
to the superintendent‘s proposal and must adopt a requested budget by March 1 at which 
time it is presented to the county executive.  The county executive then prepares the 
county‘s approved budget of which education funding is a part.  It is at this point that the 
school board‘s funding request may be funded in full or reduced.   
The county‘s approved budget must be submitted to the county council for 
ratification by March 31.  The council can move funding from one area of the budget to 
another, however it cannot change the budget‘s total.  Thus any increases in one area of 
the budget, education for example, necessitate offsetting decreases elsewhere, say 
economic development.  The council must adopt the budget by June 1.  The board then 
reconvenes in June to reconcile its budget request within approved funding levels, 
making needed changes by June 30.  The adopted budget becomes effective July 1 at 
which time a new fiscal year begins.   
Two important features of the budget process need to be noted.  First, neither the 
county executive nor county council has the authority to change specific line items within 
the school board‘s requested budget.  Only major category totals of the board‘s budget 
can be changed.  For example, the council can change the amount of money allotted for 
instruction.  It cannot determine which instructional programs receive funding.   
Second, since 1985, Maryland has required ―maintenance of effort‖ (MOE) on the 
part of local governments.  MOE sets a minimum on local government education funding 
120 
 
by requiring local jurisdictions to spend as much on education per pupil in the current 
budget year as they did in the preceding budget year.  The MOE is designed to guarantee 
local jurisdictions continue to fund education at a consistent level and not use state 
revenues to offset reductions in local funding.  Jurisdictions failing to meet their MOE 
requirement must have state educational funding withheld.  MOE provides a minimum 
level of funding.  Nothing prevents counties from providing funding above the MOE 
required level.   
These two features have, at times, contributed to a tense relationship between the 
board, council and executive especially when the county faces a budget shortfall.  For 
example, in 1995, the county faced an estimated $108 million dollar budget shortfall for 
fiscal year 1996.  Since counties are prohibited from carrying deficits, severe cuts had to 
be made to the county‘s budget.  As part of those cuts, County Executive Wayne Curry 
recommended funding for PGCPS at $706.9 million, an increase of $8.9 million over the 
current school budget (Mercurio 1995).  The allocation was $24 million less than the 
school board requested.  Further, the executive‘s budget required the school board to 
contribute $15 million to the county‘s ―rainy day‖ fund.    
Board members accused the executive of not meeting the county‘s MOE 
requirement by only increasing the budget by $8.9 million.   The board argued MOE 
required a $17 million budget increase and the $15 million fund payment put the county 
under that minimum.  The Curry countered that at least some of the $15 million should be 
included in the calculation of the county‘s MOE requirement.   School board members 
argued that since the money cannot be used for school services it should not be counted.  
Board Chairman Frederick Hutchinson accused Curry of ―accounting gimmickry‖ and 
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added, ―a much more prudent and honest approach would have been to say we just can't 
do it.  Instead, we get these fiscal shell games‖ (Ibid.).  The board threatened to sue the 
county for failing to meet MOE, and did so in May.   
Hutchinson said the board‘s decision to sue was not meant to be divisive.  Instead 
he argued that it was actually meant to be, ―a catalyst for people to come together‖ (Neal 
1995).  While some council members were sympathetic towards the board others were 
decidedly less so.  Of the school board‘s lawsuit, Council Member Walter H. Maloney 
said, ―this comes across to me as a shakedown.  What they're doing is playing a political 
game of chicken‖ (Ibid.).   
The lawsuit would have been the first MOE lawsuit in the state, however the 
school board and county executive reached an agreement a day before the case was to go 
to trial and the lawsuit was eventually dropped.
21
  But this was not the end to the 
bickering.  The dispute was reignited in July when Curry opposed the board‘s routine 
request to the council for permission to reduce its risk-management fund payments and 
apply the money to its operating budget in order to cover administrative expenses.  Curry 
objected arguing that the board had not done enough to streamline its administration as 
the county government had done.  Curry was particularly upset with Superintendent 
Jerome Clark‘s reorganization of his administration (Frazier 1995a).  While Clark 
eliminated 67 administrative positions, the people in those positions were merely 
reassigned to school-level positions.  The expenses for those positions were just 
transferred from one budget category to another.   
Once again both sides were able to reach a compromise, but the school board‘s 
actions left many county officials feeling as though the board was not doing its part to 
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ease the county‘s financial burden.  ―It was a very difficult budget time, but we now have 
a lean, mean county government. . . . [School board members] have not made the kinds of 
cuts we have made,‖ noted council Chairman Anne MacKinnon (Ibid.).  For their part, 
board members were suspicious that Curry‘s objection was part of a larger attempt to 
exert more control over board spending.   
Although this matter was settled, both sides agreed that the friction caused by the 
school finance process would invariably lead to more disputes as both council and board 
members agreed that the process breeds contempt (Ibid.).  According to a county task 
force that examined education funding, ―Structural limitations [of the education budget 
process] have led to an increasingly contentious and acrimonious relationship between 
the levels of elected officials charged with funding the school system and those charged 
with the responsibility of managing the system‘s day-to-day affairs‖ (Prince George‘s 
County Task Force on Education Funding 1996).  Council members argued that 
education has had to face the budget axe less frequently or deeply than other areas of the 
budget.  Board members argued having a quality public school system is vital to the 
county‘s overall well-being and as such it should be given the highest priority.  The 
school board accuses the council of not supporting education by not providing more 
funds while the council accuses the board of asking for too much without any regard for 
the county‘s fiscal constraints.  The most binding constraint is TRIM.  
TRIM has significantly constrained county budgets.  A 1996 Washington Post 
analysis of county and school budgets for the previous 18 years showed that in inflation-
adjusted dollars, the county made do with less in property tax revenue than it did in 1978 
(Montgomery 1996).  As a result of TRIM, the county has been on a budget roller coaster 
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ride.  While budgets naturally rise and fall with the movement of the economy, TRIM 
severely hinders the county‘s ability to blunt the impact of a sharp economic downturns.  
This led County Council Chairman, Stephen J. Del Giudice in 1996 to say of the county‘s 
budget roller coaster ride, ―we took a dive in the early '80s, climbed back up the hill in 
the late '80s, and now we're crashing down the hill again‖ (Ibid.).   Further, because 
TRIM keeps Prince George‘s budget lean, any budgetary decreases necessitate cuts that 
slice deeper into critical functions than they might otherwise.   
It did not take long after its passage for the county and PGCPS to feel the effects 
of TRIM.  In the first fiscal year (FY) TRIM went into effect, FY1980, the school board 
was forced to cut 550 positions, eliminate junior high school sports and increase class 
sizes to cover a $10 million budget cut (Meszoly 1979).  Similarly dramatic cuts occurred 
in 1982 as the school board had to cover a $30 million shortfall (Wynter and Vesey 
1982).  The school board voted to lay off up to 900 employees, almost ten percent of the 
school staff.  The layoffs included 507 teachers.  The recession of the early 1990s led to 
more cuts in education.   In addition to hiring freezes and cuts that affected every area of 
the school system, school employees, including teachers were furloughed for three days 
in 1991 (Leff 1991b).  The furloughs were in addition to the cancelling of cost of living 
pay raises for teachers.   
Opponents of TRIM complain that the lean budgets it creates make it impossible 
for the county to keep pace with its wealthier neighbors in providing a top level 
education.  Table 3-5 shows per-pupil spending for Prince George‘s and neighboring 
counties.  Prince George‘s ranked 8
th
 among Marylnad‘s 24 school districts in 1992.  Its 
spending of $5,637 per student was slightly below the state average of $5,823.  By 2002, 
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Prince George‘s had fallen to 16
th
 place and its spending of $7,699 was considerably 
lower than the state average of $8,351.  In contrast, Montgomery County‘s spending has 
consistently kept the system in first place throughout the ten year period.  
 
Table 3-6:  Per Pupil Spending for Prince George‘s County and Neighboring Counties 
Note: Rank is rank among 24 Maryland school districts from highest to lowest spending.  
Source:  Maryland State Department of Education. The Fact Book 1991-1992—2001-2002. 
 
The school board and other school officials say this gap in funding explains why 
county schools do not perform as well as its neighbors.  They lay most of the blame for 
the gap at the feet of county government officials.  A 1996 task force report stated, ―the 
Board of Education contends inadequate support from the county government is the 
reason for much of this per pupil funding gap‖ (Prince George‘s County Task Force on 
Education Funding 1996, 7).  In 2001, school board Chairman Kenneth Johnson said with 
continued inadequate school funding, ―we‘ll be settling for the same old thing, every year 
complaining about not having enough textbooks, money to pay teachers and 
administrators adequately, curriculum advancement, closing the gap‖ (Meyer 2001). 
School offiicals point to the fact that between 1980 and 2002, PGCPS‘s budget 









1992 $5,637 8 $7,377 1 $6,481 2 $5,448 10 $5,713 6 $5,823 
1993 5,897 7 7,544 1 6,457 2 5,627 10 5,984 6 5,978
1994 6,018 8 7,539 1 6,571 2 5,831 10 6,144 6 6,106
1995 6,272 7 7,697 1 6,793 2 5,983 11 6,452 4 6,337
1996 6,276 8 7,887 1 6,987 2 5,969 15 6,455 5 6,446
1997 6,370 10 8,035 1 6,988 2 6,158 14 6,463 7 6,584
1998 6,585 10 8,287 1 7,190 4 6,271 14 6,629 9 6,821
1999 6,853 9 8,574 1 7,434 4 6,423 19 6,812 10 7,125
2000 7,116 10 8,888 1 7,880 5 6,749 18 7,191 9 7,467
2001 7,313 15 9,488 1 8,432 6 7,023 21 7,782 9 7,971
2002 7,699 16 9,876 1 8,977 6 7,363 21 8,104 9 8,351
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budget amounts for PGCPS.  1987 was the only year for which the board‘s budget could 
be considered to be fully funded.  Only seven times in 23 years has the approved budget 
been less than $10 million short of what was requested.  Conversly, the approved budget 
has been more than $20 million short of what was requested nine times.   
 
Table 3-7:  PGCPS Operating Budget Requested & Approved  1980-2002 
FY Requested Approved Difference FY Requested Approved Difference 
1980  288 278 10 1992 603.3 574.7 28.6 
1981 290.3 281.1 9.2 1993 599 595.4 3.6 
1982 309.8 308.7 1.1 1994 666 640.8 25.2 
1983 337.4 306.3 31.1 1995 702.6 683 19.6 
1984 316 312.1 3.9 1996 730.2 704.4 25.8 
1985 340 331 9 1997 757 736.3 20.7 
1986 362.7 349 13.7 1998 798 780.4 17.6 
1987 389.3 389 0.3 1999 858 844.9 13.1 
1988 440 425 15 2000 928 884 44 
1989 478.4 461 17.4 2001 1.0 billion 942.1 57.9 
1990 553.6 507.6 46 2002 1.1 billion 1 billion 100 
1991 554.9 552.8 2.1 
    Note: Amounts are in millions.  
Sources: Prince George‘s County Public Schools. 2002 Approved Budget; Washington Post 
 
 
 TRIM opponents argue that while people talk about school improvement, they 
are not willing to provide the funding necessary to improve the schools.  As evidence, 
they point to the 1996 attempt to repeal TRIM.  The voters not only rejected the repeal 
attempt but placed further restrictions on the county‘s ability to raise any taxes.
22
  The 
voters did this even though the county needed funding to support a plan that would have 
ended nearly thirty years of busing, something a majority of people in the county wanted. 
For their part TRIM supporters argue that the problem with school performance is 
less about funding and more about school system leadership, or the lack thereof.  The 
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problem is school system leadership not using the money it does have wisely.  TRIM 
supporters argue against additional funding believing it will only be mismanaged like the 
funds the system already receives.  So they argue, why give PGCPS more money to 
throw down the drain.  Judy Robinson, an original leader of the TRIM movement, said of 
the school board, ―If they would spend as much energy on [their] internal problems as 
attacking TRIM, then we might really have acquired a world-class school system‖ (Ibid.).   
Community activist (and future school board member) Donna Hathaway Beck 
expressed the sentiment of many TRIM supporters when she said; ―TRIM was built and 
reaffirmed on a foundation of mistrust.  That mistrust continues, perhaps it has even 
worsened.  Does the public school system need more money?  Undoubtedly yes.  Do we 
trust those in leadership roles to effectively administer additional funds?  Probably not" 
(Tate and Krughoff  2003).   The passage of TRIM was a manifestation of people‘s lack 
of trust in the ability of public officials to govern efficiently.  Yet the financial constraints 
on PGCPS‘s budget created by TRIM have made it more difficult for school officials to 
govern effectively which in turn has led to even greater mistrust of school officials.  
  
Education Politics in a Nutshell  
In 1993, the Prince George‘s County Government Operations Review 
Commission (Turner Commission), an initiative of the county Chamber of Commerce, 
was established to review the administration of both the county government and school 
system. 
23
  The independent panel had 27 members none of whom were elected officials 
or government employees.  Initially the commission set out to ―audit‖ the system and 
look for opportunities to increase performance and efficiency.   However, once the 
commission began its examination, it became clear that school governance was a major 
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concern and the scope of the commission was expanded (Abramowitz 1993b).  The 
Turner Commission‘s report, ―Navigating the 90s: Charting a Course for Prince George‘s 
County‖ did little to encourage trust in the school board (Prince George‘s County 
Government Operations Review Commission 1993).   
The Turner Commission identified four problems related to school governance.  
First, it noted an ―alarming degree of tension and mistrust between the Board and the 
Council and Executive‖ (Ibid.,18).  The commission went further writing, ―The 
Commission was disturbed by the widespread perception among citizens that our leaders 
are squabbling politically, rather than debating the priorities and requirements of the 
county.  There is a sense in the community that too much energy is spent in political 
positioning and not enough on cooperating for success‖ (Ibid., 19).  The commission 
alleged the conflicts stemmed from the governance structure in which the county council 
is responsible for funding the schools but has no say over how that money is spent, and 
must face the anger of dissatisfied citizens nevertheless.   
Second, the Commission argued that because county officials (save the executive) 
represent districts and not the county at-large, they tended to be parochial; narrowly 
focused on their district instead of the county as a whole.  The implication was that 
officials were likely to be more inclined to do what is beneficial for their own district 
regardless of how such action impacted the county as a whole.  Officials may become 
beholden to a small group of constituents instead of focusing on the good of the entire 
county.  Additionally, the commission stated there was a perception in the county that the 
political aspirations of school board members influenced their behavior.  These 
aspirations made them less willing to take controversial positions and more concerned 
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about their own reputations than the welfare of children.  Further, these political 
aspirations put board members in direct conflict with council members (potential 
campaign opponents) thus heightening tensions even more. 
The third governance issue the Turner Commission cited was the tendency of the 
school board to micromanage the superintendent.  According to the commission, the 
board‘s focus on day-to-day matters prevented it from focusing on long-term policies.  
The tendency of the school board to micromanage made the board an obstacle to change 
rather than a catalyst for it.  This micromanaging created the fourth problem; a lack of 
strong school system leadership.   
In the commission‘s view, the school board‘s micromanaging discouraged strong 
candidates from applying for the superintendent‘s job.  Further, the board would tend to 
hire an individual they thought they could control rather than someone with strong views 
of her or his own.  The commission also found that layers of bureaucracy made the job of 
principals more difficult. This was problematic as they determined the key to successful 
schools in the system to be ―a strong principal who has been able to take charge of the 
school‖ (Ibid., 22).   
To solve these problems, the Turner Commission made what even it described as 
a radical recommendation: strip the school board of most of its power (Ibid., 23).  That 
power would be given to the county executive, with county council approval.  The county 
executive would control the budget and hire the superintendent who would report directly 
to the county executive like other department heads.  The board would become an 
advisory body becoming an ―inspector general‖ for public education in the county.  
Basically the commission was advocating what amounted to a ―mayoral takeover‖ of the 
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school system.  The justification of mayoral control of school systems rests on the 
premise that it will, centralize accountability, broaden the constituency concerned with 
education, and reduce the extent of school board micro-management (Meier 2004).  
 The recommendation to place the schools under county executive control drew 
immediate allegations that the commission was doing the bidding of County Executive 
Parris Glendening who was running for governor (Abramowitz and Leff 1993).  The 
Turner Commission‘s nonpartisan claim was not helped by Glendening calling for the 
superintendent‘s ouster just days before the report‘s release.  Opponents claimed that 
putting the blame for poor school performance on the school board absolved the county 
executive of any responsibility and allowed him to grab more power.  Board members 
also complained that giving control of schools to the executive would ―politicize‖ 
education.  ―It puts the person who's in charge of running the school system under the 
control of someone whose motives can clearly be political,‖ said Board of Education 
member Marcy C. Canavan (Woellert 1993).   
Again school board members argued the greatest obstacle to improved school 
performance was inadequate funding.  For its part, the commission did not claim that 
PGCPS was overfunded.  In fact the Turner Commission wrote about PGCPS funding, 
―further across-the-board cuts will reach into muscle and bone, seriously damaging the 
health of county government and school system operations‖ (Prince George‘s County 
Government Operations Review Commission 1993, 2).  However the commission also 
made it clear that increased funding would not solve what ails PGCPS.  The system‘s 
primary problem is one of governance not finance.   
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Some in the county applauded the commission‘s emphasis on accountability.  
However, they worried the proposals would get caught up in election year politics 
(Woellert 1993).  Turf battles between various politicians made the likelihood of enacting 
any significant changes remote.  Glendening had several enemies in the state legislature 
and they would not be inclined to give him more power by giving him control of the 
school system.  Additionally, several legislators were educators and not inclined to 
change the existing structure.  Finally, the perceived undemocratic nature of the proposal 
by some in the community precluded adoption of the proposals (Keary 1994a). 
Given the events of 2002, it is obvious the Turner Commission‘s 
recommendations were not followed.   Unfortunately, as we shall see in the next chapter, 
all four of the governance problems identified by the commission in 1993 still existed in 
2002.  And the radical recommendation of the Turner Commission would be surpassed 
by the even more drastic move of dissolving the school board. 
 
What stands out most after surveying the years leading up to 2002 is the serious 
lack of trust that percolates throughout Prince George‘s County.   The county‘s long 
struggle with desegregation led to a lack of trust between the races.  Thirty years after it 
had begun, Prince George‘s was still dealing with the issue.  While much of the initial 
racial animosity had subsided well before 2002, the residue from those events still 
lingered in the environment.  Desegregation also fermented distrust between middle class 
and working class African Americans in the county by laying bare the class divisions 
within the black community.  Working class blacks who stood the most to gain were 
generally much more supportive of desegregation.  On the other hand, many middle class 
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blacks who saw little to gain from desegregation actively opposed it.  Ironically, the 
struggle was for naught.  The county‘s changing racial demographics made desegregation 
a moot point as PGCPS student population had become overwhelmingly African 
American by 2002.  Even more, the desired educational improvements failed to 
materialize as PGCPS continued to perform poorly on state assessments.   
The subpar performance of PGCPS led to even more mistrust of the school board. 
Year after year of dismal test results encouraged residents along with state and local 
officials to question the school board‘s governance.  For a community that prides itself as 
an affluent, majority-black middle class community, PGCPS was a continuing source of 
embarrassment; and many residents put the blame squarely on the backs of school 
leadership.  For their part, school officials bemoaned the difficulty of having to educate 
poor and minority students.  They also pointed to TRIM and the underfunded budgets it 
created. 
Among other motivations, TRIM was born out of a mistrust of government.  Not 
trusting the ability of officials to be fiscally conservative, the voters put a cap on the 
amount of money they could spend.  Although TRIM has at times led to some very dire 
consequences, it has endured because of the continued mistrust.  But in a vicious cycle, 
TRIM‘s constraints have helped intensify the mistrust between the school board and other 
elected county officials.  A budget process that split budgetary authority between the 
board, county council, and county executive had friction built into it.  As budgets 
tightened, as they often have under TRIM, the building friction often led to sparks of 
acrimony.   
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Mistrust, division and acrimony are not words likely to be used to describe a 
political environment in which an educational system is performing well.  These are the 
types of words likely to be used to describe an environment in which a school system is 
underperforming.  In such an atmosphere it would seem easy to challenge the legitimacy 
of the governing regime because considerable criticism of regime leaders is likely to 
exist.  And indeed, that criticism might be strong enough to disrupt the governing regime 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  However, regime challenge is only one step in the 
process of regime change (Orr and Stoker 1994).   
Another step in the process requires the building of coalitions capable of 
supporting the establishment of a new regime.  The same environment that makes 
toppling the existing regime less difficult makes coalition building more difficult.  
Successful coalitions need agreement, trust and unity and are not likely to do well in an 
environment in which acrimony, mistrust and division reign (Chong 1991).   
It is evident that any potential advocates of regime change in Prince George‘s 
County faced a daunting challenge.  Despite years of criticism and disappointment, the 
school cartel managed to maintain its control of county education.  The cartel survived 
largely because the mistrust and division within the county served as powerful obstacles 
to reform.  For education reform to take hold in Prince George‘s, the county‘s culture of 
mistrust and division needed to be overcome.  It would appear that without some kind of 
dramatic event capable of upsetting the political environment, things were not likely to 
change.  In 2002 a dramatic event with the potential to change the political landscape 
occurred: the elected school board was dissolved by the state legislature.  How this event 






   Montgomery County Public Schools had 136,895 students in 2002. 
 
2
   Prince George‘s and Baltimore City were not the only majority minority 
systems in the state however.  Montgomery County‘s system was also majority minority 
with whites being 46.1% of the student population.  African American students were 
21.1% of the population.  
 
3
   There were minor fights and confrontations between students at some schools 
but there was not the violence people feared (McCombs and Mitchell 1973). 
 
4
   By the start of the new school year in September 1973, two junior high schools 
and nine elementary schools had again reached a student population that was more than 
the court mandated 50% black (Landers 1973).  All nine of the schools lay inside the 
Capital Beltway and near the District of Columbia. 
 
5
   Many schools in this section of the county were allowed to remain 
predominantly white because the distance required for kids to travel to integrate the 
schools was longer than the distance allowed by the court (Feinberg 1979).   
 
6
   The plan affected 75 of the system‘s 145 elementary schools and allowed over 
3700 elementary students to attend neighborhood schools (Shapiro 1980).   About 70 
percent of the students affected by the new busing patterns were black.  Interestingly, 
only 16,000 of the almost 80,000 students riding buses to school every day were bused 
for desegregation purposes.  Most rode buses out of necessity.  
  
7
   Of the 29, three were high schools, three were middle schools, and the 
remaining 23 were elementary schools.  The large number of elementary schools is 
indicative of the large number of blacks moving into the county.  Two elementary 
schools were less than 10 percent black (Wynter 1983).  
 
8
   Other directives of the MOU included the continual review of magnets for 
desegregation effectiveness, the development of a back-up busing plan to be implemented 
if magnets do not sufficiently integrate schools, and the establishment of a citizen 
advisory committee.  Additionally, TAG magnet schools were to have a student 
population that is 50% African American.  Of the various magnet programs, TAG 
magnets were the most academically rigorous.  Also, the plaintiffs agreed not to 
challenge the attendance areas of Milliken II schools.  The final component of the plan 
required PGCPS to study the current busing program and make recommendations on how 
to eliminate unnecessary busing and reduce ride times and distances.  
 
9
   Six of the magnets were to be TAG magnets and the other six were workplace 
magnets which provided before and after-school day care.  All of the Milliken II schools 
were elementary schools and would receive additional funding for and staffing.  The 






  Columbia Park was one of only eight public schools in the Washington 
metropolitan area to win the award which is given annually to outstanding schools 
throughout the country.  In 1988, 287 schools won recognition (Feinberg 1988). 
 
11
   All unattributed quotations are from interviews conducted by the author.  
Respondents were promised anonymity in return for their participation.  
 
12
  This section provides an overview of state testing and school performance.  In 
2003 Maryland‘s testing program was changed.  A more detail examination of that 
program is presented in Chapter 6. 
 
13
   Students in grades 3, 5, and 8 were tested in reading, mathematics, science, 
social studies, writing, and language arts.  To comply with the federal act, No Child Left 
Behind, the MSPAP was replaced with the Maryland School Assessment (MSA) in 2002. 
The MSA tests children in reading, mathematics, and science.  Also, all grades 3 through 
8 are tested.   
 
14
   By 2002 no system had met the proficiency goal in all areas.  
 
15
   See Table 3-6 for per pupil spending comparison. 
 
16
   Title 1 is the federal government‘s largest education program.  It provides 
supplemental funds to school districts to assist eligible public and private schools with 
the highest student concentration of poverty.  
 
17
   See Chapter 2 for a history of TRIM. 
 
18
   This is true for all 24 school systems in Maryland and all of the systems 
throughout the Washington metropolitan region. 
 
19
   By only counting funding that comes from unrestricted county funds (funds 
generated by the county itself), school officials claim that schools are around 46% of the 
county‘s budget.  For their part the county council and county executive include all 
county funding (including revenue coming to the county from outside sources) in their 
calculations and as a result claim schools receive about 60% of the county‘s budget. 
 
20
   Unless otherwise stated, discussions of budgets will refer to operating budgets. 
 
21
   The agreement called for the county to drop its demand that the board pay $15 
million to the rainy day fund.  In return, the board of education would transfer $4 million 




   The voters endorsed a new measure that requires that any future local tax 






   The commission got its nickname from the name of its chairman, former CIA 





Political Upheaval: Removal of the Elected School Board 
 
This project began with the premise that improving African American academic 
performance and successfully closing the achievement gap is a community issue that 
must be solved by the community as a whole.  What is needed is an activation of a 
community‘s civic capacity in order to build a performance regime that has improving 
academic achievement and closing the achievement gap as its primary agenda.  This 
project argues that a reason why Prince George‘s County Public Schools (PGCPS) was 
not more successful in improving African American academic performance and closing 
the achievement gap is because the county‘s educational arena had been dominated by a 
regime that did not have academic performance as its agenda.  The controlling regime, or 
school cartel, focused on ―bread and butter‖ issues meant to protect the members of the 
regime and not academic achievement.  I posit that a key to eliminating the gap is 
replacing the existing employment regime with a performance regime that has improving 
academic achievement as its agenda.  Thus regime change is necessary to close the gap. 
  Regime change is posited as a three stage process that involves dismantling the 
current regime, building a coalition in support of a new regime, and institutionalizing that 
new regime (Orr and Stoker 1994).  Challenging the existing regime is not an easy 
proposition however.  It dominates the education arena, and through its control of the 
decision-making process can deflect and defuse dissatisfaction (Rich 1996, 9).  But 
regimes are not impenetrable, permanent structures.  At times they become vulnerable to 
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challenge.  In order to successfully challenge and dismantle the regime, opponents must 
take advantages of opportunities that bring into question the legitimacy of the regime‘s 
dominance.  A focusing event provides such a window of opportunity.   
Focusing events are sudden extraordinary events like crises, disasters, or scandals 
that shock the system and focus attention on a problem that needs addressing (Kingdon, 
1984; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Birkland, 1998).  Focusing events by their very 
nature often lead to a reexamination of the existing regime.  Moreover they frequently 
lead to a questioning of the regime‘s authority.  I argue that the dissolution of the elected 
school board in 2002 was a focusing event that presented a window of opportunity for 
education reformers.   This chapter examines how that window was opened. 
On April 8, 2002, the Maryland General Assembly dissolved the Prince George‘s 
County Board of Education.  The legislation passed 45 to 0 in the Senate and 85 to 44 in 
the House.
1
   It is the only time the Assembly has voted to dissolve an elected school 
board.  The path to that April vote was long and convoluted.  Once again, the word that 
would aptly describe the events leading to that day is the same word that aptly describes 
the county:  complex.  Attempts in the General Assembly to alter the composition of the 
elected school board began more than four years earlier.  However, calls to reform the 
school board stretch back to 1993 when the Turner Commission recommended reducing 
the powers of the elected school board.
2
  Even so, it is unlikely the board would have 
been dissolved had it not been for a confluence of significant events.  This chapter 
examines the series of events that led to the fateful vote. 
The most publicly disconcerting of those events was the school board‘s feud with 
the system‘s superintendent.  It is the feud and the scandal it created that provided the 
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legislature with the needed justification for the dissolution of the school board.  But while 
the feud served as the public justification for dissolving the board, the legislature acted 
for less visible reasons.     
This chapter begins with a presentation of a timeline of events in the feud between 
the school board and Superintendent Iris Metts that precipitated the dissolution of the 
school board.  It begins with Superintendent Iris Metts‘s hiring in 1999 and ends with the 
Assembly‘s vote to dissolve the school board in 2002.  The timeline is meant to do two 
things.  First it will give the reader a better understanding of the relationship between the 
school board and superintendent, important members of the school cartel.   Second, it will 
give the reader an indication of the complexity of the education arena in which the 
relationship existed.  The rest of the chapter examines the story behind the story.  That is, 
the events and issues that all but made the school board‘s dissolution inevitable.  What 
will become evident is that the feud was only the final and most prominent event in a 
series of events ending in the denouement of the board‘s dissolution. 
 
Timeline of Significant Events in the School Board-Superintendent Feud 
In 1999, Prince George‘s County had a ten member board consisting of nine 
district elected members and one student member.
3
  Each elected member resided in the 
district he or she represented.    The elected board members included five African 
American members; Marilynn Bland, James Henderson, Kenneth Johnson, Bernard 
Phifer, and Board Chairman Alvin Thornton.
4
  The board had four white members, 




A New Superintendent is Hired 
 
On June 17, 1999, Delaware Secretary of Education Iris Metts became PGCPS‘ 
second African American and first female superintendent.  Metts‘s selection was not 
unanimous with the board split 6 to 3 (Nakamura 1999c).  Members Callahan, Como, 
Johnson, Niemann, Smith, and Thornton voted for Metts while members Bland, 
Henderson, and Phifer voted for Jacqueline Brown, a Howard County school 
administrator.  
Those voting for Brown preferred someone who had knowledge of the county and 
as a result could more easily navigate the county‘s political waters.  Brown lived in 
Prince George‘s and had ties to Prince George‘s County Executive Wayne Curry.  In 
contrast, those voting for Metts preferred someone with no ties to the county.  In their 
view, being an outsider would allow Metts to implement needed changes without having 
to worry about upsetting political alliances.  They also believed her appointment might 
appease state officials who had been critical of the board. 
The board members who did not vote for Metts pledged to give her their full 
support nonetheless.  Bland said, ―I‘m confident that if that person receives support, the 
person will be successful.  We as a board must be supportive, and I'm willing to do that.  
I‘m ready for a number one school system‖ (Nakamura 1999c).  At the announcement of 
her hiring, the board trumpeted Metts‘s political skills and ability to work with multiple 
constituents.  Board member Callahan said of Metts, ―One of her best attributes is her 
ability to garner the support of various stakeholders.  She has the ability to deal with a 
legislative body, having worked for the governor and with the legislature.  She has the 
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ability to negotiate through the political process without being swayed‖ (Nakamura 
1999d). 
A sign of potential problems to come in the board-superintendent relationship 
appeared at the first school board meeting Metts attended.  She turned heads by taking a 
seat alongside school board members.   In the past, superintendents sat facing the board 
not with it.  Some board members were not comfortable with Metts sitting with the board, 
and asked Metts to move.  Wanting to be seen as an equal, Metts declined to move.  This 
gesture offended some board members who reminded her that she was an employee.  The 
board voted on where Metts could sit and allowed her to sit beside them as an expression 
of solidarity.  The first seeds of the feud to follow were sown.   
Metts took her position as a change agent to heart and began to make changes 
almost immediately.
 5
  Less than two months into the job, she made several staffing 
changes.  Metts directed the administration to stop hiring uncertified teachers.  She also 
cut about 150 central office positions and reassigned a number of veteran principals.  Her 
actions drew an immediate negative response from the Association of Supervisory and 
Administrative School Personnel (ASASP), the principals‘ union.  The union argued that 
Metts‘s actions were arbitrary and done without first talking to principals.  It also 
considered the transfer of some administrators to schools a demotion.  The relationship 
between Metts and ASASP soured, quickly became contentious, and remained that way 
throughout Metts‘s tenure.  A board member speaking about the relationship between 
Metts and the Executive Director of ASASP, Doris Reed, said ―Doris and Iris were at 






In early 2000 another sign of tension between the board and superintendent 
surfaced.  As part of her push to improve academic performance, Metts proposed making 
all kindergarten classes throughout the county full-day.  Her plan received accolades 
from the State Superintendent Nancy Grasmick.  When the board wavered on its 
commitment to the plan, Metts reportedly snapped at the board and told them to get out 
of her way (Nakamura 2000b).  Of the incident, then Board Chairman Henderson is 
quoted as saying, ―Dr. Metts needs to know she works for us, not the other way around‖ 
(Ibid.). 
In August 2000, Metts angered middle-class parents when she proposed 
redistributing state grant money to needier schools.  Metts wanted to take $4 million from 
90 middle class schools and transfer the funds to 93 schools with less affluent populations 
(Reeves 2000).  Many of the schools to be stripped of the funds were located in Bowie 
and Laurel, cities in the northern parts of the county that contained sizeable white 
populations.  Schools receiving the money generally lay inside the Beltway and had large 
majority African American student populations.   
Protesting the plan at the school board‘s August meeting, parents from the 
affected schools blasted Metts for taking from middle class communities to aid the 
county‘s less privileged students (Ibid.).  Parents also complained about the timing of the 
cuts coming so close to the beginning of the school year.  On the other side, supporters of 
the schools receiving the funds praised Metts for correcting what they called gross 
―inequity‖ in Prince George‘s schools.  For its part, the board complained that it had not 
been adequately informed about the plan before it was proposed.  Board member 
Callahan blamed Metts for the public outcry over her proposals.  ―Metts has made a lot of 
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major administrative decisions within her authority but has made them with very little 
notice to the board and community, and that‘s eliciting public outcry, right or wrong,‖ he 
said (Nakamura 2000a).  The board had complained during Metts‘s performance review 
in July that she did not communicate with the board well.  Despite the complaint 
however, the board gave Metts a raise and a bonus.   
In August, the board and Metts also became involved in a tug-o-war over staff 
bonuses.  The board learned from media reports that Metts had given bonuses to her four 
top deputies (E. Lee 2000a).  The board complained that Metts needed its permission to 
award the bonuses and demanded that Metts force the deputies to return them.  The 
deputies threatened to quit if they were forced to return the bonuses.  A stalemate ensued, 
leaving a resolution for a later date.  Coincidently or not, all four deputies, like Metts, 
were outsiders from Delaware.  Some system insiders derisively referred to them as the 
―Delaware gang.‖   
The County‘s Maryland School Performance Assessment Program (MSPAP) 
scores were released in November 2000.  MSPAP was the cornerstone of the state‘s 
assessment program, Maryland School Performance Program (MSPP), begun in 1991. 
This program was designed to be more rigorous and to set higher standards than the 
state‘s previous testing program.  Instead of focusing on minimal competencies, MSPP 
focused on proficiency.  PGCPS had consistently ranked near the bottom in district 
comparisons.   
The county‘s 2000 scores were flat; this showed no improvement from the 
previous year.
7
  On January 31, 2001, the Maryland State Department of Education 





  It also removed one school.  A total of 15 Prince George‘s 
County schools were now on the list.  The only system with more schools on the list of 
102 schools was Baltimore city which had 85 schools on the list.
9
  At the time board 
members blamed inadequate funding for the lackluster performance (Reeves and 
Nakamura 2001).   
Meanwhile the tug-of-war between the board and Metts over the bonuses 
continued.  In March 2001, the board voted to sue the deputies for the return of the 
bonuses even though a lawsuit might cost more than the $45,000 in bonuses (Nakamura 
2001b).  The test of wills over the bonuses exploded in June when the board gave the 
deputies an ultimatum; return the money or resign.  Metts, who had the support of County 
Executive Wayne Curry and most state legislators, offered to forgo her own bonuses to 
pay for those of her deputies but the board refused her offer. She also threatened to resign 
if her deputies left.  The issue was resolved when the board allowed the deputies to keep 
the money in return for Metts taking the blame for the problem and moving her seat to 
face the board at board meetings (Nakamura 2001d). 
After the skirmish over the bonuses, State Superintendent Nancy Grasmick sent 
the board a letter warning them that if the board and Metts did not make a better effort to 
get along, she might withhold funds from the school system (Nakamura 2001e).  
Supporters of the board objected to Grasmick‘s threat, and some including Maryland 
Senator Paul Pinsky (D-Prince George‘s), County Council members Issac Gourdine (D) 
and Thomas Hendershot (D), and former school board chairman Alvin Thornton, wrote 
letters to Grasmick.  Copies of all of the letters managed to find their way into the 
Washington Post (Letters 2001). 
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Pinsky put the blame squarely on Metts in writing, ―Mistakes have been made by 
the school administration in its implementation of certain policies.  If looking to place 
blame on an identifiable entity, you would probably be better served to look at direct line 
supervision within the administration.‖  Gourdine, also a Metts critic accused state 
leaders of ―board bashing‖ and ―constantly making [a] public meal of the children of 
Prince George's.‖  He added, ―None of our elected officials have ever mentioned the fact 
that our schools have been constantly and egregiously under-funded compared to schools 
around the region.‖  Hendershot also focused on school funding when writing, ―For the 
State Superintendent of Schools to threaten funding for the School System with the state's 
second largest low-income student population is unconscionable.‖  For his part Thornton 
complained about the way the board was being treated compared to other agencies.  
―Compare and contrast the way management accountability in education is handled in the 
county to the way it is applied to public safety and public health administration.  The 
former is too often undisciplined and personality based, and the latter is carefully 
designed and managed journalistically to minimize information flow and negative 
impact,‖ Thornton wrote (Ibid.).  
Ten days after Grasmick‘s letter was sent, the school board held a retreat at which 
time Metts was to receive her annual review (Nakamura 2001f).  The board voted on a 
motion to fire Metts but the motion fell one vote short.  In lieu of firing her, the board 
gave Metts a negative review and denied her a bonus.  The review was leaked to the 
media.  Metts was infuriated the private review was made public.  The next day the board 
apologized for the release despite some board members objecting to making a public 
apology (Ibid.).  Privately, some members believed Metts may have leaked the review 
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herself in an attempt to embarrass the board and garner more sympathy for herself.  Metts 
decided to appeal the board‘s bonus denial to the Maryland State Board of Education in 
August.   It would be months before the case was to be heard.  Meanwhile, the General 
Assembly increased its attention on PGCPS and the school board. 
 
Restructuring Gains Momentum in the General Assembly    
On November 7, 2001 Maryland House Appropriations Committee Chairman 
Howard Rawlings (D-Baltimore) held a status hearing on PGCPS.  Rawlings, a Baltimore 
delegate, had been a long-time critic of the Prince George‘s County school board.  He 
was also one of the first to advocate board restructuring.   Ostensibly, the hearing was 
held to receive an update on PGCPS‘s progress in addressing the finding of a 1998 
system performance audit.
10
  A similar hearing held in February was so contentious that 
the Prince George‘s House delegation voted to reconstitute the board immediately 
afterward.  The county‘s Senate delegation nixed the proposal however.  According to the 
leader of the Prince George‘s House delegation, Delegate Rushern Baker III (D), the 
upcoming hearing would set the tone for what came next.  ―What comes out of this 
meeting could either say to the delegation that it‘s [reconstitution] not necessary, the 
school board is on the right track.  Or, it could also be a meeting in which people will 
come out and say we're in trouble, we should do something,‖ said Baker (Trejos 2001a).   
Like Rawlings, Baker had been an outspoken critic of the school board.  At the 
time, his children were enrolled in the county‘s public schools, and as a parent he saw 
firsthand some of the problems affecting PGCPS.  Baker considered the quality of the 
county‘s schools the most important issue facing the county and made improving the 
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school system one of his highest priorities.  Both Rawlings and Baker usually sided with 
Metts.   
 The hearing was much less contentious than the earlier hearing.  However, going 
into the hearing the outlook was not so optimistic.  Earlier in the day, Board Chairman 
Kenneth Johnson sent a memo to Metts forbidding her from attending a morning meeting 
with county delegates.  The memo also directed Metts not to say why she would not 
attend the meeting.  The memo outraged Rawlings who grilled the board about it (Trejos 
and Reeves 2001).  Although school officials tried to show the school system had 
improved, some board members believed the hearing was a set-up; an opportunity for the 
state legislators to gather more fuel for their attempt to restructure the board (Ibid.). 
The board members may have been right.  Less than two weeks later, no less than 
eight House bills restructuring the county school board were unveiled at a public hearing 
(Trejos 2001b).  Some bills called for an all appointed board.  Some called for a mixture 
of elected and appointed board members.  Some kept the elected board but changed 
election districts or changed board procedures.  One bill would have put the board‘s 
configuration up for referendum.   
While momentum in to change the board increased in the House, the Senate 
remained less desirous of change.  Of the eight county Senators, three were former 
educators and another was an ally of board Chairman Johnson.
11
  They were reluctant to 
take the drastic step of restructuring the board.  One interviewed Senator said he hoped 
the problems with the board would be resolved without their intervention.   
In late November 2001, the school board and Metts held a retreat meant to repair 
their strained relationship.  They agreed to work together to improve system performance, 
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but the good will did not last long.  On December 15, the school board ordered an audit 
of Metts‘s use of grant money.  Metts had used grant money earmarked for English 
language classes and reducing class size to cover a textbook shortage.  The board also 
made it known that it was upset with Metts because she has not publicly opposed ongoing 
efforts in the General Assembly to restructure the school board.  Members questioned 
Metts‘s loyalty to the board as well as her stated desire to improve her relationship with 
the board (Trejos 2001c).   
 
The Endgame  
Late January 2002, the board prohibited Metts from signing any contract above 
$5,000.  The action was taken after Metts signed ten-year lease agreements with five 
county churches to use their buildings for Head Start classes.  The board was upset that 
Metts did not get their approval before hand.  Metts claimed she informed the board of 
her plans and took the position that she did not have to wait for a board vote to sign a 
contract.   ―You have no knowledge of the number of contracts that we need to expedite. 
You will literally bring the system to a halt,‖ Metts warned (Trejos 2002a).  Board 
member Angela Como who voted for the restriction said, ―If we can do nothing else, we 
must demand accountability‖ (Ibid.).  Board member Doyle Niemann who voted against 
the measure said, ―It‘s paranoia run rampant. This is micromanaging of the worst kind‖ 
(Ibid.).  Delegate Rawlings said of the boards‘ action, ―It is the worst example in state 
history of micromanaging by a school board.  It‘s going to disrupt the ability of the 
superintendent to carry out her job. I think it‘s the most irresponsible decision ever made 
by this board‖ (Ibid.).  
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Two days later on January 28, the 2002 MSPAP scores were released.  The county‘s 
composite score dropped to 28.3% from 31% in 2001 (Maryland State Department of 
Education 2002).
12
  The state average dropped from 45.3% to 43.7%.  It should be noted 
that test scores dropped in most districts in the state.  Scores dropped by more than ten 
points in 120 schools across the state.  The 120 schools was more than three times the 
number of schools that had experienced large drops the previous year (Aizenman and 
Schutle 2002).  The drops across the state were so precipitous that several jurisdictions 
challenged the validity of the results (Trejos 2002b).  Despite the widespread concern 
about the tests, board members blamed Metts for the decline.  Chairman Johnson said, ―I 
think the data speaks for itself.  I don‘t believe enough focus has been put on improving 
the academic performance of the school system.  I want to see what her plan is to correct 
the problem‖ (Ibid.).   
 MSDE also added five more county schools to the state‘s takeover watch list.  The 
total number of county schools on the list was now 20.  Again Johnson put the blame 
squarely on Metts saying the poor performance was a result of Metts not doing her job 
properly (Reeves 2002a).  Ironically, Johnson also said that the chronic underfunding of 
PGCPS was not to blame for the decline.  Never mind that insufficient funding had been 
the school board‘s standard response when it was confronted on the school system‘s poor 
performance.  The board again contemplated firing Metts.  This time there appeared to be 
six votes in favor of firing her.  Told of this, Metts offered to resign.   
On February 2, Chairman Johnson and Metts met to negotiate a contract buyout, 
but the meeting ended without an agreement.  Later that day in a 6 to 3 vote, the board 
fired Metts.  Members Kenneth Johnson, Angela Como, James Henderson, Robert 
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Callahan, Felicia Lasley, and Marilynn Bland voted for the firing.  Members Doyle 
Niemann, Catherine Smith, and Bernard Phifer voted against it.  The Washington Post 
reported that the board was negotiating with Jaqueline Brown, the Howard County school 
administrator who had finished second to Metts in 1999 (Trejos 2002c). The next day, the 
three dissenting board members sought and received a 10-day court injunction blocking 
Metts‘s dismissal.  The judge subsequently ruled that Metts must be given 45 days notice 
before being dismissed.  At the same time, Metts, citing a lack of due process, appealed 
her firing to the state Board of Education.   
Metts‘s firing galvanized state legislators.  County Delegate Rushern Baker and 
Senator Pinsky both introduced emergency legislation to create a crisis management 
panel that would oversee the school board and approve its decisions.  The panel would 
exist until a new board was created in the fall.  The county delegation in the House voted 
15 to 3 in favor of the measure.  A vote of county senators was delayed.  Some senators 
were still hesitant to act while others wanted to focus on a more permanent change.  In 
the meantime, the earlier proposals for a more permanent restructuring of the county‘s 
education leadership were making their way through the Assembly.   
In a February 11
th
 ruling that stunned everyone, the State Board unanimously 
ruled that according to state law no superintendent can be fired without first getting the 
permission of the state superintendent.  The law had not been applied before because 
boards unhappy with a superintendent usually negotiated a buyout rather than fire them.  
Although Grasmick gave no indication of what her decision would be if a request was 
made, she had been a consistent supporter of Metts.  The school board considered 
appealing the State Board‘s ruling to Maryland‘s Circuit Court. 
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On February 14, the House of Delegates voted 94 to 29 in favor of legislation 
stripping power from the county school board and creating an emergency management 
panel.  Of the 21 Prince George‘s delegates voting on the measure, 17 voted in favor of it 
and 4 voted against it.
13
  Momentum to pass emergency legislation again stalled in the 
Senate as the sense of urgency faded after the state board‘s ruling.  The Senate preferred 
to focus on the long-term restructuring proposals.  However by the middle of March, it 
still had not voted on a restructuring proposal.  The Assembly had until April 8, the last 
day of the current legislative session, to pass any legislation.   
Exasperated with the slow pace of the Senate, Delegate Rawlings threatened to 
deny millions in state aid to the county unless the Senate voted on the board proposal.  
And on March 20, the Appropriations Committee voted to withhold $34 million from the 
county.  Baker, a member of the committee, said the House needed to send the Senate a 
message.  ―It‘s time to do something or get the hell out of the way,‖ he said 
(Schwartzman 2002c). 
On March 23, the Prince George‘s school board approved four of the five Head 
Start leases that it had chided Metts for signing in January.
14
  On March 25, the full 
House passed another bill linking state aid for the county with board restructuring.  This 
House plan called for five of the nine board members to be elected in November and the 
remaining four to be appointed by County Executive Curry, with Governor Parris 
Glendening‘s approval (Mosk and Aizenman 2002).  The bill also called for a 2006 
referendum that would allow the county to return to an all-elected board.  Despite 
complaints of being blackmailed, the county‘s Senate delegation, in a 7 to 1 vote, agreed 
on its own restructuring proposal.
15
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The Senate version was more radical than the House‘s.  It called for the current 
board to be replaced on June 1 with an interim, all-appointed board with members chosen 
jointly by Curry and Glendening.  The measure also replaced the superintendent with a 
chief executive officer (CEO).  The new board would choose an interim CEO and begin a 
search for a permanent one (Metts would be eligible for both positions).  In 2006, the 
interim board would be replaced by an elected board.  All of the new board members 
would be elected by the entire county although five of the nine would have to live in 
specific districts within the county.  The move to at-large elections was meant to 
eliminate the perceived parochialism and pandering of the current board (Montgomery 
and Reeves 2002).  The Senate‘s version also increased the amount of state aid the county 
received from $34 to $43million.  
On April 8, both the House and Senate approved the Senate bill.  After the votes, 
Delegate Baker who has long advocated restructuring said of the vote, ―It‘s a new day in 
Prince George's County.  This is going to bring great change‖ (Schwartzman and Trejos 
2002).  The next day the search for nine new Prince George‘s County school board 
members began. 
 
The Story Behind the Story: 
External and Internal Pressures on the Education Regime 
 
 
A number of factors contributed to the disruption of the school cartel.  The 
dissolution of the school board may have been the focusing event that opened a window 
for change.  However, that window probably would not have opened had the regime not 
been under considerable pressure already.  The regime was under increasing stress from 
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both external and internal forces.  On their own, each may not have had sufficient 
strength to bring about change.  However, together these pressures combined to create a 
groundswell that swept the board away.  A discussion of these pressures follows. 
 
Increased State Control: The Link between Funding, Accountability, and Education 
Reform in Maryland  
 
The report, A Nation at Risk (U.S. Commission on Excellence in Education 1983) 
focused public attention on the connection between educational performance and the 
United State‘s economic performance.  The quality of America‘s educational system was 
seen as a threat to America‘s economic superiority.  Since the report‘s release waves of 
reforms have swept across the nation.   
The excellence movement was the first wave of education reform to develop after 
the report‘s release (Fuhrman 2003).  The movement focused on raising standards for 
students and teachers, increasing graduation requirements, enhancing student assessments 
and strengthening teacher certification requirements.  Many of the reforms in this wave 
came from state-level efforts.  Thus the first wave was seen as ―top down‖ reform.  In 
reaction to state level reform, the second wave of reform, the restructuring movement, 
focused on ―bottom up‖ reform efforts.  Reforms in this wave focused on in-school 
efforts such as longer class times, increased planning time for teachers, and in-school 
governance changes.  Site-based management grew out of this wave.  The third and 
current wave of education reform attempts to integrate the first two waves.  The standards 
movement focuses on delineating specific content and performance standards for students 
and schools through state-level programs.  Educational quality and accountability have 
become the buzzwords of this third wave of reform.  Efforts have manifested themselves 
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most in the widespread use of statewide assessment programs.  
Maryland has been an active participant in state level involvement in education 
reform efforts.  The state has had a statewide testing program since 1971 when the 
General Assembly passed a school accountability law designed to improve education by 
making state and local officials responsible for meeting their own educational goals 
(Barnes 1972).  In 1991 Maryland began a new school performance program: the 
Maryland School Performance Program (MSPP).  Instead of focusing on minimal 
competencies, MSPP focused on performance and proficiency.  The program was lauded 
for its emphasis on rigor and excellence (Haigh 1996).  However, after several years of 
implementation it became clear that raising standards alone would not bring about the 
statewide transformations the state sought.  
State Superintendent Nancy Grasmick made it clear that addressing the funding 
disparity between school districts within the state was vital to continuing the progress of 
the reforms the state had begun.  Without addressing the funding issue, standards would 
not be met because districts would be able to resist increased accountability for meeting 
them.  ―How can you hold us accountable when we don‘t have enough to meet the 
standard,‖ would be the response of districts not meeting the higher state standards 
according to Grasmick (Interview with Nancy Grasmick 1994).  For the State 
Superintendent increased funding and increased accountability were linked.  This was 
also the position of Governor Glendening.  He was particularly concerned about the 
funding disparities between wealthy and poor districts and pledged additional funding for 
education saying, ―Education should not be a lottery that depends on where you were 
born‖ (Hill 1994a).   
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Glendening formed a task force to study funding disparities between Maryland‘s 
school districts in 1997.  The goals of the Task Force on Education Funding Equity, 
Accountability, and Partnerships were to, ―determine if inequities or gaps exist in funding 
programs earmarked for Maryland students who are believed to be ‗at risk‘ of failing in 
school, look at current accountability systems to provide assurances to the General 
Assembly and the public that school systems and school leaders are held accountable for 
meeting appropriate educational and fiscal standards, and see if the State can better 
leverage the money it currently spends and make use of all available public and private 
resources‖ (Task Force on Education Funding Equity, Accountability, and Partnerships 
1998).  Although the task force examined education funding throughout the state, special 
attention was paid to Prince George‘s County because of its efforts to end court-ordered 
busing.   
Settlement of the desegregation suit would require increased state funding.  The 
Task Force was asked to examine the settlement proposal and possibly make 
recommendations for state action.  County officials hoped that the Task Force would 
recommend the state endorse the settlement thus increasing the likelihood of securing the 
increased funding.  Unfortunately for settlement supporters, the Task Forced declined to 
recommend the State accept the settlement in its current form.   
It was clear the Task Force had concerns about PGCPS governance.   It concluded 
that, ―funding and accountability issues cannot be separated, and that any new funding 
commitments to Prince George‘s County should be accompanied by appropriate 
accountability measures consistent with the State‘s constitutional obligation to provide a 
‗thorough and efficient‘ education for every school-age child in the State‖ (Ibid., 67).  
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The Task Force recommended a performance audit of PGCPS.  It further recommended 
the appointment of a ―management oversight panel‖ (MOP) of county residents to 
monitor the progress of the audit and implementation of its recommendations.  The panel 
was to give periodic progress reports to the General Assembly, county government, and 
the board of education.  From the Task Force‘s report, it was clear that any additional 
state funding for PGCPS would be tied to additional accountability measures.  It was also 
clear that the state was willing to use its power to force compliance by county education 
authorities.  
 
Paying the Price to End Court-Ordered Busing   
In July 1996, the school board asked the U.S. District Court to lift the 
desegregation order that had been in place for 24 years.  As a condition of lifting the 
order, the board wanted Judge Peter Messitte to force the county and the State of 
Maryland to provide the funds needed to build and enhance neighborhood schools so 
continued busing would be unnecessary.  Judge Messitte ordered a full-scale review of 
the school system‘s desegregation efforts instead.  The order surprised and worried the 
board and the NAACP, the other litigant in the case.  Both feared the judge would lift the 
court order without requiring the county or state to fund the board‘s neighborhood 
schools plan.  The plan called for the building or renovation of 13 schools over six years.  
It also called for PGCPS to strengthening efforts to reduce the achievement gap.  The 
judge‘s decision forced the lawsuit‘s parties to work out a settlement.  According to 
School Board Chairman Kenneth Johnson, ―The horse was out of the barn.  It put us in 
the position where we had to do something‖ (Montgomery and Neal 1996).   
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In March 1998, the school board, County Executive Curry, and the NAACP 
reached agreement on a settlement of the desegregation suit.  The settlement came after 
Governor Parris Glendening agreed to have the state pay for a greater share of school 
construction.
16
  The state‘s assistance was crucial to getting the settlement.  Two years 
earlier the plan was sidetracked by the county‘s failure to pass a referendum repealing 
TRIM, the 1978 referendum that capped county property taxes.  Not only did voters 
refuse to repeal TRIM, they voted instead to strengthen the restriction by requiring any 
rise in county taxes to be subject to voter approval.  The outcome of the vote made it 
apparent that the extra money necessary to build the new schools was not going to come 
from the county.  The money would have to come from the state. 
Despite the governor‘s commitment, getting all of the needed funding for the 
settlement was not assured.  Any additional commitment of state resources to Prince 
George‘s would have to be approved by Maryland‘s General Assembly.  Getting that 
approval was in no way guaranteed.  According to interviewed legislators, there was a 
general sentiment in the Assembly against assisting the county because of TRIM.  
Legislators questioned why they should pay for Prince George‘s projects when county 
residents were unwilling to do so?  There also was resistance to giving money to a system 
many considered mismanaged.  A county delegate said, ―We had to go before our 
colleagues in the General Assembly and ask for money for our system.  There were all of 
the headlines all the time about all of the stuff that was going wrong.  The kids weren‘t 
doing well, and there was all this infighting.  We had to intervene.‖ 
Recognizing the possibility that a court might force the state to provide the 
funding, a number of legislators insisted on strings being attached to any state funds for 
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the county.  Delegate Howard Rawlings (D-Baltimore) said, ―I‘m not supporting an extra 
dime for Prince George's County schools without significant accountability proposals in 
place‖ (Editorial 1997).  Rawlings added, the ―legislature is not going to allocate 
significant sums of money to address the well-documented problems of the Prince 
George's County school system without a high degree of accountability‖ (Spinner 1997).  
As chairman of the House Appropriation Committee, Rawlings had the power to make 
good on his declarations.  Rawlings was not alone in his position.  House Speaker Casper 
Taylor (D-Allegany) said, ―I‘ve indicated to them that to the extent Prince George‘s 
County can demonstrate more efficiency, more accountability, the more support they 
would receive in the legislature.  That‘s a fundamental statement‖ (Ibid., 1997).     
Because the school board was desperate for state funding, the legislature was able 
to force the school board to agree to accept the recommendations of the Commission and 
submit to increased oversight.  That oversight came in the form of the Management 
Oversight Panel (MOP). 
 
The Performance Audit and MOP 
MGT of America, Inc was selected in January 1998 to conduct a system-wide 
performance review of PGCPS.  MGT released its final report in July.  The performance 
audit found multiple problems with PGCPS‘s management and governance.  Auditors 
made over 300 recommendations for improvement which they estimated would net 
PGCPS almost $125 million in savings (MGT of America, Inc. 1998).  Auditors found 
absent or loose internal controls over school property and funds, and school staff 
improperly trained to handle accounts.  Auditors also found many departments lacking in 
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focus and recommended the reorganization of several as well as the elimination of 
unnecessary staff.  Upgrades to PGCPS‘s technology systems were encouraged.  The 
auditors also found that administrative staff at schools were not being assigned based on 
any specified allocation formula or identified need.  Further, school administrators were 
not being held accountable for implementing the superintendent‘s school reorganization 
plan which the auditors commended.
17
   
The school board and Superintendent Jerome Clark appeared to be receptive to 
the audit‘s findings, at least publicly.  Clark said, ―I think on the whole they did a good 
job of holding up a mirror to the school system.  We want to make sure that we don't see 
ourselves as victims and hunker down like we are being prosecuted. These are legitimate 
recommendations, and we're going to aggressively address them.  I might not agree with 
all of the recommendations, but I think we need to address them‖ (Frazier 1998b).  
School board Chairman Alvin Thornton said ―I think it's a good departure point for the 
board to pressure itself and its various constituencies to move.  All and all, as audits go, 
they are initially painful and will present things that on first blush appear to be 
problematic but on further examination really are things that can be addressed‖ (Ibid.).   
Privately however, board members disputed the audit‘s assumptions and findings.   
Board members also complained that, ―anytime people wanted to say something good or 
bad about the system, they‘ll latch on to one of the key words from the Management 
Oversight Panel or the audit.  The MOP was a particular source of irritation for board 
members who saw the panel as a personal attack on the board.  Members believed the 
audit was ―rigged‖ and was ―orchestrated‖ by board opponents.  One board member 
noted that the MOP only lasted as long as the elected board.  ―People would say, ‗we 
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can‘t do without the [MOP]‘.  The day after the school board was disbanded; the 
Management Oversight Panel was disbanded.  There was no longer any more need for the 
school system to be overseen by the [MOP] since there was no more elected school board 
for them to harass.‖  Proponents of the MOP counter that the panel was necessary to 
insure changes were made because the elected school board was not inclined to make the 
changes on its own.   
A year after the MOP was appointed its relationship with the school 
administration was quite strained.  Because the panel had no enforcement powers it was 
marginalized by school officials according to the panel‘s head, Artis Hampshire-Cowan 
(Nakamura 2001a).  She said school leaders had been slow to provide them with 
information and frequently ignored their advice.  She also complained in the panel‘s first 
report to the General Assembly in January 1999 that PGCPS did not seem to be taking 
the audit recommendations seriously.  For example, Hampshire-Cowan cited the audit‘s 
recommendation that PGCPS could save $17.6 million by cutting 344 staff positions.  
Not only did Clark not cut those positions (he only cut 31 positions) he added 128 new 
positions (Nakamura and Pierre 1999).   
Delegate Rawlings blasted the school board.  He said, ―While they give the 
rhetoric of being concerned and the rhetoric of commitment . . . we find the bureaucracy, 
the old way of doing business.  In the absence of leadership, I will certainly act as a 
responsible budget committee chairman to protect the public's investment‖ (Pierre and 
Nakamura 1999).  Just days after the MOP‘s report Rawlings began drafting legislation 
designed to transfer power to an appointed board and executive team.  The superintendent 
would be replaced by a CEO who would manage the day-to-day operations.   
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Rawlings‘ proposal to restructure PGCPS provoked responses from most county 
officials that ranged from the strong opposition of the county council and school board to 
the more subdued response of state lawmakers.  At the time many county officials were 
united in their opposition to any attempt to abolish the elected board even though they 
agreed changes had to be made.  County Council Chairman M.H. Jim Estepp said, 
―Subjecting ourselves to appropriate scrutiny by the General Assembly is part of what 
you have to do when you get state money, but [the bill] sounds like overkill.  I‘m 
absolutely against anything that takes away the authority of the elected school board‖ 
(Pierre and Argetsinger  1999).  Delegate Barbara Frush said, ―I think allowing anyone to 
take over our school system is not a good avenue to pursue.  I think we are all very 
concerned.  The family of Prince George's really truly knows how best to take care of 
itself.  We are under the gun.  It is indeed something that we need to take care.  We need 
to take care of it in-house‖ (Ibid.).   
In response to demands that he stay out of Prince George‘s business, Rawlings 
said, ―I‘m elected by the Baltimore voters, but I have a statewide responsibility.  I‘m also 
an African American in a position to make an impact on a county with the largest black 
student population in the state‖ (Reeves 2002b).  Rawlings said he did not want Prince 
George‘s to become another Baltimore.  ―It's déjà vu all over again.  I heard the same 
rhetoric in Baltimore.  I heard the same defensiveness.  I heard the same resistance on the 
part of their legislators‖ (Pierre 1999).  Indeed, Rawlings proposal for Prince George‘s 





The Baltimore Settlement as Template  
In 1994, the American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland filed a class-action 
lawsuit against the State of Maryland.  In 1995, the city of Baltimore filed its own suit 
against the state.  Both lawsuits contended the state had not done enough to provide the 




Legislators from the rest of the state countered that Baltimore‘s problems were 
more the result of poor management than low funding.  Notable critics included some 
Prince George‘s County legislators.   Prince George‘s County Delegate Timothy F. 
Maloney said in words eerily similar to those that would be said about PGCPS in 2002, 
―It is pernicious to suggest the problem of the school system in Baltimore is a lack of 
money. The real issues involve standards, leadership and management, not money‖ 
(Babington  and Tapscott 1994).   
Instead of risking the outcome of a court case, the state tried to negotiate a 
settlement with Baltimore.  Governor Glendening made it clear that he would not agree to 
additional funding for Baltimore City Public Schools (BCPS) without increased academic 
accountability and management reform (Babington 1996).  After months of negotiation 
Baltimore and the state reached an agreement on a potential settlement.   
The agreement called for the existing school board and superintendent to be 
removed and replaced with a board jointly appointed by the mayor and the governor and 
a new CEO appointed by the new board (Orr 1999).  Further, the mayor would have to 
relinquish control of school personnel and procurement decisions.  That power would rest 
fully in the new board.   The school system also had to develop a ―master plan to improve 
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academic achievement,‖ and develop an evaluation system that would report progress on 
reform.  In return for these power concessions, Baltimore would receive an additional 
$254 million in state aid over five years. 
The Baltimore settlement worried legislators from other jurisdictions.  Governor 
Parris Glendening campaigned on a pledge to increase state spending on education by 
trimming spending in other areas.   The fear that the extra funds for Baltimore would 
come from funding for other jurisdictions led officials from several counties, including 
Prince George‘s and Montgomery counties to initially oppose the plan.  In exchange for 
support of the plan, Prince George‘s and Montgomery legislators wanted additional 
funding directed to other districts throughout the state with the two counties receiving the 
largest portions.  Delegate James C. Rosapepe (D-Prince George's), vice chairman of the 
House Ways and Means Committee said flatly, ―Our position is really very simple: We're 
not going to vote for the Baltimore City deal unless we get the same thing for Prince 
George's County children‖ (Neal 1997). 
After intense negotiations, a bill containing the Baltimore plan and additional 
funding for other districts—though not as much as Montgomery and Prince George‘s had 
wanted—narrowly passed the House.  A few days later it passed in the Senate and on 
April 10, 1997 the settlement became law.  Despite securing additional funding, most 
Montgomery County legislators voted against the plan and no Prince George‘s legislators 
supported the settlement plan.     
Interestingly, some on Prince George‘s school board saw what Baltimore had 
done as a template for the county.  Having seen that Baltimore‘s lawsuit was effective in 
getting the city additional funding, they assumed the county now had more leverage.  If 
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the state did not agree to give the county the extra funding needed to settle the 
desegregation lawsuit, the county would sue the state for it.  Of course, the Baltimore 
settlement also served as a template for the state.  If Prince George‘s was to get more 
money from the state, it would have to submit to the same sort of accountability measures 
imposed on Baltimore.   
 
The Role of Delegate Howard Rawlings 
The Baltimore settlement probably would not have occurred without the input of 
Delegate Rawlings.  A former math professor who had long had an intense focus on 
education and improving its quality, Rawlings demanded that those responsible for the 
education of children be held responsible for providing those children with a quality 
education.  As chairman of a powerful House Appropriations Committee, Rawlings had 
the power to support his convictions.  Time and time again, he used the power of his 
position to force through legislation designed to elicit more accountability from 
Baltimore City Public Schools officials (Orr 1999).  It was Rawlings who was 
responsible for the requirement that Baltimore craft a master plan to improve student 
performance and put in place a system to evaluate progress executing the plan.  These 
actions made the settlement more acceptable to fellow legislators.  Rawlings also used the 
power of his chairmanship to secure enough funding to make the settlement acceptable to 
Baltimore officials. 
Critics of Rawlings called him a bully who abused his authority.  Rawlings saw 
himself as an advocate for children, particularly African American children.  When the 
Baltimore Sun named Rawlings one of its Marylander‘s of the year, it said, ―He has never 
wavered in his belief that whatever problems poverty or an intransigent bureaucracy may 
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impose on them, city children can learn and succeed‖ (Marylanders of the Year 1997).  
The award was given to Rawlings after he had pushed through legislation to restructure 
Baltimore‘ school board despite opposition from constituents.  Speaking shortly after 
Rawlings‘ death in 2003, Maryland House Speaker Michael Busch said of him, ―He was 
the guy that came out of public housing and treasured his education opportunities ...   He 
believed the key to success for minorities and for working-class people was to gain the 
education to succeed in the work force and to participate in all the rich benefits of being 
part of the American dream‖ (Stuckey 2003).  Rawlings applied that philosophy to 
Baltimore—and to Prince George‘s County.   
Rawlings first turned his attention to the performance of Prince George‘s schools 
in 1997.  In June he sent a letter notifying Superintendent Clark that he intended to hold a 
hearing on the performance of schools in Baltimore and Prince George‘s.  Rawlings 
wrote, ―Low test scores and declines in performance in a large number of schools, as well 
as special education and staffing issues, all give warning of developing challenges in the 
school system‖ (Abramowitz and Frazier 1997).  County officials believed the letter 
amounted to political gamesmanship on Rawlings‘ part.  They viewed Rawlings‘ 
involvement in Prince George‘s education as retribution for the county delegation‘s 
opposition to increased funding for Baltimore.  School board member Doyle Niemann 
said of Rawlings‘ effort, ―He's trying to humiliate and embarrass the county and impose 
his will over everybody in the state. This is all about power; it's not about the children. 
It's not about what's really happening in the schools‖ (Pierre and Argetsinger 1999).   
Others thought Rawlings interest was genuine.  When asked why Rawlings was 
so involved in Prince George‘s education, one interview respondent said Rawlings, ―saw 
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great potential in Prince George‘s unlike Baltimore that had deep systemic problems.‖  
Rawlings himself said of the county, ―It's outrageous for this county, given the education 
pool and talent, to have a second-class public school system.  I don't see how they 
tolerate it‖ (Reeves 2002b).  Rawlings clearly was unable to tolerate it.  It was clear that 
as long as Delegate Rawlings was around, PGCPS was going to have to submit to state 
oversight.  Rawlings was going to continue to apply pressure to the regime. 
 
The School Cartel’s Response to Attacks  
Despite their opposition to his involvement, the school board had to take 
Rawlings‘ threat seriously.  The school board responded to Rawlings by letting it be 
known that the board would not renew Superintendent Clark‘s contract when it expired in 
July 1999.  Further they indicated that Clark would be replaced with someone from 
outside the system.   So the board members who voted for Metts were voting for the most 
―outside‖ of the outsiders.  The board hoped these actions would be enough to assuage 
Rawlings and other state officials.    
MOP chair Hampshire-Cowan was unmoved by the board‘s action.  She 
maintained Clark was being made the scapegoat for the board‘s inability to solve a much 
bigger problem.  She said, ―It's a little troublesome to me to make Jerome Clark the 
problem and thus the solution.  A number of issues need to be addressed. . . . You can get 
the best superintendent in the world, and if the community is not concerned and the 
school board is not acting properly as a board, there will be continuing problems‖ (Pierre 
1999).  Rawlings was also skeptical of the board‘s decision.  ―When there are problems, 
school boards inevitably will dump the superintendent to cover their ineptness, and 
therefore hope people believe they have solved the problem.  I have never given the 
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impression that the problem with Prince George's schools was Jerome Clark. The 
problems are deep, embedded and can only be solved by major restructuring of the 
system‖ (Nakamura 1999a).  Clark‘s response was to announce his retirement at the end 
of his contract.   
The board‘s action should have been expected because this is what school cartels 
do.  When criticism is directed at it, the board will try to deflect the criticism by placing 
blame on the superintendent.  Wilbur Rich writes, ―Termination is routine if, in the 
judgment of the cartel, change, or the appearance of change, is needed.  The cartel‘s 
expectations of a superintendent are different from those of the public.  They evaluate the 
superintendent according to their own internal needs.  If their unity is jeopardized, then 
the superintendent is expendable‖ (Rich 1996, 7). 
Another predictable response of regimes under attack is to argue that those 
questioning it are unqualified to judge it.  Board member Angela Como said of the MOP, 
―A school system is a very complex entity.  You can't just sit on a panel and look at a 
budget and make decisions about whether a magnet program should be continued or cut.  
People who are throwing stones do not know enough about the system‖ (Nakamura 
1999b).  Some board members also questioned the motives of the MOP.  They cited 
Hampshire-Cowan‘s close ties to County Executive Wayne Curry who had a tense 
relationship with the school board because of the budget.  He had typically given the 
system less than requested, and had frequently criticized the board‘s management of its 
budget.  
The board agreed money was the issue but not the board‘s handling of the 
system‘s finances.  Instead board members argued accusations of mismanagement were 
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excuses used by politicians in an attempt to get control of construction money.  ―The 
educational system became more of a football in a battle for resources because it was one 
of the few places in Prince George‘s, especially in the late 1980s and 1990s, where there 
were discretionary resources that could be fought over.  The large state and federal 
money that was coming in to settle the desegregation became a political football and 
people fought over it.‖   
So when Metts was hired as superintendent in 1999, the regime was already under 
pressure from the state.  The disruption of the regime was already beginning as state 
officials sought to limit the regime‘s authority.  Underneath those external pressures, 
there were internal pressures that were also weakening the regime. 
 
A Succession of Weak Superintendents   
Dr. Metts joined an educational system that was in a state of turbulent transition.  
She replaced Jerome Clark who had been appointed superintendent in 1995.  Clark was 
Deputy Superintendent under Superintendent Edward Felegy whom he replaced after 
serving only four years.  Felegy had the misfortune of being in office when Maryland 
overhauled its testing program in 1992.  The test results exposed the poor performance of 
PGCPS and accountability for the failure was placed on Felegy.  Sensing he had lost the 
support of the community, Felegy announced his plans to retire at the conclusion of his 
contract.   
Felegy was not helped by the fact that he was a white leader of a majority African 
American county with an even more predominately African American student 
population.  Members of the African American population in the county wanted a black 
superintendent.  In the early 1990s county blacks were beginning to flex their political 
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muscles and aiming to fill powerful positions in the county.
19
    It was clear that the next 
superintendent would be African American.  Interestingly enough, according to a 
member of the board that chose Felegy, the county would have had a black 
superintendent in 1991 had the three African Americans on the board agreed to support 
Clark over Felegy.  However, their inability to work together cost Clark the 
superintendency.   
A career PGCPS employee, Clark was the consummate insider with strong ties 
throughout the administration.  Nevertheless, Clark‘s tenure was troubled.  In 1996, Clark 
was hit with a double punch, a larger than expected enrollment coupled with a higher 
than usual number of teachers leaving the system.  As a result, PGCPS had to hire almost 
1,500 teachers for the 1996-97 school year.  A tall order for any system, the task was 
even more difficult for Prince George‘s because it had to compete with surrounding 
jurisdictions able to pay higher salaries.  For example, the average teacher salary in 
Montgomery County was $48,290 while it was $41,396 in Prince George‘s (Maryland 
State Department of Education 1997).  Montgomery also had higher maximum salaries 
than Prince George‘s.
20
  As a result, the school system had to hire a number of 
provisionally certified teachers.  For the school year, PGCPS had 900 provisionally 
licensed teachers representing 13% of the teaching staff.  In comparison, 1.5% of 
Montgomery County‘s teachers were uncertified and i7% of Baltimore‘s teachers were 
uncertified (Lipton 1998).  The high number of provisionally certified teachers in Prince 
George‘s added to a perception of declining educational quality.      
In 1998, Maryland‘s State Department of Education (MSDE) declared nine Prince 
George‘s County ―reconstitution eligible‖, meaning they were in danger of state takeover 
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if they did not make immediate improvements.  Only Baltimore had more schools on the 
list: 79.
21
  The school board‘s response was to blame Clark.  For his part, Clark tried to 
get ahead of the state and decided to ―reconstitute‖ the six schools himself.   He produced 
a plan to reorganize the staff at the schools and revamp the curriculum.  Unfortunately, 
implementation of the plan was rushed and haphazard.  The schools fared no better after 
the changes than before as a result (Ibid.).   
In addition to these issues, there was a sense that Clark was not a strong leader 
because of his inability to control his administration.  One respondent said of Clark‘s 
tenure as superintendent, ―Clark was a nice guy.  He came up through the system.  He 
just couldn‘t say no to factions.  Clark would say something, he would give a command 
and his deputy would countermand it, and what the deputy said would stand.‖  The 
deputy was able to get away with doing this because, ―people knew who to go to.  It was 
like kids going to mommy and daddy.  If mom said no and dad said yes, you know who 
to ask for.‖  This made members of the board feel that Clark was ineffectual as a 
superintendent.  Because of the problems Clark had with the administrators, board 
members looked for a superintendent capable of saying no to people.  But administrators 
used to getting their way were not likely to back down without a fight. 
 
An Entrenched Bureaucracy Will Not Acquiesce  
Although Metts did not realize it at the time, she was walking into a poisoned 
environment.  Before Superintendent Clark retired, he made a number of late-term 
appointments.  The school board, wanting to give Metts as much hiring latitude as 
possible rescinded the appointments.  The board‘s action angered many administrators.  
Administrators were further angered when the board selected Metts over their objections.  
170 
 
According to an interviewed union official, ASASP had opposed Metts‘s hiring because 
it had been told by Delaware unions that Metts was anti-union.   
Administrators were also defensive after their portrayal in the performance audit.  
For example the performance audit found that 25 of the 70 positions in the overstaffed 
Division of Personnel were administrative positions.  Further supervisors made up 36% 
of all administrators in the Division.  Auditors noted of the Division‘s administrators, 
―several have been placed here because they‘ve been ineffective in other administrative 
positions, especially at the school level‖ (MGT of America, Inc. 1998, vi). 
Metts, wanting to show state officials she was serious about system 
accountability, made staffing one of her first priorities.  Her decision to fire and/or 
reassign some administrators all but guaranteed a poor relationship with administrators 
and their union, ASASP.    
Her relationship with administrators was not helped by the fact that most of her 
top deputies were from outside the system. They all came with Metts from Delaware.  
Some board members thought Metts needed to bring in outsiders.  Asked about bringing 
in people from Delaware, board member Como responded, ‗I think that's a terrific idea.  
She really needs an outside team that she can depend on.  She‘s not going to get a straight 
story from people in the system‖ (Nakamura 1999e). Nonetheless, Metts‘s reliance on 
outsiders was seen by some system insiders as a commentary on the existing 
administration‘s quality and effectiveness.  They saw the outsiders as a testament to 
Metts‘s lack of faith in the people presently in the system.  That these deputies were 
white further emphasized for some how little Metts thought of the black administrators in 
the system.  Metts‘s relationship with the ASASP was so confrontational that the union 
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hired former superintendent Clark as a consultant to help the union analyze Metts‘s 
personnel decisions and provide strategy on how to negotiate a new contract.   
Metts‘s management style also alienated people.  Some called her autocratic.  
While Metts garnered accolades from state and county officials, other constituencies were 
less complimentary.  Some parents and administrators accused her of not seeking their 
input or making them a part of the process.  Even Metts‘s supporters conceded that she 
did not have the best communication skills.  However, Metts supporters claimed that 
many of those who claimed to be unhappy with Metts‘s style were really unhappy about 
the fact that she was changing what they had become accustomed to or had benefited 
from.  For her part, Metts said, ‗It‘s frightening to me that people say I am not listening to 
their concerns.  I am.  But no superintendent comes from the outside that would not plan 
dramatic changes.  There will be those people who say they don't feel appreciated or 
valued.  That is not true.  We‘ll get through the growing pains‖ (Bhatti 2000a).  One 
observer said of Metts, ―There were a lot of internal issues.  Dr. Metts was appointed by 
the board. She came from Delaware.  She was a controversial figure.  She had a lot of 
ideas but she didn‘t do a lot of the community work that needed to be done to build 
support for those ideas.  She tried to do things top-down.  They were maybe good ideas 
but they weren‘t sold to the community.  So there was a lot of resistance to her ideas.  
Then there got to be, because it was controversial, people started drawing lines in the 
sand.‖   
Metts represented a clear challenge to the status quo as far as administrators were 
concerned; a status quo in which administrators operated with impunity.  The entrenched 
interests were under assault, but they were not going down without a fight.  A respondent 
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described Metts‘s relationship with the ASASP as a ―death match‖ and claimed union 
heads made it their mission to get rid of Metts.   
Administrators are powerful members of the employment regime.  Long after 
boards have changed or superintendents have left, administrators remain.  They hold the 
institutional memory of the school system and the regime.  Making enemies of them 
would make an already difficult job exhausting.  However, dislodging those entrenched 
interests was necessary if the school system was going to produce the level of 
accountability demanded by the state.  So once again Metts was put in a difficult position.  
She could either please state legislators or please administrators.  She could not do both, 
and her relationship with administrators suffered as a result.   
  
The School Board-Superintendent Relationship Becomes Problematic Quickly 
In many school systems there is often at least occasional tension between the 
board and superintendent.  For large urban school systems that are often struggling, a 
tense relationship is the norm (Rich 1996; Portz, Stein and Jones 1999; Mountford 2004).  
Each side feels pressure to show demonstrable improvements in a system confronted with 
a host of problems.  Prince George‘s County was no different.  That Metts and the board 
had a relationship headed on a downward trajectory is not surprising given the nature of 
the board-superintendent relationship.  What is surprising about this relationship is just 
how bad it was and how quickly it got that way. 
The dispute over where Metts could sit was a proxy for a larger dispute over the 
position of the superintendent vis-a vis the board.  Metts saw herself as an equal.  
Members of the board clearly saw her as a subordinate.  The same can be said of the 
dispute over the bonuses.  The dispute was not about the money.  The $45,000 cost was a 
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mere drop-in-the-bucket in a nearly $1billion school budget.  Both sides acknowledged 
that the dispute was not about the money.  For the board the dispute was about 
establishing a clear chain of command.  Chairman Johnson said, ―This has never been 
about the bonuses. This is about authority‖ (Nakamura 2001c).  It was also about the 
board having second thoughts about its hiring of Metts.   
The reality is there was tension between the school board and Metts even before 
Metts was officially hired.  Board members felt pushed into hiring Metts by state 
legislators who demanded change.  A board member said, ―Purportedly, it is a board‘s 
function to select the superintendent.  She [Metts] was a slam dunk to be selected prior to 
us even realizing it.  The politicians of the county had already pre-selected her.‖  There 
was no way Iris Metts was not going to be superintendent.  It was preordained.‖  When 
the board chose Metts, it was trying to hire someone whom state legislators would 
approve.  Those voting for Metts wanted to choose an outsider in order to prove they 
were serious about improving system performance.  ―I think they wanted someone to 
come in here and really take the reins to move forward with the school system, and they 
gave Dr. Metts carte blanche,‖ said Douglas J.J. Peters, a member of a state panel 
overseeing the district. ―And then they decided, wait a second, we gotta get some of it 
back‖ (Trejos and Labbe 2002).  Although some on the board believed they had to 
appease legislators, they were unhappy doing so.  In some ways the dispute with Metts 
was the board‘s way of pushing back against the state.   
 For some school board members, the dispute was simply a clash of personalities.  
A number of respondents suggested that sexism was also involved.  Metts being a woman 
was a problem for some of the men on the school board.  Metts‘s being a black woman 
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was apparently a problem for some of the black men on the board.  They did not like her 
challenging their authority.  Although some interviewed board members deny that, other 
members talked about board members losing perspective in regards to Metts.    
Board member Doyle Niemann (who later became a House Delegate) wrote in a 
letter to the Washington Post, ―It's unfortunate that the situation has come to this point; it 
didn't have to. And it's even more unfortunate that as it plays out, all the parties are being 
forced by their own psychological logic into increasingly polarized positions‖ (Niemann 
2001).  He added, ―The most disturbing part of this current situation is that most of my 
colleagues concede that the likely outcome of this controversy will be changes in the 
structure of the board -- and yet they continue to insist on pursuing a course of action that 
has no chance of success (Ibid.).‖  As one interview respondent said, the board put the 
nails in its own coffin.‖  Another respondent said, ―We had a school system that did not 
want to change.  It absolutely did not want to change.  [The board] basically asserted 
itself as, ‗we are an elected school body.  We are autonomous from the General 
Assembly and we don‘t have to answer to you because we answer to the people.‘  In 
retaliation for the increased state scrutiny, the school board started picking a fight with 
Dr. Metts.  We gave the board an opportunity to self-regulate.  The board refused.‖  The 
dispute with Metts was not the first time members of the board have acted against the 
board‘s own self-interest.   
 
The School Board Seals Its Fate 
A campaign to overturn TRIM was launched in 1996.  The campaign was led by 
business and civic leaders and supported by County Executive Curry, the County 
Council, and the Board of Education.  Nevertheless, fighting between the board and the 
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county council and executive over the school budget caused some members on the board 
to threaten to not support the overturning of TRIM.  The threat was made despite the fact 
that the school board had been especially vocal in its opposition to TRIM and had 
repeatedly faulted TRIM for the inability to provide the quality of education demanded 
by the state and others.   
Board Chairman Marcy Canavan proposed a resolution announcing the board 
would not support the overturning of TRIM.  She did this because she alleged the school 
system was being used by the county to get TRIM repealed but the county was not 
guaranteeing the school system would get its share of the extra revenue repealing TRIM 
would generate (Frazier and Neal 1996).  Others felt the real reason for Canavan‘s action 
was her anger at the council and executive for denying the board‘s request to transfer 
funds within its budget.  Board member Frederick C. Hutchinson said of Canavan‘s 
efforts, "I think it's crazy.  Just because you're mad at the county executive and the county 
council, you can't take your eyes off the prize (Ibid.)."   
Another example of the kind of disconnect that seemed to exist between the 
school board and other county actors occurred when the Prince George‘s County 
Chamber of Commerce gave Clark an Excellence in Education Award in early February 
1998.  Just a few days later someone leaked to the media that the majority of the school 
board had given Clark an average or below average rating on his job evaluation (Brown  
1998).  Clark received the lowest scores on his evaluation in the areas of communication 
and public relations and in management and operation of the school system (Ibid.).  
Although the board apologized to Clark for the leak, the timing of the evaluation‘s leak 
was rather suspicious.  Adding to suspicion was the fact that the confidential evaluation 
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was leaked to the media before it was formally presented to Clark.
22
  One might surmise 
that some on the board were trying to use the media to deliberately undermine Clark.   
The school board‘s use of the media in this way was not a onetime occurrence.  
Auditors noted their concerns over board members leaking to the press (MGT of 
America, Inc. 1998, v.).  They even cited the leaking of information from closed 
meetings the auditors had with the school board during the audit.  Several times during 
Metts‘s tenure, board members leaked confidential information to the media.  In 
interviews, some board members admitted as much.  They believed that since the board 
was a public body, the public should know what it was doing especially since the board 
was holding numerous closed meetings at the time.   
Some board members were convinced that Metts was leaking information to the 
media in an attempt to make the board look bad.  One board member so convinced Metts 
was leaking information recounted (in an interview) how the member set up a sting to 
catch Metts leaking information.  The member sent Metts a memo that had supposedly 
been carbon copied (cc) to all of the other board members, but unbeknown to Metts, the 
board member kept all of the copies.  The member had the memo hand carried to Metts 
by school board staff.  The next day the memo‘s contents were in the newspaper.  Metts 
complained to the board member about the board releasing the memo.  The board 
member countered ―the board couldn‘t have sent it because I have all of the carbon 
copies.  The rest of the board doesn‘t even know about the memo.‖  Both Metts and 
board members admit there was a complete lack of trust between them. 
At times members of the school board used the media to sabotage Metts.   For 
example, Metts‘s plan to redistribute school funds was undermined by board member 
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Angela Como.   Before Metts could announce the change, Como released the plans to her 
constituents (Nakamura 2000b).  Como represented one of the districts likely to 
experience most of the cuts.  The resulting outrage was predictable, and more than 200 
people attended a school board meeting to protest the possible changes (Reeves 2000).  In 
the wake of the protests, Metts was forced to restore some of the budget cuts.  Metts said, 
―It's hard to give [parents and officials] information after the fact, hard to give a full 
explanation when information comes out in a fragmented, incomplete way‖ (Ibid.).  She 
added that the infighting within the board made her job more difficult. 
Board Chairman James Henderson wrote Como a letter denouncing her actions.  
Henderson wrote, ―Your actions have compromised the ability of the superintendent to 
effectuate change . . . and have undermined the structural integrity of this Board of 
Education. This I consider to be self-serving and thoughtless‖ (Nakamura 2000a)!  Como 
responded that as an elected official she had an obligation to inform her constituents.  She 
also chided Henderson on his sending memos to board members.  ―Your memos are 
becoming a bad habit! It is not your place to lecture me or any other board member,‖ 
Como wrote (Ibid.).  For his part, Henderson said the memos were part of his attempt to 
rein in board members.  He had sent an earlier memo to Robert Callahan whose criticism 
of other board member‘s handling of their expense accounts led to an audit and another 
mini scandal. 
In 2000, the school board was rocked by a scandal when board member Callahan 
complained about another member‘s misuse of her expense account.  The member, 
Marilynn Bland had used her account to print a newsletter for her political campaign.  As 
a result of the complaint, the board ordered an audit of members‘ expense accounts.  The 
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audit uncovered a number of questionable expenditures (Frazier 2000b).  Member 
Catherine Smith charged $3,300 to her account for customized furniture.  Kenneth 
Johnson spent $62 on liquor for a board holiday party.  Chairman Henderson overspent 
his $9,800 expense account by $1,802 dollars.  The most egregious charges were those of 
member Bland who charged her account $2,112 for a two-week trip to Florida.  With 
additional charges, Bland‘s account ran $4,000 over budget.  When Bland was accused of 
misusing her account, she reportedly accused some board members of being racist for 
attacking black board members (Nakamura 2000c).  Como, who is white, responded there 
was ―a lot of animosity‖ between board members.  She said, ―I feel I'm treated very 
rudely by other members. They've told me to be quiet. It's not professional. There are 
board members who want to interpret other board members' words. It's insulting‖ 
(Nakamura 2000a).  Interestingly enough this contretemps occurred just a month after the 
board had attended a retreat designed to foster better cooperation within the board and 
with Metts.  It seems the board just could not help itself.   
Delegate Rawlings alerted the board to be prepared to discuss the expense account 
audit at an upcoming hearing that had previously been scheduled.  A day before the 
hearing, the board held a news conference announcing members were relinquishing their 
board credit cards.  The gesture did not quell the criticism.  At the hearing, State 
Superintendent Nancy Grasmick joined the chorus of those critical of the board.  
Grasmick described the board as ―highly polarized‖, and that polarization ―distracts from 
what's important to serving Prince George's County‖ (Nakamura 2000d).  Auditors had 
made the same observation in 1998.  They wrote, ―The board is functioning as a group of 
individuals rather than as a cohesive corporate body‖ (MGT of America, Inc. 1998, v.).  
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Auditors also noted a lack of trust among board members and between the board and the 
superintendent.   
Other school board actions have done little to engender trust.  In 1996 there was a 
small tempest over board members leaving the board to take PGCPS positions.  Between 
August and November, three board members left for the school system.  In August, Alvin 
Thornton resigned from the board after it hired him as a consultant on the county‘s 
desegregation efforts.  The hire was made when the school board thought the county had 
a plan that would end court-ordered desegregation.  However, when voters rejected a 
referendum to repeal TRIM and provide some of the funding necessary to implement the 
plan, Thornton reclaimed his seat on the school board.
23
   
In November, Mary Canavan gave up her seat to become an assistant in PGCPS‘s 
Office of Student Appeals.  The same month Superintendent Clark hired board member 
Frederick Hutchinson as an administrator.  Members of the county council were not 
pleased with the hirings saying they gave the appearance of people cashing in on contacts 
made while on the board especially since it was the board that hired Clark (Frazier 
1996b).  County Council member Isaac Gourdine (D) said of the board‘s actions, ―the 
question is how are the citizens going to look at it? . . . I'm tired of people playing politics 
with our kids. I think it's terrible, and it's so blatant‖ (Ibid.).  The county council voted 
unanimously to ask the State Ethics Commission to review the hirings.  While what the 
members did was not deemed unethical, the board did agree to strengthen its ethics 
guidelines.   The resignations reinforced perceptions that members put their own self-
interest ahead of that of the board.   
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According to people interviewed, it seemed that members of the school board 
were in denial about or did not fully comprehend the magnitude of people‘s disaffection 
with them.  Donna Beck a longtime parent activist who sits on the current school board 
said of the school board in 2000, ―We have enough of a problem with the perception of 
our schools, but now the perception of the leadership of the schools is even worse.  I look 
at the board as entertainment. They all seem to have different agendas. Their meetings, 
quite frankly, have very little to do with children‖ (Nakamura 2000c).  The opinion of 
Timothy Maloney, Co-Chairman of the Task Force on Education, Funding Equity, 
Accountability and Partnerships is representative of those of many county officials.  He 
said, ―The legislature recognizes Prince George's County has major school construction 
needs, but it also recognizes the county has major needs for management reform as well.  
I don't think the Board of Education has come to grips with the need for real substantive 
change‖ (Pan 1998).  It is probably also fair to say the board did not seem to understand 
how much the environment within which they operated had changed.  Prince George‘s 
Delegate James Hubbard said of county efforts to get more money from Annapolis, ―The 
progress we've been able to make in Annapolis to bring back additional money is in 
jeopardy with stuff like this.  It‘s hard to talk about your needs when people look at the 
actions of the school board as lacking credibility and common sense. Their actions 
overall tend to make people like myself reconsider elected school boards‖ (Nakamura 
2000c).  
To some it seemed the school board could not help itself.  Even some interviewed 
members of the board recognized the board‘s behavior was going to be its undoing.  One 
member said, ―People who were basically very smart, descent, hard-working sort of folks 
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lost perspective on reality for a variety of reasons.  They pushed themselves into a 
confrontational mentality that led them to act irrationally.  They would even know they 
did that.  We had discussions back in the back where I remember saying ‗if you do this, 
they are going to abolish the board‘ and they would say, ‗we don‘t care‘.  Well when 
people have lost their self-preservation instincts they‘ve lost reason.  They‘ve lost their 
perspective on reality.‖  An interviewed delegate said of the board‘s fate, ―There were 
some people on the school board who didn‘t believe we would do it. We told them at that 
time, ‗this cannot continue‘.  They didn‘t believe we would actually do it and they were 
shocked.‖  
 
By the time the General Assembly convened in January 2002, the days of the 
elected school board were numbered.  The question was not if the board would be 
restructured but how the new board would be restructured.  In the end, the dissolution of 
the elected school seemed to signal the end of a long running county drama; a drama that 
was a public embarrassment for many county residents.   
The Assembly‘s action came after a feud that began almost from the beginning of 
Superintendent Metts‘s tenure.  To a casual observer it appeared that the school board‘s 
feud with Superintendent Metts was the motivation for the Assembly‘s action.  However, 
as discussed above this take is not entirely accurate.  The feud was not the primary 
catalyst for state action.  An interviewed delegate with thorough knowledge of the 




What most motivated state legislators was the county‘s desperate need for state 
funding to end court-ordered busing.  County officials rightly believed that the county 
would have a difficult time getting the money it needed to end the desegregation lawsuit 
that had hung over the county‘s head for decades.  They feared that legislators from other 
jurisdictions throughout the state would not vote to provide additional funding to the 
county if the county delegation did not take some sort of action to address the school 
system‘s accountability issues.  For years PGCPS had not operated as expected.  
Repeated fiscal management issues caused many state legislators to doubt the ability of 
school leadership to effectively manage any additional funding.  Further the county‘s 
repeated poor performance on state assessments led legislators like Delegate Rawlings to 
question school leadership‘s commitment to academic achievement.  It was clear to 
county officials that something had to be done about school system leadership.  
The changes made to Baltimore‘s school system leadership through the 1997 
settlement served as a preview of what might be expected in Prince George‘s County.  In 
some respects the dissolution of the school board was perhaps inevitable given what 
happened to Baltimore.  That said the Assembly might not have reached agreement on 
what to do had the board not acted the way it did.  Time after time the board would 
engage in behaviors sure to strengthen the position of those most critical of it.  In the end 
the board was so dysfunctional that even those inclined to support the board had come to 
the realization that the board needed radical reform.   Even some board members have, 
after the fact, admitted that dissolving the board was probably necessary.  They expressed 
the same sentiments as the legislators who voted to oust them; there was no other choice.  
183 
 
In the words of one interview respondent, ―the board gave those who wanted to get rid of 
the board, the excuse to do so.‖   
With the elimination of the elected board, the core of the existing employment 
regime was dismantled.  If ever there was a time when the regime would be vulnerable to 
the challenge of educational reformers then this was it.  But were opponents of the regime 
able to take advantage of this unique opportunity?  Were reformers ready to form a new 
regime? 
Destabilizing the current regime is just the first step in the regime change process.  
In order to supplant the old regime, reformers will need to use the given opportunity to 
activate the county‘s civic capacity to mobilize people and build the coalitions necessary 
to create a new performance regime.  As discussed in Chapter 1, this is not an easy task.  
In many ways dismantling the old regime is the easier part of the process. Building and 
maintaining a broad-based coalition long enough to establish a new regime is the role of 
leadership.  Does such leadership exist in Prince George‘s County?   If it does, were they 
able to create a new performance regime?  These are the questions to be answered in the 







   Seven of eight county senators voted for the bill.  One abstained.  In the House 
seven of twenty-one delegates voted against the bill. 
2
  The Turner Commission was tasked to review the administration of both the 
county government and school system.  A discussion of the commission‘s primary 
findings on school governance can be found in Chapter 3. 
3
  Student members on the board have very limited rights and cannot vote on 
budget, collective bargaining, disciplinary, or personnel matters.  For this reason, 
discussion of the board will be limited to the nine district elected members. 
4
  Alvin Thornton would leave the board in December to head a state commission.  
He was replaced by Felicia Lasley who was appointed by County Executive Wayne 
Curry. 
5
  Metts‘s first day as superintendent was July 6, 1999. 
6
  Unattributed quotations are from interviews conducted by the author.  
Respondents were given anonymity in exchange for their participation. 
7
   In 2000, 31% of PGCPS students scored a satisfactory on the test; the same as 
in 1999.  The state average was 45.3%, up from 43.8% the previous year. 
8
   The watch list is a list of schools in danger of being subject to state action due 
to repeated poor MSPAP performance.  State action can range from the implementation 
of new programs and the reassignment of staff to the takeover of school control.  
9
   Baltimore County and Anne Arundel each had one school on the list. 
10
   The audit will be discussed in more detail below.  
11
  The former educators were Senators Ulysses Currie, Gloria Lawlah, and Paul 
Pinsky.  Senator Nathaniel Exum was Johnson‘s ally.  The Assembly chambers usually 
follows the lead of the local delegation on local matters.  
12
   The composite score is the combined averaged score of all assessments for all 
grades. 
13
   The four were Joanne C. Benson, Carolyn J.B. Howard, Obie Patterson, and 
David M. Valderrama. 
14
  A vote of the fifth lease was delayed because of concerns over a criminal 
conviction of the pastor of the church. 
15





   Under the arrangement, the state would pay 60% of school construction costs.  
Normally, the county would have to pay 60% of the costs.   
17
   The plan was the ―Communities Committed to Children Concept‖.  It sorted 
schools into groups clustered around each of the county‘s 20 high schools.  The goal of 
the plan was to promote greater site-based management. 
18
   For a more detailed account of events in Baltimore see Marion Orr‘s, Black 
Social Capital: The Politics of School Reform in Baltimore 1986-1998 (1999). 
19
   The county‘s first African American county executive, Wayne Curry, was 
elected in 1994. 
20
   The maximum salary in Montgomery was $61,931.  It was $58,066 in Prince 
George‘s. 
21
   Only two other schools were on the list; one school each from Anne Arundel 
and Somerset counties. 
22
   The superintendent had been told about the results but had not been formally 
presented with them. 
23
   Thornton could do this because his name was not taken off the ballot after he 




Education Politics in Prince George’s County after Dissolution 
Part 1: 2002-2006 
 
 
This moment offers an opportunity for a public school system the health of which 
is essential to the health of the county; it offers also risks of continued instability.  
--Editorial, Washington Post, April 10, 2002   
 
This project argues that the regime in charge of Prince George‘s County education 
before 2002 did not have academic improvement as its primary goal.  Instead, self-
preservation and the protection of its members was the regime‘s most important 
objective.  Because of this orientation, the existing school cartel would be incapable of 
taking the actions necessary to improve performance.  A new performance regime would 
need to be created in order for there to be substantive closing of the academic 
achievement gap between white and minority students in Prince George‘s County.   
I contend the dissolution of the school board served as a focusing event (Kingdon 
1984; Birkland 1998, 2004).  A focusing event has the ability to open a window of 
opportunity through which the existing regime can be challenged, disrupted, altered 
and/or destroyed.  The dissolution of the school board by the Maryland General 
Assembly disrupted the school cartel and provided an opportunity to replace the old 
employment regime with a new performance regime.   
The last chapter discussed how and why the window opened.  The question to be 
asked now is did dissolving the school board create enough disruption within the 
education cartel as to significantly alter the regime and/or its goals?  Using the structure 
set out by Orr and Stoker (1994), regime disruption is only the first stage in a three stage 
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regime change process.  A redefining of the scope and purpose of the new regime is the 
second stage.  This second stage involves building a coalition in support of a new regime.  
This stage is then followed by the third and final stage in which the new regime is 
institutionalized.  Only after all three stages have occurred are we able to say that a new 
regime has supplanted the old regime. 
A potential indicator of regime change would be the observance in a change in the 
interactions among regime members.  Also, I have argued that a new performance regime 
would require a broad-base of support.  Evidence of a move towards a new performance 
regime might be found in an expansion of regime members.  We should also see the 
emergence of change agents capable of sparking coalition building.  Finally in stage three 
of the regime change process, there should be evidence of new regime‘s agenda holding 
sway over the education arena.  One measurement of the success of the reformers would 
be to observe an increase in civic capacity, or at the very least see some sense of coalition 
building occurring.  To get this information we must examine what happened to the 
regime after the General Assembly‘s vote. 
Because of the significant amount of change occurring after April 2002, Chapter 5 
has been divided into two parts.  Part 1 covers events from 2002 to 2006.  Part 2 covers 
events from 2006 to 2009.  The first section of Part 1 provides a chronology of events 
occurring after the school board‘s dissolution.  Presenting a chronology illustrates the 
amount of change in county education and the complexity of challenges confronting 
PGCPS.   The second section more closely examines particular components of that 
change and discusses how they influenced the environment in which a new regime would 
have emerged.  
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Public Reaction to Maryland’s General Assembly’s Action   
The decision to oust the elected school board was both extraordinary and 
controversial.  Some county legislators, particularly those who were or had been 
educators, were reluctant to directly involve the legislature in the governance of county 
education.  Prince George‘s Delegate Obie Patterson said of the legislature‘s action, 
―This bill infringes on the duties and responsibilities of an elected body‖ (Hyslop and 
Honawar 2002).  Moreover, some also believed it was unfair to blame the school board 
for the school system‘s failures.  Failures they contended were caused primarily by 
inadequate funding.   Other county lawmakers opposed the measure because they did not 
like being pressured to make changes by those outside of the county.  The earliest 
proponent and driving force behind the movement to dissolve the school board was 
House Delegate Howard ―Pete‖ Rawlings from Baltimore.  Nathaniel Exum, a county 
senator and ally of school board chairman Kenneth Johnson, said of Rawlings, "Who is 
he? Pete does not determine what happens in Prince George's County.  We are 
sophisticated enough to make our own determinations" (Schwartzman 2002a).  
This last accusation was the strongest objection to the board‘s removal expressed 
by both opposing state legislators and members of the public.  By replacing the elected 
board with an appointed board, the Assembly revoked the public‘s ability to vote on their 
school board members; an ability Prince Georgians have had since 1973.
1
  After thirty 
years of having an elected school board, returning to an appointed board seemed like a 
step backwards to many people.  It is not surprising that in this majority African 
American county, revocation of voting privileges sparked some consternation.  
Disenfranchisement is a sensitive subject for any democracy.  It remains a particularly 
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sensitive matter for many minorities in America given the country‘s racial history.  A 
black respondent said, ―I will never be in approval of, in a majority minority 
environment, taking away the right to vote.  Never.  Ever.  I don‘t care how dysfunctional 
it is….I will never ever agree with taking away the right to vote for something—ever.‖
2
  
Opponents of the dissolution argued the legislature should be expanding voting rights not 
narrowing them.   
Proponents of the board‘s dissolution countered that the measure would not result 
in a significant loss of voting rights because residents had voted for the officials 
appointing the new school board.  However, this provided little leverage because term 
limits forced the two people appointing the board, County Executive Wayne Curry and 
Governor Parris Glendening, from office in 2002.  Proponents of the measure also argued 
that the appointed board would only exist for four years after which it would be replaced 
by an elected board.  So any diminishment of voting rights was temporary and necessary 
in the minds of some state officials in order to get the school system back on the right 
track. 
Another concern about the appointed board focused more on the board‘s ability to 
be truly representative of the people.  As an elected body, the old school board‘s 
constituents were the people electing them.  Dissolution opponents made the argument 
that as an appointed body the new school board‘s constituents would be the legislators 
who put them in office.  As a result, school board membership would become another 
form of political patronage.  Opponents also argued that members of the elected board 
represented nine single-member districts which allowed all segments of the county to be 
represented by someone who focused attention on the specific concerns of the 
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constituents in each district.   Because the appointed board did not represent districts, 
members would no longer be working for the individual communities in the diverse 
county.  Supporters of the appointed board countered this criticism by arguing that the 
school board had become parochial precisely because each member focused solely on the 
narrow interests of his or her small group of supporters instead of the broader interests of 
the system as a whole.  This parochialism was seen as a major source of much of the 
bickering and disagreements between board members.   
Eliminating the parochialism and focusing attention back on the larger picture of 
school improvement was part of the motivation for dissolving the board.  A member of 
the board admitted that, ―at some point a majority of the board lost perspective on what 
they were doing and let their own little personal agendas, and there were a variety of 
agendas at work or were problems, take control and there wasn‘t enough of a 
countervailing force.‖  A state delegate said of the old elected board, ―In my opinion that 
structure [nine members from nine districts] was part of the dysfunction because you 
would have people who represented 1/9 of the county and they didn‘t seem to take 
responsibility for the entire county, for the overall education of everybody, all the 
children of the county.  They were just focused on their own districts. Then they would 
form alliances and gang up on each other.  You create a real parochialism and I think it 
damaged the education opportunities for kids across the whole county.‖ 
Some members of the ousted board emphasized the perceived racial nature of the 
action.  In an attempt to save itself, board members argued that the Assembly‘s action 
was an attempt to diminish black political power.  Recall that one of the ways the school 
cartel in Prince George‘s maintained control was its ability to play on the political power 
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concerns of county African Americans.  The cartel had positioned itself as a symbol of 
increasing black political power.  Those racial pleas had some resonance because some 
black residents were suspicious of the motives of some proponents of the dissolution.   
One African American respondent was very blunt about what he saw as racial 
motivations for the turmoil surrounding the school system and the school board, ―There is 
a group of folks who sit on the sidelines who really are not concerned and really don‘t 
care about education or anything in Prince George‘s County.  There‘s a group who just 
looks day in-day out, night in-night out to bash the County.  Part of it is racism.  There is 
a group of whites who were here when the Prince George‘s County was majority white 
and when they were the county executive and the police chief and the fire chief and the 
school superintendent--Prince George‘s County was different.  They ran things.  They 
had the power base.  There are some people that can‘t accept that the demographics have 
changed.‖  When asked about the fact that the board restructuring effort was being led by 
a black county delegate, Rushern Baker, another respondent argued that Baker was seen 
as a front for the white politicians really in control.  The respondent added that creating 
an appointed board was the only way for whites to regain control of the school system 
and the millions of construction dollars coming the system‘s way as the result of the 
desegregation settlement.   
Some appointed board opponents suggested that the dissolution of the school 
board would not have happened in a majority white county.  The reality is that the only 
Maryland counties to have new appointed boards imposed on them are the state‘s two 
majority African American jurisdictions; Baltimore city and Prince George‘s County.
3
  
And this fact was not lost on some county residents as well as some respondents.  ―It was 
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all political.  Quite frankly I don‘t think they [the General Assembly] would have done it 
anywhere but in Prince George‘s County, except for maybe Baltimore city.  Why they 
felt compelled to take away our right to vote for the board had to be strictly politics.  You 
were saying to the citizens of Prince George‘s County, ‗you don‘t have enough sense to 
elect the right people‘.‖ 
Although people clearly had concerns about the loss of voting rights and 
representation and concerns about the perception that a majority black county was being 
treated differently than other jurisdictions, residents also believed something had to be 
done about the school board.  For many, the board had become a public embarrassment.  
And by the time the board was dissolved most people were resigned to the Assembly‘s 
action.   In a Prince George‘s County voter poll conducted by the Washington Post in 
August 2002, 62% of respondents felt dissolving the elected board was a good idea 
(Washington Post 2002).
4
  Even so, there were a couple of small protest rallies against 
the bill‘s passage in Annapolis.   
A group calling itself Citizens for an Elected Board tried to generate support for a 
petition to put the measure creating an appointed board to a referendum.  However the 
group only had until May 31 (about two months) to acquire enough signatures (8,000) to 
get the board‘s June appointment delayed for 60 days while it collected the 24,000 
signatures needed to get the measure placed on the ballot.  If the group was successful, 
the new law would be placed on hold until the November elections.  Unfortunately for 
Citizens for an Elected Board, there was little public sentiment for the referendum and 
the group was unable to get the required signatures (Krughoff 2002a).  The law stood, 
and it is against this backdrop that a new school board came into office.   
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The Appointed Board Takes Over 
Immediately after the elected board was voted out, a search for the new board 
began.  The legislation creating the new board required it to include at least three 
educators, two people with business or management experience, one parent with a child 
in PGCPS, and one person with significant special education experience.  For such an 
undemocratic board, there were 196 applicants for a position that paid $18,000 a year.  
Applicants included former PGCPS superintendent Edward Felegy, current board 
member Bernard Phifer and four members of the Management Oversight Panel (MOP).
5
  
Applicants for the appointed board were vetted by State Superintendent Nancy Grasmick 
and the Maryland State Board of Education who created a final list of 23 from which 
Curry and Glendening chose the nine members.   
The appointed board was comprised of five African Americans, one Latino, and 
two white members.  The chairwoman was Beatrice Tignor, an educator, former state 
senator and MOP member.  The vice-chairman was Howard Stone, lobbyist for the 
County and Curry‘s former chief of staff.  Also on the board were John Bailer, a retired 
manager and long-time education activist; Abby Crowley, a professor and special 
education expert; Charlene Dukes, vice president for student services at Prince George‘s 
Community College; Robert Duncan, former chief administrative officer and budget 
director for Prince George‘s County; Judy Mickens-Murray, head of the Prince George‘s 
County Council of PTAs (PGCCPTA); Jose Morales, manager and Latino activist; and 
Dean Sirjue, associate dean for administration, Howard University School of Business 
and MOP member.   
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Most people agreed that the board was comprised of a good mix of people with 
strong education ties and people with strong business and managerial connections.  
Indeed several respondents commented approvingly on the level of expertise among 
board members.  While there was general praise for the qualifications of individual board 
members, there was criticism of the board as a whole (Abadjian 2002c).  Supporters of 
the old board‘s nine, single-district structure pointed to the lack of representation for 
inner Beltway communities as a significant failing of the new board.  None of the nine 
board members lived inside the Beltway.
6
   Moreover, seven of the nine members lived in 
the Bowie-Mitchellville area, the wealthiest region of the county.  In response to the 
criticism, U.S. Rep. Albert R. Wynn (D-Md.) defended the board saying, ―They're not 
appointed to represent a particular geographic area. They're appointed to represent the 
whole school system‖ (Trejos 2002d).   
The Beltway serves not only as a literal divide through the county but also as a 
symbolic dividing line as well.  In many ways, the outer-inner Beltway split represents a 
divide between middle class and working class, elites and non-elites, and the haves and 
the have-nots.  The class divide within the County has been a recurring theme in county 
politics.  Inner Beltway communities, which tend to be the older, poorer communities in 
the county, often claim they are short-changed by public officials who in the past focused 
their attention on the growing, wealthier communities outside the beltway.  For some, the 
appointed board was another example of that bias because they feared the outer Beltway 
communities would be favored over the inner Beltway communities that did not have an 
advocate at the table.  While in the past it was white elites who controlled policy, today 
middle class blacks shape public policy in the county.  Sylvester Vaughns, the lead 
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plaintiff in the county‘s desegregation lawsuit, expressed concern that the racism blacks 
experienced in 1972 has been replaced by elitism on the part of county leaders (Abadjian 
2002b).  So while race was the dividing line of the past, in 2002 the dividing line was 
class.   
With this undercurrent of race and class running through the county, the new 
board was faced with two important challenges.  First it would have to assure people that 
everyone would have an equal voice at the table.  Second, the board would have to prove 
to the entire county that it was not going to behave as the last board did.  It needed to 
establish that it could effectively run the school system.  It was clear that the board would 
have to work diligently to earn the trust of the community.  In addition to needing to 
overcome suspicions of it specifically, the appointed board also had to confront a more 
general lack of trust in PGCPS created by the dysfunction of the old elected board, 
consistently poor test scores, and poor financial management.  Suffice it to say, when the 
board took office on June 1, 2002 more than a few people were skeptical of it and its 
ability to govern.   
The appointed board was well aware of these concerns.  Its members maintained 
that they were appointed to represent the county as a whole and not for any particular 
community.  Moreover, the board saw restoring people‘s faith in the ability of the system 
to function effectively and bringing stability to the system as its most important mission.  
Howard Stone said of the public, ―They don‘t know us.  The only way we can instill 
confidence is to include people and let them be part of the process‖ (Abadjian 2002c).  
To this end, the board took steps to try to gain the trust of residents.  Board members 
were diligent about responding to constituent inquiries and concerns.  As one member put 
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it, ―you may not agree with the decision, but you cannot say we did not listen to your 
concerns.‖  Also, board members said it was important to speak with one voice.  A board 
decision had to be seen as a decision of the entire board.  While members might and did 
disagree on issues, once a matter was decided it was supported by everyone on the board.  
Further, board members made an effort not to publicly contradict each other.  More than 
one board member stated the desire to maintain a high level of professionalism; 
something many people believed was missing from the previous board.   
During its first year in office, the board was even given some credit for restoring 
dignity and professionalism to the system.  Doyle Neimann, House Delegate and member 
of the ousted school board said of the new board, "They've done a much better job of 
keeping their focus on the real issues of student performance, student achievement and 
overall school board policies, not personality and power and pettiness‖ (Trejos 2003h).   
Even some of the Board‘s detractors praised how the board conducted itself.  A vocal 
critic said of the appointed board, ―at least you could go to them if there was an issue, and 
they would at least respond to you, would get involved, and try to resolve something.‖  
Despite the good reviews, a Prince George‘s Business-Education Alliance 
(PGBEA) survey conducted a year after the appointed board took office found that 
almost 75% of those surveyed either thought the new board was no better than the old 
board or had no opinion (Alliance 2003).  Clearly it was going to take time to change 
long held opinions of the school board and system.   
Perhaps part of the explanation why those polled believed there was no change 
was that it takes time to see the impact of changes at the top filter down to observable 
changes in the classroom.  It is also possible that people were just not paying attention to 
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what was happening with the school system.  The survey report did not differentiate 
between those who had an opinion and those who did not.  So it is quite possible that a 
large portion of that 75% included people who had no opinion either way.  Of course, for 
anyone wanting to form a coalition on behalf of education reform, continued indifference 
after all of the upheaval is almost as problematic as outright opposition.   
One of the ways focusing events lead to agenda change is by getting those 
previously inattentive to become attentive (Kingdon 1984, Birkland 1998).  As more 
people pay attention to a particular issue, the possibility for a change in issue definition 
increases as change agents attempt to reframe the issue (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  
A change in definition can lead to a mobilization for or against the controlling policy 
regime.  Successful advocates of regime change take advantage of the changes in issue 
definition to mobilize people against the governing regime.  If people remain indifferent 
to the focusing event or the changes in issue definition, then mobilization becomes 
difficult if not impossible.  Thus in 2003, assuming the accuracy of the poll, the prospects 
for a new reform regime were less than ideal. 
Restoring the community‘s trust was not the board‘s only challenge.   Other large 
issues confronted PGCPS and the new school board.  Several of them related to the end 
of court-ordered desegregation.  As part of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
that settled the desegregation lawsuit, Prince George‘s had to build new schools so that 
children previously bused outside their neighborhood could attend schools within their 
neighborhoods.  Fulfilling this goal required the building of 13 new schools, nine of 
which were to open in the fall of 2003.  The openings in turn necessitated the redrawing 
of school boundaries.   
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Another part of the settlement required PGCPS to overhaul its magnet program.  
The MOU called for magnets to be restructured and expanded so that they could continue 
to be used to voluntarily integrate schools.  Magnets draw their student populations from 
across the district.  In this way the magnet concept works against the emphasis on 
neighborhood schools because magnet populations may or may not include children from 
the neighborhood where the magnet is located.  It was up to school officials to find a way 
to balance the competing goals of returning children to their neighborhood schools and 
increasing access to magnet programs.  Underlying these competing issues were the 
system‘s ever present budget concerns.   
Though these issues loomed large, the most immediate issue the board faced was 
the selection of a chief executive officer (CEO) to run the system.  The law creating the 
appointed board required the superintendent to be replaced with a CEO.  To that end, 
selecting a CEO was the first decision the new board made.  After meeting on the same 
day it was sworn in, the new school board unanimously voted to extend Superintendent 
Metts‘s contract for one year.
7
   
Retaining Metts was controversial.  As expected, supporters of the old elected 
school board were unhappy that Metts was retained because they thought she was 
responsible for the turmoil.  Others thought that the system should have made a clean 
break with the past strife and replaced Metts along with the board.  Supporters of Metts 
argued she had not been given a fair opportunity to show her effectiveness as 
superintendent because of all of the meddling of the last school board.  Retaining Metts 
would give the board and the county at large the time to properly evaluate her.  Board 
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members allow that some state legislators expected that Metts be replaced immediately. 
The question was who would replace her? 
The Board‘s retention of Metts was not necessarily an endorsement of her.  
Instead it represented a desire to maintain some continuity which was very important to 
the new board.  In its statement to the press upon extending Metts‘s contract, the board 
said it extended the contract to ―continue the stability and the reform agenda set for the 
school system‖ (Abadjian 2002a).  Metts‘s retention was an acknowledgement that with 
only two months before the beginning of the school year, the board did not have enough 
time to conduct a thorough search for a new permanent CEO and have that person in 
place for the start of the school year in August.  Instead of rushing a decision, the board 
opted to wait.  Metts would serve as an interim CEO while the board searched for a 
permanent CEO.  Metts would be eligible to apply for the permanent position.   
 
The School Board--Superintendent Relationship:  New Cast, Same Story  
CEO Metts and the new board began the new school year full of hope and 
promise.  It did not take long however, for the realities of a troubled school system to 
make their way to the forefront.  It also did not take long for the relationship between the 
school board and Metts to become strained.  In the end the appointed board had some of 
the same complaints of Metts as the old elected board.   
In October 2002, Metts advised the board that the administration had overspent its 
fiscal year (FY) 2002 budget by at least $7.5 million and possibly as much as $11 
million.
8
  The board had expected the deficit to be $2 or 3 million.  Metts appeared to 
blame school principals when she said the deficit was the result of principals hiring 
additional per diem teachers (Trejos 2002e).  Angered principals and teachers countered 
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that principals cannot hire staff without administration approval.  A month later, the 
budget deficit had grown to $13.6 million.  Moreover Metts warned of a possible $4 
million deficit for FY 2003 if spending was not curtailed.   
The board became increasingly frustrated with the increasing deficits and with 
Metts.  Part of the frustration stemmed from the fact that while the board was not alerted 
to the full extent of the problem until the fall, Metts and her deputies had known about 
the potential problem almost a year earlier.  Metts offered that in anticipation of the 
overrun, she had made cuts in the budget to diminish the deficit.  She also blamed the 
system‘s outdated computer system for making it difficult to make accurate budget 
predictions.  At least one board member was skeptical of Metts‘s defense.  Member 
Robert Duncan responded, "We can't accept that unless we have a new financial system 
in place we can't appropriately manage the finances.  Whether it's here or not, the absence 
of it is not an acceptable excuse as far as the board and system is [sic] concerned" (Trejos 
2002e).  Having served in 1969 as supervisor of accounting with the Board of Education, 
Duncan was particularly well versed in the schools‘ budget.  But he was not alone in his 
knowledge of budgets because the new board possessed several members who had 
substantial managerial and budgetary experience.  After pointed questioning by board 
members about the budget deficit, Metts was quoted as saying, ―This is a learning 
experience for us… a level of understanding [by board members] that we are not used to‖ 
(Staff Reports 2002).    On the depth of questioning, a board member said, ―It‘s not the 
first question you ask, not the second, but it‘s the third and fourth questions.  Anybody 
can answer the first or second question.  If they can‘t answer the third and fourth 
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questions, then you‘ve got a problem.‖  Metts and her administration appeared 
unprepared to handle the level of scrutiny coming from members of the new board.   
To get a more accurate picture of the system‘s budget needs and priorities, the 
board asked Metts to tie her proposed FY 2004 budget to the system‘s Master Plan.  The 
Master Plan was part of the desegregation MOU and was supposed to serve as the 
system‘s blueprint for improving student performance.  Having Metts tie her budget to 
the Master Plan was an attempt by the board to know exactly where the money was being 
spent and what impact budget cuts would have on specific programs and items.  It was 
also a way for the board to increase administration accountability.  Giving a hint of the 
growing tensions between the board and the administration, Duncan said of having Metts 
tie the budget, ―What it allows is [for] the board to look at what the master plan costs and 
then fund certain aspects of it. But what I think the administration is worried about is the 
fact it will then hold them accountable for implementing those changes‖ (Krughoff 
2002c). 
When Metts presented her proposed FY 2004 budget to the board in January 
2003, her budget was $1.3 billion.  This represented a 23% increase over the previous 
year‘s budget.  It also called for a 42% increase in county funding (Interview with Iris 
Metts 2003 ).  Board members were surprised by the size of the budget and some were 
angry that Metts would propose a budget she knew would not come anywhere close to 
being fully funded.  In addition to the usual tight county funding, state funding was in 
danger of being reduced since Maryland was in the midst of a recession.  Metts said she 
was doing as the board directed by asking for the amount it would cost to fully implement 
all of the initiatives in the Master Plan.  Members of the board had assumed that Metts, 
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realizing a large budget increase was impossible, would set priorities and select the most 
important programs to fund and not ask for everything.   
In addition to being concerned about Metts‘s financial management, the board 
was becoming increasingly frustrated with the flow of information coming to it.  
Chairwoman Tignor complained, ―We have been having a real problem with the 
administration in terms of getting the information we need in a timely manner.  The last 
board was not crazy.  They were on target with a lot of their issue on how the school 
system was being run‖ (Krughoff 2002d).  Members of the old elected board repeatedly 
complained that Metts would provide them with pertinent information only a short time 
before the board was to discuss or act on a subject.  Board member Dean Sirjue said, 
―Sometimes we don't get [information] until a few days before that decision needs to be 
made. In Dr. Metts's defense, the information may not be ready, but that has been a bit of 
a problem‖ (Trejos 2003a).  Members also complained about the depth of the information 
they received.  Board members were frustrated by Metts‘s habit of submitting proposals 
as trial balloons to gauge public sentiment or submitting plans before working out the 
details.  Board members complained that the incomplete plans created unnecessary 
confusion and controversy.   
For example, Metts submitted a plan to restructure the system‘s magnet programs.  
The restructuring was required as part of the MOU and a new magnet proposal was to be 
approved by the school board by December 31, 2002.  Metts submitted her plan to the 
board on October 15, 2002.  Two weeks later she withdrew the proposal after parents, the 
Prince George‘s County Chapter of the NAACP and board members complained about 
the plan‘s lack of specificity.  In an acknowledgement of the plan‘s deficiency, Metts said 
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when withdrawing the plan, ―It became very apparent that we could not supply all the 
supporting data in a timely manner for the board to make its decision‖ (Trejos 2002f).  
The withdrawal of the proposal required the system to ask the judge overseeing the 
desegregation case to extend the restructuring deadline.  Metts asked that the 
restructuring be delayed to the fall of 2004.  Chairwoman Tignor supported the delay 
saying, "I think it's better to wait to do the right things than it is to throw something 
together and have to change it later‖ (Ibid.).   
All of these frustrations combined with concerns about Metts‘s ability to manage 
the budget led some on the board to publicly question her abilities as superintendent.  
Board member Robert Duncan complained after an audit report was delayed several 
times, ―We've been given too many assurances that ended up not materializing.  It's about 
competence in getting things done‖ (Trejos 2003a).  Board members began turning away 
from Metts.  The relationship between Metts and the school board was quickly 
deteriorating. 
At the same time, the national search for a permanent CEO was accelerating.  
Metts, eligible to apply for the new position, did so in December.  Chairwoman Tignor 
made it clear however that Metts would not have an advantage over other applicants.  
When asked in a November interview with the Washington Post if there was a favorite in 
the running for CEO, Tignor said there were no favorites and that if Metts applied for the 
job, her application would be accepted like everyone else‘s (Interview with Beatrice 
Tignor  2002).  Before the board was to begin interviewing CEO finalists in February, 
Metts withdrew her application and removed her name from consideration.  Publicly she 
stated she believed that her vying for the position would be controversial and potentially 
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divisive because so many in the county opposed her (Interview with Iris Metts 2003).  
Also Metts said she had become worn down by all of the past controversy and was not 
willing to continue fighting.  Metts said she thought it would be best for everyone if she 
left PGCPS.  Interviews with board members made it clear however that Metts was 
unlikely to become the permanent CEO.  Moreover, board members say she had been 
told as much privately.  ―We can‘t stop you from applying, and you may be the best 
person, but Dr. Metts, my suggestion is go out while you are on top.‖  Reportedly, seven 
of the nine board members were unwilling to vote for Metts (Bhatti and Honawar 2003).     
In her analysis of her time at PGCPS, Metts blamed most of her troubled tenure 
on political forces that did not want to change.  At the end Metts admitted she was 
probably doomed from the beginning when she challenged veteran administrators at the 
beginning of her tenure.  She believed that act cost her support from some elected state 
officials.  ―I was a bit naive coming in. . . . You just made enemies from the minute you 
walked in the door,‖ Metts said (Trejos and Levine, 2003).   
Part of Metts‘s problem was that she found it difficult to respond to all of the 
competing constituencies within the county.  Metts had to answer to board members, 
state legislators, parent activists, county officials and union leaders, all of whom had their 
own agendas.  She complained that she had too many bosses to answer to, and satisfying 
one group often meant alienating another.  Metts also complained of a lack of shared 
vision and inconsistency in the direction people wanted schools to go (Interview with Iris 
Metts 2003).  In a county as large and diverse as Prince George‘s County, it is difficult if 
not impossible to please everyone.  Metts talked about how the county‘s school system 
was particularly difficult to change.  She said, ―People accuse me of changing too quickly 
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and then in the end they were saying, "Well you didn't change enough.  The problem to 
me is that it will take longer than just four years to change things here and the other 
problem is by the end of the four years, you've made a lot of enemies. It's so easy to pick 
up enemies in Prince George's County . . . because you always will have critics. There's 
no leeway for failure‖ (Ibid..).     
Metts was brought in as an outsider because county and state officials believed 
that an outsider was needed to make the changes necessary to improve educational 
performance.  Officials thought that an outsider, not beholden to any particular 
constituency could alter the school cartel and transform the school system.  However, the 
politics surrounding education in the county proved stronger than the outsider.  From 
Metts‘s point of view, she was in a no-win situation.  She said, ―An insider who is not 
strong can't survive.  An outsider who is too strong can't survive‖ (Trejos and Levine, 
2003).   
Some in the County saw Metts‘s explanations as an attempt to deflect blame from 
herself and her administration.  Some argued that while Metts was a good educator, she 
was a less than stellar manager.  Metts‘s critics also claimed she was unprepared to run 
PGCPS.  Metts was Delaware‘s secretary of education before coming to Prince George‘s.  
Her detractors argued setting policy for a small state like Delaware provided little 
experience for running a large urban school district like PGCPS.
9
  Still other critics 
claimed Metts problems stemmed from the fact that she acted as though she were still 
secretary of education.  As secretary, Metts could issue policy mandates to local level 
officials and expect them to be followed without question.  As secretary she had the final 
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word.  Critics argued Metts continued to see herself as a state secretary and as a result 
acted like an autocrat.   
It is possible that Metts‘s problems were symptomatic of a larger issue. Today‘s 
superintendents are being asked to do things they have not had to do in the past.  They 
don‘t just manage an organization.  They must also be a lobbyist for the system in the 
community.  Superintendents now have to be politicians.  This is particularly true in 
Prince George‘s.  Washington Post education columnist Karin Chenoweth summed up 
the crux of Metts‘s problems in Prince George‘s saying of Metts, 
She was flummoxed by the need to articulate and generate support for the 
common goals and aspirations of the school system, lead the community 
to think independently about how to support those goals and aspirations, 
and convince the community that she had a clear grasp on what needed to 
be done to reach those goals. Above all, she failed to convince the county's 
political leadership and citizenry that it has an obligation to schools that 
rises above all its many other obligations (Chenoweth 2003).     
 
Metts‘s primary failure was a failure to realize that she had to be a salesperson 
and politician as well as an administrator and an educator.  In the end, being a good 
educator was not enough for Metts to be able to keep her job.   
Metts‘s departure provided an opportunity for PGCPS and the County to start 
anew.  The system would have both a new board and a new CEO.  Now that all of the 
participants in the feud between the elected school board and superintendent were gone, 
the system could focus on the business of educating children.  
      
A New Beginning:  Enter the CEO 
There were 27 applications for the CEO position.  Nine people were interviewed 
and three finalists were selected.  They were Andre J. Hornsby, former Yonkers, New 
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York superintendent; John J. ―Jack‖ Keegan Jr., Sioux Falls, South Dakota 
superintendent; and Barbara Moore Pulliam, St. Louis Park, Minnesota superintendent.  
Although each finalist had been an administrator in a large system none of the systems 
they led had over 30,000 students.
10
  This fact made the public a bit skeptical of the 
candidates and their ability to improve PGCPS (Bhatti 2003).  Recall some people 
thought a reason for Metts‘s troubled tenure was her inexperience in running a large 
urban school district.  Prince George‘s County Council of PTAs President Howard 
Tutman spoke for many when he suggested, ―the ideal candidate would be someone who 
has come from a large system, who has effectively dealt with budget constraints and 
improving student achievement, especially minority achievement‖ (Trejos 2003c).   
  Beyond the odds that the ―ideal candidate‖ actually existed, finding her or him 
would be difficult for PGCPS.  The county was competing with several other school 
systems searching for a new leader in the midst of a nationwide shortage of 
superintendent candidates (Groff 2003).  A July 2003 survey of urban and large district 
superintendents found that many of them acknowledged the job was becoming undoable 
(Fuller et al. 2003).  This view was strongest among leaders of the largest school districts.  
According to Paul Houston, executive director of the American Association of School 
Administrators, "There is no shortage of people with the paper credentials. ... There is a 
shortage of people who want the job. It has clearly become unattractive‖ (Bhatti 2003).  
What is more, the turmoil surrounding PGCPS may have been an additional deterrent for 
many.   
Board Chairwoman Tignor said the board had reached out to large system 
administrators across the country but none were interested in the job.  She said of those 
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contacted, ―Many of the people we talked with said the political arena in the county is not 
one they wanted to enter‖ (Krughoff 2003a).  A Washington Post editorial painted the 
enormity of the job facing the new CEO.  According to the Post, ―the scope of 
administrative, political and public demands in Prince George's -- as well as lingering 
tensions from extraordinarily turbulent years -- requires a sophisticated blend of artful 
diplomacy and educational expertise‖ (Editorial 2003).  Moreover, the new CEO must be 
able to ―juggle conflicting political and community pressures‖ (Ibid.).  This was a very 
tall order; an order few if any could fill.  Some in the county sensed that their 
expectations might be too high.  Ray Badders, a parent of four children in PGCPS 
worried, ―Maybe we're trying to hire somebody for an impossible job where you've got 
the state pulling in one direction, the county pulling in another direction, and parents 
pulling.  Whoever the superintendent is is going to be pulled in all these different 
directions‖ (Trejos 2003c).  
Of the three finalists, the unions endorsed Pulliam.  They were opposed to 
Hornsby and Keegan because both had fought with labor unions as superintendent.  The 
three unions representing teachers, principals, and support personnel sent a joint letter to 
the school board documenting their position.  On Hornsby and Keegan, the union 
presidents wrote, ―The mere fact that these candidates were presented as finalist[s] sends 
a very powerful and negative message to the employees and the citizens of Prince 
George's County‖ (Trejos 2003d).  From the letter, it is clear that if either were chosen, 
Hornsby or Keegan would likely face considerable resistance from the unions.   
The unions as representatives of the system‘s staff are often powerful members of 
any education regime.  The institutional memory of the school system and the regime 
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resides within the administrators, teachers, and support staff who remain long after 
superintendents leave.  Alienating system employees can make a leader‘s job difficult if 
not impossible as Superintendent Metts discovered.  That said there is one group that 
holds more power than the unions: the school board.  Because ultimate authority rests 
with the board, it has the power to dominate the education arena and regime.   
It is inconceivable that the county‘s old elected board so tightly allied with the 
unions would have even made a candidate like Hornsby or Keegan a finalist let alone 
chosen him to be chief.  The appointed board however had no such alliances.  So despite 
the concerns and objections of the unions and others, the school board, in an 8-to-1 vote, 
selected Andre Hornsby to be the next CEO.  The lone dissenter was Judy Mickens-
Murray.  She did not feel that Hornsby would be enough of a collaborator.  Mickens-
Murray explained, ―I felt that Prince George's County's constituents are too volatile from 
the emotional experience of the last few years, and I thought that we needed someone 
who was a healer and a collaborative spirit to help us move to another level‖ (Trejos 
2003e).   
During the vetting process, Hornsby was described by some in Yonkers as 
stubborn and not inclined to seek input.  The president of the Yonkers PTA said Hornsby 
needed to talk with parents and not at them (Brenner 1998).  The former president of the 
Yonkers‘ NAACP chapter said of the group dealings with Hornsby, ―He had just walked 
in a month ago and barely knew where to find the bathroom when he was telling us what 
to do‖ (Ibid.).  The head of Yonkers teachers union said of Hornsby, ―He operates as if he 
was chosen king‖ (Fitzgerald 1999).  ―His favorite expression was, ‗It is my way or the 
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highway‘‖ (Honawar 2003). From the assessment of those in Yonkers, Hornsby clearly 
was not the healer Mickens-Murray sought.    
So why did the board choose Hornsby despite knowing about his contentious past 
and despite knowing the unions opposed him?  Board members voting for Hornsby said 
they chose him because he had a proven track record of improving minority achievement.  
Of Hornsby, member Dean Sirjue said, ―The major issue is that we need someone who 
can find the underlying problems of student performance and focus on that.  Everything 
else will fall in line‖ (Trejos and Labbe 2003).  Robert Duncan added, ―We're on the 
verge of being the least-functional school system in the state of Maryland.  We've got to 
find a way to make dramatic improvements now‖ (Ibid.).     
Board members had an almost single-minded focus on improving student 
performance.  The eight board members who voted for Hornsby were willing to overlook 
his personality because he had raised academic achievement in Yonkers.  In its press 
release announcing Hornsby‘s hiring, the board emphasized this point.  According to the 
announcement, ―Hornsby is recognized for significant accomplishments in the area of 
improving minority student performance on standardized tests, as well as for integrating 
technology into curriculum to improve student achievement‖ (Prince George‘s County 
Board of Education 2003).  Even those who fought with Hornsby in Yonkers 
acknowledged that he made smart educationally sound decisions (Trejos and Labbe 
2003).  There seemed to be an assumption within the Board that improving PGCPS 
academically would override other issues and lead to increased trust in the system.   
It was also that assumption that allowed Board members to discount the unions‘ 
views.  Of the unions‘ opposition to Hornsby, Sirjue said, ―We certainly wanted to work 
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with the unions.  But we can't focus on what's best for the unions. We have to focus on 
what's best for the children‖ (Trejos 2003f).  Tignor said, ―We realize that he has been a 
controversial person. You have to realize that the unions have a special interest. Our 
interests are what is best for the children and that is what we based our decision on‖ 
(Krughoff 2003a).  It was clear that in a dispute between Hornsby and the unions the 
Board would back Hornsby.   
For his part, Hornsby spoke of a willingness to collaborate with others saying, ―I 
think it will take a full commitment on behalf of all stakeholders in being able to 
cooperate and collaborate in helping children in Prince George's County demonstrate 
what they are able to do.  Our greatest challenge is to identify the gaps that exist in their 
learning and fill those gaps‖ (Trejos 2003e).  Yet Hornsby also implied a willingness to 
go it alone when he felt it necessary saying, ―Sometimes, you have to make unpopular 
decisions. You have to be willing sometimes to bite the bullet because you know, long 
term, it's going to be in the best interest of the system‖ (Ibid.).  Board member, Abby 
L.W. Crowley, thought that lessons learned from Hornsby‘s past experiences would make 
him a more effective leader in Prince George‘s.  She said, ―He's had some experiences 
that taught him about bringing a community together.  I'm more worried about [bringing 
in] people who have not had those challenges and experiences.  I don't want them 
learning here‖ (Trejos 2003f).  From interviews with board members, they believed the 
positives of his educational expertise would outweigh the negatives of Hornsby‘s 
personality.  
Hornsby‗s tenure as CEO began June 2003.  He faced a number of large 
problems.  In addition to improving academic achievement, Hornsby had to contend with 
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other problems leftover from the Metts administration.  He faced a growing budget 
deficit.  The system‘s magnet programs were still in need of overhaul, and school 
boundaries still needed more redrawing.  
  
Balancing the Budget   
Hornsby spent a sizeable part of his first year evaluating the system and tackling 
the budget deficit.  In July 2003 the school board learned that not only was the 2002 
deficit larger than the board was initially led to believe, but there was also a significant 
deficit for FY 2003.  The combined deficit for FYs 2002 and 2003 was ultimately $23.7 
million (Trejos 2004b).  The board believed it had been duped about the budget by Metts.  
They were led to believe that Metts had a handle on the budget.   
Unlike Metts, Hornsby was able to get a handle on the budget and was able to 
eliminate the deficit by 2004.  In a meeting called by state legislators, Hornsby said he 
eliminated the deficit by leaving vacant positions unfilled, delaying purchases, and 
reducing cost-of-living raises for teachers, among other actions (Hornsby 2004a).  
Hornsby‘s handling of the budget deficit demonstrated a take charge approach to his job.  
Hornsby showed he was not afraid to take bold (or some might say drastic) action.  The 
question was would Hornsby take a similar approach with regards to the other large 
issues confronting him?  A more important question was whether such an approach 
would be good or bad for PGCPS? 
 
Restructuring the Administration  
One of Hornsby‘s first administrative actions was to remove nine principals ten 
days before the start of the school year in August 2003.  Of the demotions, Hornsby said 
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that after reviewing the schools test data and historical records he made the change, 
―because I believe that those schools need a different sense of direction and leadership" 
(Trejos 2003g).  Four of the nine were principals at schools that had been on the state‘s 
reconstitution eligible list for four consecutive years.  After four years on the list schools 
must restructure.  One method of restructuring includes changing staff.   
The nine principals were demoted to vice principal.  Needless to say the principals 
union reacted negatively to the demotions.  In fact, the executive director of the union, 
Doris Reed, warned the demotions could impact ongoing contract negotiations (Krughoff 
2003b).  The following year another five principals were demoted.  With retirements, 
promotions, and resignations, Hornsby had personally selected 80 of the system‘s 197 
principals in a little more than a year (Trejos 2004c).     
In September 2003, Hornsby announced plans to restructure the entire 
administration.  According to Hornsby, the system had gotten too top heavy and he 
wanted to put the focus of the administration back on teaching and learning.  Hornsby 
wanted to put more emphasis on regional offices as a means of getting more resources to 
schools and getting more accountability from the people overseeing them.  He also 
returned teachers working in the central office back to the classroom.  ―I put them 
[teachers in administrative positions] back in schools.  In large urban districts, when you 
pull teachers out of classrooms and you use those teachers to do jobs that are non-
instructional, to me you're not being honest with yourself.  These are certified people that 
we put back out there in the schools.  I mean, there is no reason in having those people in 




Not surprisingly, Hornsby‘s relationship with the administrators‘ union was 
almost as bad as Metts‘s relationship had been.  While the union liked the increased 
accountability placed on regional administrators, it was unhappy with Hornsby‘s 
movement of other administrators as well as his selection process for filling positions.  
Though the union complained, the changes were made with little uproar from the 
community.  What made the reaction different from the reaction Metts received was 
Hornsby having the backing of the school board.  The board made it clear that it was 
going to stand behind Hornsby‘s decision.  Chairwoman Tignor said  in support of 
Hornsby‘s administrative moves, ―We're assuming this is going to be a good thing. We 
brought [Hornsby] here with a mission to improve academic success‖ (A. Lee 2004b).  
Hornsby‘s dealing with the administration was a clear indication that things had changed 
and the power of some members of the old education regime had been diminished. 
 
Magnet Programs    
Hornsby addressed the delayed overhaul of the system‘s magnet programs.  For 
six years PGCPS wrangled with the issue.  Parents of children in magnet programs 
complained that the magnets‘ effectiveness was diminished by overcrowding.  At the 
same time, other parents resisted efforts to expand magnets arguing they would force 
their children from neighborhood schools.  Superintendent Metts had created a number of 
plans to reorganize magnets but either withdrew them after opposition from parents or the 
NAACP
11
 or had them rejected by the school board for lack of specificity.   
Complicating efforts to expand magnets was the system‘s plan to return children 
to their neighborhood schools.  Most of the system‘s magnets were located in the 
southern portion of the county while the greatest number of students lived in the northern 
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portion.  Thus expanding magnet access would require children to be bused to the 
existing magnets in the southern section of the county.  Alternatively, magnets would 
have to be moved or created in the northern portion of the county.  Some parents worried 
that the expansion of magnets would lead to resources being pulled from existing 
southern area magnets and transferred to the new northern area magnets.  If this were not 
enough, the new federal No Child Left Behind (NCLB) law required that the parents of 
children in low-performing schools be given the option to transfer their children to 
another school.  In 2002, PGCPS had 20 schools designated as ―needs improvement‖ 
which qualified students in those schools for transfers (Maryland State Department of 
Education 2002).  So any magnet restructuring would have to account for possible 
transfers.   
Expanding access to magnet programs may not have been the best option 
however.  An internal evaluation of the programs showed that many of the magnets were 
not improving academic achievement  (Division of Accountability 2004).  Reading and 
math state assessment scores for elementary children in magnet programs were generally 
no better than those of children attending non-magnet programs.  At the middle and high 
school levels, only some of the magnet programs produced higher test scores than non-
magnet schools.      
After less than a year on the job, Hornsby was able to push through a complete 
revamping of the system‘s magnets and to eliminate most of them (Hornsby 2004b).  
Hornsby preferred beefing up the core curriculum at all schools over maintaining 
magnets.  He said, ―You shouldn't have to go to a math and technology magnet in 
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elementary school to get a solid math program.  At this point, the school system is good 
at doing magnets but not at focusing on a core curriculum‖ (Krughoff 2003d).   
Why was Hornsby able to do what Metts was not?  Hornsby had the benefit of 
study showing the ineffectiveness of many magnet programs (Division of Accountability 
2004).  The report helped to counter supporter‘s claims about the quality of the magnets.  
Also, Hornsby emphasized the magnet programs‘ costs.  This approach resonated with 
school board members faced with a $23 million deficit.  Further, unlike Metts, Hornsby 
had the full backing of the school board.  So despite complaints about the changes from 
parents, the board backed Hornsby   
This board, not beholden to any particular constituency, found it easier to reach 
consensus.  A board member said, ―I did not have to come back and speak to a particular 
constituency.  I did not have to worry that the people in my neighborhood or district were 
going to be upset with me.  We could fight for all, at that time 133,000 children.‖  
Because they weren‘t representing a specific constituency it became easier for members 
to tackle thorny issues that bedeviled prior boards.  Another reason given by board 
members to explain their ability to reach consensus was what some members described as 
the professional nature of the board.  That is, the board consisted of a group of 
professionals with a broad rage and balanced set of skills and expertise.  The board 
members trusted the expertise of the others on the board, and they were willing to give 
considerably weight to the recommendations of the members with the most expertise on a 
particular subject.  ―Each one of us had a qualification that we could respect from one 
another.‖  This is in contrast to the old elected board on which some members clearly did 




School Attendance Boundaries 
Addressing school attendance boundary issues was a reoccurring theme during the 
first half of the 2000s.  While some boundary changes were necessitated by the new 
magnet plan, most of the changes were necessitated by the return of children to 
neighborhood schools.  As part of the MOU, the county was obligated to build 13 schools 
to compensate for the significant number of schools—many inside the Beltway—closed 
due to court-ordered busing.  Further, because of the failure to build new schools or 
redraw attendance boundaries to accommodate a growing student population, 
overcrowding had become a significant problem at several of the system‘s schools.  The 
county offered to build an additional 13 schools to alleviate the overcrowding and 
accommodate a predicted increase in enrollment resulting from the baby boom echo.
12
  
Between 2003 and 2006 eight schools were opened.  These eight were in addition to the 
twelve opened between 1999 and 2002. 
Changing school boundaries is often one of the most conflict-ridden things any 
school board does because boundary changes are so disruptive; to children, families, 
schools, and communities.  Almost every board member interviewed identified drawing 
attendance boundaries as the most troublesome decision they made.  School board 
meetings that normally draw small crowds overflow when boundary issues top the 
agenda.  Boundary debates are often heated and can be quite personal.  Parents frequently 
buy homes with the quality of their children‘s prospective schools in mind, and efforts to 
take their children out of those schools are sure to be met with resistance.  This is the case 
in Prince George‘s where the academic quality of schools is perceived to be uneven.   
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While PGCPS has schools that have won national awards for academic 
achievement, it also has a large number of schools on the Maryland State Department of 
Education‘s (MSDE) list of schools that have failed to meet state benchmarks.
13
  Parents 
rail against attempts to send their children to schools they consider to be of lesser quality 
than their children‘s current schools.  As board member Mickens-Murray said at a board 
meeting, ―One of the reasons we have a room full of people when we start to discuss 
boundaries is because there is a perception that ‗My child is going to go to a mediocre 
school and you are taking them out of a quality school‘‖ (Prince George‘s County Board 
of Education 2004).  Many of the most overcrowded schools in the system were also 
PGCPS‘s better performing schools.  Though the parents from those schools complained 
about the overcrowding, they opposed plans that would remove their children from those 
schools.  
In 2000 and 2002, Superintendent Metts and the old elected school board 
approved boundary changes that affected 73 schools and over 11,000 students (Honawar 
2002).  The appointed board first considered boundary changes to return children to 
neighborhood schools in the Fall of 2002 while Metts was superintendent.  The board 
rejected Metts‘s plan for not being sufficiently detailed.  A year after Hornsby pushed 
through a plan to revamp PGCPS‘s magnet programs; he got board approval for a plan 
redrawing attendance boundaries.  The changes would allow for 97% of all students to 
attend their neighborhood school.
14
   
   
Academics 
 Of course, CEO Hornsby‘s primary mission was to raise the level of academic 
performance among PGCPS‘s students.  During his tenure Hornsby made a number of 
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significant changes designed to improve achievement.  Hornsby said of the system, ―This 
system has allowed itself to only have a few schools that have the rigor that is necessary 
for children to demonstrate that they have the ability to be competitive in today's society.  
We can't continue to operate that way‖ (Trejos 2004c).  For him the number one issue 
was literacy.  In his first year as CEO, Hornsby implemented a Balanced Reading 
program that uses instruction and assessment to improve reading.  During his second 
year, Hornsby changed the system‘s curriculum.  He complained that the system‘s 
voluntary curriculum led to wide differences in what was being taught to students.  He 
wanted instruction to be uniform so that no matter what school a child attended, she 
would be exposed to the same knowledge.  To this end Hornsby created a core 
curriculum and aligned it with MSDE‘s Voluntary State Curriculum and Content 
Standards (grades K-10).  Interviewed school-level employees said the alignment brought 
much needed rigor to the system‘s curriculum.  Hornsby also built on the initiative started 
by Metts and expanded pre-kindergarten.  
School employees credited Hornsby with introducing the use of technology and 
data to provide a diagnostic approach to improving student progress.  The changes were 
not made without complaint however.  Some parents complained that the changes were 
being made too quickly, and they were not adequately informed of changes.  Some 
teachers complained that they were being asked to do too much too quickly.  Nonetheless 
the changes were made.  The changes seem to be successful as the number of schools 
meeting adequate yearly progress (AYP)
15
 on state assessments increased while Hornsby 
was CEO (Maryland State Department of Education 2005). 
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In their appraisal of Hornsby several interview respondents, even some of his 
critics, acknowledged Hornsby knew education and how to improve achievement.  One 
former principal relayed the story of how Hornsby came to her school and told her that he 
could identify her top five teachers.  He then visited the school‘s various classrooms.  
Hornsby not only identified the top five teachers, he correctly identified the school‘s best 
teacher.  Others said that Hornsby had a good grasp on what was needed to improve 
performance and he had a clear vision of what needed to be done.  Those same people 
however complained about how he executed his vision. 
 
The CEO’s Management Style Creates Tension  
Interview respondents spoke of grumbling about Hornsby‘s management style 
from the beginning.  PGCPS employees complained that he was dictatorial.  County 
officials and parents complained that their views were not being considered and they 
were having little input in decisions being made.  A county council member said after 
meeting Hornsby, ―He came into a forum put on by the educational advisory committee 
and he pretty much talked at everyone and didn‘t seem to listen.  It was like he had all of 
the answers and didn‘t want to hear anything from anyone.  That seemed very strange to 
me.  It didn‘t seem to be the approach that you want.‖  A teacher said that Hornsby‘s 
message to teachers was, ―I made the decision, this is how it's going to be, and if you all 
don't agree with it then you don't have to work in the school system.‖  The teacher added, 
―He doesn't have a collaborative approach‖ (Trejos 2004c).  Even those who were 
supportive of Hornsby acknowledged he could have done a better job of involving others 
in the decision making process.  Doyle Niemann, a member of the former elected board, 
current state delegate and Hornsby supporter, worried about Hornsby‘s leadership style 
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and ability to get others behind him.  Niemann said, "There's a time and place for 
decisive action and command style. If you're going to win in the long run and make 
gains, you have to create more of a sense of unity, more of a sense of team and enlist 
others in his vision.  And I don't really see that he's done that" (Ibid.).  Many thought 
Hornsby was arrogant.  One community activist said, ―arrogant was hardly the word.  
That was a mild word for what he was in person.‖   
Hornsby of course did not see himself as arrogant.  Asked about being considered 
arrogant, Hornsby responded, "I think there's a difference in competence and arrogance. 
Arrogance means I don't recognize what's going on around me.  But when you're 
competent and confident, you do what you need to do to get the job done. I do recognize 
everything that's going on around me.  I'm not an arrogant person.  But I am a focused 
individual, and I do understand what we need to do to move this school system forward" 
(Ibid.).  A few respondents believed Hornsby was not likely to serve more than one term 
because he had alienated too many people.  An example of the alienation was Hornsby‘s 
relationship with the county council.   
In 2003, CEO Metts informed the board that because of the ―baby boom echo‖ the 
high school population was estimated to increase by an additional 6,000 students by 
2006.  To handle the increase, Hornsby and the school board wanted to build additions to 
six existing high schools.  The county council, which must request the funds for the 
project, preferred to build a new high school in the northern portion of the county 
(Bowie) and perhaps a second in the southern portion of the county (Upper Marlboro).  
The Council agreed to an expansion of one high school but opposed expansions at the 
other five schools.   
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At a June 2004 council meeting to discuss the system‘s capital budget request, 
Hornsby abruptly left with his deputies in the middle of the meeting.  Hornsby‘s leaving 
came after the Council had formally rejected his plan for the high school additions and 
had decided instead to create a task force to study the matter.  Hornsby claimed he had a 
plane to catch.  Some believed Hornsby left because he might have felt disrespected by 
the Council because some members had been inattentive during his presentation to the 
council.  Regardless, the Council did not take kindly to Hornsby‘s departure and said so 
in a letter to both Hornsby and board chair Tignor.  The letter, which managed to make 
its way into the newspapers, described Hornsby‘s behavior as demonstrating, ―great 
disrespect for the elected legislative body of Prince George's County, and was, at best, 
unprofessional‖ (Swinson and Tate 2004).  The Council also demanded Hornsby 
apologize for his actions.  Hornsby refused saying, ―I think there's no apology necessary‖ 
(Wiggins and Trejos 2004).   
Council members explained their increased scrutiny of the school system‘s budget 
as a sign of its maturity.  Council Chairman Tony Knotts told school officials that the 
council was no longer willing to rubber stamp proposed budgets.
16
  He said, ―A year ago 
a budget was placed before us, and being less mature in this process, we pretty much said 
‗OK, you're the expert. You know what's right.  But we'll see next year.‘  This is next 
year.  We are more mature in the budgetary process and we looked at it very closely‖ 
(Tate 2004a).  It is interesting to note that the two council members to vote against the 
council rejection of the system‘s capital budget were, Marilynn Bland and Thomas 
Hendershot.  Both Bland and Hendershot are former school board members.  Hendershot 
thought the council was getting too involved in school business. ―I think we need to be 
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cautious about . . . instructing those who deal with something day in and day out.  We 
don't tell engineers how to run NASA. We ought not be telling a superintendent how to 
run schools,‖ Hendershot said during the meeting (Wiggins and Trejos 2004). 
In August, Hornsby‘s administration refused to provide enrollment information 
that included identifying information on students to the consulting firm working with the 
task force.  A lawyer for the school system contended that giving the consulting firm the 
information would be a breach of student privacy (A. Lee 2004e).  The school system 
also said that because the firm was not hired by the school system it was not entitled to 
the same information as school employees.  The school system did provide some 
enrollment information to the consultant.  Hornsby said, ―I would like to reiterate the fact 
that we provided hard copy data as well as electronic data that would adequately meet the 
needs of the consultant to the task force in order to provide you with decisions that are 
necessary to determine what space is necessary‖ (A. Lee 2004f). For its part the 
consulting firm complained about a lack of cooperation from the school system (A. Lee 
2004d). 
Not content to let the council‘s decision be the last word, Hornsby held a series of 
public forums in September touting his rejected expansion plan and asking parents to 
lobby the council in support of it.  The forums were held at the five high schools Hornsby 
and the school board wanted to expand.  On September 13, the County Council and its 
task force held their own forum to promote their position.  Finally in November, Hornsby 
and the County Council, with the assistance of County Executive Johnson, reached a 




Although this dispute ended with compromise, it further illustrated for some 
Hornsby‘s stubbornness and arrogance.  Donna Hathaway Beck (then member of the 
school system‘s Parent and Community Advisory Board (PCAB) and now current school 
board member) said of Hornsby a year into his tenure, ―I don't think he'll make four 
years. I think he showed in Yonkers, N.Y., that he does not respect the elected authority.  
The honeymoon is over. Everyone kept their hands off him for a year‖ (A. Lee 2004a).  
She added she expected the public to change the way it dealt with Hornsby.  Several 
respondents contended that as good as he was as an educator; Hornsby‘s arrogance was 
going to be his undoing.  They were right.  An interviewed school administrator said that 
had Hornsby not gotten himself into legal trouble he would have been forced out by his 
opponents who were numerous.  ―His reputation was going down because of his attitude.  
[Eventually] he would have been forced out.‖   
 
The Hornsby Scandal 
In September 2004, Baltimore‘s largest newspaper, the Baltimore Sun, ran a series 
of articles on the growth of the education technology business as a result of the NCLB.
17
  
The series reported that school systems desperate to comply with NCLB standards and 
avoid its sanctions have often turned to the purchase of education software to improve 
performance (MacGillis 2004a).  The federal government provides some funding for 
under performing schools to purchase such technology.  With close to a billion dollars at 
stake, some technology vendors have included perks for education officials in their sales 
pitches to have school districts purchase their products.  A follow-up article on the series 
revealed that a June 2003 trip Hornsby took to South Africa as the outgoing president of 
the National Alliance of Black School Educators was paid for by Plato Learning, an 
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education technology vendor (MacGillis 2004b).  The school system has done business 
with Plato in the past and had purchased Plato products since Hornsby became CEO.  
Hornsby had told the board about the trip but did not say the trip was paid for by Plato.   
An October 14th Baltimore Sun article revealed that Hornsby, 51 was living with 
a 26 year old saleswoman, Sienna Owens, who worked for LeapFrog‘s education 
division, SchoolHouse (MacGillis 2004c).  Hornsby had approved the purchase of $1.3 
million worth of products from LeapFrog in June 2004.
18
  Owens was not the 
saleswoman for the transaction.  While the article made no direct allegation of wrong 
doing it suggested a possible conflict of interest.  At the time, school system officials 
were required to fill out ethics disclosure forms annually.  Hornsby had not disclosed his 
relationship with Owens on his January 2004 form.  According to ethics rules however, 
he did not have to because at the time of the disclosure Owens was not working for 
LeapFrog or for a company doing business with PGCPS.  Hornsby also stated he had not 
received gifts of more than $25 from companies doing business with PGCPS.  However 
he did disclose that in his previous position as National Alliance president he had had 
relationships with companies doing business with the system.    
Response to the article was immediate.  School board Chairwoman Tignor asked 
the board‘s ethics panel to investigate the matter.  Leapfrog also opened its own 
investigation.  State Senator Paul Pinsky (D-Prince George's) and Delegate James 
Hubbard (D-Prince George's) said they would seek to introduce legislation that would 
require stricter ethics rules for school officials with authority to approve contracts.  
Pinsky said, ―It's the public's money and we all want to have total confidence it's being 
spent the best possible way without any kind of conflict of interest‖ (Trejos 2004d).  
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Hornsby responded to the revelations by saying, ―Everything I do is in the best interests 
of this county, and everything is where it should have been – aboveboard‖ (Ibid.).  On the 
18
th
, the Maryland state prosecutor's office also opened an inquiry into Hornsby‘s trip.   
It is interesting to note that one interview respondent questioned how the 
Baltimore Sun knew about Hornsby‘s relationship with Owens when it does not normally 
report on Prince George‘s County.  An interviewed employee suggested that someone 
from the county went to the newspaper with the information.  In the respondent‘s mind, 
some people were out to get Hornsby.   Another interviewed employee said that 
Hornsby‘s arrogance had so alienated people that ―when he got into trouble, people were 
more than happy to let him hang in the wind.‖ 
Late October it was learned that the school system had hired a construction 
management company that employed one of Hornsby‘s former top deputies in Yonkers 
(Trejos 2004e).  In January 2004, school officials hired Facility Planners Group Inc. to 
manage a project to add air conditioning units to 51 schools over two years.  The 
company was introduced to the system through C. James Grosso who was an 
administrator in the Yonkers school system for 30 years, including the time Hornsby was 
superintendent from 1998 to 2003.   
In the wake of the new allegations, Senator Ulysses Currie (D-Prince George's), 
chairman of the Budget and Taxation Committee and Delegate Hubbard called for a state 
legislative audit of PGCPS vendor contracts.  In early November the Baltimore Sun 
reported that both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Maryland U.S. 
attorney‘s office had opened investigations into the LeapFrog purchase (MacGillis 
2004d).
19
 Of the potential conflicts of interest and the questioning of his ethics, Hornsby 
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said, ―Nobody can influence me. I'm not influenceable.  If I decide to do something, it is 
the best decision for the children in this county‖ (Trejos and Rich 2004).   He described 
the suggestions of wrong doing as ―character assassination‖ by a ―cast of characters‖ 
(Ibid.).   
In early December, the school system‘s ethics panel issued a three page report that 
found Hornsby had not violated any system policies.  The board satisfied with the 
report‘s findings wanted to move forward.  Others questioned the thoroughness of the 
two month investigation because the panel never questioned Hornsby or his girlfriend.  
County Council member Thomas E. Dernoga said, ―I think when you have that type of 
inquiry it would be useful to interview the person who has the most information‖ (Trejos 
2004f).  A few weeks later LeapFrog‘s SchoolHouse president resigned in the wake of an 
internal review of the company‘s transactions with the county.  Owens also left the 
company.  In response to the resignation and departure, the board hired an independent 
auditor, Huron Consulting Group, to examine Hornsby‘s purchases, including the 
LeapFrog purchase.   
Also in December the Washington Post reported that the school system had a 
three year contract with a consulting firm owned by the husband of a former Hornsby 
deputy from Yonkers (Trejos 2004g).  In response to that revelation, the school board 
increased its oversight of Hornsby‘s ability to sign contracts.
20
  Meanwhile the state and 
federal investigations continued.   
The questions surrounding Hornsby again brought turmoil to a system that 
seemed to be recovering from the tumult of the last administration.  Once again the focus 
was not on student achievement but instead on the behavior of adults.   Hornsby‘s 
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behavior was damaging not only for him but for the school board as well.  There was 
considerable criticism of the board‘s handling of the allegations.   
Initially the school board was very supportive of Hornsby.  On October 19th, five 
days after the Baltimore Sun article on LeapFrog, Chairwoman Tignor wrote a letter to 
county political leaders that tried to explain Hornsby‘s behavior and gave the impression 
that Hornsby had done nothing wrong (Washington Post 2004).  In the letter, Tignor 
acknowledged that Hornsby had told the board about the trip.  She also wrote that 
because Hornsby was not related to the woman with whom he was living, he was not 
required to disclose his relationship.  Seeming to downplay the matter Tignor wrote, ―In 
light of the fact that most of these are allegations and not formal charges, we need to stay 
focused on the business of raising test scores‖ (A. Lee 2004h).   
As more revelations occurred, the board was reluctant to criticize Hornsby.  Some 
members even questioned the FBI‘s investigation.  Howard Stone said, ―I didn't think the 
allegations merited all of this" (Rich 2004, and Wiggins).  Board member Sirjue said he 
was concerned the investigation ―is politically motivated and some politicians in the 
county might have a personal agenda in going after Dr. Hornsby and [are] looking for 
every little incident to blow it up‖ (Rich and Wiggins 2004).  That comment may have 
been a reference to Delegate Hubbard who had been especially critical of Hornsby and 
the school board. There were suggestions in a Washington Post article that there might 
have been a personal reason for Hubbard‘s harsh criticism (Trejos 2005).  His wife, 
Susan Hubbard was a senior administrator in the system and had been caught up in the 
system‘s reorganization of district offices.  Hubbard denied that his criticisms were 
personally motivated saying, "I've been told it's my responsibility to stay on top of this.  
229 
 
I've taken my responsibility seriously and don't let anything get in my way" (Ibid.).  
Meanwhile, board critics questioned the board‘s continued support of Hornsby.  When 
the board refused to place Hornsby on administrative leave after LeapFrog‘s investigation 
led to Owens departure Senator Pinsky said, ―I find it disheartening that the company 
involved in this deal has taken it more seriously than the county's Board of Education.  
They're trying to protect their company, their reputation and their shareholders, and it's 
incumbent that the Board of Education protect its stakeholders‖ (MacGillis 2004e). 
 What made the board particularly susceptible to criticism was the fact that ethics 
questions about Hornsby had been raised when he was superintendent in Yonkers, New 
York.  Months after Hornsby was fired, the city‘s inspector general opened an 
investigation into vendor gifts Hornsby had accepted while superintendent (MacGillis 
2004d).  Although critical of Hornsby, the inspector general did not recommend Hornsby 
be criminally charged.  Board critics believed that the investigation was a giant red flag 
that should have led the board to reconsider hiring Hornsby.  As a result of the scandal, 
the board was accused of either not thoroughly vetting Hornsby before he was hired or 
choosing to ignore past allegations.   
In mid-April 2005, the FBI made a surprise visit to PGCPS headquarters.  Agents 
interviewed staff and seized records.  About a week later, PGCCPTA gave Hornsby a 
vote of no confidence.  President Howard Tutman said the organization was displeased 
with the lack of input they had with Hornsby.  ―Parents don't feel they're involved. They 
don't feel that their opinions or what they say are being strongly considered,‖ Tutman 
said (Anderson 2005b).  Tutman maintained the vote was being considered before the 
FBI visit but the timing of the vote was not missed.   
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On May 27, a little over a week before the school‘s independent audit report was 
released, Hornsby resigned.  The school board agreed to give Hornsby the $125,000 
severance package negotiated in his contract.  The board said it did so in order to 
preclude a court fight.  Once the audit report was made public however, many people 
were critical of the board‘s deal with Hornsby.   
The report revealed that Hornsby may have financially benefited from the 
LeapFrog transaction.  He may have received part of his girlfriend‘s commission 
(Anderson 2005e).  Also, the probe found that a company with ties to a former Hornsby 
deputy was awarded a contract with the school system even though it had missed the 
deadlines for bids on the contract.  The audit also found evidence that Hornsby was still 
operating an educational consulting firm, Quality Schools Consulting Inc., he founded in 
2000 even though he told the board that he had ended his consulting work before 
becoming CEO.  With the report‘s findings, some of Hornsby‘s critics alleged there was 
more than ample cause to fire Hornsby without paying him anything, and they were 
angry that he was able to walk away with more of the system‘s money.  Doris Reed, 
executive director of the Association of Supervisory and Administrative Personnel 
(ASASP), the system‘s school administrators union, said of the deal, ―Why would you 
not wait for the audit report to come out?  Because they could have fired him for cause, 
and they wouldn't have had to pay him anything at all‖ (Cho 2005). 
The audit report lent credence to complaints that the school‘s ethics panel‘s 
investigation was insufficient.  The audit report was 36 pages long compared to the ethics 
panel‘s three pages.  While the ethics panel did not talk to Hornsby, the audit 
investigators spoke to Hornsby twice and numerous other people both inside and outside 
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of the school system.  It also reviewed documents and e-mails.  The thoroughness of the 
audit reinforced the perception that the school board had mishandled the scandal.  Board 
members seemed surprised by the extent of Hornsby‘s wrong doings.  Board member 
Stone said of the report, ―We're glad we got to the bottom of this.  I was greatly surprised 
at Dr. Hornsby's actions. He was dubious and he deceived us‖ (Ibid.).  A Washington 
Post editorial summed up the mood of many in the county; ―What's increasingly clear in 
this sordid mess is that Mr. Hornsby played fast and loose with the truth, with ethics and 
with the integrity of Maryland's second-largest school system. What's less clear is how 
the school board could have been so oblivious to it all‖ (Editorial 2005).  Delegate 
Hubbard was harsher in his critique.  He said, ―They kept their heads in the sand.  This 
represents a failure of the performance of the board‖ (Leonard 2005b).    
In August of 2006, Hornsby was indicted by a federal grand jury on charges of 
mail and wire fraud, witness and evidence tampering, and obstruction of justice.  He was 
convicted in 2008 and is serving a six year prison sentence.   
The Hornsby scandal was another sad reminder of the problems facing the school 
system.  Education activist Donna Hathaway Beck speaking for many in the county said, 
―It's just another bad mark for us in Annapolis because we're already the dysfunctionals 
down here. We just came off four years with [former CEO] Iris Metts and now here we 
go again. It just gives the other delegates the opportunity to say, ‗oh brother, not again.‘  
When are we going to get it right? Once again we're focused on adult agendas and 
misactions rather than moving the system forward‖ (A. Lee 2004h).  Because it hired 
him, the school board had to take some of the blame for the Hornsby scandal.  His past 
history suggested that Hornsby‘s tenure was likely to be controversial.  At best, Hornsby 
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was brusque and perhaps arrogant.  At worst, he was ethically challenged and perhaps 
corrupt.  In hindsight, Tignor allowed that the board may have been too preoccupied with 
hiring someone capable of raising test scores to give enough weight to rumors about 
Hornsby‘s ethical behavior.  ―I certainly was focused on moving academics.  Looking 
back, we certainly... could have given more consideration to the comments people made,‖ 
she said (Leonard 2006e).  The scandal and the board‘s handling of it provided an 
opening for those who had opposed an appointed board to attack not only the board‘s 
credibility but also the wisdom of having an appointed board at all.  A middle school 
parent complained about the board‘s handling of the matter, ―They are an appointed 
board and they have no accountability to anyone‖ (Leonard 2005a).  
The scandal also hurt the chances of increasing civic capacity and creating a new 
reform-minded regime.  The restructuring of school leadership was supposed to be a 
remedy for the perceived ineffectiveness that had existed before 2002.   Replacing 
ineffectiveness with corruption was not most people‘s idea of an upgrade.  For many, 
particularly for those looking at the school system from the outside, one problem was 
replaced with another.  This said the Hornsby scandal was not the only impediment to 
creating a new performance regime.   There were other issues both inside and outside the 
regime that affected efforts to build a successful reform coalition.  These issues are the 
subject of the rest of this chapter.   
 
The Loss of State Level Reform Advocates  
Only months after legislation was passed to dissolve the elected school board, the 
reform movement was dealt an immediate and consequential blow by the loss of reform 
advocates in the General Assembly.  In 2002, Delegate Rushern Baker (D-Prince 
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George‘s) decided to give up his House seat in order to run for county executive.  Baker 
was one of the county‘s leading advocates for educational reform.   For years he pushed 
the school system and the county to improve performance.   He was the first of the county 
delegation to call for reform of the system‘s leadership structure and was one of the 
strongest supporters of board dissolution.  During the campaign, Baker even wore a T-
shirt with a green apple on it to emphasize his focus on education.     
A key to forming a broad-based coalition for education reform is developing a 
common vision of how education in the county should look in the future.   Having a 
strong advocate in a prominent leadership position to espouse that vision and facilitate 
efforts to bring people together would be enormously advantageous.  Baker was primed 
to be that advocate.  Had Baker succeeded in becoming county executive, education 
would have topped his agenda.  Unfortunately for reform efforts, Baker lost his election 
bid for county executive and came in fourth in a field of five.  With Baker‘s loss, Prince 
George‘s was left without a powerful county voice for educational reform.
21
     
Perhaps the biggest blow to reform efforts at the state level was the death of 
Delegate Howard Rawlings (D-Baltimore) who died in November 2003.  As chairman of 
the House Appropriation Committee, Rawlings had enormous power and he was willing 
to use that power to improve the quality of education for children, particularly poor and 
minority children.  Not only was Rawlings instrumental in the board‘s restructuring, he 
was also instrumental in getting the Bridge to Excellence in Public Schools Act passed in 
2002.
22
 The act significantly increased the amount of state education funding given to 
local jurisdictions.  Over a five-year period, state education funding was increased so that 
an additional $1.3 billion would be added to the state‘s contribution to local districts.   
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A powerful advocate for education reform in Prince George‘s was lost when 
Rawlings died.  There is little doubt that had he lived, Rawlings would have continued to 
closely monitor PGCPS and continued to push for improvements.  An interviewed 
educator argued that Rawlings would have been strong enough to insure attention 
remained focused on education reform by making sure an outside agency reviewed the 
school system and held it accountable for its results.  Also, Rawlings had the power to 
force all of the political entities in the county to come together.  This power was 
necessary because historically there has not been much consensus or willingness to come 
together on the part of elected officials.  ―He was going to force changes.‖ 
With the power of Rawlings and the resources he could bring to the table behind 
them, challengers to the employment regime would have had a significant advantage.  
Coupled with a Baker administration that had education as its primary focus, there is little 
doubt that education awareness would have increased (the prospects for substantive 
education reform would have grown enormously).  No one can say how events would 
have occurred had Baker and Rawlings remained in office.  However, it is probably safe 
to say that the loss of these state-level advocates certainly made reform attempts more 
difficult than they might have been.   
At the same time political changes were occurring at the state-level, political 
changes were occurring at the county-level.   
 
County Politics 
Complicating coalition building efforts and regime change in the education arena 
was the regime change occurring in the county‘s political arena.  2002 was a year in 
which a whole new cadre of political leaders came to power.  Because of term limits, 
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County Executive Wayne Curry and five members of the county council were prohibited 
from running again.  As a result, the County elected a new county executive and five 
first-time council members.  The level of inexperience was increased by the fact that two 
of the remaining four incumbent council members had served less than a year in office.
23
  
Also there was going to be a new state‘s attorney because the current one, Jack Johnson, 
was elected the new county executive.   Additionally, the county‘s chief of police retired 
in February and it was unclear whether the acting chief would be retained by the new 
county executive.  As a result of all of these changes, almost all of the county‘s high 
profile officials, including the school board, were relatively inexperienced and unknown 
to many voters.   
The 2002 elections also reinforced the ascendency of African Americans to the 
top of the political power structure when Prince George‘s voted in its second black 
county executive.  For the first time a majority of the county council members were 
African American as well.
24
  This rise was decades in the making as the county‘s 
demographics shifted from majority white to majority black.  With African American 
ascendency came the white political establishment‘s final demise.   
The power of the old establishment began to unravel in the 1980s as middle class 
African Americans coming to the county began to challenge the political status quo.  As a 
result the white-led political establishment that groomed and imposed order on 
candidates, and kept the County‘s tendency towards factionalism in check lost power as 
blacks demanded a larger political role.  The election of Wayne Curry as the county‘s 
first African American county executive began a period of transition from white 
controlled politics to black controlled politics.    However the dismantling of the white-
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led regime was not followed by the development of a new dominate black-led 
organization.  Instead what developed was a political void in which several groups 
jockeyed for supremacy and candidates operated as independent political entrepreneurs.  
Delegate Hubbard said of the transition, ―for the last eight years, we've been playing 
‗Who's the top dog?‘‖ (Kurtz 2002).   
The election of Johnson in 2002 sounded the final death knell for the old regime.  
Michael E. Arrington‘s, a Johnson adviser, comments about the balance of power said as 
much.  He said, ―Until this election, there has been a fluid connection between all the 
administrations. For the first time, you have a disconnect between the new administration 
and the political operatives who have been around for 30 years‖ (Schwartzman 2003). 
What was not clear was whether Johnson would become a strong enough political figure 
around which a dominate organization could be built.  Tensions between the county 
executive and county council did not help matters. 
Johnson tried to consolidate governing power in the executive‘s office once he 
took office.  Almost immediately after taking office, Johnson lobbied to have the state 
legislature strip the county council of having a say on the appointment of members to two 
important boards.
25
  Not surprisingly he was rebuffed by the county council, and though 
Johnson‘s efforts to bypass the council failed some resentment remained.  In response to 
Johnson‘s actions, the council became more assertive in its dealings with the county 
executive.  The tug-of-war for power escalated each year with a coalition of six council 
members working as a block against Johnson.  Nicknamed ―the gang of six,‖ 
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 the group 
was able to thwart Johnson‘s move for political supremacy.  
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In 2004, Johnson and the council sparred again, this time over a bailout of 
Dimensions, Inc. the non-profit organization running the county‘s public hospitals, 
including Prince George‘s Hospital Center, the county‘s largest public hospital, and 
provider of most of the county‘s indigent care.  After years of mounting deficits, 
Dimensions was facing bankruptcy in 2003.  Initially the executive and council stood 
united in the effort to save the hospital system.  However after months of at times testy 
negotiations with state officials for a bailout, the council balked at an agreement reached 
between Johnson and Governor Robert Ehrlich in February 2004.  The council was upset 
at being left out of the final negotiations.  It also objected to not having a representative 
sit on the state-county oversight committee that would oversee the hospital system‘s 
finances.   One day before a state imposed April 16 deadline for accepting the bailout 
plan, Johnson and the council reached a deal that would add a council representative to 
the oversight committee.  Despite the compromise, the ongoing tensions between the 
executive and the council did little to create the collaborative atmosphere conducive to 
coalition building.   
Further, a public that historically has been skeptical of its political leaders had no 
less reason to be skeptical of the new county leadership.  After the hospital deal was 
brokered, a member of Dimensions board accused Johnson of withholding funds from the 
company until it hired a Johnson associate (Tate 2004b).  After a five month probe, 
Johnson was cleared of the charges by the state prosecutor.  The county executive was 
not alone in being under investigation.   According to newspaper reports, rumors spread 
in November 2004 that the FBI was investigating the relationship between county council 
members and county developers (Rich and Wiggins 2004).
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  The investigation (the 
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details of which were unknown) came in the midst of an ongoing struggle between the 
council and Johnson over residential development in the county.   
The council wanted to slow the pace of development while Johnson supported 
developers eager to build.  The tensions escalated to the point that a proposal (backed by 
developers) to add at-large members to the county council, and thus weaken the influence 
of the ―gang of six‖, was placed on the 2004 ballot.
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  The measure was soundly defeated, 
but not without increasing the animosity between the executive and council.   
The machinations between the executive and council gave education reformers 
little hope that the county political leadership would be able to come together to motivate 
county residents to do what was necessary to improve the county‘s school system.   
 
The Interplay between Race and Class 
As seen in the changes in the county‘s political class, race is a central topic in any 
discussion of Prince George‘s County.  A county cannot shift from majority white to 
majority black without race playing a prominent role in the county‘s history.  The 
question is what role did race play in 2002 and what role does it continue to play?  While 
it is somewhat difficult to answer that question, race no longer is the divisive issue it had 
been in the past.  Whites are no longer fleeing the county in an attempt to avoid having to 
send their children to integrated schools.  Blacks are no longer the victims of a majority 
white police force that harassed them on a regular basis.  The demographic numbers have 
necessitated a change in how race operates in Prince George‘s.   
But how does race operate in the county?  Depending on whom you talk to and on 
which subject you are talking, race is or is not a problem.  If a 2002 election poll is any 
indication, race is not the hot button it used to be.  The majority of voters sampled 
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answered that race relations in the county were good (Washington Post 2002).  Voters 
were asked how well they thought blacks and whites in Prince George‘s got along.  86% 
of voters thought the races got along well while only 10% thought they did not get along 
well.  In an indication of voters‘ willingness to select non-African American leaders, only 
34% of voters thought it was important that the next county executive be African 
American.  Conversely, 63% said it was not important with 42% of them saying it was 
not important at all.  That said, the only way for the white candidate in the county 
executive race, James Estepp, to win was for black voters to split the vote amongst the 
four African American candidates in the race.  However, four years later, when county 
voters were given a choice for United States Senator, they chose the white Democrat 
from Baltimore over the African American Republican from Prince George‘s.
29
   So, does 
race matter in Prince George‘s? 
Most interview respondents agree that the county‘s racial history and the strife 
associated with it fed into residents‘ distrust of county institutions.  As discussed in 
Chapter 3, court-ordered busing and the school system‘s handling of it generated distrust 
from all sides.  As a result there was a lack of confidence in the county‘s political 
institution generally.  In terms of education, this translated into a lack of trust in the 
school board and superintendent.  Thus the actions of the school board or the 
superintendent were often viewed with skepticism by at least some in the county.  Some 
respondents contend that some of the racial distrust born of past actions is still present 
and impacts county politics. They argue the distrust manifests itself as a lack of 
confidence in the willingness or ability of officials to do the right thing, or do what needs 
to be done.   
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There is a general consensus that the local media have contributed to the distrust 
within the County.  Respondents complain that any negative event happening in the 
county is sure to make the news while more positive things go unnoticed.  Some attribute 
the media‘s behavior to institutional racism.  ―This is a majority black county with a 
majority black leadership, and in general folks don‘t like to see that type of success.  So 
because of that any small negative that occurs is magnified.‖  The Washington Post 
receives particular derision.  One said of the newspaper, ―we were red meat for the Post 
reporters.‖   People argue that all of the negative articles about the County and PGCPS 
give people the impression that things are much worse than they actually are.   
Interestingly, when interviewed many respondents did not mention race unless 
specifically asked about it.  So while race is an issue, it is not so prominent an issue that 
everyone feels compelled to talk about it.  Now some of that may be a result of the fact 
that race in America is still a delicate subject.  Some of it may be a result of the fact that 
having tipped to being a solidly majority-minority county, the old black-white 
discussions no longer seem as relevant.  One respondent said of the impact of race on 
education politics, ―Is race a factor yes, but it is not a dominating factor.‖  Perhaps a 
better explanation lies in a quote of a former Maryland Timothy F. Maloney.  In 1990 he 
said, ―Race is the background music in Prince George's‖ (Milloy 2006).    Maloney said 
this during a time when the county was undergoing rapid demographic change, but in 
many ways it still holds true.   
Race in Prince George‘s is like the constant music one hears in a department 
store.  Everyone knows it‘s there but most of the time everyone ignores it.  It almost 
becomes unheard white noise in the background.  Occasionally however, a song will be 
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played that catches one‘s ear and the music is noticed.  What was once in the background 
comes to the forefront, and the emotionally charged nature of race becomes evident.   
Some of the difficulty of race in the County comes from the interplay of race with 
class.  Some issues that are seen as racial issues are actually class issues.  For example 
the Beltway divide discussed earlier is as much if not more a class issue than it is a race 
issue.  Also as discussed above, in addition to conflicts between white and African 
Americans, there are conflicts within the African American community.  Those conflicts 
are class conflicts because the interests of middle class and working class blacks diverge.  
―If the county is 2/3 black, it‘s only logical that the tensions are not just between the 
black structure and the white structure but there are tensions within the black community 
and structure too.  Class issues and all of those things begin to play out.  I‘ve seen that 
directly, with black business groups that will oppose things that seem to go against the 
interests of the black community.  But their interest is in the black business community.‖  
One of the times when race and class have a tendency to jump to the forefront in the 
education arena is when school attendance boundaries are changed.  It is during these 
times that the difficulties associated with the County‘s diversity become most visible.   
School boundary changes are always contentious wherever they take place 
(Creighton and Hamlin 1995).  PGCPS‘s history of school boundary change efforts have 
added to the contentious nature of the process.  For years majority white school boards 
attempted to redraw boundaries as a way of circumventing court-ordered busing.  Though 
unsuccessful in its attempts, the boards‘ behavior had led some African Americans to be 
suspicious of school boards‘ motives with respect to school boundaries.   Meanwhile 
whites in the county, who had been spared the brunt of busing, worried about what would 
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happen to their children after court-ordered desegregation ended.  As a result, most 
everyone came to the table suspicious of everyone else.   
  Interestingly, the county‘s goal to return children to neighborhood schools had 
the potential to exaggerate those differences and divisions that exist within the county.   
In the past the push toward neighborhood schools was promoted by white residents and 
school board members as a means of first preventing integration and second curtailing 
busing.  So for a number of black residents ―neighborhood schools‖ became code for 
segregation or resegregation.  So during the 1970s and early 1980s, racial overtones 
shadowed the debate over neighborhood schools.  As the county and the school system 
populations grew more African American, the racial overtones that once colored the 
debate have been replaced by issues of class.  Instead of white parents objecting to their 
children attending school with black children, today middle class African American 
parents object to their children attending schools with working class African American 
children (Anderson 2005c).  Alvin Thornton, a former chairman of the Prince George‘s 
school board summed up the problem of returning children to their neighborhood school 
when he said, "The school boundaries will begin to reflect the enclaves of differences -- 
social class differences -- in the county.  Children who have less will be consigned to 
schools and communities that have less" (Ibid.).  
An example of this can be seen in attempts to solve the overcrowding at Bowie 
High School.  In 2002 many of PGCPS‘s high schools were overcrowded.  Bowie was 
one of those schools.  It was 600 students over capacity.  At the same time DuVal High 
School was under capacity.  Bowie High School‘s SAT scores made it the second best 
performing high school in the County while DuVal ranked eleventh. 
30
   The student 
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population at Bowie was almost evenly split between blacks and whites, while DuVal‘s 
population was almost entirely black.  CEO Metts proposed sending about 240 Bowie 
students to DuVal.  The objection of Bowie parents was vocal and immediate.  A Bowie 
parent said, ―My children are never going to DuVal. I didn't move here so my children 
could go to DuVal. If I wanted to my children to go to DuVal, I would have moved to 
DuVal's district‖ (Genz 2002).   
Although the 2002 proposal was tabled, in part due to the objections of Bowie 
parents, it was brought up again in 2004.  This time the objection of Bowie parents was 
even more personal.  One said of the DuVal, ―You have a different caliber of parenting, a 
different attitude among the student body, and that's what we're concerned about‖ (Trejos 
2004a).  One black interview respondent complained about Bowie; ―They want 
everything to happen in Bowie.  They don‘t want to intermingle like Bowie is an enclave 
unto itself.  It is not.  They don‘t want to go to school out of Bowie.  We don‘t want 
anybody coming in to Bowie.  ‗We want all of our schools in our community to be just 
for us.‘  They didn‘t want to be a part of the larger system.‖  For years Bowie was able to 
get away with this attitude because PGCPS was desperately trying to hold on to the white 
students who lived in Bowie.  However, many outside of Bowie resented the preferential 
treatment the city received; treatment it received because it was majority white.  So race 
has played a divisive role in boundary issues. 
As the county has become majority African American, class has begun to 
supplant race as the magnet for discord.  Another county high school, Flowers High 
School was over capacity.  Flowers sits in Lake Arbor, an upper middle class town.  A 
plan called for about 490 Lake Arbor students to be sent to Largo High School.  Largo is 
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a working class community.  Flowers parents objected to the move.  One said, ―I want 
my child to be in an environment where she can excel, pass her exams and go on to 
college‖ (Anderson 2005h).  Another added, ―If it is not broke, why fix it?  Our blood, 
sweat and tears are in this community. This is my village‖ (Ibid.).  The middle class black 
parents of Lake Arbor expressed no interest in having their children attend school with 
working class students in Largo.  An interview respondent said of class-based objections 
to boundary changes, ―Parents from communities like Woodmore and Mitchellville 
[upper middle class communities] people don‘t want the children from Kent Village, 
Capital Heights [working class neighborhoods] to go to school with their children.  
Discrimination is now according to class.‖  Now in addition to race, class plays a divisive 
role in school boundary and enrollment issues. 
Nearly continuous boundary changes beginning before the new board took over 
made developing a new collaborative relationship between school system and parents 
extremely difficult if not impossible.  Boundary changes encourage parents to focus on 
the narrow interests of their own children rather than on the broader interests of all 
children.  Proposed boundary changes further encourage school personnel to act to 
protect their school and or job.  Countering this natural impulse requires concerted effort 
to refocus attention on the school system as a whole so that people concentrate on larger 
goals.  Changing behaviors requires changing the way in which parents and the larger 
community interact with the school system, and changing opinions about the appropriate 
place of PGCPS within the community. 
Community involvement efforts can alter perceptions of the role of the entire 
community in improving education in the county.  Between 2002 and 2004 a number of 
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attempts to shape and improve community involvement in PGCPS surfaced.  These 
efforts came from both inside and outside PGCPS with varying levels of success. 
 
Community Involvement 
Key to changing the community‘s relationship with its schools is changing the 
relationship of parents with the school system.  State lawmakers seemed to understand 
this because parent involvement component was added to the bill dissolving the elected 
school board.  Included in the legislation creating the new governance structure was a 
directive to create a Parent and Community Advisory Board (PCAB) (Prince George‘s 
County Delegation 2002).  Both the school board and the CEO were to consult with the 
advisory board and, ―ensure parental involvement in the development and 
implementation of the education policies and procedures in the Prince George‘s County 
public school system‖ (Prince George‘s County Delegation 2002, 4-406).  The board was 
to have 13 members selected by the CEO.  A majority of the members had to be parents 
of PGCPS students.
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  The PCAB was to hold monthly meetings and quarterly meetings 
with the CEO.        
Delegate Hubbard accused the PCAB of being a rubber stamp for Hornsby (A. 
Lee 2004i).  The NAACP‘s representative Clark Estep who resigned after six months on 
the panel lamented that the board was not advising as intended.  He said, "The CEO 
wasn't willing to make changes to carry out mandates, so I chose to no longer be a part of 
PCAB because I found that it was really a dysfunctional organization. The group was not 
following the Legislature's intent, but merely listening to reports from the CEO and not 
advising the CEO. We were more a listening group and reacting to what was being said" 
(Ibid.).  Accusing the board of being ineffective, Delegate Hubbard submitted legislation 
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to restructure the PCAB (Prince George‘s County Delegation 2005a).  He said, "The 
Parent Community Advisory Board has been dysfunctional since it was originally 
organized‖ (A. Lee 2004i).  He also accused some members of never attending meetings.   
The House bill would reduce PCAB membership to 12 and would allow for the 
removal of members with three unexcused absences in a year.  The County‘s Senate and 
House delegations, county executive, and county council would each appoint a 
representative.  The remaining members would represent a number of organizations and 
would be appointed by the county executive with council approval.
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  PCAB member, 
Faith Pounds, objected to the efforts to change the board‘s composition arguing that the 
changes would make the board too political.  ―Does the ‗P‘ in PCAB stand for politician 
instead of parent?  It is my understanding that the intention of HB-94[9], which 
established the PCAB, was to ensure that the opinions of everyday people, especially 
parents, are brought to the table in planning and policy making for the Prince George's 
County School System until we return to an elected school board. It is my opinion 
[Hubbard's proposal] does absolutely nothing to serve our children and is entirely 
politically motivated,‖ Pounds said in an e-mail to The Gazette, a weekly county 
newspaper (A. Lee 2004i).  While the bill passed the House, it died in the Senate and the 
PCAB remained as originally created.   
That the PCAB was seen as ineffective was not a surprise given CEO Hornsby‘s 
attitude toward parent and community involvement.  Several interview respondents 
complained that Hornsby was not particularly interested in meaningful parent and 
community involvement.  ―Hornsby talked at them and not with them.‖  Superintendent 
Hornsby claimed that he encouraged parent involvement.  Yet when asked about 
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complaints about a lack of parent involvement, Hornsby reportedly said, ―The 
expectation that parents would participate in [leadership] committees at schools was not 
reinforced until I got here. . . . Involvement is very different than decision-making. . . . 
Involvement clearly delineates participation, and opportunities for participation, and I 
have provided more opportunities than any of my predecessors in recent history for 
significant involvement‖ (Anderson 2005d).   
  Additionally Hornsby seemed to have a narrow view of parental involvement.  
He believed that parents should be focused on the individual school or schools their child 
or children attend.   Hornsby said, ―I make broad, global, far-reaching decisions that are 
implemented over time.  If parents are truly going to be involved in their child's 
education, they should be involved in the school where the child is‖ (Ibid.).  Hornsby also 
said, ―I think parent involvement, from my perspective, should occur directly at the 
school site.  I think that that's where our children are.  Parents don't have children that 
work in the central office.  The most meaningful parent involvement is where your child 
goes to school. Anything outside of that becomes parent advocacy. That's not 
involvement‖ (A. Lee 2004d).  It is clear that for Hornsby involvement and decision-
making are two different things.  It is also clear from the interviews that while many 
people may be involved in the process, Hornsby was going to be the one to make 
decisions. 
Hornsby‘s position seems to be in line with the traditional view of parental 
involvement which sees parents as an assistant or cheerleader.  This view in which the 
role of the parent is minimized works against broad-based reform efforts that require the 
active participation of a number of stakeholders.  In order to sustain such efforts 
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participants must believe that their participation is meaningful and necessary.  Being 
relegated to the sidelines in the role of cheerleader does not fit that requirement.  On the 
other hand this narrow parental role works very well for the maintenance of a school 
cartel.  
A traditional avenue for parental involvement has been the PTA.  However, the 
county‘s PTA organization, PGCCPTA, was enduring its own troubles. 
A persistent problem for PGCCPTA was low participation.  Judy Mickens-
Murray was head of PGCCPTA when she was appointed to the school board.  She said 
one of her most difficult problems was getting individual PTAs to get involved in issues 
that did not affect their individual school (Krughoff 2002b).  A number of respondents 
commented on the spotty PTA participation throughout the school system.  A school-
level president estimated that about 25% of parents are actively involved in PTAs 
throughout the County.  The lack of robust participation in the rank and file allowed 
clichés to develop among the leadership as people vied for power.   
In September 2005 internal conflicts erupted into dueling meetings.  While 
PGCCPTA President Darren Brown was meeting with school officials to discuss ways to 
increase parent involvement, First Vice President Walter Searcy and other PTA officers 
were meeting to discuss removing Brown from office.
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  There were complaints about 
Brown‘s dictatorial style, and Searcy complained about Brown‘s frequent use of the 
personal pronoun, all the time. ―It's ‗me,‘ about 'me.‘ ‗I‘m the president‘,‖ Searcy 
complained (Anderson 2005f).  There were also concerns about Brown‘s performance as 
Charles H. Flowers High School PTA president.  Brown had arranged for the 
procurement of the Flowers‘ school uniforms through a company that was owned by his 
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brother.  Because of several glitches in the process, the uniforms did not arrive until 
several weeks into the school year.  While no one publically blamed Brown for the 
problems, Searcy and other insinuated that he had done something wrong (Anderson 
2005g).  Removal of Brown would require a vote of the executive board. The earliest the 
board would meet was November.  In November, the PTA‘s executive board fell two 
votes short of the two-thirds majority (6 of 12) needed to oust Brown (Metro In Brief 
2005).  Searcy and another member of the executive board quit in protest.  
The dispute among the PTA leadership began about a month after it was revealed 
that the Maryland PTA (MDPTA) had delayed Brown and other PTA officials from 
taking office because the local organization had failed to file financial audits for the 
previous two years.  It also failed to purchase bonding insurance for school level PTAs 
(Leonard 2005d).  The new leaders, elected in May were not seated until August.  
2005 was not the first year that poor recordkeeping or management had gotten the 
county PTA in trouble with the state organization.  The PGCCPTA had been briefly 
disbanded in 2000 by the MDPTA.  Members of PGCCPTA executive board accused 
then president, Minerva Sanders, of financial mismanagement and failing to comply with 
organizational by-laws.  While there were violations, what seems to have driven the 
board members‘ actions was dissatisfaction with Sanders‘ leadership.  Wanda Blackburn, 
a regional vice president for the organization said, ―The county council of PTAs has been 
crippled by Miss Sanders and her personal agenda.  I feel we need leadership with 
integrity and honesty‖ (E. Lee 2000b).   
After ten months of investigation MDPTA ordered PGCCPTA to accept Sanders 
resignation or remove her from office.  The group demanded the county hold new 
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elections for county officers after the August elections were invalidated.  The group also 
had to establish leadership training for officers.  A MDPTA official had to be present at 
all county meetings for six months.  And most damming, all financial records had to be 
turned over to the state group and the state would manage the county‘s financial accounts 
and approve all expenditures (Bhatti 2000b).  If the county refused to abide by the state‘s 
demands, its charter would be revoked.  Sanders, running against incumbent Marilynn 
Bland for a seat on the Board of Education, called the accusations politically motivated 
and refused to resign.   
There appeared to have been a considerable amount of dissention within the 
organizations leadership with some supporting Sanders, and others like Blackburn 
opposing her (Ita 2000).  After the county PTA failed to oust Sanders, MDPTA revoked 
the group‘s charter in October.  As a result the county lost representation at the state and 
national level.  School-level PTAs were allowed to continue operating although they did 
so without a coordinating body.  In April 2001 MDPTA began the process of forming a 
new county organization.  In July, PGCCPTA‘s charter was restored and new officers 
installed.   
With all of the repeated problems with PGCCPTA‘s leadership, it is no wonder 
that the organization had a difficult time getting school PTAs to focus on county issues.  
More importantly, all of the strife within PGCCPTA most certainly weakened the 
organization‘s ability to be an effective spokesman for the interests of parents.   
For its part, the appointed school board was very cognizant of the need to improve 
the community‘s interaction with the school system.  Beyond trying to be more accessible 
to the community, the board was proactive in developing some new initiatives by taking 
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advantage of its business connections.  Many of those initiatives were aimed at increasing 
business involvement. 
In 2004, the school board established the Excellence in Education Foundation.  
The nonprofit foundation was the brainchild of board member Sirjue, and its mission was 
to raise private donations for PGCPS.  Although the board and CEO Hornsby would 
oversee the foundation, it would be run by others.  This was not the county‘s first attempt 
at establishing an education foundation.  An earlier foundation, Prince George's 
Education Foundation, operated from1997 until 2002 when fundraising difficulties led to 
its shuttering.  The first project for the new foundation was the Libraries Inside the 
Classroom Initiative.  As its name indicates, the initiative‘s goal was to provide a set of 
library books in every classroom.  In support of the initiative, the foundation sponsored 
5k races, ―Race for Education,‖ annually from 2004 to 2006.  During the same period the 
foundation also held an annual golf tournament.     
In another effort to strengthen school system ties with businesses, the school 
board formed the Business Partnership Committee and made it one of the board‘s 
standing committees.  One of the things the committee did was revive the Partners in 
Education program in 2003.  The program matches schools in need of donations with 
businesses with time, money, goods, and/or services to donate.  The program originally 
begun in 1999 had become defunct because of budget constraints and the feud between 
the school board and superintendent. 
Hornsby also tried to build better partnerships with the business sector.  He started 
the Principal for a Day program in 2004.  The program, similar to others in the country, 
allows business executives and other community leaders to serve as principals in the 
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county‘s elementary schools for one day.  The program is designed to connect the 
community to schools by giving leaders insight into success and challenges facing 
principals on a daily basis.  The exercise has become an annual event with more than 100 
business and community leaders taking part each year. 
Perhaps the initiative that most signaled a possible change in how education was 
viewed throughout the county was the formation of a new business and education 
partnership.  Observing the 2002 debate over schools, County Councilman (and former 
school board member) Thomas R. Hendershot and David R. Merkowitz, the CEO of 
Strategic Communications, a private public affairs firm, were convinced that business 
should play a role in the debate.  They surveyed businesses in the county to gauge 
support for more business involvement. They then convened a breakfast attended by 
about 20 of the county‘s business leaders to discuss the potential for forming some sort of 
business alliance in support of education.  The meeting was also attended by 
Superintendent Metts who gave the endeavor her strong endorsement.  The informal 
group also conducted a public opinion survey of county residents and held public 
discussions to determine how an organization could be most effective.   
The result was the Prince George‘s Business Education Alliance (PGBEA), a 
nonprofit research and policy analysis organization.  Formed in 2004, the organization 
had three goals: secure the financial resources needed to provide a world-class education 
for all Prince George's County students; improve perceptions of the county's public 
schools and colleges; and build confidence in the county's educational institutions on the 
part of elected and appointed officials and the general public (Prince George‘s Business 
Education Alliance n.d.).  PGBEA had a membership that includes 31 businesses, 11 
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affiliate organizations, and the heads of PGCPS and Prince George‘s Community 
College.  Businesses were asked to make annual contributions ranging from $250 to 
$10,000 to the nonprofit organization.  In addition to issuing reports and press releases on 
education funding, PGBEA members lobbied the Maryland General Assembly for 
increased funding for Prince George‘s education.   
In December 2004, PGBEA held the Prince George‘s Business-Education Summit 
to bring together county business and education leaders, academic experts, public 
officials, community activists, and other invited guests for a daylong meeting.  According 
to PGBEA Executive Director Merkowitz, the goal of the summit was to foster consensus 
on the agenda that will strengthen education in Prince George's County (Staff Writers 
2004).  One result of the Summit was a distributed report that summarized the major 
issues discussed at the summit and discussed ways in which the community as a whole 
and the business community in particular could work to improve county education 
(Prince George‘s Business Education Alliance 2004). 
This broad-based business coalition formed around the goal of improving public 
education represented a significant change in the interaction between PGCPS and the 
business community in the county.  The alliance represented a new approach to education 
and was the strongest indication that a new reform oriented regime might be forming.  A 
fly in the ointment however, was the fact that CEO Hornsby kept his distance from the 
Alliance.  Hornsby neither tried to encourage or inhibit the group‘s activities.  The 
Alliance did its thing and Hornsby did his.  A businessman working with the alliance 
bemoaned the fact that by not working with the Alliance, Hornsby missed an opportunity 
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to get direct feedback from the business community.  Unfortunately, given his described 
personality, Hornsby‘s behavior was not surprising.   
As discussed above, the 2002 elections provided an opportunity for government 
attention to be focused on education reform.  The outgoing county executive, Wayne 
Curry, had made increasing economic development the highest priority of his 
administration.  The new executive, Jack Johnson, had an opportunity to put action 
behind the campaign promises to make education a priority.  Bringing people together 
would not be easy.  With everyone jockeying for position in the new political regime, the 
chances of competing factions coming together to form a broad-based education coalition 
were slim.  Moreover, with so many new players, it would take time to find a common 
voice or direction if it was even possible to do so.   
While Johnson as county executive would be a logical choice to lead the effort to 
articulate a new educational vision he was not necessarily in a position to fill that role.  
According to Ronald Walters, a political science professor at the University of Maryland 
and long time county observer, ―You have a weak county executive who's coming in 
without a strong majority base.  They have to put together a base once they get elected.  
In terms of governing, you're wasting a lot of time" (Schwartzman 2002b).  Add to this 
the antagonism between Johnson and the county council and the prospects for bold 
efforts appeared bleak.  Nevertheless, Johnson seemed to defy the doubts with his first 
foray into education.   
Johnson held an education summit titled Communities United for Education on 
September 13, 2003.  The focus of the summit was parent and family empowerment for 
excellence in education.   Over 600 educators, public officials, and parents attended.  
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Attendees participated in panels where they made suggestions to increase parental and 
community involvement.  The summit was to be followed by nine mini forums focused 
on subsets within the community.  However, at the initial summit, Johnson announced the 
formation of the Visionary Panel for Excellence in Education Across the Life Span.  The 
panel was to work to implement a ―womb to tomb‖ concept of education.  The expansion 
of the panel‘s focus beyond K-12 education lessened the potential impact of the initiative 
on reforming K-12 education.   
A while later, Johnson‘s education efforts were absorbed into his Livable 
Communities Initiative.  The Livable Communities Initiative is ―an exciting Strategic 
Plan that will guide, support and assist the government, residents and businesses in the 
creation and implementation of principles that will result in a healthy, safe, litter free 
environment and promote more livable communities in Prince George's County, one 
community at a time‖ (Prince George‘s County Government 2010).  The original focus of 
the initiative was the beautification of the county‘s roads and communities.  Its focus was 
expanded to include various issues that impact and improve the quality-of-life for county 
residents.  The hallmark of the initiative is the reliance on an agenda of small scale 
projects designed to improve the quality of life for county residents.  The most prominent 
of Johnson‘s education efforts was his 2004 ―Cool Schools‖ initiative that had the goal of 
air conditioning in all PGCPS schools by the 2005-2006 school year (Johnson 
Administration 2004). 
 The decision by Johnson to place his education initiative inside the larger 
initiative prevented the enthusiasm of the summit from being leveraged into a sustained 
effort to address critical issues.  After this initial burst of activity, there appears to have 
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been only limited attention focused on education by the county executive beyond the 
required budget issues.  Part of the explanation may lie in the fact that Johnson did not 
appear to have a vision of how he wanted to approach education.  Asked about his 
expectations for the first summit, Johnson said, ―What is going to come out of the 
summit, I don't know.  What we might be looking at is a targeted campaign toward 
parents in the form of letters to be mailed home or even a task force to look further into 
the issue‖ (Krughoff 2003c).  According to a high ranking educator no concrete products 
resulted from the summits.  Clearly the catalyst for building a broad coalition for 
education reform was not going to come from the county executive.   
 
Summary  
During the four year period covering the tenures of CEOs Metts and Hornsby 
there appeared to be some concerted efforts to change the focus of the education regime.  
The school board did try to gain the public‘s confidence.  However, the positive feelings 
engendered by the board were by the ambivalence many felt toward it due to its 
perceived undemocratic nature.   
From the interviews it is clear that the county was split on the appointed board.  
While some thought they brought stability to the system and a needed level of 
professionalism others found the board unresponsive to community wishes.  This split in 
opinion weakened the ability of the board to be the focal point of a new reform 
movement.  Perhaps more importantly, the appointed board was not inclined to serve as a 
magnet around which a coalition could develop.  It saw itself more in the mold of a 
corporate board of directors rather than a team of managers.  They believed that once 
they had selected a CEO their job was to step back and let him lead the system.  The 
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board was willing to operate more in the background and allow the superintendent to 
become the focal point of any new regime if there was going to be one.  ―They let the 
superintendent run it.  They were not hands on.‖   
The prospects of forming a successful new regime were slim while Metts was still 
superintendent.  She was too much of a lightning rod for some.  Supporters of the old 
board blamed her for the board‘s removal and were not willing to work with her.  Others 
saw her as a holdover from a volatile period best forgotten.  Even some of Metts‘s 
supporters were ambivalent about her remaining with the system.  In the end, as the 
relationship between Metts and the new board deteriorated, there was too much animosity 
to make a coalition work.   
The hiring of a new superintendent seemed to provide an opportunity for a fresh 
start.  However, in hindsight, the board‘s selection of Hornsby probably killed any real 
chance to form a broad-based coalition.  There was significant opposition to Hornsby‘s 
hiring on the part of school system‘s unions.  They would have been unlikely to join a 
new coalition led by the superintendent.  There was also a more general apprehension 
about Hornsby within the general community.  Nevertheless, most people in the county 
were willing to give Hornsby a chance.  However, Hornsby‘s brusque management style 
and unwillingness or inability to act in a collaborative manner thwarted possible leanings 
towards forming a new broad-based coalition focused on educational improvement. 
It could be argued that given the reasons why the board chose him, the prospects 
for a broad based coalition were nonexistent while Hornsby was CEO.  The board chose 
Hornsby because of his blunt, take charge attitude had raised academic achievement 
elsewhere.  The board seemed to think that an aggressive, no excuses approach to the 
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school system was what was needed to improve performance.  While Hornsby‘s approach 
may have been what the system needed, it was not what a reform movement needed.   
Moreover, Hornsby‘s arrogance precluded him from building the kinds of community 
relationships necessary to sustain a reform regime.  Ultimately, the LeapFrog scandal 
brought an end to attempts to rally around a new initiative during the Hornsby term.   
Between 2002 and 2005, all of the turmoil and turnover in leadership both within 
and outside PGCPS precluded the formation of a new regime.  Hornsby‘s 2005 departure 
provided the appointed board with another opportunity to select a superintendent capable 
of engendering support rather than opposition from the community.  Would the 
environment improve with the next superintendent, or would the instability that seemed 







   Prior to 1973, the school board was appointed by Maryland‘s governor.  The 
move to an elected board was a reaction to court-ordered desegregation (Chapter 3).  
 
2
   Unattributed quotations are from interviews conducted by the author.  
Respondents were given anonymity in exchange for their participation. 
 
3
   Baltimore city schools are governed by a board appointed by the mayor.  
However, under the 1998 settlement, the mayor was forced to give up sole control of the 
appointment process.  Additionally, the sitting board at the time was replaced. 
 
4
   Only 24% responded it was a bad idea and 14% had no opinion or no response.  
The question asked was, ―Do you think it was generally a good idea or generally a bad 
idea to replace the existing board with a newly appointed one?‖ 
 
5
   The four members were Beatrice Tignor, Dean Sirjue, Darlene W. Powell and 
Diana H. Walton. 
 
6
   Beltway is the local name given to Interstate 495.  The Interstate circles the 
District of Columbia and bisects Prince George‘s County.  Communities inside the 
Beltway tend to be poorer than communities outside the Beltway (Chapter 2). 
 
7
   Metts‘s term would run from June 1
st





   Fiscal years for PGCPS run from July1 to June 30. 
 
9
   For the 2002-2003 school year, the entire state of Delaware had a public school 
enrollment of 116,288 students (An additional 28, 142 students were enrolled in private 
schools).  PGCPS‘s enrollment was 135,439.  Blacks were 31.4% of the student 
population in Delaware.  Blacks were 77.7% of the student population in PGCPS.   
 
10
   Yonkers had 26,000 students; Sioux Falls had 19,700; and St. Louis Park had 
4,200 (Trejos 2003a). 
 
11
   As plaintiff in the desegregation suit, any new magnet plan had to meet with 
NAACP or perhaps face possible challenge in court. 
 
12
   Because of declining enrollments only 24 of the 26 schools were built by 2009 
 
13
   Between 1987 and 2006, PGCPS had 11 National Blue Ribbon Schools and an 
additional 5 state Blue Ribbon Schools (PGCPS website).  Conversely, for the 2004-2005 
school year, PGCPS had 73 schools on MSDE‘s schools in improvement list (2004 






   The actual number of students attending neighborhood schools was 80%.  The 
other 20% were either in special education programs or attended schools with magnet or 
specialty programs not available at their neighborhood school. 
  
15
   AYP is the gain that schools, school systems, and states must make each year 
in the proportion of students achieving proficiency in reading and math.  To make AYP, 
schools and school systems must meet annual goals in reading and mathematics, 
graduation (high school) or attendance (elementary and middle school), and test 
participation.  
16
   As a matter of fact, the school system‘s budget was not the only one singled 
out for closer scrutiny by the council.  Other departments such as police, fire and 
corrections were also more closely scrutinized. 
 
17




   PGCPS had done business with LeapFrog since 2002. 
 
19
    Both were involved because the purchase was made with federal Title I funds. 
 
20
   The board created a committee to review no-bid contracts of $25,000 and 
directed the schools‘ internal auditor to review all contracts of $100,000 or more. 
 
21
   Baker, a lawyer, decided not to return to practicing law after his defeat.  
Instead he became executive director of a nonprofit group that recruits and trains teachers 
to teach in minority communities. 
 
22
   The act is more commonly referred to as the ―Thornton Act‖ in honor of Alvin 
Thornton, the chairman of the commission that developed the plan. 
 
23
   The two members replaced council members who died in office. 
 
24
   Five of nine council members were African American. 
 
25
  The boards are the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission and the 
Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission.  These bi-county 
(Montgomery County and Prince George‘s) boards have taxing authority and are 
extremely influential in zoning, planning and development issues.  
 
26
   The six were Tony Knotts, Samuel H. Dean, Douglas J.J. Peters, Thomas E. 
Dernoga, Camille Exum and David Harrington. 
 
27
   The FBI refused to confirm or deny the existence of an investigation.  No 






   The measure would have made it possible for councilmember Thomas 
Hendershot to remain on the council.  Term limits forced him from office in 2006. 
 
29
   Congressman Benjamin Cardin defeated Maryland‘s Lieutenant Governor 




   DuVal‘s average SAT score was 832 (Genz 2002).  Bowie‘s was 948.   
 
31
   Five members were to be selected from a list of candidates submitted by 
PGCCPTA.  Two were to come from a list submitted by the Committee of 100 [The 
Committee of 100 was the community group formed to monitor court-ordered 
desegregation and magnet programs].  Another three were to be appointed from a list 
submitted by Title I liaisons working in the school system.  The final three were to come 
from a list of nominees submitted by other parent and community groups in the county.   
 
32
   Those members would include the following representatives: two from the 
PGCCPTA, one from Prince George‘s Talented and Gifted, one from the Prince George‘s 
Chapter of the NAACP, one form the Prince George‘s County Chamber of Commerce, 
one from The Arc of Prince George‘s County, one representative from Prince George‘s 
County Municipal Association, and one Title I parent.  The Arc is a grassroots 
organization concerned about the welfare of people with developmental disabilities and 
their families. Prince George‘s Talented and Gifted is a county organization that 
advocates for PGCPS‘s talented and gifted programs. 
 
33
   The meeting was monitored by Maryland PTA officials who refused to take 





Education Politics in Prince George’s County after Dissolution 
Part 2: 2006-2010 
 
Prince George‘s County Public Schools (PGCPS) CEO Andre Hornsby‘s May 
2005 resignation created another transition point for the school system.  The school board 
appointed Chief of Human Resources, Howard Burnett as interim CEO.  Burnett who 
was to retire in the fall referred to himself as a caretaker.  Initially Burnett agreed to serve 
until the beginning of the new school year, about three months.  However, his tenure was 
extended while the school board conducted a national search for a permanent leader.  
During that eleven month period, the school system was, according to one respondent, 
―on auto-pilot‖ another said the system was ―in a holding pattern.‖  Even so, a respondent 
offered that the year with Burnett at the helm allowed the system to recover from all of 
the turmoil occurring under the watch of both CEOs Metts and Hornsby.  PGCPS 
employees referred to the year as ―the year of healing.‖  The year gave PGCPS, the 
county and potential advocates for reform a chance to regroup and consider next steps.  
The first step was the selection of a new superintendent.   
There was some discussion as to whether the appointed board should be selecting 
a new CEO.  The board was scheduled to leave office at the end of 2006.  Should the 
board choose a new superintendent when the board doing the hiring would be gone just a 
few months after the CEO had been selected?  Should not the new school board have the 
opportunity to choose the CEO of its choice?  Delegate James Hubbard, a frequent critic 
of the appointed board, thought the CEO selection should be left for the new board.  ―I 
was one of the first people out of the gate to say this school board should not be allowed 
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to make the decision on a permanent CEO‖ (Leonard 2005c).  Citizens for an Elected 
Board also wanted the board to wait.  Others wanted the board to move forward.  
Delegate Justin Ross who was in favor of the appointed board selecting the new CEO 
said, ―There's no guarantee that the elected board will pick anyone better and in the 
meantime we'll have wasted a year to 18 months where we could've had some continuity‖ 
(Ibid.).  Some thought was given to hiring an interim CEO for a year and giving the new 
board the opportunity to select a person of their choosing.  However, this option could 
possibly lead to PGCPS having entirely new leadership in 2007.  To avoid that, some 
thought was given to signing the new CEO a two-year contract.  The two years would 
allow the system to maintain some continuity because the CEO would be in place for a 
year after the new board took office.  Then the elected board would be able to hire a CEO 
of its choosing.  Some board members favored offering a two-year contract while others 
favored a full four-year contract.  In the end, the appointed board opted to hire a 
permanent CEO and sign him or her to a full, four–year contract. 
The board began its search for a new CEO by hiring a firm to conduct a national 
search for potential applicants.  The new CEO would come from outside of PGCPS.  A 
senior administrator offered that the board thought the system needed to be headed by 
someone from outside of PGCPS.  
              
Enter the New CEO, Again 
The search for a new CEO reached its final stages in early 2006, and there 
appeared to be more interest in the position than when Hornsby was hired in 2002.  This 
time the county received 66 applications almost triple the 25 it received in 2003 
(Anderson 2006b).  In February the school board named three finalists.  Two of the 
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candidates had connections to New York City‘s school system, the largest in the country.  
They were Marcia V. Lyles, a community superintendent in Brooklyn, and W.L. "Tony" 
Sawyer, Superintendent of the Topeka Public Schools.  Before moving to Kansas, 
Sawyer had been a New York City community superintendent overseeing Manhattan 
high schools.  The third candidate, John E. Deasy, was superintendent of the Santa 
Monica-Malibu Unified School District.  Lyles and Sawyer were African American, 
Deasy was white. 
As with the selection of Hornsby in 2003, all of the candidates met with various 
county stakeholders; parents and community activists, union leaders, top school 
administrators, and state and county elected officials.  This time the school board and the 
community sought to select a CEO who was much more of a collaborator than Hornsby 
and also unlike Hornsby, above reproach.  The board wanted someone who could handle 
both academics and politics.  Board member Dean Sirjue said the new CEO should be 
able to get parents and community leaders to ―embrace education and make education a 
priority in the county (Ibid.).  But Sirjue also warned people about their desire to get the 
perfect candidate.  He cautioned, ―If anyone believes there's one knight in shining armor 
who can come in and 'fix' this school system overnight, they're in for a rude awakening‖ 
(Ibid.).   
On March 2, the board voted unanimously to hire Deasy.  Unlike the board‘s last 
choice of Hornsby, this board‘s choice had the support of all the various stakeholder 
constituencies.  People were effusive in their support of Deasy.  Carol Kilby, Prince 
George‘s County Educators‘ Association (PGCEA) president said, ―Deasy has a lot of 
energy.  He's going to be very, very positive. Unions were 100 percent behind him‖ 
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(Anderson 2006c).  County Council Chairman Thomas Dernoga said, "It's the best move 
they've made in the four years they've been here" (Anderson 2006d).  And in a reference 
to Hornsby‘s strained relationship with the council, David Merkowitz of the PGBEA 
said, ―This is not a guy who's ever going to walk out of a [county] council meeting.  
They're going to have to kick him out‖ (Ibid.).  In what was music to the ears of a county 
wanting stability, Deasy declared he was here for the long haul.  He was quoted as 
saying, ―I think it will take a minimum of eight to 10 years [to radically improve student 
achievement and turn around low performing schools].  By that time I‘ll be about 55, so I 
want to make my prime work in a place where it‘s needed the most‖ (Leonard 2006b).   
Interestingly, Deasy‘s age made some people in PGCPS a little anxious.  They 
were concerned that Deasy might not stay with the system for long because of his age.  
Because Deasy was so young, 45, PGCPS could not possibly be his last stop it was 
thought.  An interviewed administrator who had worked with Deasy in the past was 
repeatedly asked by system employees if Deasy was likely to stay with PGCPS.  The 
administrator thought people did not appear to be asking because they wanted to know 
how long they would have to bide their time until Deasy left.  Instead they appeared to be 
seeking reassurance that the system would be stabilized.  As discussed previously, 
bringing stability to PGCPS was one of the motivating factors behind the dissolution of 
the school board in 2002.  But as earlier chapters have shown, stability had proven rather 
elusive. 
Personality and style wise, Deasy was nearly the polar opposite of Hornsby.  In a 
clear reference to Hornsby, a school official was quoted as saying, ―Deasy is very smart. 
But it's not important to him to show that he's the smartest guy in the room. It's not going 
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to be management by intimidation. It's going to be collegial and collaborative‖ (Anderson 
2006d).  Deasy seemed to understand that to have long term success in the county a 
superintendent must know that successfully navigating the county‘s political waters was 
almost as important as raising achievement.  He said his first priority would be, ―reaching 
out to all of the constituent stakeholders.  Building personal relationships and a 
community team for the work that lies ahead‖ (Ibid.).   
Of course the giant elephant in the room was race.  Deasy was the first white 
superintendent to lead the system since Edward Felegy retired in 1995.  Some questioned 
whether the board would hire a white person.  A respondent who attended Deasy‘s 
constituent interview overheard an African American attendee say, ―Clearly he‘s the best 
of the three candidates.  Too bad they won‘t hire him because he‘s white.‖
1
  The 
respondent hoped the fact that the board did hire Deasy was a sign of growing maturity of 
the county‘s politics, that the first qualification for the job was not race.   Some in the 
county believed that race should not be the sole motivator for everything that happens in 
the majority African American county.  This view was expressed by Valerie Lewis 
Robinson, executive director of Prince George‘s County Educators Association; she said 
race might be an issue for some people but that the county should look to more important 
issues.  ―I‘d like to think we are smarter than that, as a county. [The race question] 
irritates me, to be honest; it says we‘re more concerned about the wrong things. We need 
to be focused on who is best for the system... and who has the proven track record. [Race] 
cannot play a role. It can‘t‖ (Leonard 2006a).   
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Some, however, felt a little unease about not being able to find a black person for 
the job.  For example, Vice Chairman Howard Stone reportedly told Washington Post 
columnist Courtland Milloy,  
Let me tell you, this was an agonizing decision for me.  We've had three black 
school superintendents who didn't work out, and I sure didn‘t want to leave black 
people and especially black students with the impression that a black can't lead.  
Did I want to turn this system over to a white man?  Not if I‘d had my druthers.  
But after looking at all of the candidates, this was the best guy to lead the system, 
raise the test scores and get our kids the best education possible. (Milloy 2006)   
 
Milloy wrote that the choice of Deasy was a choice between black pride and 
pragmatism and pragmatism won.  According to Milloy, the county's black middle class 
does not, ―want to talk publicly about the embarrassing spectacle of black school leaders 
getting caught up in catfights and scandals.  Now, with a white man in charge, they won't 
have to.  And low-income blacks, who have long felt abandoned by their more affluent 
neighbors, get to root for a Great White Hope‖ (Milloy 2006).  While Milloy‘s 
assessment seems a bit harsh, there is some truth in it.  The county‘s black middle class 
has tended to downplay the significance of race and the negative impact it can have on 
county politics and social interactions.  They prefer to focus on the positive aspects of 
race such as the county executive‘s frequent mentions of Prince George‘s being the 
nation‘s wealthiest majority-minority county.    
For his part, Deasy did not shy away from the issue of race and discussed it 
directly. ―Everybody is talking about it,‖ Deasy said. ―It‘s absolutely critical. I 
understand its implications very powerfully. My mission is for all of the system‘s 
children to learn and achieve at high levels‖ (Leonard 2006a).  As further evidence that 
Deasy understood the significance and sensitivities of race, he called a quality education 
―a fundamental civil right…that means you get to get in, but you also get to acquire the 
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same high levels of education as the child sitting next to you‖ (Leonard 2006c).  On 
closing the achievement gap, Deasy said, ―It‘s not about race; it‘s an opportunity issue, 
adding, ―I think it‘s apart from race. If you handle it as a team with the community, then 
there‘s unlimited potential for kids‖ (Leonard 2006a).  If there was unease within the 
community in regards to his race, Deasy said he did not feel it. 
Deasy officially became CEO of PGCPS on May 1, 2006, and he hit the ground 
running.  Moving quickly was part of his plan to create a sense of urgency in order to get 
people moving to address the system‘s persistently under-performing schools.  ―We have 
a number of chronically low-performing schools that are going to require immediate 
attention and action,‖ Deasy said (Anderson 2006c).  Deasy also wanted to create a sense 
of urgency in order to create a new culture of accountability.  Perhaps the most important 
motivation for urgency was the threat of possible state action.  For three consecutive 
years the system as a whole had failed to make adequate yearly progress (AYP) on state 
assessments.
2
  Although the county‘s scores improved in each of the three previous years, 
they did not improve enough to reach the AYP threshold.  This failure meant PGCPS was 
eligible to be placed on the state‘s ―corrective action‖ list.  Schools and systems on the 
list are potentially subject to a number of sanctions ranging from the replacement of staff 
to state takeover.   Deasy wanted to be proactive and take steps to improve student and 
school performance before the state acted. 
In keeping with his building a sense of urgency, Deasy wanted to have a plan 
developed before the beginning of the 2006-2007 school year.  On August 24, 2006, 
Deasy unveiled his plan for improving academic achievement and raising classroom 





  A cornerstone of the plan was the Intensive Support and 
Intervention Schools program (ISIS) which directs extra resources and personnel to 
schools on the state‘s watch list (Malen et al. 2007).  There were 84 schools in the 
program.  Depending on the degree of need, schools in the initiative would receive 
tailored support that would include extra professional development for teachers; 
supplemental reading and math materials; math, reading, social studies and science 
coaches; a data analysis and testing coordinator; a pupil personnel worker; and other 
specialized assistance.   
Other initiatives included expanding the number of Advanced Placement (AP) 
courses offered in the county‘s high schools.
4
  Deasy wanted schools to offer at least 
eight courses.  He would also expand the International Baccalaureate (IB) program.
5
  
Both initiatives were designed to increase academic rigor at the high school level.  As 
part of his parent engagement initiative, Deasy proposed putting parent liaisons in 
schools.  The goal of the parent liaison is to ―engage every parent in their child‘s 
educational process; thereby, increasing parental involvement and ultimately improving 
student academic achievement and performance‖ (Prince George‘s County Board of 
Education 2008e).  Parent liaisons were located in each school and would serve as a 
direct link between parents and their children‘s schools.   
Generally, PGCPS employees were receptive to Deasy‘s call for quick action.  
According to a senior administrator, ―for the most part, people were willing to listen.  
People really wanted to move forward and shed the label of second lowest performing 
system.‖  Deasy‘s sense of urgency created buy-in from many PGCPS employees, but it 
also created some skepticism.  The skepticism was increased by the speed in which CCF 
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was developed.  The plan was developed in less than three months over the summer and 
was the creation of Deasy and his executive team.  Some employees questioned Deasy‘s 
appeal that improving PGCPS was everyone‘s responsibility when so few people had 
input or involvement in the development of the plan.  They were responsible for making 
the plan work but had no say in the formation of the plan.  Doubts notwithstanding, 
others were highly receptive of the plan.  However, they had doubts that the system could 
move as quickly as Deasy wanted.  Nevertheless, respondents indicated people wanted 
the system and consequently, CCF to succeed and were willing to give the plan a chance.    
In October 2006, the Maryland State Board of Education did place the entire school 
system under ―corrective action‖ for failing to make AYP. 
6
  
  The designation exposed the system to possible sanctions.  However, State 
Superintendent Nancy Grasmick recommended the State Board not impose any sanctions 
on PGCPS because she liked Deasy‘s CCF plan and thought he had a good strategy for 
improving the system‘s performance (Hernandez and De Vise 2006).  Thus Deasy 
received an early vote of confidence from state officials.  
 
2006:  The Elected Board Returns 
  The transitions happening in 2006 presented an opportunity to restart the drive 
for a new education coalition.  Not only did PGCPS get a new superintendent in 2006; it 
also got a new school board.  By law, the appointed board‘s four year term was to end 
December 2006, and the l board was to be replaced by a new elected school board.  At 
the beginning of the year however it was still unclear if and how a new board would be 
elected because people were having second thoughts about the transition plan.   
271 
 
The original election plan developed in 2002 was somewhat convoluted (Prince 
George‘s County Delegation 2002).  It called for all nine board members to be elected by 
the entire county.  Four of the nine would be at-large members.  The other five would 
have to reside in one of five newly created districts.  Although the five would represent 
specific districts, they would be voted on by the entire county.  This original 
configuration was the result of a compromise that seemed to satisfy few.     
Groups opposed to the original legislation had been working since its passage to 
have the elected school board reinstalled.  A black respondent working to return to nine 
member districts said, ―For African Americans and all that we have been through to get 
the right to vote; killed and maimed and brutalized and assassinated, we just could not 
stand for them to take away that right to vote.‖   
Members of the county delegation who had been opposed to the creation of the 
appointed board wanted a return to the nine member district format in place when the old 
board was dissolved.  They felt that having nine districts would provide better 
representation.  They were also concerned that the high costs of a county-wide campaign 
would prohibit potential candidates from running and that the costs of having to run at-
large campaigns would lead prospective candidates to turn to powerful interests in the 
county for financial support and to become beholden to those interests.  On the other 
hand, those fearful of a return of the parochialism that pervaded the last elected board 
preferred a hybrid board with both appointed and elected members.  The appointed 
members would act as a buffer against the sway of narrow interests.  Having a hybrid 
board would have allowed some of the current board members to remain on the new 
board thus providing some much needed continuity.   
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On February 11, Delegate Doyle L. Niemann (D-Prince George‘s) introduced a 
proposal to have a board comprised of six district elected members and three at-large 
members (Prince George‘s County Delegation 2005c).  The same day Delegate Rosetta 
C. Parker (D-Prince George‘s) introduced her own proposal to have the board composed 
of members from nine single member districts (Prince George‘s County Delegation 
2005b).  Another amendment proposed by Delegate Anne Healey (D-Prince George‘s) to 
add two at-large members to the board was defeated.  While Niemann‘s bill stalled in the 
House, Parker‘s bill passed the House unanimously on March 25.  The bill moved to the 
Senate where passage was much less likely. 
The county‘s eight Senators were less inclined to return to a nine district board.  
Senator John A. Giannetti Jr. (R-Anne Arundel & Prince George‘s) said that in his 
discussions with other senators, ―There is some interest in keeping the stability of the 
appointed board‖ (Anderson 2005a).  During a March 30
th
 meeting, the county‘s Senate 
delegation postponed action on the House bill and scheduled a hearing on the bill for 
April 6
th
.  At that same meeting County Executive Johnson expressed support for the 
House bill.  PGCEA and the NAACP chapter also supported the bill.  Nevertheless, the 
Senate failed to take action on the bill and it died with the end of the legislative session.
7
 
Another attempt to change the school board was tried during the General 
Assembly‘s 2006 Legislative Session.  Writing of the need for elections to his fellow 
senators, Senator Paul Pinsky (D-Prince George‘s) declared, ―I believe it is an important 
step and one that is expected--and supported--by an overwhelming majority of Prince 
George's County citizens‖ (Anderson 2006a).  This time there was little doubt that 
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elections would take place.  The only question remaining was the composition of the 
board.   
Each house of the delegation introduced bills changing the board‘s election 
process.  The House delegation submitted a proposal to return to nine single-member 
district elections (Committee on Ways and Means 2006).  It passed in a 139 to 1 vote on 
March 2.  On March 16, Senators Gloria Lawlah (D-Prince George‘s) and Nathaniel 
Exum (D-Prince George‘s) proposed a plan that called for nine district elections.  
However the Senators‘ plan allowed for two of the current appointed members to serve 
an additional two years and thus create an eleven member board (Committee on 
Education and Environment Affairs 2006).   
While the delegations were trying to work out a compromise, the appointed board 
approved a resolution calling for the extension of three or four of its members‘ terms.  
The appointed board wanted to provide some continuity to the system as it gained a new 
superintendent.  They maintained having appointed members remain on the board would 
be a way of guaranteeing the continued professionalism of the current board.   
The suggestion to extend the term of the appointed board did not gain much 
traction in the county however.  Support for the creation of an appointed board in 2002 
came because the existing school board had become a public embarrassment.  State 
legislators from other jurisdictions made it clear that the county would not receive the 
additional money it sought without changing the board.  Once the old board was removed 
and the money received, there was little sentiment among county legislators for the 
continuance of an appointed board that was never intended to be permanent.   
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A lawmaker who voted for the appointed board said, ―I would have loved to see 
some members on the appointed board stay.  The deal that we made with the people was 
that we would deal with the emergency situation, the crisis, and the crisis was gone.  At 
that point, once the crisis left then the will of the people should prevail.‖  Further, the 
perceived undemocratic nature of the appointed board still resonated among many in the 
county.  Moreover, the trend in Maryland was moving away from appointed boards.  By 
2006, 18 of Maryland‘s 24 school boards were elected.  Five counties had moved to 
elected boards since 2000.  Finally, lingering irritation from the board‘s mishandling of 
the Hornsby scandal made it all but certain the board‘s term would not be extended.   
Late on April 10, 2006, the last day of the Session, the Senate in a 35 to 1 vote 
passed the Lawlah-Exum bill.   The House had about three hours to reconcile the two 
bills before adjournment.  Since it was unable to do so, the original law remained as 
written.  In 2006 nine new school board members, four at-large members and five 
members representing new districts would be elected in countywide elections. 
Forty-six people ran for a seat on the new board (Anderson 2006f).  Candidates 
included appointed board members Howard Stone and Judy Mickens-Murray as well as 
the chairman of the old elected board, Kenneth Johnson.  The candidates were reduced to 
18—two candidates for each seat—in the September 12
th
 primary.  Stone and Johnson 
advanced to the November 7 general election.  Even though she lost in the primary, 
Mickens-Murray decided to run in the general election as a write-in candidate.   All three 
lost.  They were no doubt hurt by the fact that they were or had been school board 
members.  But what most hurt them was their failure to obtain the endorsement of the 
county‘s Democratic Party. 
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School board elections in Prince George‘s are nonpartisan.  Usually the most 
influential endorsements came from the PGCEA and the PGCCPTA.  Typically, school 
board candidates have little name recognition.  As a result, union endorsement gives 
candidates a significant advantage in school board races.  By an eleven to one margin, 
voters in a Prince George‘s Business-Education Alliance (PGBEA) survey said that a 
PGCEA endorsement would positively impact their vote (Potomac Incorporated 2003).  
This time however, the power of the union was challenged.  The county‘s Democratic 
Party created a slate of endorsed candidates.
8
   The Party slate was enormously beneficial 
for the endorsed board candidates.    
2006 was a major election year for the state of Maryland.  The governor and all 
state legislators, almost all county elected officials, all Congressional Representatives, 
and one United States Senator were on the ballot.  With so many contested offices, 
unknown school board candidates were apt to get lost in the sea of candidates.  Without 
slate backing, school board candidates would likely have difficulty raising funds.  The 
slate gave candidates access to Party resources.  Former county council member Peter 
Shapiro said, ―Slates are going to be the single largest determining factor in the [school 
board] election. You certainly have to favor the person with the most political 
connections‖ (Leonard 2006d).  David Merkowitz , executive director of the PGBEA 
asked elected leaders to ―put aside narrow political considerations and choose candidates 
for their slates who possess the qualifications and character traits needed to ensure the 
new board meets the hopes of county citizens and acts with integrity and purpose‖ 
(Merkowitz 2006).  One candidate supported by the Party, Donna Hathaway-Beck said 
the endorsement, ―had given us a big push forward, clearly, with the sample ballots‖ 
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(Hernandez and Helderman 2006).  As many of the board candidates were unknown to 
most people, the slates served as a convenient ―cheat sheets‖ for voters.  Beck 
acknowledged the influence of the Party saying, ―This was not a race that was just an 
election; it was a combination of being elected and being anointed‖ (Ibid.).   
The idea that people were ―anointed‖ by Party leaders was problematic for some 
who complained that the Party‘s involvement made what was supposed to be a 
nonpartisan election partisan.  Moreover, some board candidates argued that the 
involvement of state legislators took the decision out of the hands of voters.  Board 
candidate Robin Barnes Shell said that because of the slates, senators ―are deciding who 
will be elected to the Prince George's County Board of Education, not the voters.  In 
essence, you have lost your voice and your vote‖ (Hernandez 2006a).  A business person 
who ran for the board was surprised to discover the influence of state legislators.  ―I had 
no idea about the stuff that would go on behind the scenes.  I had no idea that I needed to 
connect with this delegate, this senator to be on this person‘s ticket.  That that made a 
difference in knowing whether or not I‘d win election versus my qualifications for being 
school board member.‖ 
All but one of the candidates endorsed by the Party won election.  The lone 
exception was in the District 4 election when Linda Thomas narrowly defeated Steven 
Morris.  Thomas had complained about the Party‘s involvement and claimed after she 
won that her victory, "spoke volumes to the fact that the senators don't control 
everything. . . . I think I'm the one person who doesn't have allegiance to anybody but her 
people" (Hernandez 2006d).  In addition to Thomas, the newly elected board members 
included the four at-large members: Donna Hathaway Beck, Verjeana Jacobs, Nathaniel 
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Thomas, and Ron Watson.  The five district members were Rosalind Johnson, District 1, 
Heather Iliff, District 2, Patricia Fletcher, District 3, and Owen Johnson Jr., District 5.     
The return to an elected school board made some people nervous because it 
conjured up memories of the old elected board with its infighting and feuding with the 
superintendent.  ―Everybody and their brother was trying to help make sure that didn‘t 
happen.‖   Concerned about past events, the new board came into office on December 4, 
determined not to have a repeat of the troubles of the last elected board.  Rosalind 
Johnson said, ―We know the failures of the past. We absolutely will not tolerate a 
fractious board‖ (Hernandez 2006c).  Nathaniel Thomas added, ―We made a commitment 
that we don't want to have a lot of unnecessary drama and conflict. I think most of the 
people that got elected; they really just want to serve on the school board and not look at 
the politics of the next elections‖ (Ibid.).   
The Maryland Association of Boards of Education (MABE) held several training 
sessions with the board.  The first was held two weeks after the board‘s first official 
meeting in December.   The board and superintendent Deasy held a two-day MABE led 
retreat that was meant to give board members an opportunity to ―lay the foundation for a 
productive working relationship‖ (Prince George‘s County Board of Education 2006c).  
Highly desirous of a model from which to govern, the board developed an operating 
framework that included the formation of a committee system and the reorganization of 
the board office.  The board even developed its own mission statement: ―The Prince 
George‘s County Board of Education will advance the achievement of its diverse student 
body through community engagement, sound policy governance, accountability, and 
fiscal responsibility‖ (Prince George‘s County Board of Education 2007a).  The board 
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also received a grant from the Broad Foundation in May 2007 that allowed the board to 
participate in the Foundation‘s Reform Governance in Action for Urban School Boards 
program.  The two-year program provides comprehensive training to school board-
superintendent teams in order to improve system governance.
9
  Aware, that it was being 
watched by children, the board made a concerted effort to model behavior that showed 
children how to agree and disagree.   
 
Board-Superintendent Relations 
Superintendent Deasy was a little apprehensive about the change in school board.  
―The natural disruption of a new set of leaders is one of the worries I have,‖ Deasy said. 
―Will the expectations change midstream from the new board‖ (Anderson 2006f).
10
  
Nonetheless, the new elected board and the superintendent strove to present a united front 
publicly.  At the board‘s first meeting, member Iliff spoke on behalf of the entire board 
saying, 
As the newly elected Board of Education of Prince George‘s County, we are very 
committed to the rapid progress of all schools in Prince George‘s County. We 
acknowledge that our Superintendent was hired by the appointed Board with no 
overlapping members with the current Board. As the newly elected Board, we 
would like to publicly show our support for and confidence in Dr. Deasy‘s 
continued leadership in our education system. While we plan to exercise all due 
oversight and expect full accountability, we look forward to working with Dr. 
Deasy in a spirit of partnership for the benefit of all students in Prince George's. 
County (Prince George‘s County Board of Education 2006b)  
 
Like the appointed board, the new elected board gave, according to Deasy, ―lots 
of appropriate rein to run the system under the policies constructed as opposed to 
micromanaging.‖  Because Deasy‘s proposals had allowed PGCPS to avoid corrective 
action, the board to allowed Deasy a significant amount of latitude.  Also, according to a 
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new board member, ―The board had its marching orders when it came in.  You have to 
think about the dynamics of a newly elected board.  All nine people are brand new.  You 
had a superintendent who was there before us, and you pretty much had senators and 
other elected people giving us our marching orders; don‘t piss-off the superintendent.‖ 
Another important reason why the board and superintendent seemed to work well 
together is they agreed on the importance of equity.  Board Chair Jacobs said, ―When we 
took our oath of office in December of 2006, we vowed to provide an equitable education 
for all students of Prince George‘s County – not just a chosen few‖ (Prince George‘s 
County Board of Education 2009h).  Broad Foundation training helped the board to 
develop a core set of beliefs.  At the center was a focus on equity by the board.  A new 
board member pledged, ―We are committed to equity as a board, and we define equity as 
meaning that those with the least get the most without disadvantaging others.‖  For his 
part, Deasy said he confronted the issue of class by, ―from the beginning indicating that 
decisions were going to be made on the limelight of equity and not of equality.  Equality 
is the distribution of resources equally to all.  Equity is the distribution of resources 
unequally; those who have the least get the most.‖   So although Deasy was not their 
choice, it appeared as though the new board and Deasy shared a common vision for 
PGCPS. 
In the elected board‘s first review of him, Deasy‘s performance was rated as 
excellent.  In the July 7, 2007 evaluation, Deasy was given a rating of 4.46 on a 5-point 
scale (Prince George‘s County Board of Education 2007b).  The school board said of 
Deasy, ―He has demonstrated a powerful sincerity and commitment to student 
achievement and equity. He has clearly articulated the school system‘s core beliefs and 
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has effectively communicated his vision both internally and externally‖ (Ibid.).  In a nod 
to Deasy‘s ability to attract significant grant money to the system, the board added, ―Dr. 
Deasy has raised confidence in Prince George‘s County Public Schools, leading to 
increased resources from federal, state and county governments as well as from private 
sources‖ (Ibid.).  Raising confidence in PGCPS was crucial to gaining greater community 
attention and support.  
While generally satisfied with the job Deasy had done, the board did see room for 
improvement.  The board wanted more long-term budgeting.  It also wanted Deasy and 
the entire PGCPS system to place increased attention on "cultural sensitivity to ably serve 
our diverse students and community" (Ibid.).  The board added, ―The Board observed that 
the superintendent can improve his approach to managing change to be more inclusive 
and accepting of feedback to enable changes to be more deep rooted and long-lasting‖ 
(Ibid.).  Some took this critique to be an allusion to the speed with which Deasy had 
implemented changes.  There was some concern within PGCPS and the county that the 
changes Deasy was making were occurring so rapidly that people did not have time to 
digest them.  For his part Deasy took the suggestion in stride saying in an interview, ―It 
also could mean to listen more to people's feedback, as opposed to moving as quickly 
forward as I have been‖ (Hernandez 2007b).  Deasy was also described by some as 
sometimes being less of a collaborator and more of a General Patton (Ibid.).  Deasy 
seemed aware of this potential problem.  He noted, ―I feel like I didn't have time this 
year, given our status in corrective action. That's not a defense as much as an explanation 
of our speed. Now that those initiatives have been laid down, I can afford to modify that 
style‖ (Ibid.).   
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The board‘s evaluation also seemed to hint at some tension between itself and 
Deasy.  The evaluation noted, ―The Board would like to see improvements in the 
superintendent‘s communication with the Board itself and a better understanding of the 
role of board members within the community‖ (Prince George‘s County Board of 
Education 2007b).  The critique of Deasy might have been indicative of a shift on the part 
of the board to be more assertive in presenting ideas and expressing its views.  School 
board chairman, Owen Johnson Jr. was quoted as saying, ―We have to sit around and talk 
about [issues] and find common ground [between Superintendent John E. Deasy and 
board members], and I think we are doing a better job of that‖ (Carter 2007a).  Johnson 
saw the change as part of the normal maturation of the school board.   
The critique of Deasy might also have been a reaction to criticism that the board 
has been too deferential to Deasy.  Walter Searcy, PTA president at Charles Herbert 
Flowers High School and a 2006 at-large school board candidate reportedly said of the 
board‘s relationship with Deasy, ‗‗Stop being so submissive to his agenda. Don‘t be so 
quick to embrace all of Deasy‘s offerings. They need to start really looking at the flip 
side of [Deasy‘s policies]‖ (Ibid.).  In interviews, a couple of respondents echoed those 
sentiments and complained of the board being a rubber stamp for Deasy.  ―The 
superintendent works for the board, not the other way around.‖  Yet others were quite 
comfortable with Deasy‘s leadership.  One particular person pleased with Deasy‘s efforts 
and his relationship with the board was State Superintendent Nancy Grasmick.  
Comparing the current relationship to past board-superintendent relationships, Grasmick 
said, ―We‘ve had this continuing issue [in Prince George‘s County] about the board going 
in one direction and the CEO going in another direction. In this case, they seem to be 
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working in tandem.  People are getting one message now, and that‘s important because 
people want to know there is an agreed-upon direction‖ (Ibid.).  It should be noted that 
both the board and Deasy denied anything other than the normal tensions in any school 
board-superintendent relationship.  All-in-all, the school board seemed pleased with the 
job Deasy had done so far.    
 
The Board Faces a Controversy  
In June 2007, board member Nathaniel Thomas was forced to resign after being 
indicted.  Thomas was accused of having a relationship with a student while he was a 
teacher at Forestville Military Academy in 2005.
11
  The allegations came to light after it 
was learned that Thomas had attended the National School Board Association‘s Annual 
Conference in San Francisco with the board‘s 18 year old student member without the 
consent of the student‘s parents.  To fill Thomas‘s vacant seat, County Executive Jack 
Johnson appointed Amber Waller to serve the remainder of Thomas‘s term.  Waller had 
run for the District 2 seat in 2006 and lost to Heather Iliff in the general election.   
Unlike the Hornsby scandal, this scandal did not appear to reflect badly on the 
board itself in part because the board took immediate steps to remove Thomas from any 
contact with the schools.  The board also began the process of having Thomas removed 
from office once the allegations became known.  Recall, part of the dissatisfaction with 
the appointed board stemmed from its perceived failure to adequately respond to the 
allegations against Hornsby.  With the last board‘s experience in mind, the current board 





Money Issues Again Impact PGCPS 
Superintendent Deasy warned of potential budget cuts for Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 
in his annual State of the System report to the board and community in October 2007 
(Hernandez 2007c).  These potential budget cuts were the result of a looming $1.5 billion 
shortfall in the FY2009 Maryland state budget (Maryland Budget & Tax Policy Institute 
2007).
12
  The deficit was caused by a structural budget problem in which the state spent 
more than it collected in revenues. The two identified primary culprits for the ―structural 
deficit‖ were a 1997 state income tax cut that decreased revenues by over $700 million a 
year, and the Bridge to Excellence education program that mandated increased state 
education funding (Wagner 2007).  The program, which was passed without a long-term 
funding strategy, had been underfunded from the beginning and had cost the state about 
$1.4 billion a year by 2007.  The housing fueled economic boom of 2004-2006 and fund 
transfers had allowed the state to avoid the consequences of the structural deficit (Ibid.).  
However with an economic downturn caused by the collapsing housing market, the state 
was no longer in a position to balance its budget, as mandated by law.  In fact the state 
was only able to balance its FY2008 budget by draining $1 billion from the state‘s ―rainy 
day‖ reserve fund.  At the end of FY2008 only $68 million was left in the fund (Maryland 
Budget & Tax Policy Institute 2007).  As a result, the FY2009 budget could not be 
balanced without significant budget cuts and/or increased taxes.   
The state of Maryland was not alone in its financial difficulties of course.  Local 
jurisdictions throughout the Washington region were confronting the prospect of budget 
deficits because of decreased state funding and declining property tax revenues 
(Helderman 2008).  Montgomery County faced a $401 million shortfall of its FY2009 
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county budget.  Meanwhile Prince George‘s County faced a $100 million budget deficit 
for FY2009.  This deficit was in addition to a $60 million deficit for FY2008.  Because of 
TRIM, the voter imposed property tax cap, and a law requiring voter approval of new 
taxes, the only viable way for the county to balance its budget was through spending cuts 
because voters were unlikely to approve tax increases. 
It was in this environment that Deasy presented his proposed FY2009 in January 
2008.  The $1.67 billion budget represented a $13.5 million increase over FY2008‘s 
budget.  The increase was a far cry from the increase of more than $200 million the 
previous year (Prince George‘s County Public Schools 2008).  The increase was the 
minimum necessary to maintain current programs.  The budget excluded Deasy‘s plan to 
expand the IB program.  Also gone was the signature part of his CCF Plan: the 
establishment of pre-K through 8
th
 grade schools.  Implementing the first phase of the 
plan would have cost of $35 million.  Cuts were made to staffing as 300 vacant positions 
were left unfilled.  Deasy also proposed eliminating 40 parent liaison positions.  
Additionally, there would be no teacher raises.   
After receiving an additional $10 million in funds from the state and finding 
surplus money from the FY 2008 budget, the school board approved a $1.68 billion 
budget in February 2008 (Hernandez and Helderman 2008).  With the increase in funds, 
the parent liaison positions were saved.  $14 million was also put in reserve for union 
contract negotiations. 
The fiscal environment was a far cry from one Deasy enjoyed when he first came 
to PGCPS in 2006.  The FY 2007 operating budget went into effect on July1, 2006—two 
months after Deasy became superintendent.  The FY 2007 budget was the system‘s first 
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fully funded budget since 1987.
13
  The sizable budget allowed Deasy to immediately 
begin implementing his CCF initiatives.  These initiatives were not cheap.  CCF was 
projected to cost approximately $25 million the first year of implementation.  The costs 
would rise as initiatives were implemented and expanded.  For FY 2008, the cost of CCF 
would be $43.2 million (Prince George‘s County Board of Education 2006b).  As 
discussed above, the economic downturn and resultant budget cuts posed a serious threat 
to the system‘s ability to continue Deasy‘s initiatives.   
   
State Legislators Make Their Presence Felt 
The budget problems created by the recession were at the center of controversies 
involving the intervention of state politicians.  The first involved the school board‘s 
decision to lease two buildings for a new headquarters.  The second concerned the school 
board‘s construction priorities in its Capital Improvement Program (CIP) budget. 
 
Move School Headquarters at Your Own Peril 
The school board wanted to move its headquarters to two office buildings in the 
Washington Plaza complex in Upper Marlboro.  The current headquarters is housed in the 
Sasscer Administration Building also in Upper Marlboro.  Sasscer is a converted former 
middle school originally built in 1949.  The building has not been renovated in over 20 
years and has long been in need of updating.
14
  Of Sasscer, board member Pat Fletcher 
said, ―The citizens of Prince George's County deserve better than to come into a rat-
infested, roach-infested services building‖ (Hernandez 2008a).  Because of the small size 
of the building, administrative offices are scattered throughout the county.  The board 
contended the new buildings would lead to more efficiency because it would 
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consolidate15 departments and five locations.  Consolidating offices would also alleviate 
the need for parents to travel to multiple offices on behalf of their children.   
At an April 10, 2008 meeting, the Board of Education voted unanimously to 
amend its FY2008-2013 CIP Budget request to include $36 million in funding for a lease 
on the new headquarters complex.
15
   In May, the county council approved the 
amendment.  On June 26, the board prepared to vote on the headquarters lease.  Board 
members supporting the lease claimed it would eventually save the system over $2 
million a year (Prince George‘s County Board of Education 2008g).  It would take two to 
six years to start seeing the savings however.   
Just before the board was to vote on the lease, Superintendent Deasy asked that 
the proposal be postponed.  The request represented a reversal for Deasy as he had 
originally supported the lease.  In fact, members said it was Deasy‘s idea to move the 
headquarters and he was the one to find the complex.  Members claimed Deasy had 
actively pushed the plan until he had a meeting with County Executive Johnson just hours 
before the board meeting.  Johnson had not endorsed the Council‘s funding approval; his 
spokesman said Johnson did not believe the financial climate was right for a move 
(Helderman and Hernandez 2008b).  Some board members felt blindsided by Deasy‘s 
position switch just before the vote and were angered by it. Despite Deasy‘s objections, 
the board voted 6-4 to enter a ten-year lease for the new headquarters.  Members Patricia 
Fletcher, Heather Iliff, R. Owen Johnson, Rosalind Johnson, Ron L. Watson, and 
Verjeana Jacobs voted for the lease agreement.  Members Donna Hathaway Beck, Linda 
Thomas, Amber Waller, and student member Haywood Perry voted against it.  
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The lease drew immediate criticism from people who complained that spending 
money on a new headquarters at a time when the county was raising taxes to stem a $48 
million budget shortfall was ill advised (Ibid.).
16
  ―You want to spend $11 million of my 
taxpayer dollars so you can keep up with the Joneses?‖  Bob Ross, president of the 
Surrattsville High School PTSA encouraged the board to reconsider its decision.  He said, 
―It wasn't a well thought-out plan … They saw the economy and the way it was going. 
They just ignored it; they really did‖ (King 2008d).  The criticism grew stronger as the 
scope of the county‘s budget crisis grew and PGCPS faced a significant budget cut.  
Opponents of the lease argued that now was not the time to spend money on a nice new 
building when classroom programs were likely to be cut.  ―This was not the time to buy a 
building when it was more important to pay the teachers to be in the classroom.‖   For its 
part, the board felt misunderstood.  Board member Heather Iliff who supported the lease 
nevertheless warned her fellow board members that their decision to sign a lease for the 
new headquarters would be problematic.  She said the decision would turn the board into 
―a political punching bag‖ (Hernandez 2008e).   
State Senators C. Anthony Muse, chairman of the county‘s Senate delegation and 
Douglas J. J. Peters, vice chair asked the board to reconsider their lease vote (Valentine 
2008a).  The lawmakers questioned the board on the wisdom of spending money on a 
new headquarters at a time when the state was facing a serious budget deficit and was 
likely to reduce education and construction funding to counties.  They also argued it 
would be more difficult to stave off more state budget cuts when they could not give an 
adequate defense for spending $36 million on a new lease.  Muse and Peters were also 
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unhappy that construction projects they championed for their districts were not supported 
in the board‘s latest CIP budget.  
In November 2008, County Executive Johnson proposed reducing the PGCPS‘s 
FY2010-2015 CIP request from $137.5 million to $88.5 million.  Johnson justified the 
reduction by saying, ―This administration would like to present a state request that is 
sensitive to the current economic climate. Therefore, we have carefully identified our 
highest priorities so that the state can focus its attention on those projects we consider the 
most critical‖ (Valentine 2008b).  Reducing the request probably made sense because the 
highest amount the county had received from the state since 2005 was the $52 million it 
received for FY2008.  With the State facing a significant budget shortage, it was unlikely 
the county would receive anything close to that amount for FY2010.  Senator Muse said 
he did not know about the cuts until he was contacted by The Gazette, a local weekly 
newspaper.  He complained that, ―all of us have to be kept in the loop, because this 
affects all of us‖ (Ibid.).  Muse along with Peters considered proposing legislation that 
would require the county‘s capital budget be approved by the House and Senate chairmen 
of the county‘s state delegation.  Currently state legislators are not directly involved in 
choosing which projects to fund.   
State funding for school construction operates under Maryland‘s Public School 
Construction Program.  The program requires each school district to submit both an 
annual and five-year capital budget request.  The budget first must be approved by local 
fiscal authorities before submission.  In Prince George‘s, the county council and county 
executive are the fiscal authorities.  After approval, each county‘s budget is submitted to 
the Interagency Committee on State School Construction (IAC).  The IAC evaluates the 
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budget requests and recommends which projects to fund and what amounts to allocate 
each of the 24 local jurisdictions.
17
  The IAC‘s recommendations are then given to the 
State Board of Public Works which makes the ultimate funding decisions though the 
Board usually follows the IAC‘s recommendations.  The Governor and General 
Assembly determine the amount of funds available to the Board during the annual 
legislative session.   
Under the Muse-Peters proposal, the budget would have to be approved by state 
legislators before it is sent to the IAC.  Peters claimed that the proposed legislation would 
ensure that everyone was on the same page and state legislators would know exactly 
which projects to push for funding (Valentine 2008c).  Muse argued that constituents 
hold them responsible when projects get delayed.  He said, "To be totally out of the loop 
on the decision-making process and to still be held accountable doesn't seem to be the fair 
thing to do" (Ibid.).  Critics of the senators claimed their actions were a not so thinly 
veiled attempt to gain control of school construction money.  Muse and Peters were 
unhappy because construction projects they supported had been lowered in priority.  The 
proposal died in the House. 
In December, the school board and the county council met with state elected 
officials to discuss legislative priorities for the upcoming General Assembly session.  The 
meeting quickly turned into a cross-examination of the school board as legislators 
questioned the board‘s spending decisions.  Legislators questioned the wisdom of 
spending money on a new headquarters during the economic downturn.  Also, legislators 
were skeptical of the board‘s cost estimates for the ten-year lease with most guessing they 
were too low.  In addition to the $36 million for the lease, moving would require $8 
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million in one-time relocation costs.  Delegate Barbara Frush summed up the legislators‘ 
opinions about the move; ―It may be a good idea, but not today, not this week, not this 
month, not this year.  It's just very bad timing.  It will be problematic. Everybody's [other 
jurisdictions] going to have their hand out. And they'll have their hand out for better 
reasons than a new building‖ (Hernandez 2008e).  Board members insisted that the move 
would save money.  Board chair Jacobs said, ―What Washington Plaza provides for us is 
a cost savings for us to consolidate needs‖ (Valentine 2008d).   
Legislators again complained that they had been out of the loop on the deal.  ―As 
an elected official, nobody ever explained this to me.  I have not received any 
information about it. You have not communicated that to the people on Main Street, and 
you need to do that,‖ said Senator Nathaniel Exum (Ibid.).  Board members 
acknowledged that they could have done a better job of explaining the rationale for the 
move with the public and elected officials.  A board member later admitted,  
The board failed to interact with the council and the delegation and that‘s why 
there was so much chaos on--‗We don‘t know what the board is doing.  We don‘t 
why they‘re spending $36 million when we‘re going into layoffs on this 
building‘…If the board had worked collaboratively at every step of the way with 
the delegation and the council, then if we were all singing from the same page, 
then that decision would have been different.   
 
Despite the warning from legislators, the school board moved forward and began the 
process of moving into Washington Plaza. 
While the controversy over the headquarters was continuing, legislators became 
concerned about another funding issue in the board‘s CIP request.  Legislators questioned 





School Construction: Who Gets a Slice of the Pie? 
In September 2007 the school board hired Parsons 3D/International (3D/I) to 
conduct a condition assessment on 184 of the system‘s facilities, 168 of which were 
schools.
18
  In a report presented to the board in May 2008, 3D/I determined 25 facilities 
to be in good condition, 150 to be in fair condition, and 9 to be in such poor condition 
that they should be replaced (3D/International 2008).  Of the nine buildings in the worst 
shape, eight were schools: Morningside, Clinton Grove, Avalon, Samuel Chase, 
Middleton Valley, Henry G. Ferguson and Tulip Grove elementary schools.  The other 
was an annex building at Suitland High School.  3D/I estimated the cost to fix all of 
PGCPS‘s buildings would be $2.1 billion.  It would cost $700 million to maintain them at 
their current condition for the next ten years.     
 In its FY2010-FY2015 CIP Budget request sent to the county council in August, 
the school board did not include any of the eight schools as a top funding priority (Prince 
George‘s County Board of Education 2008c).  In fact none of the eight schools ranked in 
the top ten on the board‘s priority project list (Deasy 2008).  Highest on the list was 
Clinton Elementary at fifteen.  Morningside was next at 51.  School board chairman 
Jacobs said the schools listed as high priority had been chosen by previous boards.  
Jacobs said, ―This board was very clear that [school construction] items that were already 
in the pipeline -- that have already been approved -- that we would honor those‖ 
(Hernandez 2008f).  Jacobs also implicated the county executive and county council by 
saying they ultimately approve and submit the final budget request to the state.  She said, 
"Once it leaves us, it's subject to all kinds of changes" (King 2008b).  Although the 
council did make changes to the CIP it did not change the position of the nine schools.  
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County officials also justified the low position of the schools on the list by saying the 
county needed time to work out the details of the omitted construction projects before 
requesting funding for them.  Additionally, PGCPS‘s uneven enrollment complicated the 
matter because the consolidation of schools might eliminate the need for new buildings.  
Council Vice Chairman Thomas E. Dernoga (D) wrote as much in a letter he sent to 
concerned parents. ―Before one can rationally decide where to expend funds, one has to 
determine whether an evening out of enrollment and consolidation of students can result 
in closing certain older schools instead of expending renovation funds‖ (Valentine 
2008e).  
The school board‘s funding request drew the ire of Maryland Senate President 
Thomas V. ―Mike‖ Miller (D-Calvert & Prince George‘s) whose district includes part of 
southern Prince George‘s County.  The district includes Accokeek where Henry G. 
Ferguson Elementary, one of the eight schools in need of replacement, is located.  Miller 
wrote a letter to the IAC asking it to reject the county‘s budget request.  In a December 
11, 2008 letter to the IAC, Miller wrote, ―It is indeed incredible that the county would 
propose having children sitting in schools they know must be torn down while they 
request state funds for new schools not even justified by state enrollment criteria‖ (Ibid.).  
Miller accused the board and the council of catering to the wishes of affluent 
communities.  Two schools in Bowie, one of the wealthiest areas in the county, were 
higher on the priority list than Ferguson and most of the other nine schools.  ―State funds 
are too limited and our economic times are too desperate to subject the great needs and 
safety of our children to political pandering by local officials,‖ Miller wrote (King 
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2008b).  In his letter, Miller also criticized the board‘s spending $36 million to move its 
headquarters.  
As president of the Senate, Miller is very powerful.  He is arguably the most 
powerful person in the General Assembly.  In the words of one respondent, ―If Mike 
doesn‘t want it to happen, it doesn‘t happen.‖  Because of Miller‘s clout, it came as no 
surprise when the IAC wrote a letter to Prince George‘s officials suggesting the county 
revise its CIP request.  The IAC wrote, ―The deficiencies in schools identified in the 
Parsons 3D/I project raise serious concerns about the health and safety of their occupants. 
For this reason, the IAC is inviting Prince George's County to supplement its CIP request 
with additional projects identified in the Parsons 3D/I report‖ (King 2008c).  The 
Committee gave the county until February 1, 2009 to submit a revised request though the 
county was not required to do so.  The IAC made it clear however it was in the best 
interest of the county to submit a revised request.  It wrote, ―While the IAC has 
historically deferred to local jurisdictions in setting funding priorities, the State has an 
obligation to insure that its significant investment in public school construction is 
directed toward those students who have the most significant needs.  In fact, the IAC will 
not recommend funding or planning approval for projects that do not meet the State 
criteria, even if they are prioritized by the local board and government‖ (Hernandez, 
Wiggins and Helderman 2008). 
 Miller had been alerted to the issue by Ferguson‘s parents and PTA.  ―The board 
of education is pretty mad at us.  But we tried to warn them. Now the state is giving them 
another chance to do their job,‖ said Ray Lacy, president of the PTA at Henry Ferguson 
Elementary (King 2008c).  What was good for Accokeek was potentially bad for Bowie.  
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Two of the new schools high on the priority list, Fairwood Elementary and a second 
Bowie High School lay in city.  Bowie Mayor G. Frederick Robinson said, ―If they add a 
bunch of new projects to the list, the effect of Bowie's standing would be put in question 
again.  Losing this would be unacceptable to us. We've worked our way to the top of the 
list, twice, as a matter of fact, only to be kicked off twice‖ (Ibid.).  The city had been 
trying to get a second high school for five years.  Senator Peters who represents Bowie 
had been an advocate for the Bowie schools and indicated he would lobby to have the 
schools kept on the priority list.  He also took issue with Miller saying, ―I think this could 
have been better resolved by putting all the stakeholders in a room, rather than going 
through this letter-writing process,‖ which he claimed had been disruptive to the budget 
process (Ibid.).  As is frequently the case in Prince George‘s where funding is rather 
limited, school construction and boundary changes often pit the interests of one 
neighborhood against the interests of another. 
On January 22, 2009, the school board decided to add Avalon, Henry G. 
Ferguson, Samuel Chase, Clinton Grove, and Tulip Grove elementary schools to its 
FY2010-2015 CIP Budget supplemental request (Prince George‘s County Board of 
Education 2009a).  It did not delete any projects from the list or reprioritize projects on 
the list.  As a result, the additions increased the CIP budget request by $12 million to a 
total of $100 million. The board‘s failure to reprioritize irritated some council members 
who expressed their displeasure in a January 29
th
 meeting to approve the CIP request.  
Councilwoman Camille A. Exum complained about the size of the board‘s request, 
―You're placing us in a bad dilemma.  I want the record to be clear. You know full well 
it's not going to happen‖ (Valentine 2009a).  There was absolutely no chance the State 
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would fund the board‘s budget at a level anywhere close to the requested amount.  Before 
the budget crisis worsened, the State gave the county $41 million for FY2009.  Council 
members also complained that the board‘s failure to prioritize placed on them the 
unpopular task of deciding which schools get built.  Despite the complaints, the council 
approved the request without making changes to it.
19
   In June, the State Board of Public 
Works allotted $28 million to the county for school construction (Interagency Committee 
on School Construction 2009).   
The dispute revived old arguments with the school board complaining of a lack of 
support from state and county officials accusing the board of mismanaging the school 
system.  Worst yet, it hinted at more trouble down the road because everyone would be 
forced to confront a deepening budget crisis. 
 
Round Two in the School Headquarters Fight: Score One for State Legislators 
The conflict over the school board‘s headquarters lease flared up once again in 
2009.  By February the county‘s budget deficit had grown to $132 million.  PGCPS faced 
a $100 million deficit of its own.  As a result the board approved an operating budget for 
FY2010 that eliminated 800 jobs and cost of living raises, cut programs, and eliminated 
144 parent liaisons (Prince George‘s County Board of Education 2009l).  In February, 
The board learned that the cost of the lease did not include an additional $8 million in 
one-time costs (Hernandez 2009b).  PGCEA, citing agitation in the community, wrote it 
could not support the move (Ibid.).  State delegates again wanted the board to reconsider 
its decision but the board refused and maintained its position that the lease would save 
money over the long run.    
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In April, the state Senate, led by county senators, proposed a measure as part of 
the state budget that would provide PGCPS with an additional $36 million for FY2010 
only if the board canceled the headquarters lease.  Senate President Miller said, ―We‘re 
giving them an incentive to get out of that agreement. We need that money to build 
schools, not office buildings‖ (Tallman and King 2009a).  Some board members were 
infuriated by the Senate‘s action.  Board member Rosalind Johnson accused the state of 
usurping the board‘s authority.  She said, ―Home rule in Prince George's County, electing 
their own members of the board, it cuts it.  It says, ‗You can elect somebody, but we'll 
neuter them‘‖ (Helderman and Hernandez 2009).  Of Mike Miller she added, ―He is a 
person. He's not God.‖  Board member Pat Fletcher complained, ―I wouldn't go down 
there and tell them how to do their job. I wouldn‘t‖ (Ibid.). 
The Senate gave the board another incentive by attaching an amendment to a 
House bill that would make board members eligible for the school system‘s health plan 
(Committee of Ways and Means 2009).  At the time, board members were considered 
part-time employees and were not eligible for the system‘s health benefits.  Board 
members, who make $18,000 a year, complained that not including the benefits narrowed 
the pool of people willing to serve on the school board.  They argued the job is actually a 
full-time job that makes it difficult to hold other employment, and private insurance is too 
expensive for most people except retirees and the independently wealthy.   
The Senate then attached an amendment that specifically forbids the use of any 
county or state funds for the Washington Plaza lease and purchase of the new 
headquarters.  If the amended measure passed the House, the lease deal would essentially 
be scuttled because almost all of the system‘s money comes from the county or state and 
297 
 
what little comes from other sources cannot be used for the lease.  Board Chairwoman 
Jacobs criticized the Senate‘s action saying, ―I have reached out to legislators, including 
the president of the Senate. And so to do it this way I think sends the wrong message, and 
just reinforces that they're not here to work with [the school board], they're here to say, 
‗Let me tell you what to do‘‖ (Tallman and King 2009b).  Both Houses unanimously 
approved the measure with the Senate‘s amendment (Committee on Ways and Means 
2009). 
One respondent summed up the sentiment of the state legislators thusly, ―We told 
you not to do it, and you basically said ‗screw you‘ to all of us. So we‘re giving you the 
‗screw you‘ back.‖  Another suggested that had the school board done a better job of 
informing people of their intentions before moving ahead with the lease, the board might 
not have gotten so much push back from legislators and the public.  The board also 
seemed defiant to some observers.  One incredulous resident stated, 
Everyone warned them not to do it, and they did it anyway.  They wasted $11 
million on a building that they should never have entered into contract…Other 
jurisdictions in the metropolitan area, they all want a new headquarters and that 
might have been nice, but this was not the year to do that…They could not deal 
with anybody challenging them on that.   
 
One respondent‘s impression of the board‘s action was not one of defiance so much as it 
was a defense of its position.  ―That board, young and rather inexperienced, [was] 
wedged between a county government that holds a lot of the purse strings and a 
delegation that plays a pretty activist role in setting policy.  I really actually think this 
was a blow for the board‘s rightful place.‖  As it was, to the public it seemed as though 
the school board was more interested in its own comfort than it was interested in the 
achievement of students.   
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On May 18, 2009, the Prince George‘s County Board of Education held an 
emergency meeting to discuss terminating the lease.  During discussion of the settlement, 
board members asked why they were being treated as they were by the state legislature.  
They pointed to Frederick County in comparison.  Frederick County school officials 
planned to spend $16.7 million (over 25 years) to move into a new central office.  State 
officials did not oppose that move even though the system owned its current buildings 
and the system faced a $15 million budget deficit.  Board member Fletcher called the 
state‘s action ―discrimination against the Prince George‘s County Public School System‖ 
(Prince George‘s County Board of Education 2009i).  Board member Watson directed his 
anger at legislators and Miller in particular.  He said,  
This board has also tried to work with our Legislators. We have had no 
opportunity to speak with our Senate President.  He met with the county council 
and the board was not invited but the Montgomery Board of Education was 
invited when a similar meeting was convened.  The board conducted a Legislative 
Meeting but unfortunately the Senate President did not show. (Ibid.)  
 
Watson also added, ―I find it disheartening that there are two sets of rules.‖  Board 
member Rosalind Johnson called the legislature‘s action ―blackmail.‖   
Despite their misgivings, the board voted to enter into a settlement to terminate 
the lease. The vote was 5-2 with Members Beck, Iliff, Thomas, Waller and Watson 
voting for the measure and Fletcher and Rosalind Johnson voting against it.  Jacobs 
abstained; R. Owen Jonson was not present for the vote.  The settlement cost the board 
$4.8 million.  Added to the $6.8 already spent on the building, the total cost paid by the 
board for the terminated lease was $11 million.  Jacobs said of the matter, ―I long for the 
day when we can all sit down and talk about what‘s best for Prince George‘s County 
Public Schools and the children instead of having a conversation in public‖ (Ibid.).  
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Watson said in a meeting with The Gazette‘s editorial board, ―Unfortunately, things turn 
political very quick in Prince George's County, and unfortunately some folks for their 
own personal reasons prefer to frame things differently than what is actually the case" 
(King 2009b).   
The controversy over the headquarters and the school construction request 
illustrated the complicated relationship between the school board and state officials.  
State Senator Peters said the divisions between the board and lawmakers are not helpful.  
He added, ―Everyone in this room campaigned on education.  There's nothing worse than 
when you ask us for ‗X‘, and we come back with ‗X minus 1‘ and then you say, ‗The 
state let us down.‘ We‘re fighting our guts out for you‖ (Valentine 2008d).  Board 
members responded by saying they needed to better communicate with lawmakers.  
Watson said, ―This shows that we all need to sit down together more often‖ (Ibid.).   
The episodes with state legislators also demonstrate the unusually high level of 
involvement state legislators have on county education beyond the standard 
appropriations.  One school official said of state legislators, they were ―consistently and 
persistently involved in education.‖  Respondents gave a couple of different reasons for 
the involvement.  First, several of the county‘s state legislators have or had ties to PGCPS 
or other public education organizations.  For example, State Senator Paul Pinsky is a 
former president of the PGCEA.  Senator Uylsses Currie is also a retired PGCPS 
educator.  Delegates Joanne Benson and James Proctor Jr. are retired PGCPS educators 
as is former delegate Rosetta Parker.  Delegate Carolyn Howard is a current PGCPS 
administrator.  Delegate Doyle Niemann served on the elected school board dissolved in 
2002.  Former senator Gloria Lawlah was an educator with District of Columbia Public 
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Schools.  Also, Senator James Hubbard‘s wife used to be a senior PGCPS administrator.  
These educational ties to public education give legislators a heightened interest in 
PGCPS.  ―Many came up through the education system so it‘s a backyard issue.‖  
 Second, respondents said there has been a history of state legislators being 
involved in education dating back to 1973.  Angered by the school board‘s failure to 
prevent court-ordered busing, legislators converted the Governor appointed school board 
into an elected body (Krause 1974).  Legislators have been actively involved in local 
education issues ever since.  Further the county‘s poor reputation for governance at both 
the school system and county level has allowed people to turn to state legislators to solve 
their problems.   As one respondent put it, ―The County doesn‘t have a much better 
reputation for how it does its business than the school system does.  This has opened up 
the space over time for the delegates to be pretty hands-on if they want to be.‖ 
A third explanation is money.  PGCPS is the largest employer and purchaser in 
the entire county.  ―There‘s a huge economic engine around that as well.‖  Many people 
want to have a hand in the running of that engine.  ―This is the bank.  This is the 
employment agency.  This is the contract agency.  That‘s what it is.  That‘s what it was.‖  
Also, in the late 1990s early 2000s the county and PGCPS were inundated with school 
construction money as a result of the desegregation settlement.  Politicians eager to show 
their constituents some results wanted to direct school funds.  Some critics of the 
legislators‘ involvement complained that they are beholden to developers.  Some board 
members complained that legislators did not object to the new headquarters building 
because of its cost.  They objected to it because the developers they were connected to 
objected to the deal with a rival developer.  Whether this is true is not known, but the fact 
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that county politicians going back to the machine days of the 1940s and 1950s have had a 
close relationship with county developers lends weight to the allegations. 
Whatever the reason, legislators continue to play an active role in county 
education decisions.   
 
The System Endures More Change at the Top 
Controversy again came to PGCPS on September 11, 2008 when the Washington 
Post reported on questions about the PhD Superintendent Deasy received from the 
University of Louisville in 2004 (Hernandez 2008b).  During an investigation of a 
University Dean, a question arose about whether Deasy had been given any special 
exception to University rules because of the small number of credits he earned in 
residency at the University.
20
  Deasy earned nine credits at Louisville and 77 credits at 
other institutions.  Typically, students earn 18 credits in residence at the University 
although there is no requirement to do so.  The University announced the convening of a 
panel to investigate the propriety of Deasy‘s degree.  Deasy was quoted as saying of the 
matter, ―If the university made errors in the awarding of the degree, I do hope they 
rescind it.  My responsibility is to do everything I was advised and told to do.  If I was 
advised wrong and given wrong information, the university needs to take responsibility 
for that.  I certainly would not want anything unearned‖ (Ibid.).  The school board‘s 
reaction to the news was to publicly support Deasy and wait for the outcome of the 
investigation.   
Despite backing from the board, on September 30, Deasy announced he was 
leaving PGCPS in February to become the deputy director of education for the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation.  Deasy‘s announcement was a shock to many in the county, 
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and came less than three years into his tenure.  When he first came to Prince George‘s, 
Deasy had said that it would take four years to see solid results and eight years to get the 
system where it ought to be.  Some wondered whether the tempest over his PhD was the 
reason for Deasy‘s departure.
21
  Many thought there had to be more to his leaving.   
A number of respondents speculated Deasy was leaving to avoid the hassles of 
dealing with a shrinking budget.  ―He looked around and saw that the economy was 
starting to go in the tank and the fiscal authorities weren‘t going to be able to provide the 
kind of money that was going to be necessary for him to build the kind of reputation that 
he wanted to build.  He got a good offer from Gates and he jumped at it.‖  Some 
respondents commented on the fact that Deasy was a graduate of the Broad Foundation‘s 
Superintendent Academy.
22
  According to respondents, Broad graduates have a reputation 
for being ―spend happy‖.  ―Broad superintendents are very expensive.  They‘re great if 
you‘re in the good times.  What do we do when we don‘t have [the money]?‖  Deasy had 
already seen two signature programs in his CCF plan delayed due to a lack of funding, 
and further cutbacks loomed.  ―I thought that Deasy was going to be short-term because I 
knew we were going to be in lean years.  I never ever thought he would stay when he had 
to cut his precious programs.‖  
More cynical respondents believe that it was never Deasy‘s intention to stay with 
the system for four years.  They believe he came to the system to burnish his resume so 
that he could land a job like the one at the Gates Foundation.  ―Dr. Deasy clearly wanted 
a national spotlight.  Dr. Deasy clearly needed Prince George‘s County to get that.  Dr. 
Deasy got what Dr. Deasy wanted.‖  They argued Deasy needed the ―street cred‖ of 
having run a large, urban school system before he could work for a foundation that has 
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improving urban education as a priority.   For its part, the Foundation said it had recruited 
Deasy and had been watching him for some time.   
It is possible that Deasy left because of increased tensions between himself and 
the board.  After Deasy‘s resignation was announced the Washington Post‘s education 
columnist, Jay Mathews, wrote of tensions between Deasy and the school board 
(Mathews 2008).  Some respondents did find it interesting that the school board did not 
ask Deasy to stay, and that suggested to them there may have been some friction.  A high 
ranking administrator said the board‘s relationship with Deasy was forever changed after 
the headquarters vote in June.  From interviews, it does appear there was some lingering 
irritation over the handling of the headquarters lease.  Board members however 
downplayed the tensions characterizing them as the type of things that normally occur in 
any board-superintendent relationship.   
That said some members did talk about the superintendent‘s relationship with 
other elected officials, and were irritated that officials would go to Deasy with their 
concerns and not to the board.  ―What was occurring because he thought he could do 
whatever he wanted to do and was very engaged in the political landscape of the county, 
county folks were going to him to get things done.  Then he would come and tell the 
board when it should work the other way around.  Elected officials should communicate 
with other elected officials.‖  This last statement is particularly telling.  Board members 
were very concerned about the position of the school board relative to other elected 
politicians.  They wanted to establish their political authority while county officials, 
especially state legislators, wanted to maintain their influence over the system.  Deasy 
was caught in the middle.    
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When the school board announced Deasy‘s departure, it also designated his 
deputy superintendent, William Hite Jr., to become interim superintendent once Deasy 
left.  Hite would serve until a permanent superintendent was selected.  The quick 
announcement was seen as a reflection of the board‘s desire to maintain stability while it 
decided its next course of action.   
Hite came to PGCPS shortly after Deasy in 2006. In a newspaper article, Hite, an 
African American, was described as Deasy‘s double because they shared a focus on 
equity (Hernandez 2008c).  Hite said, "Regardless of a child's Zip code, a child's home, 
that child should have the same opportunities as we provide to children from a more 
privileged background.  It is not an effective system if you have 20 AP courses in one 
school and zero in another" (Ibid.).  Like Deasy, Hite attended the Broad Foundation‘s 
Superintendent Academy.  That said, Hite is described as being more deliberative than 
Deasy.  Further, Hite had never been a superintendent before.  Hite made it clear that 
PGCPS would continue in the same direction under his tenure.  ―Everything that has 
touched all of our schools comes through my office right now.  Because I'm not Dr. 
Deasy, it does not mean our beliefs and our vision about what should incur changes. The 
work will not change. The focus does not change‖ (Ibid.). 
Near the end of October, the school board announced that Deasy would be leaving 
PGCPS at the end of November instead of in February Board Chair Jacobs said, ―The 
Board of Education is pleased that Dr. Hite will ensure the day-to-day operations of our 
schools and the work of improving student achievement continues at a rapid pace and 
without interruption, while we lay out a plan to find a new superintendent‖ (Prince 
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George‘s County Board of Education 2008f).  Hite officially became interim 
superintendent on December 1
st
.   
In January 2009, the school board held a series of forums seeking community 
input on the qualifications needed for the next superintendent.  The board said of 
feedback from the forums,  
A consistent message from the public and employees was that continuity is 
needed in the superintendent‘s office, and that the progress that has been made 
should continue. Consistently, community members and employees said they 
wanted a superintendent who is committed to Prince George‘s County and to 
serving our community for an extended period, not someone who will leave after 
a short time. (Prince George‘s County Board of Education 2009b)   
 
Undoubtedly many in the county had grown weary of the turnover PGCPS had 
experienced over the last decade.   
From the comments of education leaders, it was evident Hite was a frontrunner to 
become superintendent permanently.  ―He already has been through the vetting process. 
He already has a working relationship with the board, which is key, and he understands 
the core principles.  We have a guy that's already in place that knows where we need to 
streamline, and the board can keep working seamlessly. It will be a seamless transition,‖ 
declared Bob Ross, president of the Surrattsville High School PTSA (King 2008a).   
Superintendent Hite was the first person the board interviewed.  Board member 
Rosalind Johnson supported Hite, ―I think he's in an excellent position because he was 
here, and he worked through the entire tenure of Dr. Deasy.  I think that gives him great 
advantage. He knows how to work with this board. He knows what all our foibles are‖ 
(Hernandez 2009c).  Other members of the board echoed that sentiment.  Member 
Watson said of Hite, ‗If he meets the criteria and has a long-range plan, as far as I'm 
concerned, the search process is over‖ (Ibid.).  Indeed it was over.   
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On April 3, 2009 the board announced it had made Hite the permanent 
superintendent.  In its announcement, the board said that, ―the feedback from the 
community during public meetings on the topic underscored the immediate need for 
strong, stable, knowledgeable, and trustworthy leadership‖ (Prince George‘s County 
Board of Education 2009f).  Chair Jacobs added, ―During his tenure as Interim 
Superintendent of Schools, Dr. Hite has demonstrated that he meets or exceeds all the 
requirements the community has said they want in a superintendent. He knows our 
schools, understands our challenges, and has demonstrated his commitment to the 
children, parents, and community members of Prince George‘s County‖ (Ibid.).   
The school board believed that because he was Deasy‘s deputy, Hite would keep 
the system moving in the same direction.  Hite said one of the things that attracted him to 
PGCPS was Deasy‘s vision.  He also added that he planned to stay longer than previous 
superintendents.  He said, ―I quite frankly think that has been part of the problem in 
Prince George's County, because you've had this revolving door of leadership‖ 
(Hernandez and Wiggins 2009).  Mindful of the tensions between the board and Deasy, 
Hite said it was important for the school board and him to speak with one voice.  ―If in 
fact I‘m trying to lobby individuals on behalf of a school system that doesn‘t include the 
board‘s position or they‘re trying to lobby individuals on behalf of the board that doesn‘t 
include the administration, then we‘re into those friction points that I think have doomed 
other administrations and boards in the past,‖ Hite said (King 2009b). 
Hite‘s appointment seemed to be positively received by the public.  Doris Reed, 
executive director of the Prince George's Association of School Administrators and 
Supervisory Personnel and a frequent critic of past superintendents, said Hite ―has 
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experience with the system now, and, quite frankly, we‘ve been bringing people from the 
outside and that hasn't worked.  I don't feel real confident that if we went out and looked 
for someone else they could do a better job than him‖ (Hernandez and Birnhaum 2009).  
A county official affirmed, ―Everybody I‘ve met has a very positive impression of Dr. 
Hite.   I think the school board has confidence in him as well.‖   Another offered, ―I don‘t 
know if he will be as visionary but I don‘t know if he needs to be.  Maybe it‘s just about 
staying the course just like the school board.  Maybe we can be quiet and effective for the 
next five or ten years.‖   
There was a small amount of concern about the short amount of time Hite had 
spent with PGCPS.  One state official said choosing Hite was appropriate but cautioned 
that Hite ―has been with PGCPS only for a short time, just like Deasy before him.  Hite 
brings stability, but it is stability compared to what.‖  June White Dillard, president of the 
county chapter of the NAACP was concerned about Hite‘s lack of experience as a full 
superintendent.  ―We really would have preferred someone that came with more 
experience, she said.  ―But I certainly think we need to have somebody that will commit 
themselves to being here long term.  He does have familiarity with the system, even 
though he hasn't been here very long‖ (Ibid.).  Overall, people seemed cautiously 
optimistic about Hite.  If there was any serious apprehension, it was not so much about 
Hite and his abilities as it was about the economic environment in which Hite would have 
to lead.   
 
Can You Spare a Dime? There is a Hole in the Budget 
 Hite became head of PGCPS in an environment vastly different from the one 
Deasy entered.  While Deasy had the luxury of working with a fully funded budget, Hite 
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has had to contend with substantial budget cuts.  Of the difference, board member Beck 
said, ―Deasy came to us with an enormous fund balance.  Hite does not have that 
advantage.  Hite will oversee what could be, most likely will be, dramatic cuts in the 
operating budget.  You can‘t underestimate the anticipated effect of tenures marked by 
different fiscal starting points‖ (Hernandez 2008d).  Hite had to confront the difference 
head on as his first task as superintendent was completing his FY 2010 operating budget 
proposal.  With the America‘s economy in full slide in 2008, there was little doubt that 
PGCPS‘s budget would be cut.   The state of Maryland was facing a $2 billion budget 
shortfall in its FY2010 (Maryland Department of Budget and Management 2009).  Prince 
George‘s County was facing a $113 million shortfall of its own (Prince George‘s County 
Office of Management and Budget 2009).   
It was under these conditions that Hite offered a proposed FY2010 operating 
budget of $1.68 billion (Hite 2008).  This budget represented a $40.4 million reduction 
from the approved FY2009 budget that resulted in 884 positions being either cut or left 
unfilled.  The reduction did not include eliminating any teachers, but it did include the 
elimination of 140 of 229 parent liaisons.  The plan also called for increasing class size.   
In January, PGCPS learned that it was losing $35.2 million more in state aid (De 
Vise and Helderman 2009).  This loss forced the board to make additional cuts to the 
FY2010 budget (Hite 2009b).  Hite recommended furloughing employees up to twelve 
days and cutting an additional 119 jobs.  On February 27, the school board approved a 
$1.64 billion budget.  Thanks to an April infusion of $41 million in federal stimulus 
funds, PGCPS was able to avoid furloughs and class size increase.  It looked as though 
the system was finally catching a break. 
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PGCPS‘s good fortune would be short lived.  When school officials reconciled 
the FY2010 budget in June, they discovered a $5.6 million budget shortage (Hite 2009a).  
The shortfall was caused by higher than expected employment costs.  The board also had 
to face another unexpected cost.  In order to help solve its own budget deficit, the county 
government decided to charge PGCPS $11.8 million for services the county had 
previously provided without charge.  As a result, the schools‘ budget was $17.4 million 
short.   Reluctantly, the board decided to take money from the system‘s $21 million rainy 
day fund.  On June 25, the school board in a 6 to 2 vote approved a $1.7 billion operating 
budget (Prince George‘s County Board of Education 2009k).
23
  Additional federal 
stimulus money and additional budget adjustments allowed the board to increase the 
budget beyond the initial $1.64 billion approved in February. 
The split in the vote highlights the difficulty of the board‘s decision.  Typically, 
budgets are approved unanimously once all of the details have been sorted out.  To 
balance the budget, the board had to reduce expenditures by $120.2 million.  The 
reductions required significant cuts in personnel and programs.  The reductions also 
represented a serious threat to the system‘s ability to continue the progress it had been 
making.  Board member Fletcher who voted against the budget protested, ―I think our 
legislators and those who fund us are doing a great disservice to our children simply 
because we have to cut vital staff that have [helped us] accomplish what we have done‖ 
(Ibid.).  Some would argue a particular disservice was the county‘s plan not to provide 







Maintenance of Effort 
Since 1985, Maryland has required county governments to ―appropriate per pupil 
operating budget funds to the local school system in an amount not less than the per pupil 
amount provided in the prior year [adjusted for enrollment]‖ (Office of Policy Analysis 
2009).  This requirement amounts to a ―maintenance of effort‖ (MOE) on the part of local 
governments.
24
  The MOE is designed to guarantee local jurisdictions continue to fund 
education at a consistent level and not use state funds to offset reductions in local 
funding.  Jurisdictions failing to meet their MOE requirement must have increases in state 
educational funding withheld.  In 1996, the MOE statute was amended to allow the State 
Board of Education to grant county requests for a temporary or partial waiver from the 
MOE requirement.  A waiver may be granted if the State Board determines that a 
―county‘s fiscal condition significantly impedes the county‘s ability to fund the 
maintenance of effort requirement‖ (Ibid.).  Since the waiver option was added it had not 
been request--until 2009.   
In the spring of 2009, eight counties requested a waiver from the MOE 
requirement for FY 2010.
25
  All but three counties withdrew their requests before the 
required hearing.  The three remaining counties were Wicomico, Montgomery, and 
Prince George‘s counties.  All three counties asked for a partial MOE waiver.  Wicomico 
asked for a 3.94% reduction of $2 million, and Montgomery asked for a 5.2% reduction 
of $79.5 million.  Prince George‘s asked for a 4.39% reduction of $23.6 million. 
County Executive Johnson included the waiver in the county‘s FY 2010 operating 
budget he submitted to the county council in March.  In his budget cover letter, Johnson 
wrote, ―In these extraordinary times, we simply do not have the resources to provide 
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funding at the same per pupil amount as in the past‖ (Prince George‘s County Office of 
Management and Budget 2009).  Johnson added that although the schools‘ budget was 
being reduced by 3.5%, it was less than the average 6.6% reduction for all other county 
agencies.  On March 30, the county council voted 7 to 1 to seek the waiver.  Ingrid 
Turner, the dissenting vote said, ―Education is the foundation for the future of our 
children.  We have made tremendous strides in the county regarding education, and we 
need to continue with them‖ (Wiggins and Hernandez 2009).   
School officials were not pleased with the request.  They understood the financial 
strain the county was under.  However, they were concerned about the impact further cuts 
would have on the school system.  Board member Thomas said, ―My fear is that we still 
may not have enough to take care of the basic needs of our schools.  I want to make sure 
everything is taken care of‖ (King 2009a).  Added board member Rosalind A. Johnson, ―I 
realize you have to be creative; you have to spend effectively.  But there is a level you 
cannot go below without actually seeing major changes in the delivery of public 
education‖ (Ibid.).  Council members supporting the waiver request had hoped the school 
board would be a little more understanding given the county‘s fiscal difficulties.  One 
offered, ―This year we asked them for a little leniency and that didn‘t go over too well.‖  
Another council member added, ―The perspective of a lot of people on the county side 
was, ‗well we‘ve been funding you at higher than the MOE level for many years; above 
and beyond what is required.  The one year when we can‘t make that, when it‘s a tough 
year…It‘s disingenuous to be critical of not meeting MOE‘.‖    
  In arguing for the waiver, Johnson said at the April 27 State Board hearing, ―In a 
crisis like this, all of us must share the burden‖ (Ibid.).  He added that the county had 
312 
 
been funding the schools‘ budget above the required MOE amount.  Table 5-1 shows the 
MOE required amounts and the actual appropriated MOE amounts from FY2003 to 
FY2010.  Every year since FY 2003, the county has funded PGCPS above the required 
amount.  Moreover, in FY2009, the county‘s funding was 2.68% more than what was 
required. 
 
   Table 5-1  Prince George's County Maintenance of Effort 2003-2010 


















































     Sources: Maryland State Department of Education. The Fact Book 2002-2003  
   through 2008-2009; Prince George‘s County Public Schools FY2010  
   Approved Operating Budget. 
 
 
In response, Superintendent Hite maintained granting the waiver would have ―a 
devastating impact on the children of our county‖ (King 2009c).  Both Hite and Johnson 
suggested the other use their respective contingency reserve funds to cover the $23.6 
million.   PGCPS had a reserve fund of $21 million while the county had a reserve fund 
of $129 million and an operating reserve of $51.6 million (Maryland State Board of 
Education 2009).  Johnson had resisted using surplus funds for fear that doing so would 
lower the county‘s bond rating.  After the hearing board Chair Jacobs responded, ―We 
understand everyone's got to endure some of the pain. We really do believe we've 
endured our share‖ (King 2009c).   
313 
 
On May 15, the State Board of Education denied Prince George‘s waiver request.  
It denied the requests from Montgomery and Wicomico counties as well.  In denying the 
waiver request the State Board wrote, ―In our view, the fiscal issues the county presented 
do not include the significant, extraordinary circumstances we deem necessary to waive 
MOE‖ (Maryland State Board of Education 2009).  The State Board noted that the county 
had not been hurt by the recession more than other counties who managed to meet MOE.   
Hite hailed the decision saying, ―We‘re excited that the state board considered the 
work that we‘re attempting to do with our young people and factored the number of 
schools in school improvement and considered that in the request‖ (Valentine and King 
2009).  Johnson responded to the waiver denial by proposing to charge PGCPS $23.6 
million for services previously provided for free.  Those services included paying for 
crossing guards and staffing law enforcement officers at county schools, and servicing 
the system‘s school construction debt.  ―In light of the county's fiscal situation, it has 
been necessary to evaluate many of the services we provide at no cost to support the 
board,‖ said Jonathan Seeman, director of the county's Department of Management and 
Budget (Ibid.).  The county council objected to charging PGCPS for the full bill.  In a 
compromise with the county executive, the council voted to charge half of the bill; $11.8 
million.   
Looking towards the future, board member Rosalind Jonson said of the county‘s 
fiscal problems, 
The public needs to be acutely tuned in to, in real language ―dooms day‖.  Here 
we are.  What does this mean for your child?   What does it mean for your school?  
What does it mean for the future of Prince George‘s County Public Schools?  I 
think to throw out millions and millions of dollars clearly the public understands 
that, but most importantly they want to know what will I not see in 2009-2010 
that I saw this year, and we need to engage the public to work and fight with us to 
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come with some ideas and strategies how we can all get through these difficult 
times. We need to show the public where every dollar is going, and its 
importance.  It is amazing what many out there believe is not essential; public 
education is not just the classroom, it is what supports that classroom and the 
work, and I believe it is very important that we talk about every element of our 
school district and the money it takes to support it, and what you will not have if 
you do not have any money. (Prince George‘s County Board of Education 2009j)   
 
With continued budget shortages it will be increasingly difficult to maintain current 
initiatives and continue the steady progress the system has made over the last few years.  
Northwestern High School teacher Jeanne Mignon spoke for many when she complained, 
―There's a point where the public cannot continue to criticize education and keep 
expecting us to cut back and back and back‖.  She added, the county cannot ―keep 
eliminating resources that make the job doable and expect to get the same results‖ (King 
2009d). 
One strategy that was used in 2009 to offset some of the budget shortfall was the 
consolidation of schools. 
    
School Consolidations   
In June 2008, the school administration presented the school board with its 
strategy to increase access to Enrichment & Specialty Programs (ESP).  These programs 
were formerly the magnet programs that were so popular they had waiting lists in the 
hundreds.  As discussed in Part 1, the most effective magnet programs were retained after 
the system was declared unitary.  Because they continue to be so popular with parents, 
school board members wanted to expand access to those children (primarily African 
American) denied access while the programs were magnets.  The administration‘s 
strategy was to create five new ESP schools of choice.  It would do this by ―repurposing 
neighborhood schools that are under-enrolled and converting them into county-wide 
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schools of choice‖ (Deasy, Hite and Mitchell 2008).  In order to expand the programs, 
boundaries would have to be changed.   
In September, the board directed the school administration to conduct a 
comprehensive review of the attendance areas and school boundaries of all PGCPS 
schools.  Some schools were under-enrolled because the district‘s student population was 
declining.  As Table 5-2 shows, enrollment in PGCPS has been declining since 2003.  
 
  Table 5-2: PGCPS Student Enrollment 
School Year Enrollment 
 2003 137,285 
 2004 136,095 
 2005 133,325 
 2006 131,014 
 2007 129,752 
 2008 127,977 
 2009 127,039 
              Source: Maryland State Department of Education. The Fact Book  
2002-2003 thru 2008-2009 
 
The enrollment had dropped from 137,285 in 2003 to 129,977 in 2008.  As a 
result some schools operated under capacity.  Despite the overall decline in enrollment 
however, some schools were overcrowded because of population growth in some 
segments of the county, the return to neighborhood schools, and previous boundary 
decisions.  Redrawing boundaries would address both problems.  The school board 
directed the administration to specifically evaluate ―those boundaries to determine 
whether they are as equitable as practicable and as financially efficient as they can be, in 
light of (a) historical inequities; (b) overutilization of each facility; and (c) 
underutilization of each facility‖ (Prince George‘s County Board of Education 2008d).  
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The administration also was directed to develop a plan for redrawing boundaries and 
report back to the board by January 2009.   
The thought of redrawing boundaries made some board members anxious.  They 
were well aware of the potentially explosive nature of altering boundaries.  At the board‘s 
September 16 meeting, member Iliff was concerned about whether the timing was right 
for changing boundaries given the disruptive nature of the process (Ibid.).  Member 
Jacobs understood the concerns but argued that the problem would only get worse if the 
board continued to avoid it.  Member Fletcher declared, ―Every last one of us sitting here 
knows what we need to do. We can drag this out until election [sic] because our term will 
run out and it probably won‘t get completed then. I feel in my heart this needs to be done 
if we are really sincere when we talk about equity in our school system‖ (Ibid.).   
The administration presented the review‘s findings to the board on January 8, 
2009.  As expected, the review showed that the system‘s enrollment was not equally 
distributed throughout the district.  While some schools were under capacity, others were 
over capacity.  The review found that much of the system‘s underutilization occurred in 
central and lower county communities lying inside the Beltway, while much of the 
overcrowding occurred outside the Beltway.
26
   The system had 18 schools above 120% 
of capacity while 60 schools were at less than 80% capacity (Hite and Mitchell 2009).  
For example, Gaywood Elementary School in Seabrook (outside the Beltway) was at 
153.01% of capacity while Benjamin D. Foulois Elementary School in Suitland (inside 
Beltway) was at 38.71% of capacity (Office of Pupil Accounting and Boundaries n.d.).  If 
left unchecked, the system would have 37 schools above 120% capacity and 67 schools at 
less than 80% capacity.  The review also revealed that the system had 9,800 empty seats.   
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The administration recommended creating more efficient school boundaries.  The 
use of new boundaries coupled with the building of new schools where necessary would 
allow the system to alleviate much of the overcrowding.  At the same time new 
boundaries would allow the administration to establish new ESPs in central and southern 
county schools that were currently being underutilized.  The administration 
recommended that the multi-year process be done in four stages.  The first phase would 
address the boundaries of central and southern county elementary and middle schools 
inside the Beltway.  The second phase would address boundaries in elementary and 
middle schools lying west and southwest of the Beltway.  The third phase would focus on 
elementary and middle schools in the northeast quadrant of the county.  Finally, the 
fourth phase would change high school boundaries throughout the county.
27
    
The boundary discussion was taking place right in the middle of the Great 
Recession.  As discussed above, the state of Maryland and Prince George‘s County were 
facing significant budget deficits.  PGCPS was facing a $70 million deficit of its own.  
This economic reality was the backdrop in which the administration presented its 
recommended boundary changes to the school board on January 22, 2009.  Included was 
the recommendation that 12 schools be consolidated.
28
  The administration defined 
consolidation as the incorporation of an existing school‘s attendance area into a nearby 
school or schools with available capacity, emptying the targeted school facility (Prince 
George‘s County Public Schools 2009).  Eleven of the targeted schools sat inside the 
Beltway, and eight of them lay south of Maryland Route 214 (Central Avenue), which 
bisects the county from north to south.   In addition to the 12 consolidated schools, six 
schools would be converted into five schools with kindergarten to 8
th





  One school, Benjamin D. Foulois Elementary would become a southern 
county replication of the Creative & Performing Arts K-8 ESP at Thomas G. Pullen 
School which sits in the northern section of the county.  The entire school would be 
dedicated to the choice program.  In total, 70 schools would either change boundaries, 
change programs, or close.  The changes would save the system almost $12 million in FY 
2010 and more than $161 million over ten years (Ibid.).   
Board members were prepared to get resistance from parents.  Board Chair Jacobs 
said of the proposal, ―Yeah, it's controversial. Let's face it; some people do not want their 
kids to go to school in certain areas‖ (Valentine 2008d).  Board member Watson said to a 
group of parents, ―These are tough, tough conversations.  We realize that citizens move 
into these neighborhoods to go to a particular school‖ (Hernandez and Wiggins 2009).  
To reduce some of the resistance and get public input on the proposal, the board 
scheduled a series of hearings.  In all, the board held eight hearings on the consolidation 
and boundary changes with hundreds of people attending.  Not surprisingly, many of the 
people attending hearings were opposed to the plans; none more so than the people at 
Glenarden Woods Elementary School.    
As part of the proposed boundary changes, Glenarden Woods‘ Talented-and-
Gifted (TAG) program would be moved to Robert R. Gray Elementary School.  TAG 
parents objected to the change.  A meeting at the school included an hour-and-a-half of 
speeches; most of them made by TAG parents opposed to the plan.  Parent Robert 
Braddock, in tears said, ―You are destroying the ties that bind this community. You're 
playing with people's lives. You‘re playing with our kids‘ lives‖ (Hernandez 2009a).  The 
passionate opposition of Glenarden Woods parents led to the school board removing 
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Judge Sylvania W. Woods Elementary School from the consolidation list and replacing it 
with Dodge Park Elementary School.  The TAG program would remain at Glenarden.  
Board member Rosalind Johnson said community engagement was responsible for the 
change (King and McGill 2009). 
Opposition was similarly strong at Oakcrest Elementary School.  People there 
were surprised that a school that was near capacity and had met adequate yearly progress 
(AYP) on state assessments would be scheduled for closure.  Dozens of Oakcrest parents 
attending a hearing on the proposal questioned the administration‘s reasoning.  Among 
the critics was state Delegate Joanne C. Benson who told the parents, ―We are in 
Annapolis fighting like you wouldn't believe to bring money back to Prince George's 
County.  I cannot tell you all in words how disappointed I am that someone would have 
the audacity to close Oakcrest Elementary. I speak for the senator -- Senator [Nathaniel] 
Exum -- I speak for the [County] Council, I speak for the House of Delegates -- we are 
not going to take this sitting down‖  (Hernandez 2009a).  To no one‘s surprise, Oakcrest 
was removed from the consolidation list.   
Strong opposition to the boundary proposal also came from parents at Thomas 
Pullen performing arts school.  Pullen‘s students, who gain admission either through 
lottery or audition, come from across the county.  According to a school official there 
were on average 2000 applications for about 70 spots.  Thus, the need for a second 
performing arts school was great.  The boundary proposal called for Pullen to be 
duplicated at Benjamin D. Foulois.  As a result, some of the students at Pullen would be 
transferred to Foulois because it would be closer to their homes.  Kindergarten through 
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 graders would remain at Pullen.
30
  There would be no 
grandfathering in the implementation.  Pullen parents objected to the move arguing that it 
would tear families and the school community apart.  The parents also felt blindsided by 
the move and prepared to fight it.  Natalie Hope, Pullen's PTA vice president, said ―I 
believe that if the parents keep going and pushing to the Board [of Education] then we 
can get it changed‖ (McGill 2009).   A PGCPS administrator conceded that Pullen 
parents had been blindsided by the lack of grandfathering.   
At a March 7
th
 board meeting, member Iliff responded to the opposition of Pullen 
parents by saying,  
We as a school system are an enormous school system where we are asking 
everyone to change and I would just ask the families at Thomas Pullen who have 
been frustrated and worried by this process to try and think about how we all need 
to pull together for change in our school system and sometimes change involves, 
if you‘ve been fortunate that you turnaround and lend a hand to bring someone up 
to be more fortunate with you and I think that the fortunate parents of Pullen will 
be equally fortunate at Foulois. (Prince George‘s County Board of Education 
2009d)  
 
The efforts of Pullen parents ultimately proved unsuccessful; the transfer plan remained 
in the final proposal. 
After two months of debate, the school board voted unanimously on March 26 to 
consolidate eight schools, create five K-8 schools, and make Foulois an arts ESP 
school.
31
  Board vice Chair Watson said of the changes, ―The reason for the 
consolidations was never about cost.  It was about capacity, it was about access and it 
was about programs‖ (Hernandez 2009d).  It is true that the review of boundaries began 
as part of an effort to increase access to specialty programs.  However, with the 
deepening of the recession, the cost savings resulting from the changes became just as 
important as the academic benefits.   
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On April 21, 2009, the school board approved final Phase I boundary changes for 
67 elementary and middle schools.   The vote was not unanimous.  Member Thomas 
whose district was most affected by the changes voted against it arguing that the plan was 
not an ―A‖ plan (Prince George‘s County Board of Education 2009g).  She wanted more 
time to improve it.  She was also concerned about the south county being treated fairly.  
In the past, residents in the southern section of the county have felt put upon.  This 
feeling has been particularly strong among south county residents living inside the 
Beltway.  Before being forced to integrate in the 1970s, school officials tended to neglect 
the majority black schools in this area.  And during desegregation, this same area bore the 
brunt of court-ordered busing because it had the highest concentration of African 
Americans.  Once children were bused out of the neighborhood, schools were closed and 
no new school built for decades.   
Since the end of busing some residents living in the southern portion of the county 
have often felt neglected by county officials who have catered to the fast growing, 
affluent neighborhoods in the central and northern sections of the county.  Some saw the 
boundary change proposal as another example of the south county being short changed; 
they wondered why the boundaries were being changed for them and not others in the 
county (Garner 2009).  Suspicion of the school system‘s motives caused some parents to 
question the explanation that their area was chosen first because it was the area with the 
greatest number of empty seats.   
Board members addressed the past inequities before they voted.  Board member 
Rosalind Johnson said,  
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Because the Prince George‘s County Public School System was not diligent about 
keeping a watchful eye on our school boundaries in past 30 years, December 4, 
2006, [the day the board took office] we inherited many long delayed issues.  
Because of that work and the work that this Superintendent and staff have done, 
many inequities of the past are finally being wiped away. (Prince George‘s 
County Board of Education 2009g)   
Member Fletcher added,  
There is heartburn everywhere but there are decisions that we have to make 
because of the injustice that was done years ago when they drew the boundaries 
so we have to fix that. No other Board, included the appointed Board prior to us 
would deal with it simply because of the heartburn.  We have to do it fairly and 
with compassion and I think we did both. It didn‘t satisfy everybody and we will 
never satisfy everyone but we did it as fairly as we could. (Ibid.) 
She stated further: 
Many talk about change but are unwilling to undertake the critical retooling 
required, and that includes many elected officials. We need to have the will power 
to do what is required to move the schools system forward. It is not about politics 
and votes. It is about doing what is required and what has been neglected for so 
long because people are more concerned about things being quiet than to create 
the positive change that causes a little noise. Although it is uncomfortable at 
times, it must be done. (Ibid.) 
 
Finally board chair Jacobs pleaded with the public:  ―These decisions are hard. I 
know you are upset and angry but inequity is staring you in the face. I am asking you to 
turn your head to inequity and open your eyes to the opportunity that is available to this 
county‖ (Ibid.).   
The statements by board members were an acknowledgment of the fractious 
nature of boundary changes.  Every interviewed board member cited boundary changes 
as one of the most contentious or conflicted topics they had to face.  Unfortunately, these 
boundary changes were the beginning of the process for the board not the end.  The board 
still had to review the boundaries of the system‘s remaining elementary and middle 
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schools.  This process was set to begin fall 2009.  The high school review was pushed 
back to late 2010.   
The magnitude of the current boundary review is similar to the massive rezoning 
that took place at the end of court-ordered desegregation when children were returned to 
neighborhood schools.  However, these boundary changes were even more dramatic in 
that it they were occurring within a much shorter timeframe.  The earlier rezoning took 
place over a series of years as new schools were built.  This time, the boundaries for 
nearly all 208 of PGCPS‘s schools were to be changed within three years.   
It is debatable whether undergoing such massive change quickly or slowly is 
better.  Is it less disruptive to have massive change occur in one brief outburst or have a 
gradual, more constant change occur over a longer period?  Both methods are disruptive; 
there is no getting around that.  Indeed the level of disruption is a large part of the reason 
why boundary changes are almost universally controversial (Birnbaum 2008; Creighton 
and Hamlin1995).  
The Phase I changes highlighted the differences in parental power.  Some parents 
were able to influence the process while others were not.  It is clear that public reaction 
played a role in determining the final list of schools closed.  Judge Sylvania Woods and 
Oakcrest elementary were taken off the consolidation list after hundreds of parents 
protested.  Clearly vocal and active parents can have significant influence over 
educational issues.  Unfortunately, the pattern in Prince George‘s has been for the most 
advantaged parents to use that power to maintain that advantage.  A county leader 
charged, ―We have allowed in this county the ability for some to carve out their own 
―private‖ public schools and these private public schools have been carved out at the 
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detriment of others.‖  Power has been used to pursue the narrow interests of individual 
families as opposed to the wider interests of the county as a whole.     
With additional boundary changes to come, more conflict between parents is 
likely and probably inevitable.  The continuation of issues that tend to drive people apart 
will certainly do little to encourage the creation of a performance regime that needs its 
members to focus on the well-being of all children and work on behalf of the system as a 
whole.  Other developments involving parental and community involvement have 
dimmed the prospects for the formation of a performance regime. 
 
Community Involvement Prospects Dim 
An organization that might have been helpful in directing parents to look at the 
bigger picture both when it came to the boundary changes and education in general would 
have been the PGCCPTA.  Unfortunately, the county organization was not active in 
2008.  The organization had its charter revoked by the Maryland PTA (MDPTA) in 2007 
for the second time.   
The charter was first revoked in October 2000 after a MDPTA investigation found 
financial irregularities and bylaws violations in officer elections.
32
  While the county 
organization was dissolved, the school level PTAs were allowed to continue.  However 
they did so without a unifying advocacy voice or the resources the county organization 
provided.  The county PTA was reinstated in July 2001with Judy Mickens-Murray as 
president.  After Mickens-Murray left the organization in 2002 to serve on the appointed 
school board some of the old problems returned.   
In August 2005 the election of new county leaders was held up briefly by the 
MDPTA because the organization had not submitted audits for the previous two years 
325 
 
(Leonard 2005d).  That issue was resolved and new president Darren Brown took office.  
However about two months later, the PTA was holding dueling meeting because some 
members contemplated ousting Brown.  Ultimately, no action was taken against Brown at 
the time.   
After continuing financial and bylaws irregularities, MD PTA voted to strip 
PGCCPTA of its charter once again in June 2007 (Hernandez 2007a).
33
  The revocation 
came after several attempts to resolve the issue.  It also came just two weeks after new 
leadership had been elected.
34
  This time PGCCPTA was required to wait two years 
before it would be eligible to have its charter reinstated.  Once again school PTAs were 
left without the organizational structure and advocacy voice of a county-level 
organization.  The disbandment ―broke-down a lot of the communication that was going 
on among parents,‖ according to a PTA leader.    
It is worth noting that the response to the revocation was markedly different from 
the response to the 2000 charter revocation.  Back then, the revocation was seen by 
residents as one of many black-eyes for the county‘s educational system coming as it did 
in the wake of the school board‘s credit card scandal.
35
  Neither parents nor county elites 
mobilized in support of the organization.  Such was not the case in 2007.  As evidence 
that the education arena had changed, several county political leaders came to the defense 
of PGCCPTA.  All of the county‘s 23 state House delegates sent a letter to MDPTA 
asking that the charter be reinstated as soon as possible (Carter 2007b).  The county 
Chamber of Commerce sent a letter as well.  Even State Superintendent Nancy Grasmick 
suggested the county and state PTAs work out their differences so that the charter could 
be reinstated before the two year point (Carter 2007c).  It would appear that people‘s 
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attitudes towards county education had improved since 2000.  Nevertheless, MDPTA was 
unmoved by the show of support and the revocation stood.  [PGCCPTA‘s charter was 
recently reinstated and the organization is in the process of rebuilding.] 
In addition to losing the advocacy of PGCCPTA, parents also lost the advocacy 
provided by the Parent and Community Advisory Board (PCAB) whose 2006 demise was 
planned.  A creation of the Maryland General Assembly bill (HB949) dissolving the old 
elected board, the PCAB ended when the appointed board‘s tenure ended.  Whether the 
loss of the PCAB was significant is subject to debate in part because some questioned the 
board‘s effectiveness (A. Lee 2004i).  That said, a parent activist described the impact of 
the loss of the PCAB and PGCCPTA,  
There‘s no advisory council, PCAB, any longer.  There‘s no County Council of 
PTA any longer.  Now parents aren‘t getting information.  They know what‘s 
going on at the individual school, but they don‘t know what‘s going on in the 
whole school system; where they can collectively come up with ideas on how to 
improve the whole school system or make their suggestions.‖  Not having the 
Council has been a ―Big disadvantage.  The Council would meet and discuss 
issues.  The superintendent was a part of that. You had a seat at the table. There is 
no voice [without the Council]. 
 
In 2006, Superintendent Deasy created a new advisory council, establishing the 
Superintendent‘s Community Advisory Council in 2006.  Originally, Deasy was to meet 
with the Council six times a year, but he only met with the group four times.  In 2008, the 
council was discontinued.  Again parents were left without a unifying voice. 
Other school system efforts designed to expand the scope of community 
involvement have also floundered since their initial development.  Most notably, 
initiatives established by members of the appointed school board withered once the 
board‘s term ended.  The annual Race for Education, a 5K walk/run to raise funds for 
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classroom library books had its third and last run in 2006.  The Excellence in Education 
Foundation stopped operating in 2007 after failing to raise enough funds to sustain it.  
These initiatives suffered from being too connected to the individual members who 
championed them.  Once the board members left office, their initiatives lost momentum 
and were unable to be sustained.   
As mentioned above, the number of Parent Liaisons who served as Deasy‘s 
primary parent involvement initiative was significantly reduced by budget cuts.  The 
number of liaisons dropped from 229 in school year 2008 to 87 in school year 2010.  
Since PGCPS‘s Office of Family and Community Outreach found itself repeatedly 
understaffed.  As a result, the office has not engaged in much outreach.  The office‘s 
efforts have been focused on providing schools with technical assistance and advice on 
improving parent and community involvement at the school level rather than at the 
district level.  A comprehensive community involvement strategy is not in place.   
One positive school system effort to increase parental involvement was the First 
Annual Dual Language Summit held on October 6, 2007.  The summit was jointly 
sponsored by the Prince George‘s County Board of Education and the Mid-Atlantic 
Hispanic Chamber of Commerce.  The idea for the summit grew out of a May lunch 
between Jorge Ribas of the Chamber and board member Rosalind Johnson who taught 
Spanish and French in the county for 35 years.  The summit's goal was to stress the 
importance of parental involvement and to open doors to a growing Latino population 
that has at times felt reluctant to engage with school officials and even worse 
unwelcomed.  More than 1,000 parents signed up to participate in the summit. Jorge 
Ribas exhorted, ―It‘s a beautiful day in Prince George's County, where we're telling the 
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world education is important‖ (Parker 2007)!  Although the summit was quite successful, 
there was a sour note afterward.  The school system had to pay $75,574 to cover the costs 
of the summit when verbal pledges of financial support fell through.   
Other community involvement efforts begun outside of PGCPS have failed to 
reach the level of impact their initial burst of optimism suggested.   For example, County 
Executive Jack Johnson‘s initial education initiative, the Communities United for 
Education Summit in September 2003 held the promise of a more active and engaged 
county leadership.  The summit drew over 600 participants.  However, the momentum 
gained from the summit was lost when the initiative was absorbed into Johnson‘s Livable 
Communities Initiative.  Education appears to have taken a backseat though despite the 
occasional one day events sponsored or supported by county government.  Some of the 
failure of the county government to play a more assertive role in education may stem 
from how the county executive see‘s his role in education.   
In a 2006 interview with the Washington Post, Johnson was asked about the 
county executive‘s role in education.  He answered, ―My main role, or elected role, is to 
do whatever I can to make certain we have adequate resources.  That really starts at 
creating the kind of community that generates sufficient revenue‖ (County Executive 
Candidates Take on Education 2006).  Indeed much of Johnson‘s attention has been 
focused on economic development issues.  That the county executive focuses on 
development is certainly not unusual.  Development is a priority for many if not most 
urban mayors and county leaders.  That said, time and time again, county residents and 
political leaders have stressed the importance of a high performing school system on the 
ability of the county to attract new development.  A county business executive argue, ―If 
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you don‘t‘ have a good education system, you are not going to attract any business 
because no one is going to move their company here if their employees can‘t put their 
kids in good schools.  Or if they don‘t have a pool of educated people that they can pull 
from to be employees.‖ 
A persistent criticism of Johnson‘s tenure as county executive has been its hand-
off posture towards governing.  As a respondent said, ―I don‘t think this county executive 
has played a large role, and I think it is just his hands-off approach.‖  Beyond providing 
increased funding for PGCPS, Johnson has not been actively involved in educational 
reform issues.  An education activist speaking about the county executive‘s efforts, 
―Johnson was supportive, but I don‘t know if I have seen demonstrative leadership except 
in his providing funding.‖  Johnson has certainly not used his office as a bully pulpit for 
education. 
Perhaps the most disappointing development on the community involvement front 
has been the wilting of PGBEA.  This promising coalition of business advocates for 
education found itself a victim of the Great Recession.  Many of the businesses in the 
coalition no longer had the wherewithal to continue paying dues.  As businesses struggled 
for their own survival, they paid less attention to educational issues.  A Chamber member 
offered, ―Of about 900 chamber members 800 are small businesses.  The small 
businesses don‘t have time to come to the school.  They have to make payroll.‖  A 
member of PGBEA said that the county‘s business organizations have returned their 
focus back to finance and development issues.  As a result the PGBEA went dormant in 
2007.  The Alliance‘s leaders hope that once the economy recovers, the organization can 
be revived.  
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The low level of parent and community involvement was bemoaned by almost 
every interview respondent.  ―Parental involvement is, I don‘t know what the word is 
because weak is not strong enough a word.‖  Ask for an explanation for the low level of 
involvement, a number of respondents sympathetic to parents pointed to the fact that 
parents‘ work inhibits involvement.  Both parents are working, or a single parent is 
working more than one job.  All may work long hours and have long commutes 
diminishing time available for involvement.  The middle class status of many African 
Americans in the county is tenuous.  Studies have shown that for many African 
Americans both parents must work in order to maintain that middle class status.  A 
resident described the position of many middle class blacks in the county, ―We‘re 
supposed to be the most affluent minority majority county in the country.  That means 
people have to work.  Even though people are at home at 7:30, their brain needs rest.  
Those big houses in Bowie and Mitchellville and all these places; somebody‘s got to 
afford those. And sometimes the PTA meeting gets pushed to the back burner.‖ 
Though the county has a large number of black, middle class, two parent 
households, it also has a sizeable number working class and a significant number of 
single female headed households.  Single parents have less time for parent involvement 
activities.  ―Prince George‘s county is extremely high in the number of single mom 
households.  To ask that mom to do what two parent households do regularly is a tall 
task.  Parent involvement gets pushed way down the priority list,‖ said a parent activist.  
A few respondents did offer that the level of involvement varies from school to school.  
At schools with specialty programs, involvement tends to be greater than average.  
Involvement is higher in more affluent sections of the county.   
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Some respondents put the blame for poor involvement squarely on the school 
system.  They argue the school system has not made it easy for parents to be involved.  
―Parents don‘t feel welcome in the schools.  Yes they say there is an open door policy; 
but, how are they treated when they show up to ask questions?  How are they treated 
when they try to get involved in the instruction of the student?‖  A principal offered, 
―Sometimes schools just don‘t want parent involvement.  Sometimes certain principals 
are bad with parents.  Often times we‘re not doing the right things at schools and we 
don‘t want sunshine.  We say we want parents involved but we do so many things to 
thwart that effort.‖  Some respondents argued that principals are too busy to focus on 
parent involvement.  Another principal rejected this and claimed the argument that 
principals are too busy is a very weak argument, ―because how are you so busy with a 
component that is so critical for you achieving success.  No matter what we do…we‘re 
not going to maximize the success of our students and tap into their true potential; we 
cannot sustain student achievement without parent involvement.‖ 
Other respondents put the blame on parents.  They take parents to task for the lack 
of involvement even when efforts are made to make involvement convenient for them.  A 
NAACP member related an example of the difficulty the organization had getting parents 
to attend a meetings arranged for parents.  When the state was considering requiring 
students to take High School Assessments (HSAs) 
36
several years ago, the NAACP got 
actively involved in informing the community about what would be required of students 
and how they would be impacted.  The NAACP setup 2 meetings, one each in the 
northern and southern halves of the county, for 7
th
 grade parents to discuss what was at 
stake. People do not attend.  ―If we had 5 or 6 parents show up in either place they were 
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lucky.‖  Two years ago the NAACP held more meetings on the HSAs for parents.
37
  This 
time they said ―if parents won‘t come to a meeting, we will go to the parents.‖  They got 
in touch with a couple of apartment complexes and used community rooms for meetings 
with parents.  They got school system personnel to attend, and ―we talked to ourselves.‖  
They sat around asking each other, ―What do we need to do to get the parents to be 
concerned about what is happening with their kids?‖   
The low level of parent involvement is mirrored by the low level of community 
involvement.  Business involvement is not much better than parent involvement.  
Respondents cite pockets of increased levels of involvement at individual schools.  In fact 
the majority of business efforts are targeted towards individual schools with which 
particular businesses may have an ongoing relationship. A respondent spoke of repeated 
efforts by Delegate Gerron Levi to create a concept that would link businesses, churches 
and schools to work together on after-school activities.  ―It didn‘t fly.  Nobody would 
support it.‖  Asked why the respondent pointed to funding issues as the reason given for 
the failure. ―People want ownership of their funding.  People want credit for their 
individual activities.  So when you have that kind of politics going on, it makes it difficult 
for people to collaborate.‖ 
The less than ideal levels of parent and community involvement illustrate the 
difficulty in developing a new performance regime in Prince George‘s.  The county does 
not have a good track record in sustaining initiatives.  Further efforts to mobilize parents 
would likely be hindered by complacency among parents.  As mentioned before the 
PCAB was criticized for the poor attendance record of some of its members.  The school 
system has had difficulty in expanding PTA membership.   
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What might be hurting efforts the most is the general level of satisfaction parents 
seem to have with the system.  PGCPS conducted a School Climate Survey (Keane and 
Sunmonu 2007) to gauge satisfaction with the schools.  The results were to be used to 
develop a comprehensive improvement plan for PGCPS and individual improvement 
plans for each school in the system.  The survey was intended to discover the extent to 
which schools‘ major stakeholders: students, parents, and teachers ―believe their schools 
exhibit characteristics associated with school effectiveness‖ (Ibid., 1). 
38
  Participants 
were asked a series of questions related to eleven characteristics of effective schools.  
These included, Effective Instructional Leadership, Positive School Climate, High 
Expectations, and Parent/Community Involvement.
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A large majority of parent and teacher respondents were satisfied with their 
school‘s climate (Ibid., viii).  Overwhelmingly, parents (83%) and teachers (84%) held 
positive perceptions of their schools.  Although they were less positive than adults, 71.5% 
of student respondents felt good about their schools.  Interestingly, 77% of parents and 71% 
of teachers had a positive perception of parent involvement in their schools (Ibid., 42).  
Both parents (87.9%) and teachers (92.7%) thought parents were encouraged to support 
the instructional activities of their school (Ibid., 42-43)  There were some notable 
differences in the perceptions of parents and teachers however.  While 83.4% of parents 
believed parents actively participated in school activities, only 56% of teachers felt the 
same.  76.6% of parents believed they had a voice in school policies (Ibid., 42-43), but 
only 47.6% of teachers believed parents were active participants.  Parents thought they 
were more actively involved than teachers thought parents were.  The survey‘s authors 
suggested the differences in perception may be indicative of parents‘ belief that ―they are 
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doing as much as they can‖ while teachers believe ―the level of parent and community 
involvement is not as high as they would like it‖ (Ibid., 46).  
In regard to efforts to form a new regime, the climate survey suggests that parents 
content with their children‘s‘ schools may not see the need for significant reform thus 
making them less likely to join a movement.  Even more, these parents might actually 
feel uneasy about a reform movement that is likely to disrupt the status-quo.   
 
2010:  Here We Go Again 
As if all of the transformations PGCPS has endured were not enough, more 
change came to PGCPS in 2010.  The entire school board was up for reelection 2010.  
The new board would have a new configuration because, in 2008, the General Assembly 
changed the way school board members are to be elected (Prince George‘s County 
Delegation 2008).   
In 2006 the school board consisted of four at-large members and five members 
representing districts.
40
  All nine were voted on by the entire county.   In 2010, the board 
returned to its pre-2002 structure; nine single member districts.
41
  Only district residents 
will vote on candidates not the entire county.   In order to avoid a massive turnover every 
four years and maintain some institutional memory, the four new members who receive 
the most votes will serve four-year terms.  The other five members will serve two-year 
terms after which they will run for reelection in 2012.  The winners in that election will 
then serve four-year terms.  Thus, under this new plan half of the board will be elected 
every two years.   
Supporters of the new plan argue that the district elections will make board 
members more accountable to their constituents.  David L. Cahn, co-chairman of Citizens 
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for an Elected Board exclaimed, "Obviously, we're delighted that we've finally gotten 
back to where we should have been all along.  The return to nine single-member districts 
means that the school board will be directly accountable.  Each member will be directly 
accountable to the voters in his or her community‖ (Helderman and Hernandez 2008a).  
Opponents of the new plan fear it will lead to a return of the parochialism partly 
responsible for the dissolution of the school board in 2002.  One opponent said, 
The previous elected board was nine members from nine districts.  In my opinion 
that structure was part of the dysfunction because you would have people who 
represented 1/9
th
 of the county and they didn‘t seem to take responsibility for the 
entire county; for the overall education of everybody, all the children of the 
county.  They were just focused on their own districts, and then they would form 
alliances and gang up on each other.  You created a real parochialism.  I think it 
damaged the education opportunities for kids across the whole county. 
 
The change to nine single member districts meant that some current board 
members would not return because some members live in the same district.
42
  Indeed 
only five of the nine board members chose to run for reelection.  They were Donna 
Hathaway Beck, Pat Fletcher, Verjeana Jacobs, Rosalind Johnson, and Amber Waller.  
Members Heather Iliff, R. Owen Johnson, and Ronald Watson decided not to run.  
Member Linda Thomas decided to run for another elected office.
43
   Beck, Jacobs, 
Johnson, and Waller won their reelection bids.  Fletcher was defeated.  The new board 
took office in December 2010 with five new members.
44
   
In addition to the leadership changes experienced by PGCPS, the county itself 
endured massive leadership change as term-limits swept out a number of elected officials.  
The terms of County Executive Johnson and five council members ended in 2010.  Thus, 
once again newcomers comprise the majority of Prince George‘s top leadership.  For 
advocates of a performance regime, the 2010 elections provided them with reason for 
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hope despite the turnover.  Rushern Baker, who had run for county executive in 2002 and 
2006, ran again in 2010.  Baker was probably the county‘s leading proponent of 
education reform.  Once again he ran on a platform that put education at the forefront of 
his agenda.  Baker who ran on the platform of ―going from good to great‖ put improving 
county education in the center of that plan.  At the center of his reform plan was a call to 
improve the quality of instruction in PGCPS classrooms.   
As the saying goes, the third time was a charm for Baker; he won the election 
easily.  He had the backing of most of the County‘s state delegation.  He also had the 
support of the first African American former county executive, Wayne Curry.   One 
negative note was PGCEA‘s decision to endorse Baker‘s leading opponent.  The 
endorsement vote was 8 to 1 against Baker.  Such a decisive rejection may not bode well 
for Baker.  The union would not say why it voted as it did.  The vote might indicate a 
concern about Baker‘s attention on instruction.  If this is the case, Baker may experience 
some union pushback on his reform efforts.  Only time will tell.  What is known is that as 
has happened several times since the old elected school board was dissolved in 2002, 




To this point, this project has focused on the political changes that have occurred 
with respect to education in Prince George‘s County.  Since 2002, PGCPS has had to 
navigate around several detours created by repeated leadership changes, and as a result 
reform efforts that seemed promising have floundered.   
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A three stage regime change process was laid out in Chapter 1.  The first stage is 
disruption of the current regime.  The second is coalition building and mobilization of 
support for a new regime.  The third is the creation and institutionalization of the new 
regime.  The 2002 dissolution of the school board destabilized the old regime.  Moreover, 
the repeated leadership changes have prevented the old school cartel from reasserting 
itself.  However, those same changes have apparently made it difficult to reach the 
second stage of the regime change process; coalition building.  As a result reform efforts 
appear to be stuck in neutral; neither moving forward or backward.     
So what does this mean for the student of PGCPS?  At the end of the day, reform 
is, or should be, about student achievement.  Are PGCPS students achieving?  How does 
the current state of affairs contrast with the state of PGCPS when the appointed school 
board took over in 2002?  What has happened to the Black-White achievement gap?  The 







   Unattributed quotations are from interviews conducted by the author.  
Respondents were given anonymity in exchange for their participation. 
 
2
   Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) is designed to measure the continuous 
improvement each year toward the NCLB goal of 100% proficiency in 2014.  To make 
AYP, schools and school systems must meet the annual measurable objective in reading 
and mathematics for students in the aggregate and for each student subgroup, in 
graduation rate for high school or attendance in elementary and middle school for 
students in the aggregate, and meet the testing participation requirement of 95%. 
Definition from Maryland State Department of Education‘s ―Maryland Report Card 
website: 
http://www.mdreportcard.org/supporting/definitions.aspx?WDATA=def&inc=ayp 
(accessed January 12, 2011). 
 
3
   The components are Enhanced Accountability System, Advanced Placement 
(AP)/ Strategic Plan, International Baccalaureate (IB) Strategic Plan, Pupil Personnel 
Workers Plan, Parent and Community Engagement Plan, High School Assessment (HSA) 
Strategic Plan, Intensive Support and Intervention Schools (ISIS)/ Isis Work Plan, and 
Library Media Centers Improvement Initiative. 
4
   The Advanced Placement program offers thirty-three college level courses in 
high school.  At the end of the year exams are given in the AP courses.  College credit is 
often given to students who score highly on the exams.   
 
5
   The International Baccalaureate is a two year high school program.  It uses an 
interdisciplinary approach to learning.  Completion of the program leads to an 
internationally recognized diploma.  IB is widely recognized for its academic rigor. 
  
6
   Baltimore city‘s school system is the only other system to be designated for 
corrective action.  Other systems have been given the less-serious ―school system 
improvement‖ status.  Those systems are Charles, St. Mary's, Allegany, Cecil, 
Dorchester, Kent and Somerset counties.  Their designations were lifted in 2006. 
 
7
   The Maryland General Assembly holds a 90 day session at the beginning of 
each year.  In 2005, the session ran from January 12 to April 8. 
 
8
   Some individual senators also headed slates that included board candidates. 
 
9
   The program is the result of a partnership between the Broad Foundation and 
the Center for Reform of School Systems.  According to the CRSS website, ―The 
objective is a high-performance board/superintendent team working together in harmony 
and using efficient and effective processes to develop, approve and implement major 
reform policies that will directly improve student achievement and narrow the 






   CEO Deasy‘s title reverted back to superintendent with the return of the 
elected school board. 
 
11
   Due to a technicality, the case against Thomas was dismissed in 2007. 
 
12
   Fiscal year 2009 ran from July 1, 2008 to June 30, 2009. 
 
13
   The board‘s FY1987 requested budget of $389.3 million was approved at 
$389 million by the county council essentially making it a fully funded budget. 
 
14
   Sasscer was originally a middle school.  It had additions added in 1962, 1967, 




   The lease included an option to buy the two buildings at its conclusion.  
 
16
   On May 21, a day before it approved the FY2009 budget, the county council 
voted to raise the county‘s income and recordation taxes.   
 
17
   The 24 jurisdictions include Maryland‘s 23 counties and the city of Baltimore. 
 
18
   The assessment was limited to buildings older than 15 years. 
 
19
   The vote was 8-1. 
 
20
   The person under investigation was Deasy‘s dissertation chair, Dr. Robert 
Felner. As dean of the College of Education and Human Development, Felner was being 
investigated for the alleged misappropriation of a $694,000 grant from the U.S. 
Department of Education.  There was no suggestion that Deasy was involved in any 
criminal wrongdoing.  Felner was later indicted and charged with defrauding the federal 
government of more than $2 million.  He pled guilty in January 2010. 
 
21
   After a seven month investigation, the University of Louisville found that 
Deasy had done nothing wrong and allowed him to keep his degree 
.   
22
   The Academy is a ten month training program designed to train leaders from a 
variety of disciplines to become the next generation of urban school system leaders.  The 
program uses a business management approach to leadership. 
 
23
   Members Beck, Iliff, R. Owen Johnson, Waller, Watson, and Jacobs voted for 
approval.  Members Fletcher and Rosalind Johnson voted against approval.  Member 
Thomas abstained.  Student member Edward Burroughs was not present. 
 
24
   The MOE provides a minimum level of funding.  There is nothing that 




next years‘ MOE will be calculated from the actual funding amount regardless of its level 
above the MOE requirement. 
 
25
   The eight counties were Anne Arundel, Calvert, Charles, Frederick, 
Montgomery, Prince George‘s, Wicomico, and Worchseter. 
 
26
   The exception is the area nicknamed the ―Latin Corridor‖ for the large influx 




   In March 2009, Phase II and III were combined. 
28
   The twelve schools were G. Gardner Shugart Middle School and the following 
elementary schools; Concord, District Heights, John Carroll, John E. Howard, Judge 




   Henry Ferguson Elementary School and Eugene Burroughs Middle School 
would be combined into one K-8 school. The schools recommended for conversion were 




   At the time PGCPS had a ―tag-a-long‖ policy that allowed siblings of ESP 




   The eight schools were G. Gardner Shugart Middle School, and Berkshire, 
John Carroll, John E. Howard, Matthew Henson, Middleton Valley, Morningside and 
Owens Road elementary schools.   
  
32
   For more details on PGCCPTA events prior to 2006 see Chapter 5, Part 1. 
 
33
   It was assumed that the continuing irregularities were the cause of the 
revocation.  MDPTA has never publicly stated the reason for its action. Even PGCCPTA 
leaders complained that they were not told exactly why the charter was being revoked. 
  
34
   Bob Ross, Surrasttville High School PTA president and long-time education 
advocate had been elected PGCCPTA president on May 22.  His goal was to repair the 
county‘s relationship with MDPTA. 
 
35
   See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the scandal. 
 
36
   The HSAs are the high school level tests given as part of Maryland‘s 
assessment program.  The HSAs differ from the assessments given to students in lower 






   The class of 2009 was the first class required to pass the HSAs in order to 
graduate.  At the time many PGCPS students had not passed the exams.  The NAACP 
wanted to meet with parents to discuss options. 
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 grade students, as 
well as sample of parents, teachers and paraprofessional educators. 
 
39
   The other characteristics are Clear and Focused Mission, Safe and Orderly 
Environment, Frequent Assessment/Monitoring of Student Achievement, Emphasis on 
Basic Skills, Maximum Opportunities for Learning, Strong Professional Development, 
and Teacher Involvement in Decision Making. 
 
40
   There is also a student member who does not have full voting privileges. 
 
41
   The board will also have a student member. 
  
42
   Members Beck and Owen Johnson live in the same district as do members 
Watson and Jacobs. 
 
43
   Thomas ran for Clerk of the Court and lost to former school board member 
and outgoing county council member, Marilyn Bland. 
 
44
   Joining incumbent members on the board are, Henry Armwood, , Carolyn 
Boston (who defeated Fletcher), Edward Burroughs (a former student board member), 




Back to School: The Impact of Political Change on  
Academic Achievement 
 
 "If we can't close the achievement gap here, then where can it be closed?" 
--Heather Iliff, Prince George‘s County Board of Education 
 
 
The last chapter showed how much change Prince George‘s County Public 
Schools (PGCPS) has undergone since 2002.  The system has endured almost constant 
turnover at the top of its leadership structure.  PGCPS has had two school board changes 
and five superintendents.  Such leadership changes can have a detrimental effect on a 
school system (Hess 1999).  New superintendents feeling pressure to produce quick 
results often feel compelled to change or dismantle existing programs or structures 
without much regard for the effectiveness of those programs or structures.  New school 
boards may clash with old superintendents not of their choosing as both try to establish 
the terms of their relationship.  Caught in the middle are students, teachers, and system 
staff who must adjust to each change.  One would surmise that such frequent changes 
would not be good for the school system and attempts to develop a comprehensive 
strategy to improve achievement. 
A central office administrator described the feelings of school staff after all of the 
change PGCPS has endured thusly, ―The boat is sailing along and then it is asked to 
make a 90 degree turn and then two years later it is asked to make a 180 degree turn the 





  Another administrator expressed the frustration of having to change course 
abruptly when a new superintendent arrives:  
Every new superintendent that comes in has their new bright idea.  Every one of 
them has the best way that things are going to work.  So here you are learning this 
curriculum, following this program and all of a sudden two years later here comes 
somebody else with a whole new idea saying, ‗No no, throw all of that out.  
We‘re going to come over here and do this because this is now the best thing‘.  
 
School personnel are not the only ones negatively affected by leadership changes.  
Parents are also affected.  A PGCPS administrator spoke of the impact of all of the 
changes have affected parents‘ relationship with the system.  ―It keeps parents 
wondering, ‗where are we going this time‘. They get confused with how to navigate the 
system all over again.‖  The disbanding of the Prince George‘s County Council of Parent 
Teacher Associations further hampered the ability of parents to effectively interface with 
the school system. 
Yet despite all of the change and churn, Prince George‘s County Public Schools 
(PGCPS) keeps moving.  The question is in what direction is PGCPS moving?  Is it 
moving forward or is it moving backwards?  What has happened to the achievement gap 
between African American and white students?   This project hypothesizes that the 
failure to form a new regime should result in a failure to substantially decrease the 
achievement gap.   
This study now turns to an examination of academic performance of PGCPS 
students.  It will begin with a brief look at the state of PGCPS achievement before 2002.  
It then will turn to an analysis of PGCPS‘s academic performance since 2002.  In the 
analysis comparisons between PGCPS and other Maryland school districts will be made.  
The analysis ends with an examination of the black-white test score gap in PGCPS. 
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This project acknowledges upfront that test scores do not provide a complete 
measure of the full impact of education on the lives of children.  On the academic level, 
there are other measures of learning such as grades or teacher evaluations.  Beyond 
academics, schools provide a myriad of potential benefits to children that go well beyond 
performance on standardized tests.  Children learn proper socialization through schools.  
Children learn their country‘s values through education.  This said one cannot overlook 
the fact that the primary goal of education is to impart knowledge to children.  Even 
more, public education in America was established to equalize the playing field for all 
children.  To that end, what children learn does matter, and we need to measure what 
children have learned.  Test scores are the most objective and manageable way of doing 
that.  
  
Academic Achievement in PGCPS Prior to Dissolution 
Maryland was one of the earliest states to address the issue of measuring student 
achievement and holding schools accountable for the results.  In 1972, the Maryland 
legislature enacted a law mandating statewide goal-setting and testing.  A testing program 
using the California Achievement Test was established.  Students in grades 3, 5 and 8 
were tested annually in the subjects of reading, language, and mathematics.   In 1989, the 
Governor‘s Commission on School Performance recommended ―the establishment of a 
comprehensive system of public accountability in which each school, each school system 
and the state are held responsible for student performance‖ (Governor‘s Commission on 
School Performance Commission 1989).  The result was the beginning of the Maryland 
School Performance Program (MSPP) in 1991.  A key feature of the new program was 
the development of a new testing program, the Maryland School Performance 
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Assessment Program (MSPAP).  According to the Commission, the goal of MSPAP was 
to ―identify excellence, uncover problem areas, and point the way toward improvement‖ 
(Ibid.).   
Like the early state test, MSPAP tests were given in May to students in grades 3, 
5 and 8.
2
  Proficiency in the subjects of reading, writing, language usage, mathematics, 
science, and social studies was tested.   This project will examine proficiency scores for 
reading and math.
3
  Students were graded on a scale from 1 to 5 with 1 being the highest 
score.  Students reached a satisfactory level of achievement if they received a 3 or better 
on their assessment.  The state‘s goal for each school and the school system was for 70% 
of students to achieve the satisfactory level.  A school district or school would achieve 
the excellent standard when 70% of its students met the ―satisfactory‖ level and 25% met 
the ―excellent‖ level.   
Achievement standards were deliberately set high.  So high in fact that school 
systems were not expected to meet the standards initially.  Accordingly, all of Maryland‘s 
24 school systems failed to meet any of the tests goals in 1993, the first year the test 
given.  State officials expected that systems would reach proficiency by 1996.
4
   As an 
incentive to improve test scores, the Maryland State Department of Education (MSDE) 
used a carrot and stick approach by giving bonuses to schools that make significant 
progress and threatening failing schools with sanctions.  Schools that failed to make 
adequate yearly progress (AYP) were put on a watch list for potential sanction.  To be on 
the list, schools must be far from the proficiency standard and have shown little or no 
progress for multiple years.  If schools remain on the list for two consecutive years they 
become eligible for reconstitution, state takeover or other corrective action. 
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In 1995 when MSDE began to identify schools eligible for state takeover PGCPS 
did not have any schools on the list.  By 1998, nine schools were on the list (Maryland 
State Department of Education 1998).  By 2002 the number had climbed to 20 (Maryland 
State Department of Education 2002). The only school system with more schools on the 
list was Baltimore City which had 85 schools on the list.
5
    
Another component of the MSPP was the annual publication of test data for 
school districts and schools. The annual report allowed residents to compare the 
performance of PGCPS with any and every other school system in Maryland.  Because 
PGCPS students did not perform well on MSPAP, the annual report served as a continual 
reminder that PGCPS was not meeting expectations.  Since the tests began, PGCPS has 
ranked either next to or second from the bottom and in 2002 only Baltimore City schools 
fared worse than Prince George‘s schools (Hill 1994b;Trejos 2002b).  Failing to raise 
MSPAP scores was one of the reasons the elected school board gave for firing 
Superintendent Iris Metts in 2002. 
Table 6-1 shows PGCPS district-level performance on the reading MSPAP from 
1993 to 2002.  The scores are the percentage of students scoring at the satisfactory level 
or above.  Most of the improvement in proficiency occurred at the grade 5 level.  In fact 
fifth grade white students had the highest proficiency gain improving 15.1 points between 
1993 and 2002.  In stark contrast, both black and white third grade students‘ proficiency 
actually declined.  A closer look at Table 6-1shows that grade 5 scores generally rose 
until 1999 after which the scores declined.  It is unclear what was responsible for the 
decline.  Prince George‘s was not alone in the decline. Systems across the state also 
experienced declines (Maryland State Department of Education 2002).   
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Table 6-1  PGCPS  Reading MSPAP 1993-2002 
Prince George's Reading 
  
Satisfactory  pct. 
  
 








 16.2 18.8 20.6 19.9 24.6 25.3 22.9 18.7 13.7 -2.5 
White n/a 35.4 40.5 42.2 40.8 46.7 49.7 42.7 38.8 27.2 -8.2 
Gap n/a 19.2 21.7 21.6 20.9 22.1 24.4 19.8 20.1 13.5 -5.7 
Grade 5 
          Black 14 17 14.8 18.9 19.3 23.6 23.6 23.8 22.9 23.1 9.1 
White 29.7 34.3 32.2 35.5 37.2 45 45.5 47.2 46.7 44.8 15.1 
Gap 15.7 17.3 17.4 16.6 17.9 21.4 21.9 23.4 23.8 21.7 6 
Grade 8 
          Black 11.3 11.2 16.2 13.7 13.9 14.2 14.8 16 15.9 15.1 3.8 
White 25.9 25.6 33.6 32.8 32.4 31.4 28.1 25.7 28 25.8 -0.1 
Gap 14.6 14.4 17.4 19.1 18.5 17.2 13.3 9.7 12.1 10.7 -3.9 
 Notes: 1. The Grade 3 reading test was not administered in 1993. 2. For Grade 3 the years are 
1994-2002 and 1994-2001. Source: Maryland Department of Education
 . 




Table 6-1 also shows the size of the achievement gap between black and white 
students between 1993 and 2002.   The scores show uneven progress in closing the gap 
between black and white students.  The gap for grade 3 declined from 19.2 points in 1994 
to 13.5 points in 2002; a decline of 5.7 percentage points.  The gap for grade 8 also 
dropped although not as much.  The gap narrowed from 14.6 in 1993 to 10.7 in 2002; a 
3.9 point drop.  These positive results were countered by an increase in the gap at the 
Grade 5 level.  The gap among fifth graders expanded from 15.7 points in 1993 to 21.7 
points in 2002.  It is interesting to note that the achievement levels for both black and 
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white students in the third and fifth grades are higher than the levels for both groups at 
the eighth grade level.   
Looking at Table 6-1 again, one sees that at no point do any groups come near the 
70% achievement goal set by the state.  The cohort with the highest proficiency level was 
grade 3 whites who achieve a  49.7% level in 1999.  Interestingly enough, African 
American students‘ highest performance also occurred in 1999 when 25.3% of black 
third graders reached the satisfactory level.  At the same time however 1999 was also the 
year in which the black-white gap among third graders was greatest.  The growth in the 
gap despite achievement gains highlights the problem of trying to close the gap without 
measures designed specifically to address the gap.  Accountability programs that aim to 
improve academic achievement for all students do seem to increase achievement for all 
students.  However, they do not seem to be able to close the gap between students.  While 
all boats rise, they generally rise at the same rate thus maintaining the gap between 
students (Hansushek and Raymond 2006; J. Lee 2006).  
The MSPAP scores in mathematics are even more discouraging than the reading 
scores.  Table 6-2 shows that for every grade level, the gap between African American 
and white students increased between 1993 and 2002.  Once again, the grade 5 gap was 
the largest with 49.7% of whites performing at the satisfactory level and only 14% of 
African Americans doing the same, a 35.7 point gap.  Worse still at no time does any 
African American cohort rise to 30% proficiency.  In contrast no white cohort fell below 





Table 6-2  PGCPS Mathematics MSPAP 1993-2002 
Prince George's Mathematics 
 
Satisfactory  pct. 
   
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 93-02 
Grade 3 
         
 
Change 
Black 10 15.3 22.7 20.7 21.3 23.3 20.9 20.1 16.7 11.8 1.8 
White 30.4 35.9 49.4 48.8 51.7 50.8 50.2 53 43 33.1 2.7 
Gap 20.4 20.6 26.7 28.1 30.4 27.5 29.3 32.9 26.3 21.3 0.9 
Grade 5 
          Black 16.9 19 23.8 27.9 26.8 27.8 26.3 22.5 17.5 14 -2.9 
White 45.5 49.6 54.4 59.3 57 61.9 58.7 57.4 48 49.7 4.2 
Gap 28.6 30.6 30.6 31.4 30.2 34.1 32.4 34.9 30.5 35.7 7.1 
Grade 8 
          Black 12.2 15.3 22.7 19.3 20.7 21.8 21.9 24.5 19.6 20.1 7.9 
White 39.1 46.3 49 50 53.4 54.9 54.9 54.5 52.7 50.7 11.6 
Gap 26.9 31 26.3 30.7 32.7 33.1 33 30 33.1 30.6 3.7 
Source: Maryland Department of Education
 . 
2002 Maryland School Performance Report. 
 
Considerable controversy surrounded the 2001 MSPAP.  That year, most school 
systems around the state experienced dramatic drops in test scores.  A number of schools 
around the state experienced double digit swings in their scores that were not easily 
explainable.  The outcry over the accuracy of the scores was so great that MSDE delayed 
public release of the scores while independent evaluators examined the accuracy of the 
scores.  Though the scores were found to be accurate, doubts about the validity of 
MSPAP persisted.  Many people were comforted by the knowledge that 2002 was to be 
the last year in which MSPAP was to be administered.  The 2002 MSPAP was also the 




Academic Achievement in PGCPS after Dissolution 
In 2003 Maryland‘s assessment program was changed in order to comply with the 
guidelines of the federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001.  According to the 
United States Department of Education, the purpose of NCLB is,  
to ensure that all children in the United States receive a high-quality education 
and to close the achievement gap that exists between children who typically 
perform well in school and those who do not—many of whom are from minority 
racial and ethnic groups, have disabilities, live in poverty, or do not have English 
as their first language. (Office of Communications and Outreach 2006 rev.)   
 
NCLB has four key principles: stronger accountability for results, more freedom for 
states and districts, education methods grounded in scientific research, and more parental 
choice.  NCLB requires states to set student achievement goals and annually measure 
student progress on meeting those achievement goals through the use of state-developed 
tests.  The results of those tests and other accountability indicators are published annually 
in state report cards.   
The NCLB guidelines forced the replacement of MSPAP because the test was 
designed to evaluate schools and districts not students, and did not allow for individual 
student scores.  NCLB requires that states disaggregate data to the student level.  MSPAP 
relied on essays and joint activity projects and the time necessary for grading the tests 
precluded the state from reporting the data within the timeframe set by NCLB.   Lastly, it 
would be expensive to administer as NCLB requires students in grades 3 through 12 be 
tested.  MSPAP only tested third, fifth, and eighth graders.   Thus in 2003, MSPAP was 
replaced by a new assessment, the Maryland State Assessment (MSA).  Administered 
351 
 
each March, the MSAs tests students in mathematics and reading.  Students in grades five 
through eight are also tested in science.   
 
Data Description  
The data used for this project are taken from the Maryland State Department of 
Education‘s (MSDE) Maryland State Assessment Report Card data set.  The information 
is publicly available for download at http://www.mdreportcard.org.  State-level, system-
level and school-level data are reported.  Student-level data is not available. 
NCLB requires that the information be disaggregated by specific student 
populations.  These populations include five racial subgroups, (African Americans, 
Asians, Latinos, Native Americans, and whites), Limited English Proficiency students, 
students eligible for the federal governments‘ Free and Reduced Meals (FARMS) 
program, and special education students.  Maryland requires all students to be tested 
although some students may have the test modified to accommodate disabilities.  
Students‘ performance on the MSAs is scored as Basic, Proficient, or Advanced.  ―Basic 
indicates that a student is not passing standards and that more work is needed to meet 
grade-level expectations. Proficient indicates that a student is passing standards. 
Proficient is considered a realistic and rigorous level of achievement. Advanced indicates 
that a student is performing above standards. Advanced is considered a highly 
challenging and exemplary level of achievement‖ (Maryland Department of Education 
2009).  
NCLB requires that all students be proficient in reading and mathematics by the 
2013-2014 school year.  Accordingly, each year progressive annual measurable 
objectives (AMO) are set.  If AMO target levels are reached each year, school systems 
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will achieve the NLCB required 100% proficiency level by the end of school year 2013-
2014.  AYP is the measure used to track progress.  States, school systems, and students 
are expected to make AYP in the proportions of students achieving proficiency in reading 
and mathematics.  Test scores and at least one other academic indicator are used to 
calculate AYP.   
To make AYP in Maryland, schools and school systems must meet the annual 
measurable objective in reading and mathematics for students in the aggregate 
and for each student subgroup, in graduation rate for high school or attendance in 
elementary and middle school for students in the aggregate, and meet the testing 
participation requirement of 95%.  (Maryland Department of Education 2010).  
  
Methodology 
Three different techniques for determining the test score gap are used.  First, the 
gap is expressed as simple point differences in proficiency percentages between African 
American and white students.  This method is often used by schools and school systems.  
System level AYP and MSA data are used for this analysis.  Second, the effect size of the 
black-white gap is calculated to determine the magnitude of the difference between the 
scores for blacks and whites.   Calculating effect size has a couple of advantages.  Effect 
size is not influenced by the sample size, unlike statistical significance.  Further, effect 
size is a good measure to use when comparing different testing protocols because it is 
standardized.  The effect size specifies the number of standard deviation units separating 
the scores of black and white students.   
I use the modified Cohen‘s d effect size measure used by Larry Hedges and Amy 
Nowell (Hedges and Nowell 1998).  Instead of using the pooled standard deviation of 
blacks and whites, they used the standard deviation for all tested students.  The resulting 




Cohen‘s d = Black Sample Mean-White sample Mean/Standard Deviation for All 
Students 
 
Effect sizes of > |.20| are considered to be small or smaller than typical.  Effect sizes 
between |.20| and |.80| are considered to be medium or typical.  Effect sizes between |.80| 
and |1.00| are large or larger than typical.  Effect sizes of ≥ |1.00| are much larger than 
typical. 
The data used for the effect-size analysis are school-level data.  Use of school-
level data is necessary to determine sample means.  Special education schools, alternative 
school, night schools, early childhood centers, and charter schools have been eliminated 
from the sample because I believe they might unduly influence the scores.  Special 
education scores typically are lower than average scores.  It is assumed that children 
incapable of being mainstreamed would likely have the lowest scores.  Alternative 
schools serve students who for behavior or discipline reasons can no longer attend their 
regularly assigned school.  Because these children are likely to struggle educationally, I 
thought it best to eliminate them.  PGCPS operates three evening high schools.  They 
have been eliminated because most attendees are over 18 or are unable to attend school 
during normal hours.  Charters schools have been eliminated because PGCPS has very 
limited control over the instruction in them.  The early childhood centers were eliminated 
because the centers have student populations too young to be tested.  An average of 23 
schools has been eliminated from each sample as a result of these modifiers.  The sample 
size for African American students averaged 185 schools.  The average was 96 schools 
for white students.  A number of schools did not report AYP scores for white students 
because a school must have at least five test-takers in a subgroup before the results for 
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that group are counted towards AYP.  That so many schools did not report white score 
suggests PGCPS‘s small white student population is concentrated in a small number of 
schools.   
The third analytical technique used expresses the achievement gap as the relative 
progress in reaching 100% proficiency for each racial group.  In 2008, MSDE hired an 
auditing firm to evaluate the effectiveness of its education funding program.  For the 
evaluation, the auditing firm, MGT of America, Inc. developed a formula, the Proficiency 
Gap Closure, to assess students‘ performance (MGT of America, Inc. 2008).  The 
Proficiency Gap Closure (PGC) measure was used to illustrate black-white differences in 
closing the gap between proficiency levels in 2003 and NCLB‘s 2014 100% proficiency 
goal.   
System-level AYP and grade level MSA data are used for this analysis.  Prior to 
2004, only third, fifth and eighth grade students were tested.  Beginning in 2004 all 
students in grades 3 through 8 were tested.  This change does not present a problem for 
analyzing MSA data because MSA scores are disaggregated by grade level.  This does 
present a problem for the analysis of AYP data.  AYP is a composite of all assessment 
results for all grade levels in a school.  This means that 2010 AYP scores contain the 
results from students in all grades from grade 3 to grade 12 while the 2003 AYP scores 
only include the results of students in grades 3, 5 and 8 therefore an accurate comparison 
of 2003 and 2010 AYP score is not possible.  AYP data from 2004 and 2010, and MSA 
data from 2003 and2010 are used for this reason.   
Calculating PGC allows a comparison of the progress made by PGCPS‘ black and 
white students to close the gap between where they were in 2003 and 2004 and where 
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they hope to be in 2014.  The PGC is calculated by dividing the gap closure during the 
period studied by the proficiency gap that existed at the beginning of the period studied.  
The Proficiency Gap Closure equations are: 
 
MSA PGC=(2010 Proficiency%--2003 Proficiency%)/(100%--2003 Proficiency%)  
 AYP PGC=(2010 Proficiency%--2004 Proficiency%)/(100%--2004 Proficiency%) 
 
Analysis and Findings 
My initial examination of the data began with comparisons of 2003 PGCPS data 
with that of the other 23 school districts in Maryland.  This comparison was done to o 
establish a starting point for evaluating the progress, or lack of progress PGCPS may 
have made since the school board‘s dissolution.  The examination showed that PGCPS 
continued to perform poorly compared to most of Maryland‘s other school districts.  
Once again Prince George‘s scores bested only those of Baltimore City‘s.   
Table 6-3 shows AYP scores in both reading and mathematics for each of 
Maryland‘s school districts.  With 44% of schools making AYP in reading and only 
32.7% of schools making AYP in mathematics, PGCPS was a long way from reaching 
the 100% proficiency goal by 2013-2014.  That said, no Maryland school district had 
reached the 100% proficiency level in 2003.  Howard County had the highest level of 
proficiency with 72 % proficiency in math and 82% proficiency in reading.   A little over 
half of Maryland‘s districts were at least halfway towards meeting NCLB‘s 100% goal in 
mathematics.  School district performance was better in reading with all but three districts 
being at least halfway to the goal.  Not coincidentally, those three districts, Dorchester, 
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Prince George‘s and Baltimore City were also three of the four districts with the largest 
percentage of African American students. 
 
          Table 6-3 2003 District Ranking, Math and Reading AYP  
  AYP  
 
Proficient pct.   
Rank District Math District Reading 
1 Howard 72.5 Howard 82 
2 Montgomery 65.6 Calvert 76.4 
3 Carroll 64.1 Carroll 75.4 
4 Frederick 62 Harford 73.5 
5 Worcester 60.6 Frederick 71.8 
6 Washington 59.7 Montgomery 71.2 
7 Harford 59.4 Queen Anne's 70 
8 Calvert 58.3 Worcester 68.6 
9 Cecil 57.4 Washington 68.2 
10 Anne Arundel 56.2 Anne Arundel 66 
11 Queen Anne's 55.7 Cecil 65.8 






14 Garrett 49.8 Caroline 63.7 
15 Caroline 48 Kent 63.4 
16 Charles 47.5 Charles 62.8 
17 Kent 47.2 Garrett 62.7 
18 Talbot 46.5 Allegany 61.3 
19 Wicomico 45.5 Talbot 60.5 
20 Somerset 45.3 Wicomico 59.1 
21 Allegany 43.7 Somerset 55.8 
22 Dorchester 34.2 Dorchester 49.5 
23 Prince George's 32.7 Prince George's 44 
24 Baltimore City 26.1 Baltimore City 36.6 
  Maryland State 51 Maryland State 61.4 
Source: Maryland Department of Education. 2010 Maryland  
Report Card.   
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Table 6-4 lists the total 2003 enrollment for each district ranked by the percentage 
of African American students.  Baltimore City and Prince George‘s were the only two 
districts in which African Americans comprised more than 50% of the student 
population.  African Americans accounted for 77.7% of PGCPS‘s enrollment and 88% of 
Baltimore‘s.  At the other end of the spectrum African Americans were just 2.6% of 
Carroll County‘s population and only 0.2% of Garrett County‘s enrollment. 
 
   Table 6-4  2003 District Enrollment by Size and African American pct 
Rank School District Total School District Black pct. 
1 Montgomery 138983 Baltimore City 82775 88 
2 Prince George's 135439 Prince George's 105169 77.7 
3 Baltimore County 108297 Somerset 1357 45.6 
4 Baltimore City 94031 Dorchester 2026 42.1 
5 Anne Arundel 74787 Charles 9727 39.2 
6 Howard 47197 Wicomico 5207 36.2 
7 Harford 40252 Baltimore County 38247 35.3 
8 Frederick 38559 Kent 677 25.8 
9 Carroll 28430 Worcester 1751 25.5 
10 Charles 24794 Talbot 1025 22.8 
11 Washington 20102 Montgomery 29775 21.4 
12 Calvert 17153 Anne Arundel 15214 20.3 
13 Cecil 16203 Caroline 1062 19.2 
14 Saint Mary's 16110 Saint Mary's 3037 18.9 
15 Wicomico 14395 Howard 8449 17.9 
16 Allegany 10128 Calvert 2673 15.6 
17 Queen Anne's 7523 Harford 6256 15.5 
18 Worcester 6871 Queen Anne's 732 9.7 
19 Caroline 5535 Frederick 3655 9.5 
20 Garrett 4833 Washington 1783 8.9 
21 Dorchester 4817 Cecil 1096 6.8 
22 Talbot 4498 Allegany 403 4 
23 Somerset 2978 Carroll 734 2.6 
24 Kent 2630 Garrett 11 0.2 




For the purposes of this study the performance gap between black and white 
students is of most interest.  Looking at the reading and mathematics proficiency 
percentages for all 24 districts (Table 6-5), one sees that PGCPS performance was near 
the state average.  PGCPS had an achievement gap of 28.4% in reading; 4.8% smaller 
than the state average.  Its 39.2% gap in mathematics was 4.9% larger than the state 
average.   
 
    Table 6-5 2003 District Rankings Black-White Gap for AYP Reading & Math   
Reading Mathematics
District Whites Blacks Gap rank White Blacks Gap rank
Allegany 61.8 48.8 13 23 44.2 32.8 11.4 23
Anne Arundel 71.4 46.4 25 15 61.9 33.9 28 13
Baltimore City 53.2 34.7 18.5 21 41.5 24.2 17.3 22
Baltimore Co 73.2 49.1 24.1 16 60.8 30.2 30.6 10
Calvert 79.9 57.8 22.1 19 63 31.5 31.5 7
Caroline 70.5 41.8 28.7 9 54.2 26.6 27.6 15
Carroll 76.1 49.4 26.7 12 65 36 29 11
Cecil 67 46.6 20.4 20 59.1 36.5 22.6 20
Charles 73.2 47.3 25.9 14 57.2 32.4 24.8 19
Dorchester 64.5 29.2 35.3 3 45.8 18.8 27 17
Frederick 75.2 44 31.2 7 65.3 31.9 33.4 5
Garrett 62.8 na* na 24 49.8 na na 24
Harford 77.2 54.4 22.8 18 63.7 36.9 26.8 18
Howard 87.5 63.7 23.8 17 78.3 46.8 31.5 8
Kent 73.8 34 39.8 1 57.2 16.5 40.7 1
Montgomery 85.4 53.2 32.2 6 80 40.8 39.2 2
Prince George's 70.1 41.7 28.4 10 58.2 29.2 29 12
Queen Anne's 72.9 45.6 27.3 11 59.4 22.8 36.6 3
Saint Mary's 70.8 40 30.8 8 59 31.3 27.7 14
Somerset 62.8 47.9 14.9 22 54.1 35.5 18.6 21
Talbot 69.6 33 36.6 2 54.5 20.7 33.8 4
Washington 70.7 44.5 26.2 13 62.3 35.2 27.1 16
Wicomico 71.3 38.1 33.2 5 56.7 25.4 31.3 9
Worcester 78.2 43.4 34.8 4 69.2 37.2 32 6
Maryland State 75.2 43 32.2 64.5 30.2 34.3  
     Note: * indicates there are fewer than the five students required for AYP  




What is most interesting about Table 6-5 is the position of Montgomery County.  
Montgomery County‘s school system is generally regarded as the best Maryland school 
system in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area and competes with Virginia‘s Fairfax 
County school system for the title of best D.C. area school system.  If one looks at 
MCPS‘s overall AYP scores, MCPS ranked sixth in reading proficiency and second in 
math proficiency.  However, Montgomery County Public Schools (MCPS) has the sixth 
largest reading gap and the second largest math gap among Maryland systems.  This 
suggests that generally favorable overall scores have the capability of masking more 
problematic issues underneath.   With this in mind, this project now turns to an 
examination of 2010 results.  But before doing so a short discussion of what is to be 
expected is in order.  
It is appropriate to reiterate the expectations for PGCPS‘s performance on the 
2010 MSAs and for the size of system‘s achievement gap.   Chapter 5 presented the case 
that while the old regime had been disrupted, a new performance regime had yet been 
formed.  In fact, in a three stage process of regime change, Prince George‘s had not 
moved beyond the first stage; disruption of the old regime.  Because reform advocates 
were unable to form a new performance regime, it is expected that Prince George‘s 
position relative to Maryland‘s other school districts would not have changed.  Further 
one would expect PGCPS to have made no more progress in closing the achievement gap 
than any other Maryland district.   
The data show that by 2010, the position of Prince George‘s County compared to 
other school districts had not changed much.  Table 6-6 shows the 2010 mathematics and 
reading AYP scores for all 24 Maryland school districts.   
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          Table 6-6   2010 District Ranking MSA Math and Reading  
rank District Math District Reading 
1 Worcester 91.3 Carroll 91.9 
2 Howard 90.5 Calvert 91.8 
3 Calvert 89.8 Howard 91.8 
4 Carroll 89.2 Queen Anne's 90.9 
5 Queen Anne's 89.2 Frederick 89.9 
6 Frederick 87.2 Worcester 89.6 
7 Caroline 87.1 Montgomery 89.4 
8 Saint Mary's 87 Anne Arundel 88.2 
9 Washington 86.8 Garrett 88 
10 Garrett 86.1 Harford 87.8 
11 Anne Arundel 85.7 Saint Mary's 87.2 
12 Montgomery 84.6 Baltimore County 85.4 
13 Harford 84.4 Washington 85.4 
14 Talbot 81.7 Caroline 84.5 
15 Baltimore County 81 Charles 84.2 
16 Cecil 80.7 Allegany 83.9 
17 Charles 80.4 Cecil 83.5 
18 Allegany 80.1 Talbot 82.7 
19 Wicomico 78.1 Kent 82.2 
20 Kent 77.6 Somerset 81.8 
21 Somerset 77.5 Wicomico 79.2 
22 Dorchester 73.5 Dorchester 75.3 
23 Prince George's 67.4 Prince George's 75.1 
24 Baltimore City 66.1 Baltimore City 70.9 
  Maryland State 80.4 Maryland State 84.3 




Once again, the counties at the bottom of both lists are the same three at the 
bottom of the list in 2003 (Table 6-3); Dorchester, Prince George‘s and Baltimore City.  
Just looking at Table 6-5 one would conclude that Prince George‘s is not performing 
well.  Its 67.4% proficiency in mathematics and 75.1% proficiency in reading place the 
county next to the bottom of the list.  However what that observation misses is the fact 
that these scores represent significant increases for the county.  Prince George‘s math 
AYP score rose from 32.7% in 2003 to 67.4% in 2010, a 106% increase (see Table 6-3).  
The county‘s reading score improved 70.7% rising from 44% in 2003 to 75.1% in 2010.  
Before getting too carried away by the improvement, it should be noted that 
though the increases are noteworthy, they are skewed by the fact that PGCPS‘s scores 
were so far below 100 percent.  The amount of possible increase in a system‘s scores 
decreases as a district approaches 100% proficiency.  Other school system‘s with higher 
proficiency levels in 2003 had less room for improvement.  Further, PGCPS was not the 
only system to see its scores rise.  Every Maryland school district increased its scores.   
Some respondents critical of PGCPS argue that given the amount of money the 
county spends per pupil, the system should perform better than it has.  Per pupil spending 
for PGCPS in 2010 was $13,246.  As Table 6-7 illustrates, PGCPS‘s expenditures rank it 
eighth among Maryland‘s 24 school districts, and the county‘s per pupil spending is more 
than $2,000 less than the highest spending district, Worcester which spent $15,498 per 




  Table 6-7   2010 District Per Pupil Expenditures & Wealth per Pupil   
Per Pupil Expenditures 
 
Wealth per Pupil 
 rank District 2010 rank District 2010 
1 Worcester $15,498  1 Worcester $1,237,416  
2 Montgomery $14,969  2 Talbot $961,272  
3 Kent $14,490  3 Montgomery $751,154  
4 Baltimore City $14,302  4 Kent $636,064  
5 Somerset $14,240  5 Anne Arundel $571,232  
6 Howard $14,166  6 Queen Anne's $529,890  
7 Allegany $13,251  7 Howard $509,009  
8 Prince George's $13,246  8 Baltimore County $454,919  
9 Dorchester $12,564  9 Garrett $442,553  
10 Baltimore County $12,236  10 Frederick $393,024  
11 Anne Arundel $12,178  11 Calvert $392,845  
12 Garrett $12,093  12 Carroll $381,712  
13 Wicomico $12,054  13 Harford $369,649  
14 Calvert $11,789  14 Saint Mary's $357,219  
15 Charles $11,786  15 Dorchester $348,786  
16 Frederick $11,727  16 Charles $348,341  
17 Carroll $11,671  17 Prince George's $341,193  
18 Harford $11,542  18 Cecil $334,682  
19 Cecil $11,395  19 Washington $333,898  
20 Saint Mary's $11,387  20 Somerset $287,438  
21 Washington $11,276  21 Wicomico $284,459  
22 Queen Anne's $11,273  22 Caroline $262,215  
23 Talbot $11,160  23 Baltimore City $241,651  
24 Caroline $11,154  24 Allegany $232,669  
 
Maryland State $13,019  
 
Maryland State $460,482  
    Source: Maryland Department of Education. 2010 Maryland Report Card. 
363 
 
PGCPS critics argue that Prince George‘s level of spending should put its 
assessment performance higher than 23rd.  They ask, ―How can the county be eighth in 
spending and only twenty-third in results?‖  They argue that a school system that spends 
as much as PGCPS does should not perform so poorly.  However, as was the case with 
the AYP scores, a cursory examination of expenditures is misleading.  It does not put the 
spending levels into context.  Although Prince George‘s is eighth in spending, it is only 
seventeenth in wealth per pupil (Table 6-7).  So Prince George‘s spends considerably 
more on education than its wealth would suggest.   
The disparity between the county‘s wealth and costs indicates that the county 
receives a significant portion of its funding from sources other than local revenues.  For 
fiscal year (FY) 2010, PGCPS had an operating budget of $1.67 billion (Prince George‘s 
County Board of Education 2009l).  County revenues of $614.5 million accounted for 
36.6% of the budget, state funds ($922.7 million) were 54.9% of the budget, and federal 
funds ($94.3 million) accounted for 5.6% of the budget.
6
  Much of the outside funding is 
directed at improving the academic achievement of disadvantaged children.   
In contrast to Prince George‘s County, Montgomery County funds account for 
71.3% of MCPS‘s $2.2 billion budget in FY2010 (Montgomery County Office of 
Management and Budget 2009).
7
  Because Montgomery County is considerably wealthier 
than Prince George‘s County, it can afford to allocate more resources to MCPS without 
spending more than half of its total budget on education.  In FY 2010, funding for MCPS 
was 49.2% of the county‘s total budget.  In Prince George‘s, PGCPs funding was 62.8% 
of the county‘s budget (Prince George‘s County Office of Management and Budget 
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2009).  So while Montgomery County provides more actual dollars for education, Prince 
George‘s provides a greater percentage of the dollars it has for education.   
Most interviewed educators and school officials expressed criticism of simple 
comparisons of PGCPS with all of Maryland‘s other school districts.  The respondents 
maintain that such comparisons do not accurately reflect the differences between the 
systems.  They claim that the differences between the systems are so great as to make 
most comparisons meaningless.  Respondents pointed to the variance in district size as 
just one example.      
Table 6-8 shows the enormous size differences between Maryland‘s school 
districts in 2009.
8
   Prince George‘s school system is over four times larger than sixteen 
of the state‘s school districts.  A large urban majority minority school system like PGCPS 
shares little in common with a small rural school system like Kent County Public Schools 
(KCPS).  In fact, two of PGCPS‘s high schools had larger student populations than 
KCPS‘s total student population.
9
  An additional 9 of 22 PGCPS high schools had 




     Table 6-8  2009 District Enrollment by Size and African American pct. 
rank District Enrollment District Black pct 
1 Montgomery 141722 Baltimore City 72783 87.8 
2 Prince George's 127039 Prince George's 91671 72.2 
3 Baltimore County 103324 Charles 14594 54.5 
4 Baltimore City 82866 Somerset 1285 44.3 
5 Anne Arundel 74776 Baltimore County 41922 40.6 
6 Howard 50641 Dorchester 1834 39.6 
7 Frederick 40159 Wicomico 5456 37.3 
8 Harford 38636 Kent 517 23.7 
9 Carroll 27721 Montgomery 32864 23.2 
10 Charles 26779 Anne Arundel 17216 23 
11 Washington 21902 Worcester 1517 22.8 
12 Saint Mary's 17186 Howard 11193 22.1 
13 Calvert 17006 Harford 7905 20.5 
14 Cecil 16205 Saint Mary's 3502 20.4 
15 Wicomico 14619 Talbot 896 19.9 
16 Allegany 9152 Caroline 1060 19.1 
17 Queen Anne's 7793 Calvert 2890 17 
18 Worcester 6659 Washington 3168 14.5 
19 Caroline 5551 Frederick 5078 12.6 
20 Dorchester 4628 Cecil 1782 11 
21 Talbot 4495 Queen Anne's 622 8 
22 Garrett 4311 Allegany 537 5.9 
23 Somerset 2898 Carroll 1179 4.3 
24 Kent 2184 Garrett 25 0.6 
  Maryland State 848412   321650 37.9 
  Source: The Fact Book 2008-2009 
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PGCPS was one of only three districts to have enrollments larger than 100,000.  The 
work of Valerie Lee and Julia Smith has shown that larger school size negatively affects 
the academic outcomes of economically disadvantaged and minority students (Lee and 
Smith 1997).  In addition to having a large number of students, Prince George‘s has the 
second largest concentration of African American students in the state (Table 6-8).  Mark 
Berends and Roberto Peñaloza found that a higher concentration of African American 
students in a school corresponds to a widening of the black-white achievement gap 
(Berends and Peñaloza 2010).  Thus PGCPS has twice the load to bear.   
Another area where PGCPS vastly differs from most other systems is in the 
number of students participating in the federal government‘s free and reduced meals 
programs (FARMS).  FARMS are needs-based programs for children from families 
below, at, or slightly above the poverty level.  FARMS counts are frequently used as an 
indicator of poverty within school systems.  The 2003 and 2010 percentages of FARMS 










             Table 6-9 2003 and 2010 School District FARMS Participation 
Rank District  2003 District 2010 
1 Baltimore City 72.9 Baltimore City 80.7 
2 Somerset 58.3 Somerset 66.6 
3 Allegany 46.3 Dorchester 56.3 
4 Prince George's 46.3 Prince George's 55.3 
5 Caroline 43.2 Wicomico 53.1 
6 Garrett 43.1 Allegany 52.9 
7 Wicomico 43 Caroline 52 
8 Kent 39.2 Garrett 50.1 
9 Dorchester 35.1 Kent 48.7 
10 Worcester 32.4 Washington 44.6 
11 Washington 29.3 Baltimore County 42.1 
12 Baltimore County 29.2 Worcester 40.4 
13 Talbot 28.1 Cecil 36.5 
14 Montgomery 23.7 Talbot 35.7 
15 Saint Mary‘s 21.9 Montgomery 30.8 
16 Charles 20 Saint Mary's 30.5 
17 Cecil 17.7 Charles 28.6 
18 Harford 17.7 Harford 27.2 
19 Anne Arundel 15.8 Anne Arundel 26.7 
20 Queen Anne's 15.2 Frederick 22.2 
21 Fredrick 12.9 Queen Anne's 21.8 
22 Calvert 12.4 Calvert 17.8 
23 Carroll 8.4 Howard 16.2 
24 Howard 7.6 Carroll 15 
  Maryland State 31.2 Maryland State 39.8 





Prince George‘s County has the fourth highest level of FARMS participants in 
both 2003 and 2010.  In 2003 46.3% of PGCPS students qualified for free or reduced 
meals.  Given the toll the Great Recession has had on the county, it is no surprise that the 
number grew to 55.3% in 2010.
10
   Research has consistently shown that poverty has a 
negative impact on achievement (Jencks and Phillips 1998).  Unlike many of the other 
school districts in Maryland, PGCPS must overcome three obstacles that negatively 
impact student achievement; large school size, large numbers of minority students, and 
concentrations of poverty. Keeping these district differences in mind, I examined the test 
score gap between black and white students in 2010.  
There is some progress to report related to the achievement gap.  The state has 
seen a decline in the Black-White performance gap on the MSAs.  Table 6-10 shows that 
Maryland has a statewide gap of 21.3% in mathematics and a gap of 15.6% in reading.  
These gaps represents a decline of 13% on the mathematics MSAs and 19.2% on the 
reading MSAs since 2003 (Table 6-5).  Thus Maryland as a whole has made some 
progress towards closing the test score gap.   
Earlier the performance of Prince George‘s and Montgomery Counties was 
discussed.  What was most noticeable were MCPS‘s large gaps despite high overall 
achievement scores (Table 6-5).  Like the state, MCPS‘s second highest mathematics gap 
dropped to fourth highest.  Its reading gap dropped from sixth to tenth.  PGCPS‘s gaps 
also declined, however the county‘s ranking rose.  In 2010, PGCPS mathematics gap of 
19.7% was the sixth largest in the state (Table 6-10).  Its reading gap was ninth.  In 2003, 
PGCPS ranked twelfth and tenth respectively (Table 6-5).  Thus PGCPS actually lost 
ground relative to the other Maryland school districts. 
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Table 6-10  2010 District AYP Math and Reading  by Race & Black-White Gap   
Mathematics Reading
District Whites Af Amer Gap rank White Af Amer Gap rank
Allegany 80.4 70.3 10.1 23 84.1 79.6 4.5 23
Anne Arundel 90.1 72.6 17.5 9 91.9 78.6 13.3 13
Baltimore City 79 64.4 14.6 20 80.5 69.8 10.7 19
Baltimore Co 87.6 71.9 15.7 15 89.7 79.9 9.8 21
Calvert 92.4 77.5 14.9 19 93.6 82.9 10.7 20
Caroline 90 74.7 15.3 18 88.3 71.1 17.2 6
Carroll 90 70.4 19.6 7 92.5 81 11.5 17
Cecil 82.7 67.2 15.5 17 84.6 75.7 8.9 22
Charles 89.2 73.4 15.8 14 90.5 79.1 11.4 18
Dorchester 83.1 59.5 23.6 3 84.6 61.9 22.7 1
Frederick 90.2 72 18.2 8 92.3 78.8 13.5 11
Garrett 86.3 92.9 -6.6 24 87.8 100 -12.2 24
Harford 87.8 72.1 15.7 16 90.7 77.2 13.5 12
Howard 94.7 77.8 16.9 11 95.1 83.3 11.8 16
Kent 85 55.5 29.5 1 86.1 70.6 15.5 8
Montgomery 93.7 72 21.7 4 96 81.9 14.1 10
Prince George's 84.6 64.9 19.7 6 88.9 74.2 14.7 9
Queen Anne's 90.7 73.6 17.1 10 92.5 76.6 15.9 7
Saint Mary's 90.3 73.6 16.7 12 90.8 73.1 17.7 5
Somerset 83.1 70.4 12.7 22 88.1 75.2 12.9 14
Talbot 88.2 61.3 26.9 2 88.6 66 22.6 2
Washington 89 74.5 14.5 21 87.2 74.6 12.6 15
Wicomico 86.5 65.2 21.3 5 87.7 66.7 21 3
Worcester 95.2 78.5 16.7 13 94.1 75 19.1 4
Maryland State 89.5 68.2 21.3 91.2 75.6 15.6
 
Source: Maryland Department of Education. 2010 Maryland Report Card. 
 
A closer look at the data shows that in Garret County African Americans actually 
outperformed whites.  Blacks outperform whites by 6.6% on mathematic MSAs and by 
an incredible 12.2% in reading.  The word incredible is used knowingly.  The numbers 
are skewed because of the small number of students involved.  Out of a total test 
population of 2,177 for the math MSA and 2,180 for reading MSA, only 14 (for both 
tests) were African American.  Thus results are undoubtedly skewed by the small sample 
size.  The Garret County results are useful however because they results illustrate the 
need to delve deeper into the test data.  The results also highlight a problem several 
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respondents had with the reporting of MSA results by the local newspaper, the 
Washington Post.  Respondents complain that by reporting system-level results without 
acknowledging differences among the districts, the newspaper unnecessarily exposes 
PGCPS to unwarranted criticism.  The Washington Post‘s critics claim that if PGCPS 
were compared to school districts similar to itself, the system‘s results would be viewed 
more favorably. 
However, hen such comparisons are made (comparing PGCPS to other Maryland 
school districts of similar size and/or population)—comparing apples to apples—Prince 
George‘s still does not fare well.  Table 6-11 presents the Grades 3, 5 and 8 MSA 
mathematics scores for Prince George‘s and selected counties.  Montgomery County and 
Baltimore County districts were chosen because they are nearest to PGCPS in size (Table 
6-8).  Baltimore City and Charles County were chosen because their student population‘s 
demographics are the most similar to PGFCPS‘s population.  Howard County and Anne 
















 District Subgroup 2003 2010 2003 2010 2003 2010 
 Prince George's All 49.4 77.5 36.7 71.6 22.1 41.2 
 Montgomery All 75.5 88.1 67.8 85.9 57.5 75 
 Baltimore City All 41.9 79.5 31.2 74 11.5 38.9 
 Baltimore County All 66.2 87.3 52.2 84.2 39.5 66.7 
 Charles All 65 83.1 56.7 82.5 36.6 68.7 
 Howard All 82.9 90.9 78.9 90.1 62.9 84.5 
 Anne Arundel All 73.3 91.2 64.5 88.8 39.1 72.1 
 
         Prince George's Black 47.4 75 33.7 69.4 18.5 38.1
 Montgomery Black 55.8 78.5 43.1 73.8 28.8 57.3 
 Baltimore City Black 39.8 78.2 29.8 72.9 9.7 36.4 
 Baltimore County Black 49.4 79.8 33.8 76.3 18.3 54.2 
 Charles Black 51.9 75.6 38.7 76.8 19.9 59.1 
 Howard Black 59.5 78.2 57.9 77.8 31 63.6 
 Anne Arundel Black 53.8 81.1 40.8 78.2 15.9 47.8 
 
         Prince George's FARMS 39.9 73.5 27.9 66.7 14 35.1
 Montgomery FARMS 51.8 76.3 40.8 72.6 25.3 52.5 
 Baltimore City FARMS 39.1 78.4 28.8 73 9.1 37.1 
 Baltimore County FARMS 48 79.5 31.7 75.8 16.2 51.9 
 Charles FARMS 42.5 73.2 32.4 72.1 12.2 50.4 
 Howard FARMS 54.7 76.2 42.8 70.8 24.8 57.6 
 Anne Arundel FARMS 51.1 82.9 62.5 83.3 14.4 50 




Table 6-11 shows 2003 and 2010 mathematics MSA scores for all students, 
African American students and FARMS participants.  Comparing Prince George‘s scores 
to similar districts does little to improve the perceptions about PGCPS‘s performance.  In 
fact, one might conclude the comparison is even more damaging.   In 2003, Baltimore 
City had the lowest scores in all categories except grade 5 FARMS students.  By 2010, 
PGCPS had the lowest score in six of nine categories.  PGCPS‘s performance at the 
Grade 5 level is particularly troubling as all student subgroups performed worse than 
comparable subgroups in any other jurisdiction.  Looking at Table 6-11it is clear that 
since the Board of Education‘s dissolutionment in 2002, PGCPS has not made significant 
improvement relative to comparative districts.  In fact PGCPS has lost ground since the 
elected school board was dissolved. Given that a new regime has not been established, 
this result is not totally surprising.  Even Baltimore City Public Schools which 
traditionally ranks at the bottom of most district rankings is outperforming PGCPS 
The results in reading are slightly less disappointing, Table 6-12.  Again the only 
school system PGCPS outperforms is Baltimore City‘s.  The overall reading scores in all 
three grades are higher as well as the grade 3 and 8 scores for blacks.  The most 
disappointing results are found with FARMS students.  Grade 3 and 5 FARMS students 
trail all districts.  The numbers are only slightly better than Baltimore at Grade 8.  Thus in 




Table 6-12  2003, 2010 MSA Reading Advanced & Proficient pct by Grade 
 
Student Grade 3 Grade 5 Grade 8 
 District Subgroup 2003 2010 2003 2010 2003 2010 
 Prince George's All 49.4 77.5 46.1 81.1 41.9 66.9 
 Montgomery All 75.5 88.1 74.7 93 70.9 88 
 Baltimore City All 41.9 79.5 31.2 74 32.8 61.5 
 Baltimore County All 66.2 87.3 69.6 90.3 59.9 81.3 
 Charles All 65 83.1 64.9 88.4 61.6 80.5 
 Howard All 82.9 90.9 84.2 94.8 80.7 90.6 
 Anne Arundel All 73.3 91.2 74.2 92.9 65.2 84.6 
 
         Prince George's Black 47.4 75 43.9 80.8 39.3 66.1 
 Montgomery Black 55.8 78.5 58.3 87.5 51.1 80.4 
 Baltimore City Black 39.8 78.2 42.9 80.8 31 60.2 
 Baltimore County Black 49.4 79.8 54.9 86.2 42.6 76.5 
 Charles Black 51.9 75.6 50.2 85.6 46.9 74.9 
 Howard Black 59.5 78.2 68.2 88.4 61.8 82.1 
 Anne Arundel Black 53.8 81.1 54 87.6 43.7 72.7 
 
         Prince George's FARMS 39.9 73.5 35.6 76.9 31.4 60.2 
 Montgomery FARMS 51.8 76.3 47.5 84.7 41.3 75.3 
 Baltimore City FARMS 39.1 78.4 42 80.1 29.1 60.1 
 Baltimore County FARMS 48 79.5 51.2 85 36.9 72.7 
 Charles FARMS 42.5 73.2 41.1 82.4 34.3 66.4 
 Howard FARMS 54.7 76.2 56.1 86.5 52.2 72.9 
 Anne Arundel FARMS 51.1 82.9 51 85.9 37.7 70.7 
 Source: Maryland Department of Education. 2010 Maryland Report Card. 
Despite the disappointing comparisons with other Maryland school districts, 
PGCPS has made progress (Table 6-11 and 6-12).  But while PGCPS has progressed, 
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other districts in Maryland have also progressed.  As a result, PGCPS continues to suffer 
in district comparison.  As long as race is so strongly correlated to test performance, 
PGCPS will always pale in comparison to most of the other districts in Maryland that do 
not have as high a concentration of African American students. While it is useful to 
examine PGCPS in relation to other school districts, it is also important to examine what 
is happening inside PGCPS.  With this in mind I now turn to an analysis of the PGCPS‘s 
black-white test-score gap.  
 
PGCPS Black-White Test Score Gap 
I began my analysis by examining the test score gap on the math and reading 
MSAs.  I also calculate the Proficiency Gap Closure (PGC) for both PGCPS and the State 
of Maryland.  Table 6-13 reports the mathematics MSA scores for grades 3, 5 and 8.  
There has been a nearly 11 percentage point decline in the gap at grade 3 and an almost 
14 percentage point decline at grade 5.  While less than half of grade 3 black students 
were math proficient in 2003, 75% of were proficient in 2010.  Whites moved from 73% 
proficiency in 2003 to 90% proficiency in 2010.  Grade 3 white students seem poised to 




Table 6-13 2003-2010 PGCPS & Md. Math MSA Gap and Proficiency Gap Closure  
PGC    PGC PGC 
Grade 3  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 PG MD 
Black 47.4 54.3 63.8 67.8 66.7 70.5 71.9 75 52.5 56.7 
White 73.4 77.5 82.2 86.5 89.1 85.8 88.4 90.4 63.9 66.2 
Grade 5  
         Black 33.7 41.5 49.7 57.7 63.5 67.9 66.6 69.4 53.8 58.9 
White 63.6 68 72.4 78 82.5 84.3 85.3 85.5 60.2 70.4 
Grade 8  
         Black 18.5 24.1 32.6 30.7 35.7 39.8 40.2 38.1 24.0 34.2 
White 50.4 53.4 62.6 63.2 66.7 71.7 70.1 69 37.5 56.7 
           PGCPS & Md. Black-White MSA Gap 
    
Change 
 Grade 3  
       
2003-10 
  PG gap 26 23.2 18.4 18.7 22.4 15.3 16.5 15.4 -10.6 
 Md. gap 31.9 25.9 23.2 22.9 22.5 19.4 16.5 15.8 -16.1 
 Grade 5  
          PG gap 29.9 26.5 22.7 20.3 19 16.4 18.7 16.1 -13.8 
 Md. gap 34.3 30.4 29 24.8 21.6 19.8 18.8 17.6 -16.7 
 Grade 8  
          PG gap 31.9 29.3 30 32.5 31 31.9 29.9 30.9 -1 
 Md. gap 36.2 35.5 36.8 40.4 38.2 37.2 33.8 34.2 -2 
 Source: Maryland Department of Education. 2010 Maryland Report Card and author calculations 
 
Unfortunately, Table 6-13 shows that the good news at grade 3 is tempered by the 
disappointing news at grade 8.  The gap has barely moved at this level.  The gap that was 
31.9% in 2003 dropped only 1 percentage point to 30.9 in 2010.  More disturbing than 
the gap scores are the grade 8 MSA scores for black students.  Less than 40% were 
proficient in 2010.   This poor result may be explained by the fact that the middle school 
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years have been troublesome for many school systems.  Also many educational reform 
efforts are often aimed at the lower grades with the assumption that results are easier to 
turn around at the elementary school level.  Nonetheless, this confirms what a respondent 
told me.  The improvements are being made at the lower grade levels.   
If one compares PGCPS‘s gap scores with Maryland‘s gap scores one sees that 
the system has progressed but trails the state.  The system is about 6.5 percentage points 
behind in closing the MSA gap at grade 3 and 2.9 percentage points behind at grade 5.  
At grade 8, PGCPS is only 1 percentage point behind the state, but neither PGCPS nor 
the state has had much success improving the performance of grade 8 students on the 
MSAs.    
An examination of the PGC results show differences in the progress PGCPS 
blacks and whites are making in closing their proficiency gaps.  Recall, PGC is a 
calculation of how much ground students have covered in their quest to reach 100% 
proficiency.   For instance, the PGC for grade 3 blacks is calculated by taking their 27.6 
percentage point improvement and dividing it by 100 minus the 47.4% that were 
proficient in 2004.  Thus, to reach the 100 percent proficiency goal by 2014, grade 3 
blacks need to close a 52.6 percentage point gap.  By 2010 grade 3 blacks have closed 
27.6 of those 52.6 percentage points, which equates to a PGC of 52.5%.   
The county trails the state in the progress being made in closing the proficiency 
gap.  Table 6-13 compares PGCPS‘s and Maryland‘s PGC scores for black and white 
students.  At grades 3 and 5 blacks in PGCPs trail Maryland blacks by 4to 5 percentage 
points.  PGCPS blacks trail Maryland blacks by 20 points at grade 8.  Interestingly, grade 
5 and 8 whites have not done as good a job in closing the proficiency gap as blacks have 
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relative to the state.  PGCPS white student‘s proficiency closure trails Maryland‘s white 
students by 10 points at grade 5 and 19 points at grade 8.  It is unclear what explains 
these results. 
The reading MSA scores paint a somewhat different picture.  This time, grade 3 
students have had less success in closing the gap (Table 6-14).  The grade 3 gap closed by 
8 percentage points while grade 8 gap closed by 12 percentage points.  Grade 5 students 
did the best, producing a 19 percentage point decline.  Looking at the data, the progress 
of blacks students at all levels is notable.  From 2003 to 2010, blacks have almost 


















Table 6-14 2003-2010 PGCPS & Md. Reading MSA Gap and Proficiency Gap Closure 
PGCPS  Reading MSA PGC PGC 
Grade 3 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 PG Md. 
Black 38.3 53.2 62.2 66.4 68.4 71.4 72.8 72.8 55.9 57.2 
White 63.4 75.3 80.6 82.8 87.1 83.5 89.1 89.6 71.6 68.3 
Grade 5 
          Black 43.9 48.3 57.4 60.4 61.3 76.3 80.9 80.8 65.8 68.1 
White 71.4 73.6 76.2 80.8 82.5 88 91.3 88.9 61.2 73.8 
Grade 8 
          Black 39.3 48.1 48.1 49.9 52.1 56.3 67 66.1 44.2 49.0 
White 69.4 70.5 75.4 72.7 77.2 76.4 83.1 84.1 48.0 56.4 
           PGCPS & Md. Black-White MSA Gap 
      Grade 3  
        
2003-10 
 PG gap 25.1 22.1 18.4 16.4 18.7 12.1 16.3 16.8 -8.3 
 Md. Gap 30.8 24.1 21 19.4 18.7 16.7 15.2 16.3 -14.5 
 Grade 5  
          PG gap 27.5 25.3 18.8 20.4 21.2 11.7 10.4 8.1 -19.4 
 Md. Gap 31.4 28.2 24.9 23.8 22.9 14.7 11.4 11.2 -20.2 
 Grade 8  
          PG gap 30.1 22.4 27.3 22.8 25.1 20.1 16.1 18 -12.1 
 Md. Gap 34.1 27.4 32.3 30.1 29.2 26.4 18.8 19.3 -14.8 
 Source: Maryland Department of Education. 2010 Maryland Report Card and author calculations. 
The PGC scores overall are a little better than the math PGC scores.  The county 
still trails the state however.  Again the worst performance in closing the proficiency gap 
is by grade 5 whites.  Their PGC score of 61.2 is almost 12 points less than the 73.8 PGC 
for whites throughout the state.  PGCPS white students were also best at closing the 
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proficiency gap.  Grade3 white students closed 71.6% of their proficiency gap.  This is 3 
points better than the performance of Maryland‘s grade 3 white students.    
The last data analyzed are the AYP rates for black and white PGCPS students.  As 
mentioned above, schools are held accountable for meeting AYP.  Table 6-15 presents 
the test score gap in AYP proficiency in both mathematics and reading.  As expected, 
steady progress has been made in closing the black-white test score gap.
11
  The gap 



















    Table 6-15 PGCPS AYP Black-White Gap & Effect Size 2004-2010 
 AYP 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Gap 
Math 
       
Change 
Black 34.5 45.5 51.4 56.7 63.1 63.2 64.9 
 White 62 71.4 76.6 80.5 84 83.7 84.6 
 Gap 27.5 25.9 25.2 23.8 20.9 20.5 19.7 -7.8 
Reading 
        Black 50.3 55 58 63 71.4 74.5 74.2 
 White 74.1 77.6 78.2 83.5 86.4 88.3 88.9 
 Gap 23.8 22.6 20.2 20.5 15 13.8 14.7 -9.1 
         
  
Black-White Difference in Test Score  
  












































    Source: Maryland Department of Education. 2010 Maryland Report Card and  
author calculations.  
 
Both black and white students have made progress in increasing the percentage of 
students proficient in math and reading.  Table 6-15 shows that 74.2% of blacks and 
88.9% of whites were proficient in reading in 2010.   Meanwhile the math proficiency of 
whites has risen to 84.6% while 64.9% of blacks were proficient in 2010.  
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A decline in the effect size of the gap confirms the progress being made.  The 
effect sizes are negative because whites outperform blacks.  The effect sizes for the test 
score gap are very large indicating race is still a potent determinant of test performance.  
Even so there has been a decrease in the magnitude of the effect.  Although there is some 
variation in the effect size between 2004 and 2010, none of the scores subsequent to 2004 
are as large as they were in 2004.  PGCPS is also making progress closing its proficiency 
gap. Table 6-16 presents an AYP test score gap and PGC score comparisons for PGCPS 
and Maryland.  It shows that except for white student‘s math proficiency, PGCPS 
students seem to be keeping pace with the rest of Maryland‘s students.  The progress in 
reading proficiency is almost identical.  The math proficiency gap closure for PGCPS 
trails the proficiency gap closure for the state by only two points for whites and four 














        Table 6-16   PGCPS & Maryland AYP Black-White Gap and PGC 2004-2010 
AYP Black-White Gap 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Change 
 Math 
         PGCPS 27.5 25.9 25.2 23.8 20.9 20.5 19.7 -7.8 
 Md. 32.2 32.3 30.8 28.5 24.7 22.4 21.3 -10.9 
 Reading 
        PGCPS 23.8 22.6 20.2 20.5 15 13.8 14.7 -9.1 
 Md. 27.5 26.6 24.9 23.5 18.2 15.7 15.6 -11.9 
 
          
  
AYP Proficiency Gap Closure 2004-2010  
  
   
Mathematics Reading 
   
   
PGCPS Md. PGCPS Md. 
   
  
Black 46.4 48.6 48.1 49.4 
   
  
White 59.5 64.6 57.1 57.5 
           Source: Maryland Department of Education. 2010 Maryland Report Card and  
        author calculations. 
 
There is one disconcerting note.  The AYP gap for PGCPS is smaller than the 
state‘s AYP gap.  While this might seem like PGCPS is doing a better job at closing the 
gap, this is not necessarily the case.  While AYP scores for PGCPS‘ black students 
tended to be within a point or two of the state‘s scores, the scores of PGCPS‘ white 
students were generally five points lower.  This would suggest that PGCPS could do a 
better job educating all of its students, black and white.     
So what conclusions can be made from all of this data?  Because a new 
performance regime was not established, I surmised that the performance of PGCPS on 
the MSAs would not exceed those of other districts or the state as a whole.  The data 
show that while there has been some improvement in test scores that improvement that 
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improvement appears to not be any better than the improvements made elsewhere in the 
state.  Thus PGCPS is still struggling to raise the academic achievement and close the 
achievement gap.  This said, given all of the turmoil the system has endured over the last 







   Unattributed quotations are from interviews conducted by the author.  
Respondents were given anonymity in exchange for their participation. 
 
2
   Students in grades 2, 4 and 6 took the Comprehensive Test of basic Skills 
(CTBS). 
3
   Reading and mathematics were chosen for examination because they were the 
first two of three subjects tested under NCLB.  Science is the other subject tested. 
4
   By 2002 no system had met the goal in all six subject areas. 
5
   Since 1995 only three other school systems have had a school on the list: Anne 
Arundel, Baltimore County, and Somerset. 
6
   The other 2.9% of the budget came from board sources and surpluses from the 
previous year. 
7
   20.5% of MCPS‘s budget comes from the state.  The rest, 8.2%, comes from 
other sources. 
8
   2010 enrollment data were not available at the time of the study. 
9
  The two high schools were Eleanor Roosevelt High School with a population of 
2,748 and Suitland High School with a population of 2,796.  
10
   Since the beginning of the recession, Prince George‘s County has led 
Maryland in the number of foreclosures and has one of the highest foreclosure rates in the 
nation (Robbins 2010).  
11





Conclusions and Prospects for the Future 
Regrettably, no governing consensus exists, with appropriate leadership, which takes 
account of the complexities facing public education in the county and provides a context 
for coordinated educational reform. Such a consensus needs to be developed and be 
broad enough to accommodate the county’s diversity and discipline interests and actions 
that function against the best interests of children. 
--Alvin Thornton, former chairman, Prince George‘s County  
Board of Education  
 
 
The comments by Alvin Thornton were in response to a Washington Post request 
of local leaders for advice on improving Prince George‘s County Public Schools 
(PGCPS) (Wanted: Ways to Change the System 2002).  Thornton‘s comments were made 
in 2002 but could have easily been made in 2011.   The county that was in need 
substantial education reform capable of closing the black-white achievement gap in 2002 
is still in need in 2011.  This chapter will discuss some of the county characteristics and 
obstacles that have made regime building difficult in Prince George‘s County. 
I have argued that the persistence of the achievement gap in America despite over 
50 years of efforts to close it suggests the need for a new way of thinking about the gap 
and the failed efforts to eliminate it.  To be successful, reform efforts need to address 
both the school and community issues that impact academic achievement.  If solving the 
achievement gap problem necessitates making changes both in school and in 
communities, then both schools and communities have to be part of the solution.  What is 
required is an activation of a community‘s civic capacity.   
Civic capacity is the extent to which segments of a community come to see 
themselves as having a stake in an issue in need of community attention, and then act as a 
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community to address the issue (Stone et al. 2001).  The type of education reform needed 
to close the achievement gap necessitates a high level of civic capacity.  That is, it 
requires a broad, cross-sector coalition in support of the creation of a new, performance 
regime.  A performance regime consists of a broad based coalition brought together to 
put in place a set of arrangements to promote and support improved academic 
performance.  Educators, parents, business leaders, and elected officials usually are key 
members of a performance regime.   
This project has submitted that PGCPS was controlled by an employment regime 
in 2002.  An employment regime consists of a small group of insiders that usually 
includes the school board, school administration staff, superintendent, union leaders, and 
other activists whose job it is to promote the cartel‘s interests.  The employment regime is 
focused on securing the position of its members.  Members focus on immediate concerns 
and small-scale reform efforts that tend to maintain the status quo which is the preferred 
state of employment regimes.   
The employment regime in control in 2002 was also concerned about maintaining 
the political power of African Americans.  In the late 1990s and early 2000s the county 
was nearing the end of a political transition in which the majority African American 
population began asserting its political power.  For some members of the school board 
that meant fighting to affirm the authority of the school board which had become 
majority black.  Criticisms of and challenges to the school board were interpreted as 
criticisms of and challenges to African American political control.   
In 2002 the regime was under enormous pressure both internally and externally.  
Internally, the demographic and political transition being experienced by the county was 
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also being experienced by PGCPS.  More African Americans were moving into positions 
of authority at the same time that the system was coming under increasing scrutiny.  
Splits within the board often carried a racial overtone.   
Externally, increased accountability standards from the state exposed deficiencies 
in student performance.  The chronic underperformance of PGCPS students on the 
Maryland School Performance Program assessments drew widespread criticism of 
PGCPS leadership.  The underperformance was happening at the same time that PGCPS 
was trying to settle a nearly thirty year desegregation lawsuit.  Settlement required the 
building of numerous new schools.  Because of Tax Relief in Maryland (TRIM) the 
taxpayer led property tax cap, the county could not afford to build the schools without 
substantial state aid.  The county‘s need for state funds provided an opportunity for state 
legislators to exert more influence over Prince George‘s education.   
State legislators led by Maryland General Assembly House Delegates Howard 
Rawlings of Baltimore city and Rushern Baker of Prince George‘s began to impose their 
will on the board and installed an oversight panel to monitor the school board.  
Legislators had determined that poor governance was the source of many of PGCPS‘s 
ills.  Assertions of competency by the school board were not helped by the internal 
squabbles between board members and the board‘s ongoing feud with Superintendent Iris 
Metts.  Believing that the school board was beyond hope, the General Assembly 
dissolved the elected school board and replaced it with an appointed board.   
I have proposed that the dissolution of the elected board served as a focusing 
event that provided an opportunity for the existing employment regime to be successfully 
challenged and disrupted.  It presented an opportunity for the formation of a performance 
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regime.  That said regime change is not an easy process, and disrupting the existing 
regime which is not effortless may be the least difficult step of the process.   
As stated, the first stage of regime change involves the questioning of the 
controlling regime‘s legitimacy (Orr and Stoker 1994).  Focusing events do this by 
shocking the system and highlighting a problem or problems that need attention and have 
not been adequately addressed or prevented by the regime (Kingdon 1984; Birkland 
2004).  Focusing events tend to demand action and make the status quo unacceptable.  
For this reason focusing events are potentially quite harmful to the employment regime 
which thrives on stasis. The rejection by the Assembly of the school board‘s governance 
was a direct attack on the regime‘s legitimacy.   
Once the existing regime has been destabilized, regime change enters the second 
stage; the negotiation phase.  This second stage is the stage in which competitors to the 
existing regime jockey to build support for a new regime and civic capacity is activated.  
This is the stage in which leaders or elites attempt to reframe the scope of the regime in 
an attempt to gain the cooperation of actors possessing the resources needed to pursue a 
new agenda.   
The third stage of the regime change process is the stage in which one coalition 
becomes dominant and takes steps to institutionalize itself as the new controlling regime.  
In this stage a new agenda is set, and the arrangements needed to secure cooperation and 
pursue the new agenda are set as well.   
My review of events after the school board was dissolved shows that Prince 
George‘s County was not able to form a performance regime.  In fact, the county was 
only able to muster a low level of civic capacity on behalf of education reform.  An 
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employment regime, the default education regime continues to control the education 
arena in Prince George‘s County for several interrelated reasons.  I turn next to a 
discussion of those reasons. 
 
A County Environment Hostile to Cooperation 
Regimes are complex systems of cooperation (Stone, Orr and Imbroscio 1991).  A 
key to sustained cooperation is trust.  It is very difficult to form a coalition when no one 
trusts anyone to act in good faith.  The one thing that is sorely lacking in Prince George‘s 
County is trust.  Residents do not trust their government.  Whites and blacks do not trust 
one another.  Poor and working class blacks are suspicious of the motives of middle class 
blacks.  Educators are suspicious of state legislators. With so much mistrust, it is hardly 
surprising that coalition building is very difficult in Prince George‘s.   
The legacy of race is at the core of a significant amount of the distrust in the 
county.  Nearly thirty years of court-ordered busing has left a legacy of suspicion of 
motives.  The school board‘s early and repeated attempts to subvert the court‘s order with 
the support of the county‘s elected officials induced African Americans in the county to 
not trust white officials.  The fact that most of the burden for desegregation fell on blacks 
only added to the animosity.   
At the same time desegregation was intensifying divisions between blacks and 
whites, it was also exposing divisions within the black community.  Middle class blacks 
were far less supportive of busing than poorer blacks in the county.  By the late 1990s, 
middle class blacks were pushing for an end to busing as much as whites had earlier.  
Middle class blacks preferred a return to neighborhood schools where their children could 
take full advantage of the resources those middle class neighborhoods possessed.  Poor 
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blacks on the other hand would be returned to schools with few community resources of 
support.  Thus, the interests of middle class blacks and working class and poor blacks 
divulged.  Further, when middle class blacks began to move into the county‘s political 
structure, working class blacks felt they were no more likely to have their concerns 
addressed than they were when whites controlled the political system. 
My research confirms Valerie Johnson‘s earlier research on the county (Johnson 
2002).  Prince George‘s has two distinct African American populations.  One is middle 
class and fully incorporated into the county‘s political, social, and economic structures.  
The other is working class and poor and like most working class and poor communities 
still waiting to have its interests become part of the county agenda.   
Another source of racial strife for some was TRIM.  Some blacks in the county 
believe that the property tax cap referendum was racially motivated.  They claim that 
whites did not want their money going to services for blacks.  Even though there is not 
much support for this position, it increased the friction between blacks and whites 
nonetheless. 
What does seem to have actually motivated TRIM supporters was a distrust of 
county officials.  The distrust extends back to the machine politics of the 1950s and 
1960s when county officials and bankers developed a close relationship mutually 
beneficial to both at the perceived expense of county taxpayers.  A close relationship 
between elected officials and developers continues to this day.  The coziness of the 
relationship has at times resulted in corrupt activities on the part of county officials.  
Government corruption of course is bad for building trust.  The continued support of 
TRIM by both whites and blacks despite the strain it puts on county resources speaks to 
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the continued distrust of county officials.  Residents do not trust county officials to 
effectively use any additional money coming from a repeal of TRIM.  Thus county 
residents‘ support for TRIM remains high. 
 
Community Disengagement 
Almost everyone interviewed lamented the low levels of parent involvement.  
Many Prince George‘s parents find it difficult to commit time for school activities.  Poor 
and working class parents often have low levels of involvement in their children‘s 
education because the demands of living get in the way.  Single mothers have limited 
time for school activities.  Even middle class parents in the county can find themselves 
stretched for time after long commutes. 
The ongoing internal problems with the Prince George‘s County Council of PTAs 
(PGCCPTA) also hindered coalition building efforts.   Ordinarily, the county-level PTA 
would be the conduit to channel the disparate efforts of school-level PTAs into a united 
parental voice.  With PGCCPTA‘s charter revoked, parents lost the advantage of having a 
single structured and coherent voice.  In the legislation dissolving the elected school 
board, legislators created the Parent and Community Advisory Board to serve as the 
voice of the community during the appointed board‘s tenure.  However, the Board 
evolved into more of a sounding board for the superintendent rather than an advocacy 
voice for the community.  Thus parents, key members of a performance regime were 
without an effective representative to voice their concerns.   
In Prince George‘s County, middle class parents have not been more vocal 
proponents for education reform for at least two possible reasons.  The first is the 
possibility that middle class parents have removed their children from PGCPS and thus 
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have no incentive to devote their attention to the system.  The increasing number of 
affluent people leaving the county supports this argument.  The second explanation is that 
middle class parents have found ways to make the system in its current configuration 
work for them.  They have taken advantage of PGCPS‘s specialty programs to provide 
their children with the best that PGCPS has to offer.  Accordingly, middle class parents 
have little incentive to change the system.  This behavior emphasizes the point that racial 
identity is not a strong enough force to get middle class black parents to unite with poorer 
black parents for educational reform.  Class is the greater motivator.  
The lack of involvement extends beyond parents into the larger community.  No 
respondent mentioned any particular group that played a strong role in education reform 
efforts.  The community received nearly as much criticism as parents for its lack of 
involvement in education.  Business fared only slightly better in people‘s critique since 
most business activity is directed at helping individual schools and is decidedly small 
scale.   
Low levels of involvement in education are not that unusual.  However, what is 
unusual about Prince George‘s County is the low level of attentiveness to county issues in 
general.  Disinterest appears to be the norm for the county.  Scandals seem to provoke 
only tepid response from the public.  While residents express displeasure over the poor 
performance of PGCPS student‘s on state assessments, this displeasure appears not to 
have risen to a level of indignation that might motivate people to act.   
There seems to be a culture of disengagement in the county, and it seems to run 
deep within the county.  This disengagement may well extend back to the county‘s 
plantation and farm days and the laissez faire attitudes of the landed gentry.  The machine 
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politics of the mid-20
th
 century owed its power not only to patronage but also to the 
indifference of voters.  The blacks who moved into the county during the 1970s and 
1980s maintained their ties to Washington, D.C., neglecting activities in the county.  For 
reasons that are not exactly clear a high level of indifference remains.   
Of course the employment regime thrives on indifference because further efforts 
to raise civic capacity and form a new performance regime can be killed by indifference.  
The county‘s history of disengagement makes the role of leadership in education reform 
all the more important.  This disengagement makes it highly unlikely that efforts to 
mobilize the community and raise civic capacity will emanate from the grassroots.  
Therefore, leaders are needed to take on the job of mobilizing for reform.  However this 
type of leadership is another area in which Prince George‘s County finds itself lacking. 
 
A Shortage of Educational Reform Leaders  
Behind low levels of trust and high levels of indifference, the greatest hindrance 
to coalition building in Prince George‘s is the scarcity of education reform leaders.   
Though focusing events can deliver powerful shocks to a regime, they cannot change the 
regime on their own.  There must be actors, reformers, available and ready to exploit the 
disruption created by the focusing event.  In Prince George‘s County reform agents have 
not come forward to take advantage of the opportunity the school board‘s 
dissolutionment provided.  
Almost immediately, the momentum for reform was hurt by the loss of two of the 
leading proponents of education reform.  The reelection loss of Delegate Rushern Baker 
(D-Prince George‘s) and the death of Delegate Howard Rawlings (D-Baltimore) meant a 
significant loss of the ability to translate state-level pressure on PGCPS into coherent 
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county-level action.  Both Baker and Rawlings made educational improvement a 
centerpiece of their campaigns and agenda.  Rawlings especially had the power to direct 
state resources towards reform efforts in the county.  Other state legislators, especially 
those from the county, have been inclined to limit their involvement in education politics 
to responding to constituent concerns.  Other state legislators have yet to articulate a 
vision for PGCPS the way Baker and Rawlings did.   
State legislators also have been at times a hindrance to the formation of a 
performance regime.  On numerous occasions the county‘s state legislators, on the behalf 
of their constituents, have become actively involved in PGCPS matters.  As a result local 
stakeholders are often able to appeal to state legislators to have their concerns addressed 
bypassing the existing employment regime.  Being able to have their own particular 
interests addressed through individual action tends to dissuade people from more 
collaborative efforts in which their own interests may not be prominent.  Moreover, 
constituents have less motivation to question the regime.  Thus the activities of county 
legislators work against the building of the coalitions needed to build a performance 
regime. 
Outside the school system a natural choice for reform leader is the county 
executive.  As the central figure in county politics, the county executive has a platform 
from which a new agenda can be offered.  Jack Johnson was county executive from 2002 
to 2010.  Like many political leaders financially constrained governments, economic 
development was the primary focus of the county executive.  Early in his tenure it 
appeared as though Johnson would focus significant attention on education.  He held an 
education summit early in his administration.  However Johnson diminished the potential 
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impact of the summit by folding his targeted efforts to improve PGCPS into a larger 
initiative more broadly designed to improve the quality of county life in general.  The 
practical effect of the change was to lower the importance of education within the 
executive‘s administration.  So what at first appeared to be the initial steps towards 
building a new education coalition quickly evaporated into a limited endeavor that had a 
limited impact on reform. 
Another natural candidate to lead reform efforts is the superintendent.  As the 
single most prominent education leader, the superintendent has a ready platform from 
which to build a coalition—if she or he so desired.  Superintendent Iris Metts tried to 
modify the agenda of the old employment regime, but she met considerable resistance 
from people both inside and outside the regime.  Because of the antagonisms generated 
by her efforts, Metts became too divisive a figure to be able to lead the creation of a 
broad-based coalition.   
The first prospect the county had at a superintendent led coalition was during the 
tenure of Superintendent Andre Hornsby.  Unfortunately for reform advocates, Hornsby 
was not interested in forming coalitions.  The narrowness of the employment regime 
suited his sensibilities because he was not inclined to favor extensive community input 
into his decision making.  Superintendent John Deasy perhaps provided the county‘s best 
chance at a superintendent led reform movement.  Deasy was politically savvy enough to 
realize that the support of key stakeholders would make the programs he implemented 
more resistant to challenge.  This said Deasy‘s signature initiative was developed with 
limited input from those beyond his inner circle.  Though Deasy appeared more willing to 
engage parents than Hornsby had been, his interaction with parents declined over time. 
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Today, because of fallout from the Great Recession the current superintendent, William 
Hite, has had to spend most of his time trying to keep deep budget cuts from reversing the 
fragile progress PGCPS has made.   
In cities like Chicago, Pittsburgh and Boston, business has served as the driving 
force for education reform (Portz, Stein and Jones 1999, Shipps 2006).  Those cities have 
entrenched industries whose ties to the city make them more likely participants in reform 
efforts. Unlike those cities, Prince George‘s does not have an entrenched industry that is 
identified with the county.  In fact most of the businesses in the county are small and as a 
result are too focused on their own survival to contribute substantial resources to 
education efforts.   
On the other hand not having a powerful business sector might actually improve 
the prospects for building a performance regime.  As influential elites, business leaders 
can often shape the nature of the regime agenda.  Business tends to gravitate towards 
market-based solutions that often lead to the development of a more narrow market 
regime instead of the broad-based performance regime that is needed to close the 
achievement gap (Shipps 2006).  Not having a strong business sector in the Prince 
George‘s County helps preclude the replacement of the employment regime with a 
market regime. 
Members of the business community did try to add the weight of the business 
community to reform efforts in the form of the Prince George‘s Business Education 
Alliance.  However, the Alliance‘s initial efforts were not embraced by Superintendent 
Hornsby and the two entities operated independently of one another.  As a result there 
was little coordination of effort between the business community and the school system 
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and a significant opportunity to build a powerful new coalition was lost.  The recession 
brought an end to the Alliance‘s activities.   
The Great Recession specifically and the county‘s economic environment 
generally are two of a number of loosely connected impediments to regime formation in 
the county. 
  
More Challenges to Coalition Building and Regime Formation 
Earlier TRIM was mentioned as a source of distrust in the county.   It is also a 
negative influence on education reform for another reason.  Because it limits county 
budgets, TRIM makes funding debates even more acrimonious than normal.  Limited 
budgets mean increased competition for resources.  Increases in the education budget 
frequently necessitate cuts in other areas such as infrastructure, economic development or 
public safety.  Advocates of those policy areas are likely to resist reform efforts likely to 
draw resources away from the policies they support.  At times the relationship between 
education leaders and the county‘s political leadership has been strained because of 
limited budgets.  Also limited economic resources reduce the amount of material 
incentives that can be used to secure commitments to a new regime.  Increased 
competition can also stymie cooperation and collaboration and often works against 
coalition building.   
Another issue that has hindered efforts to form a broad-based coalition has been 
the near constant turnover occurring in school leadership.  Almost every two years from 
2002 until 2010, the school system has had either a new superintendent or new school 
board.  The constant turnover makes it very difficult to develop the relationships needed 
to engender trust.  Building trust takes time and experience.  Just about the time the 
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community and educators begin to trust one another a leadership changes forces the 
process to begin anew.  Consequently coalition building efforts have to be restarted every 
time key players change.   
Also putting a strain on relationships is the near constant changes in school 
boundaries.  The return to neighborhood schools as part of the desegregation settlement 
resulted in 24 schools being built within a ten year period between 1999 and 2009.  
Twelve have been built since 2002.  The prospect of a new school has led to competition 
among communities as they push to have a school built in their neighborhood.  In this 
situation parents are pitted against parents.  The consolidations and boundary changes 
that took place in 2009 did the same.   
The consolidations again exposed differences between parents in terms of their 
ability to have their interests met by the school system.  Organized parents of children in 
specialty program were able to influence the consolidation process to their benefit.  
Meanwhile less organized poor and working class parents were unable to have a similar 
influence.  Thus boundary changes became one more drag on efforts to reform education 
in the county. 
 
Implications for Regime Change 
So what does all of this mean for educational reform in Prince George‘s County?  
What it means is that a county that on its surface would seem to be the exception to the 
rule pertaining to the difficulty of regime change and education reform is anything but.  
Achieving substantial education reform has been as difficult in Prince George‘s County 
as it has been in any inner city.  Thus my findings confirm the findings of others who 
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have found building civic capacity and regime change difficult (Henig et al. 1999; Stone 
et al. 2001).   
Prince George‘s County is a county that currently has a low level of civic 
capacity.  Raising civic capacity in a county such as Prince George‘s that has an aloof 
public and a culture of disengagement is an extremely difficult undertaking.  It calls for 
skillful and talented leadership capable of breaking through the wall of indifference that 
has enveloped the county.  So far such leadership has yet to emerge. 
Despite all of the changes PGCPS and the county have endured since 2002, 
education is still controlled by an employment regime.  To be clear, it is not the same 
regime that governed prior to 2002.  Today‘s employment regime exists as a default.  The 
failure to form an alternative regime left the old regime in place.  Recall the employment 
regime is the stasis regime.  It exists because the status quo rules the day.  And because a 
coalition in support of education has not been substantially broadened, the status quo 
endures.   
 
Some Hopeful Signs for the Future 
Despite the numerous hindrances to coalition building and regime change a few 
promising signs suggest change advantageous to substantive education reform might yet 
be possible. 
The importance of race in the Prince George‘s has declined as the county‘s 
African American population has become entrenched in all aspects of the county‘s 
political, economic, and social endeavors.  Also, racial animosities seem to be fading.  
Many of the longer-term residents who experienced the worst of desegregation are 
increasingly less active in education or county politics.  Thus, a good amount of the 
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antagonisms and distrust that once emanated through the county as a result of the 
county‘s handling of desegregation appear to be dissipating.  In this context, time might 
be on the county‘s side.  As the county moves further away from the divisive period of 
demographic transition and forced desegregation there is an opportunity to regain some 
of the trust that was lost.  The county may then be able to stop having the same old 
conversations of the past and start having new conversations of the future.   
A major sign of hope for the prospects of regime change and education reform in 
the county has to be the 2010 election of Rushern Baker as county executive.  Baker has 
been a long-time promoter of education reform.  Improving county education was a 
prominent theme of his campaign.  If Baker uses his office as a bully pulpit to promote 
education reform, then the county might have a solid chance to put together the coalitions 
needed to build a regime capable of raising African American academic achievement and 
closing the achievement gap.  
  
Prospects for Future Study 
This project calls for more study.  Will the County Executive Rushern Baker be 
the education advocate he claims to be?  Will Baker make education a high priority or 
will he feel pressure to pursue an economic development agenda like his predecessors?  If 
Baker does attempt to focus county attention on education, how will county residents 
react?  These are all questions that depending on how they are answered could indicate a 
dramatic change in education politics in the county.  The next four to eight years have the 
potential to be transformative.  Extending the study might lead to different results.  
It would also be interesting to determine if the results in Prince George‘s are 
similar to those in other suburban communities.  A comparison with a community like 
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Georgia‘s DeKalb County, a majority African American, affluent suburban county, might 
prove instructive.   
Another potential topic for further study is the school system itself.  Will PGCPS 
be able to maintain some stability?  Now that the county has come full circle and again 
has an elected school board whose members represent nine districts, will the board revert 
back to the ways of the old elected board?   
Extending the study of Prince George‘s County and PGCPS may be needed to 
determine the full impact of all of the turmoil resulting from and coming after the 
General Assembly dissolved the school board.  This study only examined a small cross-
section of time.  It is possible that the county is still in the midst of regime change.  A 
longer time period of study might produce more definitive or different results. 
  
Conclusion  
I end this project back where it began with a concern about the academic 
achievement gap in Prince George‘s County.  Most of this dissertation has focused on the 
behavior of adults.  But it should not be forgotten that the people most affected by the 
behavior of adults are the children who are dependent on them.  If we can remember what 
is at stake for children, then perhaps real progress can be made.  I find the words of 
Sheryll Cashin quite instructive for Prince George‘s County. 
We have to acknowledge there is a black achievement gap and bring our 
resources and talents to bear to cultivate institutions and a culture where 
learning is taken seriously, teachers and elders are respected, and parents 
and the entire community are oriented toward educational achievement.  I 
don‘t think this can happen in Prince George‘s County or elsewhere 
without a full, rather than a partial, embrace by the black middle class of 





One can only hope that people of Prince George‘s County come to see the 
big picture and realize that no less than the future well-being of its children is at 
stake.  Maybe then the children of Prince George‘s County can get the quality 




INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 1: 
For Respondents Active in County Education or Politics in 2002 and Today  
INTRODUCTION:  I‗m Cheryl Jones.  I am conducting research for my dissertation on 
education politics in Prince George‘s County.  I am looking at the way the community 
makes educational decisions and how those decisions affect academic achievement. I am 
particularly interested in how things have changed since the school board was dissolved 
in 2002.   
May I record the interview?     You will not be quoted by name. 
As we begin,  
1.  Can you tell me a little about the kinds of education policies and/or initiatives 
you and your organization are pursuing?  
 
2.  If you or your organization had a new initiative you wanted to recommend to 
the school system (PGCPS), whose support would it be important to have in order to 
make it a reality? 
 2a.  IF SCHOOL BOARD IS ANSWER:  Is there anyone else beside the 
school board? 
 
Now I would like to turn to what is happening in county education today 
3.  In your opinion, what are the major education issues in Prince George‘s 
County? [Prompt: What are the major challenges?] 
4.  Where does education rank as a priority in Prince George‘s compared to other 
county issues (like economic development or public safety)?  [Follow up: What ranks 
higher?]  
 
Now I would like to turn to the issue of academic achievement generally and the 
African American achievement gap in particular.  {Explain the gap as racial and class 
difference in performance on state exams, graduation rates, and other standardized tests, 
i.e., SAT and AP tests.}     
5.  How would you describe the county‘s efforts to improve academic 
achievement and close the achievement gap?  
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6.  Recognizing that no county can do everything that it would like to do in 
education, would you say the county is,  
A___ Doing everything that can be done,  
B___ Doing fairly well, 
C___ Neither succeeding nor failing 
D___ Falling short of what it could be doing, 
           F___ Not doing well at all. 
7.  What would enable Prince George‘s County to make a better effort toward 
improving academic achievement and closing the gap? 
8.  Are there significant obstacles to making that effort?  What are they? 
9.  How have the changes in school leadership affected the county‘s ability to 
improve student performance? 
 
Parents occupy an important position in education and can be a potent force. 
10.  How would you describe the activity level of parents in Prince George‘s?  
11.  What kinds of activities are parents involved in? 
12.  Are some parents more active than others?   
13.  Have you seen a change in the activity level of parents over time?  [SKIP 
FOR TIME] 
13a.  IF YES:  What do you think are the reasons for the changes?  
14.  Are there things you would like to see parents do, or do more of? 
 
Turning to education politics, sometimes, education decisions are highly visible and 
generate a lot of conflict.  Sometimes, they are handled pretty routinely and out of 
the public eye.  
15.  When there is conflict, what is likely to be the source, and who is likely to be 
involved?  
[Prompt: Is it typically groups in the community struggling against school 
officials or is it more likely to be conflict between groups in the community? Or, 
is the conflict typically within the school system; board vs. superintendent, 
factions within the board, or factional divisions within the school administration?] 
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16.  What do you think explains the level of conflict in the county?    [SKIP FOR 
TIME] 
17.  Would you say there is more or less conflict than in the past?  Why? 
 
Now I would like to ask you some questions concerning the school board’s 
dissolution in 2002.  
18.  The decision to dissolve the board came after an escalation of tensions 
between the school board and Superintendent Metts.  In your opinion, what was the 
source of the tension and why did things escalate as they did?  [SKIP FOR TIME] 
19.  Dissolving the school board was a rather extraordinary step, why, do you 
think, people were willing to take such a step?   
20.  Did you support or oppose dissolving the board?   [Prompt: Why?] 
 
Looking at county education over the last several years, 
21.  Generally, how would you compare the state of education in Prince George‘s 
today to the state of education before the school board was dissolved in 2002?  
 [Prompt: Are things better or worse?  What is the primary reason?] 
22.  In addition to the school board changes, the county has gone through several 
superintendents in the last seven years. How has all of this change affected county 
education?  [SKIP FOR TIME] 
 
As we wrap up, 
23.  Is there anything else about education or programs to improve academic 
achievement in Prince George‘s County that I should be aware of?    Reports?     Other 
studies?    
24.  Are there other people who would be especially useful for me to talk to? 








DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON RESPONDENT:     
   
CHECK:     GENDER:      ______Male     ______Female 
ETHNICITY/RACE: 
______Hispanic ______African--American 
______White  ______Asian-American 
______Native American 




INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 2:  
For Respondents Active in County Education or Politics Today but Inactive in 2002 
 
INTRODUCTION:  I‗m Cheryl Jones.  I am conducting research for my dissertation on 
education politics in Prince George‘s County.  I am looking at the way the community 
makes educational decisions and how those decisions affect academic achievement.  To 
that end, I am talking to a variety of people actively involved in county education.   
May I record the interview?     You will not be quoted by name. 
 
As we begin,  
1.  Can you tell me a little about the kinds of education policies and/or initiatives 
you and your organization are pursuing?  
2.  If you or your organization had a new initiative you wanted to recommend to 
the school system (PGCPS), whose support would it be important to have in order to 
make it a reality? 
 2a.  IF SCHOOL BOARD OR SCHOOL SYSTEM IS THE ANSWER:  Is 
there anyone else outside of the school system or school board? 
 
Now I would like to turn to what is happening in county education today 
3.  In your opinion, what are the major education issues in Prince George‘s 
County? [Prompt: What are the major challenges?] 
4.  Where does education rank as a priority in Prince George‘s compared to other 
county issues (like economic development or public safety)?  [Follow up: What ranks 
higher?]  
 
Now I would like to turn to the issue of academic achievement generally and the 
African American achievement gap in particular.  {Explain the gap as racial and class 
difference in performance on state exams, graduation rates, and other standardized tests, 
i.e., SAT and AP tests.}     
5.  How would you describe the county‘s efforts to improve academic 
achievement and close the achievement gap?  
6.  Recognizing that no county can do everything that it would like to do in 
education, would you say the county is,  
A___ Doing everything that can be done,  
B___ Doing fairly well, 
C___ Neither succeeding nor failing 
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D___ Falling short of what it could be doing, 
           F___ Not doing well at all. 
 
7.  What would enable Prince George‘s County to make a better effort toward 
improving academic achievement and closing the gap? 
8.  Are there significant obstacles to making that effort?  What are they? 
9.  How have the changes in school leadership affected the county‘s ability to 
improve student performance? 
 
Parents occupy an important position in education and can be a potent force. 
10.  How would you describe the activity level of parents in Prince George‘s?  
11.  What kinds of activities are parents involved in? 
12.  Are some parents more involved than others? 
13.  Have you seen a change in the activity level of parents over time?   [SKIP 
FOR TIME] 
13a.  IF YES:  What do you think are the reasons for the changes?  
14.  Are there things you would like to see parents do, or do more of? 
 
Turning to education politics, sometimes, education decisions are highly visible and 
generate a lot of conflict.  Sometimes, they are handled pretty routinely and out of 
the public eye.  
15.  When there is conflict, what is likely to be the source, and who is likely to be 
involved?  
 [Prompt: Is it typically groups in the community struggling against school 
officials or is it more likely to be conflict between groups in the community? Or, 
is the conflict typically within the school system; board vs. superintendent, 
factions within the board, or factional divisions within the school administration?] 
16.  What do you think explains the level of conflict in the county?   [SKIP FOR 
TIME] 
17.  Would you say there is more or less conflict than in the past?  Why? 
 
Now I would like to ask you some more questions about your involvement in county 
education, 
18.  How long have you been involved in education in Prince George‘s County? 
[PROMPT: Does that include periods in a position(s) other than your 
current one?  IF YES: ask to elaborate] 
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19.  Since you began your involvement, how has education changed in the 
county?  
20.  Is the state of education in Prince George‘s better or worse today than when 
you started?   
20a.  What is the primary reason for the change? 
21.  The county has gone through a number of leadership changes over the last 
several years with new superintendents and new school boards. How do you think these 
changes have affected county education?  [SKIP FOR TIME] 
 
As we wrap up, 
22.  Is there anything else about education or programs to improve academic 
achievement in Prince George‘s County that I should be aware of?    Reports?     Other 
studies?    
23.  Are there other people who would be especially useful for me to talk to? 






DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON RESPONDENT:     
CHECK:     GENDER:      ______Male     ______Female 
ETHNICITY/RACE: 
______Hispanic ______African--American 
______White  ______Asian-American 
______Native American 




INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 3: 
For School Board Members Past and Present  
INTRODUCTION:  I‗m Cheryl Jones.  I am conducting research for my dissertation on 
education politics in Prince George‘s County.  I am looking at the way the community 
makes educational decisions and how those decisions affect academic achievement. I am 
particularly interested in what was happening in the county while you were a member of 
the school board.   
May I record the interview?     You will not be quoted by name. 
 
During your time on the board, 
1.  What were the major education issues in Prince George‘s County?  
[Prompt: What were the major challenges?] 
2.  Where did education rank as a priority in Prince George‘s compared to other 
county issues (like economic development or public safety)?  [Follow up: What ranked 
higher?] 
 
Now I would like to talk about a couple of specific topics in education,  
 
In America, a persistent academic achievement gap exists between children of 
different races and socioeconomic classes.  This is a particularly important issue for 
school systems with large numbers of minority students; systems like PGCPS. 
3.  How would you describe the county‘s efforts to improve academic 
achievement and close the achievement gap while you were on the board?  
4.  What would have enabled Prince George‘s County to make a better effort 
toward improving academic achievement and closing the gap? 
5.  Were there significant obstacles to making that effort?  What were they? 
 
Some people argue that a way to improve achievement is to get parents more 
involved in their children’s education.  Whether that involvement is making sure 
their child does her homework or taking part in school governance, it is clear 
parents occupy an important position in education and can be a potent force for 
change.  While you were on the board, 
6.  How involved were parents in your opinion? 
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7.  What kinds of activities were parents in Prince George‘s most likely to be 
involved in?  
8.  Were some parents more actively involved than others?  [Prompt: Which 
parents were more active?] 
9.  Were there things you would have liked to see parents do, or do more of? 
 
Often involvement in schools is not limited to parents.  Let’s talk about other 
community members and their involvement in county education while you were on 
the school board, 
10.  How involved was the business sector in education? 
11.  What about community organizations and advocacy groups?  Were they 
actively involved? 
12.  Were there people or groups you would have liked to see be more active in 
education? 
 
Turning to education politics, sometimes, education decisions are highly visible and 
generate a lot of conflict.  Sometimes, they are handled pretty routinely and out of 
the public eye.  
13.  When you were on the board, what was the level of conflict?  [SKIP FOR 
TIME] 
14.  When there was conflict, what was likely to be the source, and who was 
likely to be involved?  
[Prompt: Is it typically groups in the community struggling against school 
officials or is it more likely to be conflict between groups in the community? Or, 
is the conflict typically within the school system; board vs. superintendent, 
factions within the board, or factional divisions within the school administration?] 
 
The tensions between former Superintendent Metts and the school board at the time 
were well documented. 
15a.  FOR OLD ELECTED BOARD:  In your opinion, what was the source of 
the tension and why did it seem to grow? 
15b.  FOR APPOINTED BOARD:  Were there tensions between Superintendent 
Hornsby and your board?  What was the source of the tension? 
15c.  FOR THE CURRENT BOARD:   When Superintendent Deasy left, there 
were news articles hinting at some tension with the board.  Were there tensions, and what 




ASK IF CURRENT BOARD MEMBER IS FAMILIAR WITH 2002 EVENTS.  IF 
NO, go to question 18b. 
 
Now I would like to talk about the dissolution of the board in 2002.  Some in the 
General Assembly cited the ongoing tension as the reason for a need to take action.  
Nonetheless,  
16.  Dissolving the school board was a rather extraordinary step, why, do you 
think, people were willing to take such a step? 
17a.  FOR OLD ELECTED BOARD:  How would you describe the community‘s 
reaction to the General Assembly‘s action?  [SKIP FOR TIME] 
[PROMPT:  Were you disappointed with the community‘s reaction?] 
17b.  FOR APPOINTED BOARD AND CURRENT BOARD:  Did you agree 
with the decision to dissolve the board?  {PROMPT: Why did you agree or disagree?]  
 
Now let’s look at the general state of county education during the time you were on 
the board,  
18a.  FOR PREVIOUS BOARDS:  Recognizing that no county can do everything 
that it would like to do in education, would you say the county,  
A___ Did everything that could be done, 
B___ Did fairly well, 
C___ Neither succeeded nor failed, 
D___ Fail short of what it could be doing, 
           F___ Did not do well at all. 
    [PROMPT:  Why did you choose ___?] 
18b.  FOR CURRENT BOARD:  Recognizing that no county can do everything 
that it would like to do in education, would you say the county is,  
A___ Doing everything that can be done,  
B___ Doing fairly well, 
C___ Neither succeeding nor failing 
D___ Falling short of what it could be doing, 
           F___ Not doing well at all. 
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[Probe: Why did you choose ____?] 
 
ASK OF PREVIOUS BOARD MEMBERS: Do you follow what is happening in 
county education today?       IF NO, go to Question 22. 
 
FOR CURRENT BOARD MEMBERS: Skip questions 19-21 if they are unfamiliar 
with 2002 events. 
19.  In addition to the school board changes, the county has gone through several 
superintendents in the last seven years.  Looking at county education today, what has 
been the net effect of all of these leadership changes? [SKIP 19 OR 20 FOR TIME]  
20.  Earlier we talked about past conflict in education politics.  Would you say 
there is more or less conflict today than in the past?  Why?  [SKIP 19 OR 20 FOR 
TIME] 
21.  Overall, comparing the state of education in Prince George‘s today to the 
time when you were on the board?   
Would you say? 
 1_______There has been a great deal of improvement, 
 2_______ There has been some improvement, 
 3_______ Some things have improved but others have worsened, 
 4_______ Things have gotten worse. 
 
21a.  Why did you choose ____? 
   
As we wrap up, 
22.  Is there anything else about education or programs to improve academic 
achievement in Prince George‘s County that I should be aware of?    Reports?     Other 
studies?    
23.  Are there other people who would be especially useful for me to talk to? 






DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON RESPONDENT:     
CHECK:     GENDER:      ______Male     ______Female 
ETHNICITY/RACE: 
______Hispanic ______African--American 
______White  ______Asian-American 
______Native American 
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